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direct expenses, salaries and overhead solely from revenues.
No public funds or tax dollars are allocated to its budget.
Revenues are obtained from registrant enrollment fees, and
the sale of publications. Our sole function is to provide
professional development services. In the event surplus
funds become available, they are utilized to offset deficits or
retained in our budget to improve the quality and variety of
services we provide.
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EPA "Overfiling"
Assume you represent a client that generates, handles, or
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otherwise manag~s hazardous waste. Assume your state's environmental
regulatory agency has filed an enforcement case against your client
relating to its hazardous waste activities. Assume you have negotiated a
somewhat favorable settlement with the agency and are preparing to
advise your client to sign an agreed order with the agency.
Now assume that, as the negotiations are nearing closure, your
client is served with an Administrative Complaint filed by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") relating to the same issues
involved in the state's enforcement case, except that EPA is seeking a
much higher penalty amount.
What should your client do? Should it finalize the agreed order with
the state agency? Should it break off negotiations with the state and
begin negotiating with EPA? What if your client settles with the state (or
with EPA)? Would such a settlement bar the other agency from
proceeding with its enforcement case? These difficult issues are at the
heart ofEPA "overfiling."
A. "Overfiling" defined
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")1 permits
the EPA to delegate the authority to enforce hazardous waste regulations
under RCRA to states that meet certain criteria.2 States that have such
1 42 U.S.C. §6901 et seq.
2 This "delegation" authority is contained in RCRA Section 3006(a), 42 U.S.C. 42 § 6926(a).
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authority are authorized to implement and enforce RCRA in lieu of EPA.
"Overfiling" occurs when the EPA files an enforcement case alleging
violations under RCRA after a RCRA-authorized state has brought an
enforcement case addressing the same issues.
The definition of overfiling is being debated. EPA has adopted a
narrow definition, arguing that overfiling means the initiation of a federal
enforcement case following the conclusion of a state enforcement case
involving the same violation at the same facility.3 Others have adopted a
broader definition, arguing that overfiling occurs if EPA files an
enforcement case following the initiation of a state enforcement case.4
B. Statutory authority for Overfiling
RCRA contains several provisions dealing with EPA's authority to
act after it has delegated enforcement authority to a state.
RCRA provides, in Section 3008(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. 6928(a)(2), that
EPA, after notifying a state authorized to enforce RCRA, may bring an
administrative enforcement action for civil penalties and injunctive relief
against a violator of RCRA requirements in that authorized state. As
previously stated, EPA has argued that this provision allows it to overfile a
state enforcement case.
3 Harmonizing Federal and State Environmental Enforcement Roles: Policy and Legal Considerations,
Gary A. Jonesi, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (paper presented during American Bar Association
Section on Natural Resources, Energy, and Environmental Law 28th Annual Conference, March 11-14,
1999, Keystone, Colorado).
4 See, e.g., Brieffor Appellee Harmon Industries, Inc., Docket No. No. 98-3775,
<http://www.lathropgage.com/htopic.html>.
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However, RCRA also provides, in Section 3006(d), 42 U.S.C.
§6926(d), that an authorized state "is authorized to carry out [its
hazardous waste program] in lieu of the Federal Program...." (Emphasis
added.) That section also provides that "[a]ny action taken by a State
under a hazardous waste program authorized under this section shall
have the same force and effect as action by the Administrator" of EPA. Id.
~. Administrative Decisions on Overfiling
1) In Re BKK Corp.
In 1983, hazardous waste inspectors in California, a RCRA-
authorized state, inspected the BKK Corporation facility. Federal
inspectors also participated. After violations were discovered, California
initiated an enforcement case that culminated in a consent decree
providing for a fine of $1.3 million.
EPA, dissatisfied with the settlement, then filed its own enforcement
case seeking higher penalties. The Administrative Law Judge dismissed
EPA's case, finding that EPA lacked jurisdiction because California had
effectively enforced the same provisions EPA was seeking to enforce.s
On appeal, EPA's Chief Judicial Officer affirmed.6 The CJO relied upon
the "in lieu of' and "same force and effect" language in Sections 3006(c)
and 3006(d) to limit EPA's ability to overfile.7
5 In Re BKK Corp., Docket No. RCRA-IX-84-0012, 1984 LEXIS 36 (Apri113, 1984).
6 BKK, 2 E.A.D. 35 (1985).
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2) In Re Martin Electronics, Inc.
In 1984, Florida, also a RCRA-authorized state, filed an
enforcement case against Martin Electronics, Inc.8 The Florida
Department of Environmental Regulation ("FDER") and Martin entered into
a consent decree under which Martin agreed to install groundwater
monitoring wells. Because FDER regulations allowed it to recover only its
costs, and not penalties, when entering into RCRA consent decrees, the
settlement called for Martin to reimburse FDER only $107 in costs.
As in BKK, EPA was not satisfied with the amount of the "penalty"
in Martin. EPA filed an administrative complaint seeking penalties of
$48,000.
Following BKK, the administrative law judge in Martin ruled that
EPA was barred from overfiling FDER.9
D. EPA Reaction to Administrative Decisions
EPA General Counsel Memorandum
After these rulings, the EPA's General Counsel examined EPA's
overfiling authority. In a Memorandum, the General Counsel (Francis S.
Blake) compared the overfiling provisions in RCRA, the Clean Water Act,
and the Safe Drinking Water Act. 1o Mr. Blake concluded that while the
Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act provisions allowed EPA to
overfile an authorized state only if the state's enforcement initiative were
7 Id.
8 In Re Martin Electronics, Inc., No. RCRA-84-45-R, 1985 RCRALEXIS 43 (June 21, 1985).
9 Martin,2 E.A.D 381 (1987).
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inadequate, the RCRA overfiling provisions do not contain any such
restriction. Thus, the General Counsel concluded that EPA could overfile
even after a state had initiated an "adequate" enforcement case.11
Armed with the General Counsel's Memorandum, the EPA's
Deputy Administrator, A. James Barnes, issued a Guidance Memorandum
enforcement cases "when the state fails to take timely and appropriate
Administrator directed the Regional Offices to overfile authorized states'r
r
to the EPA Regional Offices.12 In that Memorandum, the Deputy
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E. Federal Court Decisions on Overfiling
1) Where State Had Not Acted
u. S. v. Conservation Chemical Co.
In Conservation Chemical, the EPA brought a RCRA suit against a
corporation and its president,14 ,Defendants filed a motion to dismiss
arguing, among other things, that EPA had no authority to bring an
independent enforcement action in Indiana, a RCRA-authorized state,
because EPA had delegated its enforcement authority to Indiana. The
court held that, so long as EPA notifies the state of EPA's intent to bring
10 The General Counsel's Memorandum is discussed in Guidance on RCRA Overfiling, May 19,1986 (EPA
Document # 9939, available through National Technical Information Service, Publication No. 91-140095
<http://www.ntis.gov/ntisserv.htm>.
111d.
12 Guidance on RCRA Overfiling, May 19, 1986 (EPA Document # 9939, available through National
Technical Information Service, Publication No. 91-140095 <httQ://www.ntis.gov/ntisserv.htm».
13 ld.
14 u.s. v. Conservation Chemical Co., 660 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
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an enforcement case, EPA can exercise its independent authority to do
SO.15
To similar effect are U.S. v. Environmental Waste Control.
Inc., 698 F. Supp. 1422 (N.D. Ind. 1988) and Waste Management of
Illinois, Inc. v. EPA, 714 F. Supp. 340 (N.D. 11I1989).
2) Where State Had Acted
Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner
a). Facts
Harmon Industries' plant in Missouri assembled circuit
boards.16 The Missouri Department of Natural Resources ("MDNR")
obtained authority to administer its own hazardous waste program in
1985.
In November, 1987, Harmon conducted an environmental
audit. The audit team discovered that maintenance workers had been
dumping chlorinated solvents in an area behind the plant. Harmon's
management immediately ordered that the practice be stopped.
Harmon hired an environmental consultant to investigate the
extent of contamination. After the consultant issued its report in May,
1988, Harmon requested a meeting with the MDNR. During that meeting,
Harmon voluntarily disclosed its prior solvent disposal method. MDNR
conducted an inspection and issued a Notice of Violation ("NOV").
15Conservation Chemical, 660 F. Supp. at 1244.
16 Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1998 (W.D. Mo. August 25,1998).
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Ultimately, Harmon spent about $1.5 million to investigate and remediate
the contamination.
On September 30, 1991, while Harmon was negotiating
resolution of the NOV with MDNR, EPA filed an administrative action
against Harmon. EPA sought penalties of $2,343,706.
On March 5, 1993, while the EPA's case was pending,
MDNR and Harmon entered into a state-court consent decree in which
MDNR recognized Harmon's voluntary self-reporting and released
Harmon from all RCRA claims, including any claims for monetary
penalties.
In December, 1994, an EPA Administrative Law Judge
entered an order holding Harmon liable for $586,716 in civil penalties. 17
Harmon appealed to the Environmental Appeals Board ("EAB"). The EAB
entered an order affirming the ALJ's decision.18 On June 6, 1997, Harmon
appealed the EAB's order to the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri. On August 25, 1998, the court entered its
order reversing the EAB's decision.19
b). Holding
In a case of first impression, the district court held that
RCRA's Section 3006(d), as well as principles of res judicata, barred EPA
from filing an enforcement case after Harmon and MDNR had finalized the
consent decree.
17 Harmon Electronics. Inc., No. RCRA-VII-91-H-0037, 1994 RCRA LEXIS 31 (December 15, 1994).
18 Harmon Electronics, Inc., No. VII-91-H-0037, slip op. at 5 (EAB Mar. 24, 1997.
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The district court stated:
[T]he plain language of section 3006(b)
provides that the MDNR operates "in lieu of' or
instead of the federal program ... the concept of co-
existing enforcement powers (advocated by EPA) is
inconsistent with EPA's delegation of authority and
the legislative history. Indeed, such a concept would
predictably result in confusion, inefficiency, duplicative
agency expenditures and would thwart the public
policy of early and non-judicial dispute resolution ...
As such, the "same force and effect" language of
section 3006(d) means exactly what it says. Any
action by a state shall have the same binding effect
as if the action was taken by EPA.
Harmon, 19 F. Supp.2d at 995-96.
The district court observed that, if EPA were dissatisfied with
a state's enforcement efforts, it could withdraw authorization under Section
3006(e). The court stated that EPA does not have "the option to reject
part of a program or course of action on an incident-by-incident basis." Id.
at 996. "Such a schizophrenic approach to enforcement of RCRA would
.result in uncertainty in the public mind. With whom should it negotiate?
Must it negotiate with both state and federal authorities? Should it insist
that EPA sign off on all agreements with authorized state agencies?" Id.
The district court also held that EPA's overfiling was barred
by res judicata. First, it held that Missouri law applied concerning the
elements of res judicata. Under Missouri law, res judicata requires (1)
identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity
of the persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality of
19 Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1998 (W.D. Mo. August 25,1998).
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the person for or against whom the claim is made.2o In Harmon, only the
third element of res judicata - identity of the persons and parties to the
action -- was in substantial dispute.
EPA argued that it does not share an identity of interests with
a state authorized to administer RCRA. Harmon argued that the "federal-
state partnership," the "same force and effect" language, and the "in lieu
of' language established privity between EPA and MDNR.
The court found that because Missouri was an authorized
state and because the underlying interests were "nearly identical," the
EPA was barred from seeking civil penalties against Harmon by res
judicata.
c). Issues on Appeal
On October 22, 1998, The United States Department of
Justice ("DOJ") filed an appeal in the Eighth Circuit. In its brief, DOJ
stated the following issues:
A. Whether the State could disable EPA from maintaining
an action under Section 3003(a)(2) by subsequently filing
its own action regarding the same conduct and entering
into a consent decree that provides limited, and in EPA's
view, inadequate, relief?
B. Whether EPA's administrative enforcement action against
Harmon became barred by res judicata as a result of the
entry of a state court settlement between Harmon and
Missouri, where the United States was not a party to that
proceeding, where there has been no waiver of sovereign
immunity that would have allowed the United States to
become a party, and where the interests of the United
States were divergent from those of Missouri?
2° Id. Under Kentucky law, res judicata requires essentially the same elements. See. e.g., Napier v Jones,
Ky. App., 925 S.W.2d 193 (1996).
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In its brief, Harmon stated the following issues:
A. Whether RCRA bars EPA from seeking a penalty from a
regulated entity which has settled all RCRA claims with
an authorized State, since the statute provides that
actions of an authorized State have "the same force and
effect" as actions by EPA.
8. Whether EPA's penalty claim is barred by res judicata in
light of the consent decree entered between Harmon and
MDNR settling the same claims, under the same
regulations, concerning the same facts.
C. Whether EPA's penalty claim is barred by the governing
statute of limitations, given that, by EPA's own admission,
each of its claims against Harmon "first accrued" more
than 5 years before EPA filed suit.
d) 8th Circuit's Ruling
On September 16, 1999, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court's opinion.21 The appeals court followed the district court's
reasoning. First, the court found that Missouri's hazardous waste
program - including its enforcement aspects -- operates "in lieu of' the
federal hazardous waste program. The 8th Circuit found that the plain
language of §6926(b) reveals a congressional intent for an authorized
state program to supplant the federal hazardous waste program in all
respects, including enforcement. If EPA becomes dissatisfied with the
state agency's operation and enforcement of its program and rules, EPA
can, under RCRA, withdraw its authorization. It cannot, however, file its
own enforcement action.
21 Harmon Industries v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999).
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The 8th Circuit also relied on RCRA's §6926(d), which provides
that "any action taken by a State under a hazardous waste program
authorized under this section shall have the same force and effect as
action taken by the [EPA]," to conclude that state action substitutes for
federal action, even in the enforcement arena.
Finally, the 8th Circuit found that state law principles of res judicata
precluded the EPA from filing its own federal enforcement action. The
court held that Missouri law res judicata requirements had been satisfied -
that EPA and Missouri were "in privity" for these purposes -- and,
therefore, the EPA federal action seeking civil fines was barred.
EPA chose not to seek certiorari to the Supreme Court, apparently
preferring to preserve the argument that the impact of Harmon should be
confined to the 8th Circuit.
F. Overfiling in Kentucky
EPA and the Kentucky Environmental Protection Cabinet have
engaged in a dialogue relating to whether Kentucky's hazardous waste
program has been adequately enforced.22 EPA appears to be of the
opinion that it has not.
Consequently, EPA has overfiled the Kentucky Division of Waste
Management ("KDWM") in at least one enforcement matter. Because
EPA and KDWM both have asserted confidentiality regarding the identity
of the targets of EPA attention, neither agency will identify those targets.
22 Copies ofcorrespondence between EPA and KDWM were obtained through the Freedom of Information
Act and Kentucky's Open Records Act. To obtain a copy of that correspondence, contact the author.
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However, this author was currently dealing with such a case at the time
these materials were prepared.
II. Passive Migration: U.S. v. 150 Acres of Land
Is "passive migration" - the movement of previously deposited
hazardous substances through land or water without human activity - a
"release" that will defeat the "innocent purchaser" defense? The 6th Circuit
has held that "passive migration" is not a "release."
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"),23 "innocent purchasers" have
a complete defense to liability. CERCLA's Section 107(b) provides:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this
section for a person otherwise liable who can
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
release or threat of release of a hazardous substance
and the damages resulting therefrom were caused
solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other
than an employee or agent of the
defendant, or than one whose act or
omission occurs in connection with a
contractual relationship, existing directly
or indirectly, with the defendant (except
where the sole contractual arrangement
arises from a published tariff and
acceptance for carriage by a common
carrier by rail), if the defendant
establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that (a) he exercised due care
with respect to the hazardous substance
concerned, taking into consideration the
characteristics of such hazardous
substance, in light of all relevant facts
23 42 u.s.c. §9601, et seq.
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and circumstances, and (b) he took
precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party and
the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or
omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing
paragraphs.
The definition of "contractual relationship" is contained in
CERCLA's Section 101 (35):
(A) The term "contractual relationship", for the
purpose of sections 9607(b)(3) of this title,
includes, but is not limited to, land contracts,
deeds or other instruments transferring title or
possession, unless the real property on which
the facility concerned is located was acquired
by the defendant after the disposal or
placement of the hazardous substance on, in,
or at the facility, and one or more of the
circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or
(iii) is also established by the defendant by a
preponderance of the evidence:
A-13
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the
defendant must establish that he has satisfied the
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by
inheritance or bequest.
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(i)
(ii)
At the time the defendant acquired the
facility the defendant did not know and
had no reason to know that any
hazardous substance which is the
subject of the release or threatened
release was disposed of on, in, or at the
facility.
The defendant is a government entity
which acquired the facility by escheat, or
through any other involuntary transfer or
acquisition, or through the exercise of
eminent domain authority by purchase
or condemnation.
r
r requirements of section 9607(b)(3)(a) and (b) of this
title.
r (8) To establish that the defendant had no reason
to know, as provided in clause (i) of
r subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, thedefendant must have undertaken, at the time of
r
acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the
previous ownership and uses of the property
consistent with good commercial or customary
r
practice in an effort to minimize liability. For
purposes of the preceding sentence the court
shall take into account any specialized
r
knowledge or experience on the part of the
defendant, the relationship of the purchase
price to the value of the property if
r
uncontaminated, commonly known or
reasonably ascertainable information about the
property, the obviousness of the presence of
r
contamination at the property, and the ability to
detect such contamination by appropriate
inspection.
r (C) Nothing in this paragraph or in section9607(b)(3) of this title shall diminish the liability
r of any previous owner or operator of suchfacility who would otherwise be liable underthis chapter. Notwithstanding this paragraph, if
r the defendant obtained actual knowledge ofthe release or threatened release of a
,
hazardous substance at such facility when the
r defendant owned the real property and thensubsequently transferred ownership of theproperty to another person without disclosing
r such knowledge, such defendant shall betreated as liable under section 9607(a)(1) of
this title and no defense under section
r 9607(b)(3) of this title shall be available to suchdefendant.
r (D) Nothing in this paragraph shall affect theliability under this chapter of a defendant who,
by any act or omission, caused or contributed
r to the release or threatened release of ahazardous substance which is the subject of
the action relating to the facility.
r
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Thus, a purchaser who can demonstrate that any release of a
hazardous substance and the resulting damages were caused solely by a
previous owner and that the purchaser undertook "all appropriate inquiry"
concerning the environmental condition of the property before acquiring it
and did not know, and had no reason to know, that the property was
contaminated with a hazardous substance at the time of acquisition is an
"innocent purchaser" and has a complete defense to CERCLA liability.
In 150 Acres of Land24, the district court was presented with
evidence that the defendants had "failed to remove or stabilize drums"
containing hazardous substances. For this reason, the court concluded
that the defendants could not prove that the release was "caused solely by
an act or omission of a third party.... ,,25 Based on that conclusion, the
court held that the defendants could not qualify for the "innocent
purchaser" defense.
On appeal, the 6th Circuit observed that "the district court evidently
was not entirely clear about the elements of and defenses to CERCLA
liability.,,26 The 6th Circuit found the distinction between "disposal" and
"release" significant. It stated: "in the absence of evidence that there was
human activity involved in whatever movement of hazardous substances
occurred on the property since the [defendants] owned it, we hold that the
[defendants] have not "disposed" of hazardous substances on the
24 204 F.3d 698, (6th Cir. January 20,2000).
25 I d.
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Is a real estate appraiser's testimony that contamination diminishes
property value admissible where the opinion is based on the unsupported
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 179 F.3d 403 «6th Cir. May 27,1999).
29 !d.
WhiteIII.
property. ,,27 For this reason, the 6th Circuit reversed the district court's
ruling that the defendants could not qualify for the "innocent purchaser"
defense.
What is the standard for an effective contractual transfer of
environmental liabilities between vendor and purchaser? The 6th Circuit
recently addressed this issue in White Consolidated Industries, Inc. v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp. 28
In White, Westinghouse had operated a manufacturing facility from
1951 through 1974. In 1975, Westinghouse sold the property to White. In
the purchase agreement, White assumed "[a]1I obligations and liabilities of
the Business, contingent, or otherwise, which are not disclosed or known
to Westinghouse on the Closing Date and are not discovered by [White]
within a period of one year from the Closing Date.,,29
The 6th Circuit concluded from this language that White "agreed to
assume ... unknown environmental liabilities when it purchased
Westinghouse's business operations.,,3o
IV. Rockwell
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conclusion that any quantity of contamination - no matter how small - is
harmful? In this case, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held the trial court's
admission of such testimony was an abuse of discretion.
Rockwell appealed from a Logan Circuit Court judgment awarding
over seventy landowners more than $7 million in compensatory damages
- representing the fair market value of all their properties - and $210
million in punitive damages. The jury had concluded that Rockwell had
contaminated the properties with PCBs. On appeal, Rockwell argued that
the plaintiffs failed to prove that low levels of PCBs caused any damage
and that, therefor, the real estate appraiser's testimony - based upon his
unsupported assumption that such damage had been caused - was
inadmissible.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals observed that:
[a]n essential element of the landowners' claim is that the presence
of PCBs interferes with their right to exclusive possession by
causing actual harm to their property. The landowners have proved
that their properties have a level of PCB contamination that, at least
in some instances, exceeds the level acceptable to the Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet. What they have
failed to prove is that additional PCB exposure at low levels equals
additional risk to themselves, their crops or their farm animals. The
landowners must prove more than the mere presence of PCBs on
their property; they must prove that the PCBs have somehow
harmed their property. And the only way they can do so is by
showing that PCBs in the quantities present on their properties are
a health hazard. This they have failed to dO.31
30 Id.
31 Rockwell International Corp. v. Wilhite, et aI., 2000 WL 95282 (Ky.App., Jan 14, 2000) (NO. 1997-
CA-000l88-MR, 1997-CA-00021O-MR, 1997-CA-000348-MR) (footnotes omitted).
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In so concluding, the court found that the appraiser's unsupported
opinion could not form the basis for a damage award. The court therefore
reversed.
V. Individual Liability Under Kentucky Environmental Law
A Hearing Officer for the Kentucky Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet has issued a Report and
Recommended Secretary's Order containing an exhaustive examination of
whether, and if so under what circumstances, individual liability may be
imposed under Kentucky's environmental laws. In Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet v. Cumberland Wood and Chair Corp.,
Robert M. Kupchick and Jerome J. Pawlak, DOW-18965-042, DWM-
13064-042, filed May 8, 1998 in the Office of Administrative Hearings, the
Hearing Officer issued a 109-page Report and Recommended Secretary's
Order. The Hearing Officer examine Kentucky, as well as federal,
environmental cases in setting forth a test for when individual liability may
be imposed.
The Hearing Officer stated:
[i]n certain limited instances involving a violation which
resulted in or could potentially harm the public health or
environment, an individual or corporate officer can be
considered an owner or operator of a hazardous waste
facility for purposes of imposing liability, irrespective of the
corporate formalities that may be in place.
An examination of the cases indicates that the standard for
imposing liability is in effect a balancing test and ... the
factors that are to be examined include: (1) the seriousness
of the violation, (2) the degree of control exercised by the
corporate officer or agent over the affairs of the corporation
A - 18
Id. at p.94-95.
In applying this test, the Hearing Officer found the individual
defendants liable for various violations regardless of the existence of a
and (3) the amount of the corporate officer's or agent's
knowledge, participation, or cUlpability in the violation.
*****
corporation with which they were associated.
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2000 ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
Out of the 1441 bills introduced in the 2000 regular session of the
Kentucky General Assembly, relatively few, in comparison to previous sessions,
dealt with environmental issues. Most of the environmental bills introduced were
not enacted by the legislature. The following is a summary of certain key
environmental bills introduced in the session.
WATER SUPPLY
Senate Bill 409, introduced by Senate Majority Floor Leader Dan Kelly,
was passed to create a program through which incentives are provided to both
public and private water concerns in order to provide water to all areas of
Kentucky by the year 2020. Amended in the House to accommodate many of
Governor Patton's interests, the bill establishes an account within the Kentucky
Infrastructure Authority and empowers the Authority to manage a program,
including low interest loans, to foster the goals of the bill. The bill is designed to
meet its goals by the promotion of regionalization of water services, achieved
through the management and advice of regional water planning councils, area
development districts, and the Authority.
REGULATION DEVELOPMENT
House Bill 856 establishes new procedures under KRS Chapter 13A for
administrative regulations proposed by state agencies. This bill was passed by
both chambers of the legislature, but was vetoed by the Governor. The
legislature, during the final days of the session, overrode the veto; hence, the bill
will become law. In addition to several technical changes to KRS Chapter 13A,
the bill requires extended notice requirements for agencies that file regulations
proposing to establish or increase fees. The bill further amends an agency's
obligations with respect to the contents of the regulatory impact analysis required
to be attached to each proposed regulation. The amendments include a clearer set
B-1
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of parameters to be followed by the agency, including the types of entities
affected by the regulation, as well as the impact and costs to those entities. The
bill also creates new procedures for the review of regulations during periods when
the legislature is in session.
WASTE
House Bill 643 was introduced to extend in perpetuity the hazardous
waste assessment fee, which is paid by generators and handlers of most types of
hazardous waste. Existing law contains a provision that the fee would sunset on
June 30, 2000. The bill passed the House with the sunset removed, but the Senate
Appropriations and Revenue Committee amended the bill to provide a sunset date
of June 30, 2002. The bill was enacted with the new sunset date intact. The new
sunset provision allows the General Assembly sufficient time to study the sources
of the funds, as well as the purposes for which the funds are used by the Cabinet.
House Bill 756 creates an exemption for composted waste water treatment
sludge by colleges and universities from the requirements applicable to special
wastes. In addition, House Bill 579 amends the hazardous waste requirements for
the treatment, storage, or disposal of chemical munition compounds.
House Bill 1, the "Bottle Bill," was introduced by Greg Stumbo. The
original bill sought to establish mandatory solid waste collection, financed by the
use of a tax on certain containers and an advance disposal fee for other types of
containers. By the time a vote was taken on the House floor, the bill was
amended to provide that the solid waste collection was to be financed through the
use of a flat environmental fee to be paid by all businesses that collect sales taxes.
The bill was defeated on the House floor. In an effort to rekindle the purpose of
House Bill 1, Stumbo introduced House Bill 745, which would have created a
constitutional referendum on the "Bottle Bill." The bill, which passed the House,
died in the Senate Agriculture and Natural Resources Committee.
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Senate Bill 290 would have created a voluntary cleanuplbrownfields
program to be administered in conjunction with KRS 224.01-400 and KRS
224.01-405. Several states have passed such measures, which promote the
redevelopment of underused or idle property and provide incentives for persons
voluntarily remediating contaminated property. The bill, co-sponsored by Senator
Bob Leeper and Senator David Karem, passed the Senate and, by agreement with
the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, municipal interests,
and business interests, was substantially amended in the House Natural Resources
and Environment Committee. Although the bill was poised for a vote to be taken
on the House floor, it was recommitted to the House Appropriations and Revenue
Committee late in the session to die.
Senate Bill 179 was introduced to address problems relating to perceived
nuisances created by solid waste sites or facilities. The bill, as passed by the
Senate, would have required the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Cabinet to place conditions in permits to prevent public nuisances due to blowing
litter, debris, or other waste or material, or because of odor, noise, light, or traffic
congestion. The bill was not heard by the House Natural Resources and
Environment Committee and died there.
VEHICLE EMISSION TESTING
Several bills were introduced during the 2000 session relating to vehicle
emission testing programs conducted throughout the state. House Bill 236
exempts motorcycles from the vehicle emission testing requirements. House Bill
314 provides for a reciprocal vehicle emission testing certificate to be issued to a
person who relocates from a state in which that person's vehicle had been tested
under the previous state's program. Senate Bill 14 prohibits local air pollution
control districts from regulating sources other than those regulated under the
state's program.
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UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS
House Joint Resolution 70, primarily sponsored by Representative Robin
Webb, directs the Public Protection and Regulation Cabinet and the Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet to enter into a memorandum of
understanding to better coordinate their respective responsibilities regarding the
underground petroleum storage tank program. Senate Bill 21 requires that
persons submitting requests for reimbursement from the Petroleum Storage Tank
Environmental Assurance Fund certify by affidavit that all subcontractors and
vendors have been paid, unless the subcontractor waives its right to seek payment
from the owner. In addition, the bill extends the registration date for eligible
tanks to July 15,2002 and provides for liability for persons submitting false and
misleading information to the Fund.
COAL. OIL & GAS
The legislature also passed several bills relating to mining and natural
resources. These include:
House Bill 404 relating to increased training and education requirements
for miners;
House Bill 436 relating to mine safety and the jurisdiction of the
Department of Mines and Minerals;
House Bill 599 relating to the termination ofnoncompliance and cessation
orders and the creation of easements ofnecessity to abate violations;
House Bill 616 relating to the issuance of permits for oil or gas wells and
boundaries of leaseholds; and,
House Bill 792 relating to road construction on highwalls.
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Environmental Review Under the National Environmental Policy Act
A. Background
1. The Statute: The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et
seq. ("NEPA"), was enacted to create a framework within the Federal
government for including environmental considerations among the factors
ordinarily examined in the decision-making process. The heart of NEPA
is the environmental impact statement ("EIS"), which must be prepared
for all major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment. An EIS must include a detailed statement of:
a. the environmental impact of the proposed action;
b. any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented;
c. alternatives to the proposed action;
d. the relationship between local short-term uses of the human
environmental and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity; and
e. any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be
implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The EIS requirement must be satisfied by the
federal agency responsible for the proposed action. The responsible
agency must consult with other federal agencies that have jurisdiction or
special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved, and
must provide the public with notice and an opportunity to comment on the
proposed action.
The principal purpose of the EIS is to ensure that agencies give proper
consideration to the environmental consequences of their actions and that
the public is informed about the environmental impact of proposed agency
actions. Nevertheless, NEPA is a procedural statute, specifying particular
procedures that must be followed in making a project decision; it does not
mandate any particular substantive outcome. Thus, the agency is not
required to select the environmentally preferable alternative.
2. The Regulations: The Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") has
adopted regulations to implement the requirements of NEPA, including
the EIS requirements. See 40 C.F.R. parts 1500-08. In addition, many
federal agencies have developed their own agency-specific regulations and
C -1
B.
guidance documents to better integrate the NEPA requirements into that
Agency's mission.
Categorical Exclusions and Environmental Assessments
In determining whether to prepare an EIS, the federal agency must determine J
whether the proposed action is one which:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Normally requires an EIS: In this case, some environmental
documentation is required, and the presumption is that an EIS is required.
However, if the agency believes that an EIS is nevertheless unnecessary, it
may be able to demonstrate that no EIS is required through the preparation
of an Environmental Assessment ("EA") (see discussion below and 40
C.F.R. §§ 1501.3, 1508.9); or
Normally does not require either an EIS or an EA: In this case, the project
may fit within a "categorical exclusion," exempting the agency from the
requirement to prepare any environmental documentation. Individual
agencies generally adopt regulations containing categorical exclusions for
certain projects typically sponsored by such agencies.
EAs: If the proposed action does not fit within a categorical exclusion, the
agency must at least prepare an EA, which is a concise document that
serves to provide sufficient information concerning the project's likely
environmental impacts to determine whether an EIS must be prepared.
The EA must describe briefly the need for and alternatives to the proposal,
the environmental impacts of the proposed action and alternatives, and a
list of agencies and persons contacted. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9. (An EA need
not be prepared if the agency has decided to prepare an EIS.)
Final documents: After completing an EA, the agency must prepare one
of the following documents:
a. An EIS, if the agency determines that the proposed action may
have significant effects on the human environment.
j
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b. A Finding of No Significant Impact, or "FONSI," presenting the
reasons why an action will not have a significant impact on the
human environment, and for which an EIS therefore will not be
prepared. The EA (or a summary) should be appended to the
FONSI. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e), 1508.13. The agency may proceed
with the proposed action based on the FONSI, after sufficient
notice to the public.
J
J
1
Note: If a proposed action is closely similar to one which normally j
requires an EIS, the agency must make the FONSI available for
C-2
rEnvironmental Impact Statement
Contents ofEIS: An EIS must include the following elements:
public review for 30 days before making a final determination. 40
C.F.R. § 1501.4(e)(2).
Scoping: The regulations require an "early and open" process for
determining the scope of issues to be addressed in the EIS. This process
includes a Federal Register notice describing the proposed action, possible
alternatives, and the scoping process. The agency must invite the
participation of affected government agencies, Indian tribes, the proponent
of the action, and other "interested persons." 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7.
Statement ofPuq>ose and Need: States the underlying purpose and
need to which the agency is responding.
Summary: Stresses major conclusions, areas of controversy, and
issues to be resolved.
Alternatives Analysis: This is the "heart" of the EIS, presenting
the environmental impacts of the proposed action and the
alternatives, in comparative form. This must include all
"reasonable" alternatives, including those not within the
jurisdiction of the lead agency, as well as the "no action"
alternative. The preferred alternatives should be identified, if one
exists.
•
•
•
1.
2.
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r • Affected Environment: Succinctly describes the environment ofthe area to be affected.
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Environmental Consequences: Discusses the environmental
impacts of the proposed action and alternatives, including: direct
and indirect effects and their significance; energy and natural
resource requirements and conservation potential ofvarious
alternatives and mitigation measures; urban quality, historic, and
cultural resources; and means to mitigate adverse environmental
impacts.
List of preparers.
Appendices (material related to EIS and its analyses).
r See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.10-1502.19.
r
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3.
The analysis of "indirect effects" includes "cumulative effects," defined as
the impact on the environment that results from the incremental impact of
the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable
future actions regardless of what agency or person undertakes those other
actions. Such effects can result from individually minor but collectively
significant actions taking place over a period of time. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7.
"Indirect effects" also include "growth inducing effects" of the proposed
action. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8.
Summary of EIS Preparation Process: The EIS must be prepared in two
stages, and also may be supplemented.
a. A Draft Environmental Impact Statement, or "DEIS," must be
prepared first. The DEIS must satisfy to the fullest extent possible
the statutory requirements for a final EIS.
I
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The agency must publish the DEIS and obtain comments on it
from any federal agency that has jurisdiction or special expertise .oil
with respect to any environmental impact associated with the
proposed action, or that is authorized to develop and enforce
environmental standards~, EPA, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, J
etc.). The agency also must seek comments from certain state and
local agencies, Indian tribes, the applicant (if any), and the public.
See 40 C.F.R. part 1503. .-l
b.
c.
A Final Environmental Impact Statement, or "FEIS," must respond
to all comments received on the DEIS, including any responsible
opposing view that was not adequately discussed in the DEIS and
the agency's response to such views. The agency may respond to
comments by modifying alternatives (including the proposed
action), developing and evaluating new alternatives, supplementing
or modifying its analyses, making factual corrections, or
explaining why the comments do not warrant further response. All
substantive comments (or summaries) must be attached to the
FEIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4.
The agency may (but need not) request comments on the FEIS
before making a final decision. Other agencies and persons may,
in any case, make comments before a final decision is made.
A Supplemental EIS must be prepared (for either a DEIS or FEIS)
if:
,
J
:1
"""
,
J
(1) the agency makes substantial changes in the proposed
action that are relevant to environmental concerns; or
C-4
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(2) there are significant new circumstances or information
relevant to environmental concerns that bear on the
proposed action or its impacts.
The agency also may prepare a Supplemental EIS if it
determines that the purposes of NEPA would be furthered
by doing so. The same procedures and requirements apply
to Supplements as apply to DEISs and FEISs. 40 C.F.R. §
1502.9(c).
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5.
Record of Decision: After making a final project decision, the responsible
agency must provide a concise statement of its decision-ealled a Record
of Decision, or "ROD." The ROD should identify all alternatives
considered and specify the altemative(s) deemed to be environmentally
preferable. The agency also must identify the considerations that entered
into its decision. Finally, the ROD must state whether all practicable
means to avoid or minimize environmental harm have been adopted, and if
not, why they were not. 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2.
An agency may not issue a ROD until the later of 90 days after the Federal
Register notice of the public availability of the DEIS or 30 days after the
Federal Register notice of the public availability of the FEIS.
Agency Cooperation: Ifmore than one agency is involved in the proposed
action, a "lead agency" shall supervise the preparation of the EIS. Other
federal agencies with jurisdiction by law over all or a portion of the
project or its impacts will be "cooperating agencies." Agencies with
special expertise also may be cooperating agencies, upon the request of the
lead agency. Cooperating agencies participate in the NEPA process from
the outset, including scoping, preparing the environmental documentation,
and commenting on the EIS. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.5-1501.6.
EISs also should, to the extent possible, be prepared concurrently and in
integration with environmental analyses and studies under the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act (16 U.S.C. § 661 et seq.), the National Historic
Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. § 470 et seq.), the Endangered Species Act
(16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.), and other environmental review laws and
executive orders. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.25. EISs should include a discussion
of Environmental Justice issues, pursuant to Executive Order No. 12898.
r
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II. Judicial Review Under NEPA
A. Private right of action: NEPA itself does not provide a private right of action for
violations of its provisions. Absent any right of action in the statute, the courts
have found that agency actions are reviewable under the judicial review provision
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. ("APA"). Under t~at
C-5
B.
pn 3ion, an agency decision may be set aside only if it is "arbitrary, capricious,
an,ouse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," or was
undertaken "without observance of procedures required by law." Id. § 706(2)(A),
(D). This review standard is narrow, and the reviewing court may not substitute
its judgment for that of the agency. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council,
109 S. Ct. 1851, 1861-62 (1989). The reviewing court must determine whether
the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
there has been a clear error ofjudgment.
Constitutional and statutOly standing: In order to bring a NEPA challenge under
theAPA, prospective plaintiffs first must satisfy Constitutional and statutory
standing requirements. Because Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the role
of the federal judiciary to resolving cases and controversies, plaintiff standing is a
necessary predicate to federal court jurisdiction. Thus, any potential NEPA
plaintiff must satisfy the following Constitutional standing requirements:
-
-
~;
-
!
-
1.
2.
3.
Injury-in-fact. The injury must be concrete and particularized, rather than
conjectural or hypothetical.
Causation. It must be substantially probable that the challenged acts of the
defendants will cause the particularized injury of the plaintiff.
Redressability. The relief sought must be shown to be likely to alleviate
the particularized injury alleged by the plaintiff.
C. Final agency action and zone of interest: In addition, to bring an action under the
APA, a prospective plaintiff also must identify some "final agency action" ~,
issuance of a ROD) and must demonstrate that is claims fall within the "zone of
interests" protected by the statute forming the basis of its claims (~, NEPA).
The courts generally have found that economic injuries are not within the zone of
interests protected by NEPA. It is clear, on the other hand, that injuries to a part
of the environment that the plaintiff enjoys on a regular basis would satisfy the
zone of interests test and establish plaintiff's standing.
III. Selected Issues in NEPA Compliance
A. "Purpose and Need"
The CEQ regulations say very little about what is required in the statement of
"purpose and need" for the proposed action, but this statement nevertheless has
become the subject of increased controversy in recent years.
ii
..i
1. CEQ Regulation: "Purpose and need. The [EIS] shall briefly specify the
underlying purpose and need to which the agency is responding in
proposing the alternatives including the proposed action." 40 C.F.R. §
1502.13.
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Judicial Interpretation. Federal courts generally will accord a high degree
of deference to an agency's formulation of purpose and need, but that
deference is not absolute. Several recent decisions have emphasized the
importance of the statement of purpose and need.
a. Simmons v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 120 F.3d 664 (7th Cir.
1997): "When a federal agency prepares an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS), it must consider 'all reasonable alternatives' ....
No decision is more important that delimiting what these
'reasonable alternatives' are .... To make that decision, the first
thing an agency must define is the project's purpose. [Citation
omitted.] The broader the purpose, the wider the range of
alternatives; and vice versa. The 'purpose' of a project is a
slippery concept, susceptible of no hard-and-fast definition. One
obvious way for an agency to slip past the strictures of NEPA is to
contrive a purpose so slender as to define competing 'reasonable
alternatives' out of consideration (and even out of existence). The
federal courts cannot condone an agency's frustration of
Congressional will. If the agency constricts the definition of the
project's purpose and thereby excludes what truly are reasonable
alternatives, the EIS cannot fulfill its role." Id. at 667.
b. Sierra Club v. U.S. Department of Transportation, 962 F. Supp.
1037 (N.D. Ill. 1997): The District Court rejected the subject EIS
because, among other things, the final statement "relies on the
implausible assumption that the same level of transportation needs
will exist whether or not the tollroad is constructed. In particular,
the final impact statement contains a socioeconomic forecast that
assumes the construction of a highway such as the tollroad and
then applies that forecast to both the build and no-build
alternatives. The result is a forecast of future needs that only the
proposed tollroad can satisfy. As a result, the final impact
statement creates a self-fulfilling prophecy that makes a reasoned
analysis of how different alternatives satisfy future needs
impossible ...." The court also faulted the EIS for failing to
justify current transportation "needs" that it relied on in defining
alternatives. The court also noted that the objectives of "providing
a 'north-south transportation corridor linking Interstate Route 55
and Interstate Route 80', and completing a project that has been
'an element of regional and county transportation plans for over
thirty years'" were goals that could only be satisfied by the
proposed tollroad. The court concluded that, "[w]ithout justifying
these current needs and without justifying project needs, it
becomes impossible to assess any of the possible alternatives." Id.
at 1042-44.
C-7
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City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. U.S. Dep't of Transportation, 95 F.3d
892 (9th Cir. 1996): By materially changing the statement of
purpose and need between the Draft EIS and Final EIS without
also considering an acceptable range of alternatives designed to
meet the changed purpose, the agency failed to consider a range of
alternatives which were dictated by the nature and scope of the
proposed action and which were sufficient to permit a reasoned
choice. A reasonable range of alternatives must remain open to
consideration under a new statement of purpose and need.
Citizens Against Burlington v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991): "We have held before
that an agency bears the responsibility for deciding which
alternatives to consider in an environmental impact statement. We
have also held that an agency need follow only a 'rule of reason' in
preparing an EIS, and that this rule of reason governs 'both which
alternatives the agency must discuss, and the extent to which it
must discuss them.' It follows that the agency thus bears the
responsibility for defining at the outset the objectives of any
action. As the phrase 'rule of reason' suggests, we review an
agency's compliance with NEPA's requirements deferentially. We
uphold an agency's definition of objectives so long as the
objectives that the agency chooses are reasonable, and we uphold
its discussion of alternatives so long as the alternatives are
reasonable and the agency discusses them in reasonable detail. ...
Deference, however, does not mean dormancy, and the rule of
reason does not give agencies license to fulfill their own
prophecies, whatever the parochial impulses that drive them. . . .
[A]n agency may not define the objectives of its action in terms so
unreasonably narrow that only one alternative from among the
environmentally benign ones in the agency's power would become
a foreordained formality. Nor mayan agency frame its goals in
terms so unreasonably broad that an infinite number of alternatives
would accomplish those goals and the project would collapse
under the weight of the possibilities. Instead, agencies must look
hard at the factors relevant to the definition of purpose. When an
agency is asked to sanction a specific plan, the agency should take
into account the needs and goals of the parties involved in the
application. Perhaps more importantly, an agency should always
consider the view of Congress, expressed, to the extent that the
agency can determine them, in the agency's statutory authorization
to act, as well as in other congressional directives." Id. at 195-96.
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Range ofAlternatives
The Statute.
a. Section 402(2)(C) of NEPA (the EIS requirement) calls for a
"detailed statement by the responsible official on . . . (iii)
alternatives to the proposed action." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii).
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
B.
1.
b. Section 402(2)(E) also states: "The Congress authorizes and
directs that, to the fullest extent possible . . . all agencies of the
Federal Government shall ... study, develop, and describe
appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any
proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning
alternative uses of available resources." 42 U.S.c. § 4332(2)(E)
(emphasis added).
r
r
r
r
2. The Regulations.
a. The alternatives analysis is the "heart of the environmental impact
statement." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14.
b. The alternatives analysis must:
I. "Rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable
alternatives, and for alternatives which were eliminated
from detailed study, briefly discuss the reasons for their
having been eliminated."
r
r
r
r
r
ii.
lll.
iv.
v.
VI.
"Devote substantial treatment to each alternatives
considered in detail" to ensure a fair evaluation of their
comparative merits.
Examine alternatives that are not within the jurisdiction of
the lead agency, if those alternatives would accomplish the
agency's purpose and need.
Include the "no action" alternative.
Identify the agency's "preferred alternative.
Include appropriate mitigation measures not already
included in the proposed action or alternatives.
r
r
r
40 C.F.R. § 1502.14.
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c. The agency must not "commit resources prejudicing selection of
alternatives before making a final decision." 40 C.F.R. §
1502.2(f). Prior to issuance of the ROD, the agency cannot take
any action to "limit the choice of reasonable alternatives," or allow
any non-Federal applicant to take such action. 40 C.F.R. §
1506.1(a)(l), (b).
I
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3. Selected Judicial Decisions.
a.
b.
c.
d.
NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837-38 (D.C. Cir. 1972): Mere
fact that an alternative requires legislative implementation does not
automatically establish it as beyond the domain of what is required
for discussion, "particularly since NEPA was intended to provide a
basis for consideration and choice by the decisionmakers in the
legislative as well as the executive branch."
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519,
551 (1978): "[C]oncept of alternatives must be bounded by some
notion of feasibility. . .. [EIS] cannot be found wanting simply
because the agency failed to include every alternative device and
thought conceivable by the mind ofman."
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1971): "NEPA requires
that an agency must-to the fullest extent possible under its other
statutory obligations--eonsider alternatives to its actions which
would reduce environmental damage."
Roosevelt Campobello Inn Park Comm'n v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041,
1046-47 (lSI Cir. 1982): "EPA's evaluation of alternatives was
explicitly based on the premise that its role in reviewing privately
sponsored projects 'is to determine whether the proposed site is
environmentally acceptable,' and not, as in the case of a publicly
funded project, 'to undertake to locate what EPA would consider
to be the optimum site for a new facility.' ... EPA's duty under
NEPA is to study all alternatives that 'appear reasonable and
appropriate for study at the. time' of drafting the EIS, as well as
'significant alternatives' suggested by other agencies or the public
during'the comment period. In order to preserve an alternatives
issue for review, it is not enough simply to make a facially
plausible suggestion; rather, an intervenor must offer tangible
evidence that an alternative site might offer 'a substantial measure
of superiority' as a site."
C-lO
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Connected Actions and "Segmentation"
The Regulations.
a. The CEQ regulations provide that "[t]o determine the scope of
environmental impact statements, agencies shall consider 3 types
of actions . . .. They include:
r
r
r
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1.
b.
(a) Actions (other than unconnected single actions) which
maybe:
(1) Connected actions, which means that they are closely
related and therefore should be discussed in the same
impact statement. Actions are connected if they:
(i) Automatically trigger other actions which may
require environmental impact statements.
(ii) Cannot or will not proceed unless other actions are
taken previously or simultaneously.
(iii)Are interdependent parts of a larger action and
depend on the larger action for their justification.
(2) Cumulative actions, which when viewed with other
proposed actions have cumulatively significant impacts
and should therefore be discussed in the same impact
statement.
(3) Similar actions, which when viewed with other
reasonably foreseeable or proposed agency actions,
have similarities that provide a basis for evaluating
their environmental consequences together, such as
common timing or geography. Any agency may wish
to analyze these actions in the same impact statement.
It should do so when the best way to assess adequately
the combined impacts of similar actions or reasonable
alternatives to such actions is to treat them in a single
impact statement."
40 C.F.R. § 1508.25.
The CEQ regulations also provide that "[w]hen preparing
statements on broad actions (including proposals by more than one
agency), agencies may find it useful to evaluate the proposal(s) in
one of the following ways:
C-ll
(1)
(2)
(3)
Geographically, including actions occurring in the
same general location, such as body of water,
region, or metropolitan area.
Generically, including actions which have relevant
similarities, such as common timing, impacts,
alternatives, methods of implementation, media, or
subject matter.
By stage of technological development including
federal or federally assisted research, development
or demonstration programs for new technologies
which, if applied, could significantly affect the
quality of the human environment."
-
c.
40 C.F.R. § l502.4(c).
In evaluating the "intensity" of a proposed action-in order to
determine whether it will have a "significant" environmental
effect-an agency is required to consider "[w]hether the action is
related to other actions with individually insignificant but
cumulatively significant impacts. Significance exists if it is
reasonable to anticipate a cumulatively significant impact on the
environment. Significance cannot be avoided by terming an action
temporary or breaking it down into small component parts." 40
C.F.R. § l508.27(b)(7) (emphasis added).
J
J
J
2. Selected Judicial Decisions.
a. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390,410 (1976):
1.
11.
When several proposals for coal-related actions that will
have cumulative or synergistic environmental impact on
region are pending concurrently before an agency, their
environmental consequences must be considered together.
Only through comprehensive consideration of pending
proposals can the agency evaluate different courses of
action.
Statute requires preparation of EIS only for "proposed"
actions; it does not require agency consideration ofpossible
environmental impacts of less imminent actions when
preparing the impact statement on proposed actions.
b. City of Tenakee Springs v. Clough, 915 F.2d 1308,1312 (9th Cir.
1990): "NEPA requires that where several actions have a
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cumulative or synergistic environmental effect, this consequence
must be considered in an EIS. . .. Where there are large scale
plans for regional development, NEPA requires both a
programmatic and site-specific EIS. . .. This court has held that
where several foreseeable similar projects in a geographical region
have a cumulative impact, they should be evaluated in a single
EIS." Thus, where agency had examined single project in isolation
without considering net impact of all projects, court remanded to
agency for further consideration of cumulative impact of all
actions.
Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1985):
r
r
r
r
r'
r
r
D.
1. Agency is not allowed to divide a project into multiple
actions, each 'of which individually has an insignificant
environmental impact, but which collectively have a
substantial impact.
11. Construction of timber access road and sale of timber in
National Forest meet second and third (and possibly first)
criteria for "connected actions." "It is clear that the timber
sales cannot proceed without the road, and the road would
not be built but for the contemplated timber sales. . .. The
road construction and the contemplated timber sales are
inextricably intertwined, and "connection actions" within
the meaning of the CEQ regulations."
iii. See also Save the Yaak Committee v. Block, 840 F.2d 714
(9th Cir. 1988).
Indirect and Cumulative Impacts
1. The Regulations.
r
r
r
r
r
r
a. "Effects" include "direct effects, which are caused by the action
and occur at the same time and place," and
"Indirect effects, which are caused by the action and
are later in time or farther removed in distance, but
are still reasonably foreseeable. Indirect effects
may include growth inducing effects and other
effects related to induced changes in the pattern of
land use, population density or growth rate, and
related effects on air and water and other natural
systems, including ecosystems.
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b.
Effects and impacts as used in these regulations are
synonymous. Effects includes ecological . . .
aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic, social, or
health, whether direct, indirect, or cumulative."
40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (emphasis added).
"Cumulative impact" is "the impact on the environment which
results from the incremental impact of the action when added to
other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions
regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person
undertakes such other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from
individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place
over a period of time." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (emphasis added).
2. Selected Judicial Decisions.
a.
b.
c.
Preliminary no~e: Growth-inducing and cumulative impacts are
most often important in determining whether a proposed action
may have a "significant impact" on the human environment, and
thus, whether an EIS must be prepared. The goal of the proponent
often is to avoid having to "take ownership" of the effects of other
actions that mayor may not occur in the area.
Coalition on Sensible Transportation v. Dole, 826 F.2d 60, 70-71
(D.C. Cir. 1987): It "makes sense to consider ... cumulative
effects by incorporating the effects of other projects into the
background 'data base' of the project at issue, rather than by
restating the results of the prior studies." In this case, the EA and
FONSI were "sufficient to alert interested members of the public to
any arguable cumulative impacts." See also Piedmont Heights
Civic Club v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430, 441-42 (5th Cir. 1981)
("NEPA does not require an agency to restate all of the
environmental effects of projects presently under consideration.
Where the underlying data base includes approved project and
pending proposals, the 'statutory minima' of NEPA has been
met.")
Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1245-46 (5th Cir. 1985):
Cumulative effects analysis must identify "(1) the area in which
effects of the proposed project will be felt, (2) the impacts that are
expected in that area from the proposed project, (3) other actions-
past, proposed, and reasonably foreseeable-that have had or are
expected to have impacts in the same area, (4) the impacts or
expected impacts from these other actions, and (5) the overall
impact that can be expected if the individual impacts are allowed
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e.
f.
g.
h.
to accumulate." EA should "consider (1) past and present actions
without regard to whether they themselves triggered NEPA
responsibilities and (2) future actions that are 'reasonably
foreseeable,' even if they are not yet proposals and may never
trigger NEPA-review requirements." See also City of Carmel-by-
the-Sea v. Dep't of Transportation, 772 F.2d 1225, 1245 (5th Cir.
1985) (adopting Fifth Circuit's Fritiofson analysis of cumulative
impact analysis requirements).
Landmark West! V. U.S. Postal Service, 840 F. Supp. 994
(S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 41 F.3d 1500 (2d Cir. 1994) (cumulative
impact analysis considers other actions as context/background
against which incremental effect of proposed action is measured;
agency sponsoring proposed action need not "take ownership" of
environmental consequences of other actions that provide
background for proposed action).
Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 674-76 (9th Cir. 1975): DOT
must analyze growth effects of constructing highway interchange
in otherwise undeveloped area.
Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 878-79 (1 st Cir. 1986):
"[A]gencies should have taken account of the 'secondary impacts.'
First, ... building the causeway [to Sears Island] and port [on
island] will lead to further development [on island]. . .. Once
Maine completes the causeway and port, pressure to develop the
rest of the island could well prove irreversible."
Laguna Greenbelt, Inc. v. Dep't of Transportation, 42 F.3d 517,
525-26 (9th Cir. 1994): "Discussion and documentation in the EIS,
however, support the EIS's conclusion that the tollroad will not
affect the amount and pattern of growth in Orange County."
"Record shows that 98.5% of all land in the project's 'area of
benefit' is already accounted for by either existing or committed
land uses not contingent on construction of the corridor."
Citizens Comm. Against Interstate Route 675 v. Lewis, 542 F.
Supp. 496,563 (S.D. Ohio 1982): Growth discussion unnecessary
because Final EIS reflects view of no anticipated "secondary
impact primarily because 'the facility has been a part of the
regional and community planning for years . . . to control the
development of an expanding urban area'" and "impacts and
growth have occurred even without the construction."
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The "Small Federal Handle" ProblemE.
1.
2.
The Issue: At what point does federal participation in a project proposed
by a non-federal entity (private party, state or local government, etc.)
"federalize" the action and subject it to the requirements of NEPA? Also,
when must the non-federal portion of an overall project with both federal
and non-federal elements be included within the NEPA scope of analysis?
Common Situations:
-
-
a.
b.
Nonfederal actions that require federal permits or approvals, such
as permits from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers under Section
10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act and Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act; or Secretary of the Interior approval of Indian
contracts.
Nonfederal actions eligible for federal assistance, such as mass
transit systems; highway construction; housing developments HUD
mortgage insurance; and HUD funding for a portion of a project.
3. The Corps' NEPA regulations. This problem seems to arise most
commonly in the context of Corps of Engineers permitting actions. In
1984, the Corps adopted its own regulations governing the NEPA process,
at 33 C.F.R. part 325, App. B (hereinafter "Appendix B"). The Appendix
B regulations codified two seminal cases from 1980 that addressed the
"small federal handle" issue in the Corps permitting context.
a. Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.
1980): The Corps was asked to permit a 1.25-mile river crossing
on a proposed 67-mile, nonfederal power line. The Corps' EA
focused solely on the river crossing and concluded that no
significant environmental impacts could be expected. Plaintiffs
challenged the Corps' EA, arguing that, "but for" the Corps'
permit, the power line could be built, and therefore, the Corps had
sufficient control over the proposal to require an environmental
analysis of the entire 67-mile power line.
The Eighth Circuit analyzed the situation under both an
"enablement" (or legal control) framework and under a factual
control test. In this case, the Corps permit was not found to be "a
legal condition precedent" to the entire nonfederal power line
project. Likewise, the court found that the Corps lacked sufficient
factual, or "veto," control over the project. The court outlined a
three-part test to determine factual control, including
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c.
(1) the degree of discretion exercised by the agency
over the federal portion of the project;
(2) whether the federal government has given any
direct financial aid to the project; and
(3) whether the overall federal involvement with the
project is sufficient to tum essentially private
action into federal action.
621 F.2d at 272. These factors were found lacking in this case.
Save the Bay v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 610 F.2d 322 (5th
Cir. 1980): The Corps was asked to issue a permit for the
construction of a 2200-foot wastewater discharge pipeline
associated with a proposed massive nonfederal titanium dioxide
manufacturing facility adjacent to Bay St. Louis, Louisiana. In its
EA, the Corps only analyzed the effects of building the outfall
pipeline, not the associated nonfederal facility. In upholding the
Corps' action, the Fifth Circuit determined that there was an
insufficient nexus between the Corps and the construction of the
nonfederal plant to make the agency a partner in that construction
and thereby "federalize" its construction. Although it explicitly
refused to adopt a "but for" test, the court nevertheless noted that
the pipeline was not necessary to operate the plant (because
another method of discharge, not requiring a Corps permit, was
available), and therefore, the Corps lacked factual control over the
construction as well.
Appendix B: The Corps' response to the "small federal handle"
problem and the decisions of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits is
codified in Appendix B. The Corps has identified its "scope of
analysis," which defines the scope of activities on a nonfederal
project that will be included in the Corps' environmental analysis
under NEPA. Appendix B closely tracks the rationale behind
Winnebago and Save the Bay, although it was modified somewhat
at the suggestion of CEQ, after EPA objected to its initial
publication. The goal of the procedures set forth in Appendix B is
to allow the NEPA document to "address the impacts of the
specific activity requiring a [Corps] permit and those portions of
the entire project over which the district engineer has sufficient
control and responsibility to warrant Federal review. . .. The
district engineer is considered to have control and responsibility
for portions of the project beyqnd the limits of Corps jurisdiction
where the Federal involvement is sufficient to tum an essentially
private action into a Federal action. These are cases where the
environmental consequences of the larger project are essentially
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products of the Corps permit action." 33 C.F.R. part 325, App.
B(7)(b).
Selected Judicial Decisions. -
a.
b.
c.
Enablement. or Legal Control: Landmark West! v. U.S. Postal
Service, 840 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 41 F.3d 1500
(2d Cir. 1994). This case provides one of the most thorough,
exhaustive treatments of this issue and provides an excellent
introduction to the "small federal handle" issue.. In the case,
private developers were constructing a mixed use building in New
York City that would include a post office, in addition to numerous
private commercial and residential facilities. The plaintiffs sought
to "federalize" the entire project because of the Postal Service's
involvement. The Postal Service has prepared an EA and FONSI,
based on its limited participation in the overall project.
The court concluded that determining the extent of federal
involvement requires determining the ability of the federal entity to
influence or control the outcome of the project in material respects.
That, in tum, depends on a consideration of both de jure and de
facto influence. 840 F. Supp. at 1005. Notably, the court stated
that "the fact that a federal action is a 'but for' cause of a non-
federal action does not, in itself, subject the non-federal action to
NEPA." Id. at 1006. The court also found that in the New York
project, the Postal Service lacked sufficient legal or factual
control-via such factors as its financial participation, contractual
rights, and leasing leverage-to "federalize" the project. See also
Goos v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 911 F.2d 1283, 1294 (8th
Cir. 1990); NRDS v. U.S. EPA, 822 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Macht v. Skinner, 916 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1990): Although state
light rail project required Section 404 permit to cross wetlands,
Corps' ability to prevent proposed route was insufficient to
"federalize" project, even coupled with additional federal funding
for preliminary engineering studies and state EISs.
Factual Control: Four general factors have been identified by the
courts in determining whether agency has "veto" control over
nonfederal project:
i
-
J
(i) The degree of discretion exercised by the agency over the
nonfederal portion of the project, see Save Barton Creek
Ass'n v. Federal Highway Adm'n, 950 F.2d 1129, 1134 (5th
Cir. 1992);
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Whether the nonfederal project will go forward even if the
federal action does not (known as the "but for" test):
Whether the federal government has given any direct
financial aid to the nonfederal project, see Save Barton
Creek Ass'n, 950 F.2d at 1135.
Whether the overall federal involvement with the project is
sufficient to tum an essentially nonfederal action into a
federal action, see Landmark West!, 840 F. Supp. 994;
Winnebago, 621 F.2d at 272.
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r IV. Other Federal Statutes
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(a)
(b)
(c)
Sugarloaf Citizens Ass'n v. FERC, 959 F.2d 508
(4th Cir. 1992) (no federal control where state
authority could have lawfully disregarded FERC
criteria and constructed its facility, although without
obtaining FERC benefits)..
Sylvester v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 884
F.2d 394, 400-01 (9th Cir. 1989) (Corps lacked
sufficient control over nonfederal resort complex
where resort could have gone forward without
federal wetlands permit for golf course).
Save the Bay, 610 F.2d 322 (entire plant was not
"federalized," because alternative method of
effluent discharge was available which did not
require Corps permit).
r
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A. National Historic Preservation Act
Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act ("NHPA") requires every
federal aget:J.cy with jurisdiction over a proposed federal or federally assisted
undertaking to "take into account" the effect of that undertaking on historic
properties, prior to approving the expenditure of federal funds or issuing a license
for the undertaking. 16 U.S.C. § 470f. The Section 106 review process is
governed by regulations promulgated by the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation ("ACHP" or "Council"), see 36 C.F.R. part 800 ("Protection of
Historic Properties").
1. Regulatory Framework
The purpose of §106 of the NHPA is to take into account the effect of
Federal undertakings on historic properties by identifying historic
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properties potentially affected by the undertaking, assessing the effects of
the undertaking and seeking to avoid, minimize or mitigate any adverse
effects on those properties. 36 C.F.R. § 800.I(a). The process is
administered by the sponsoring Federal Agency, in consultation with the
State Historic Preservation Officer ("SHPO"), representatives of local
governments, the applicant(s) for Federal assistance, if any, and
individuals and organizations which have demonstrated an interest in the
undertaking. 36 C.F.R. § 800.2. The Agency must "seek and consider
views of the public" with due respect to the complexities and individual
circumstances of the undertaking. 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(d). The Council also
may participate in the consultation when "its involvement is necessary to
ensure that the purposes of section 106 and the Act are met ...." 36
C.F.R. § 800.2(b)(l).
i
-'
a. The Roles and Obligations of the Parties
I ..
ii.
iii.
IV.
Agency Official: The Federal Agency has the statutory
responsibility of fulfilling the Section 106 requirements.
Id. § 800.2(a). The Agency must ensure that an Agency
Official with jurisdiction over the undertaking takes
financial and legal responsibility for Section 106
compliance, and that all actions taken on behalf of the
Agency meet professional standards. Id. § 800.2(a), (a)(l).
Contractors: The regulations permit the Agency to use the
services of a contractor to prepare information, analyses, or
recommendations. Id. § 800.2(a)(3). The Agency,
however, remains responsible for satisfying the regulations
and for making sure that the contractor's work meets the
appropriate standards. Id.
Council: Although the Council's primary responsibility is
to implement Section 106 review through promulgating
regulations, by giving advice and guidance on the
procedures, and by generally overseeing the process, it has
some responsibilities involving individual undertakings.
Id. § 800.2(b). The .council is to consult with and make
comments to the Agency regarding Section 106 review for
individual undertakings as needed. There are several stages
of the Section 106 review process at which the Council
may become involved based upon its own initiation or at
the behest of the Agency or the consulting parties.
State Historic Preservation Officer: The role of the SHPO
is to reflect the interests of the State and its citizens in
preserving cultural heritage. SHPOs are to advise and
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VI.
assist the Agency in carrying out Section 106 review. Id. §
800.2(c)(I).
If, at any stage, the SHPO fails to respond to the Agency
within thirty days of receipt of a request for review of a
finding or determination, the Agency may either proceed to
the next step in the Section 106 process using the finding or
determination, or may consult with the Council in lieu of
the SHPO. If the SHPO later reenters the process, the
Agency is not required to reconsider these findings and
determinations. Id. § 800.3(c)(4).
Other Consulting Parties: Other parties who have
consultative roles in the Section 106 process are the Tribal
Historic Preservation Officer; Indian Tribes and Native
Hawaiian organizations that attach religious or cultural
significance to the historic properties; representatives of
local goyernments that have jurisdiction over the area in
which the undertaking may have effects; applicants for
federal assistance; and certain individuals and organizations
that have a demonstrated interest in the undertaking
because of their legal or economic relation to the
undertaking or affected properties, or their concern with the
undertaking's effects on historic properties. Id. § 800. (c).
The regulations define "consultation" as "the process of
seeking, discussing, and considering the views of the other
participants, and, where feasible, seeking agreement with
them ...." Id. § 800.16(f).
Public: The regulations state that the views of the public
are "essential to informed Federal decisionmaking in the
section 106 process." Id. § 800.2(d). However, the
Agency is to consider the public's views "in a manner that
reflects the nature and complexity of the undertaking and
its effects on historic properties, the likely interest of the
public in the effects on historic properties, confidentiality
concerns of private individuals and businesses, and the
relationship of the Federal involvement to the undertaking."
Id. Thus, the Agency can determine what topics are suited
to public discussion and how to involve the public on those
issues.
C - 21
b. Initiating the §106 Process
Initiating the §106 Process essentially involves determining if §106 J
is applicable to the proposed project and contacting all of the
parties essential to the review process.
1.
ii.
111.
Establishing an Undertaking: The first step in the §106
process is determining whether the Federal action
constitutes an "undertaking." llL § 800.3(a). An
"undertaking" is defmed as a "project, activity, or program
funded in whole or part under the direct or indirect
jurisdiction of a Federal agency ...." Id. § 800.16(y).
Also, the Federal agency needs to determine whether the
undertaking is the type of action which could potentially
cause effects on historic properties. Id. § 800.3(a).
Identify the appropriate SHPO and Other Consulting
Parties: The next step requires the Agency to identify and
contact the SHPO(s) involved, the local governments that
have jurisdiction over the area which may be affected, the
applicant for federal assistance or approval, if any, and any
Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organizations which may
attach religious or cultural significance to historic
properties in the project area. Id. § 800.3(f). The agency,
in consultation with the SHPO(s), also must consider all
written requests from individuals and organizations which
have requested to be involved as consulting parties. Id. §§
800.3(f)(3),800.2(c)(6).
Plan to Involve the Public: The Agency should also
determine what issues are appropriate for public input and
plan how it will notify and involve the public on those
issues. Id. § 800.3(e). Public involvement is an important
and pervasive requirement in the revised Section 106
regulations.
J
J
J
!
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c. Identifying Historic Properties
The next major step in the § 106 review process involves
determining the number and significance of the historic properties
which might be affected by the undertaking.
1. Determining the Area of Potential Effects: The Agency, in
consultation with the SHPO, must determine the
geographic area in which the undertaking may cause
changes to historic properties. Id. §§ 800.4(a), 800.16(d).
C-22
J
J
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
ii.
Next, the Agency must gather existing information on
historic properties within that area and seek new
information from the consulting parties, those "individuals
and organizations likely to have knowledge of' historic
properties in the area, and any tribes identified earlier. Id. §
800.4(a).
Identify and Evaluate Historic Properties: Using the
information gathered, the Agency must then make a good
faith effort to identify the historic properties which exist
within the Area of Potential Effects. Id. § 800.4(b). Next,
the Agency must work with the SHPO to determine
whether identified historic properties that are not already
listed on the National Register are eligible for registry. Id.
§ 800.4(c). Ifthere are no historic properties or there will
be no effect upon the historic properties that are present,
the Agency may conclude the Section 106 process. Id. §
800.4(d)(1). However, if historic properties exist which
may be affected, the Agency must continue the Section 106
review and invite the consulting parties' views on the
potential effects. Id. § 800.4(d)(2).
r
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d. Assessing Adverse Effects
If the Agency and the SHPO determine that some eligible historic
properties might be affected by the undertaking, they must assess
the extent of the adverse effects. Id. § 800.5. An adverse effect
exists if the undertaking might diminish, "directly or indirectly,
any of the characteristics of a historic property that qualify the
property for inclusion in the National Register." Id. § 800.5(a)(1).
Examples of adverse effects include:
1. "Physical destruction of or damage to all or part of the
property," Id. § 800.5(a)(2)(i);
11. "Alteration of the property ... that is not consistent with
the Secretary's Standards for the Treatment of Historic
Properties ...," Id. § 800.5(a)(2)(ii); and
111. "Introduction of visual, atmospheric or audible elements
that diminish the integrity of the property's significant
historic features." Id. § 800.5(a)(2)(v).
Once these determinations are made, the process requires the
Agency to seek the agreement of the SHPO and consulting parties
concerning its adverse effect findings. If they cannot agree and no
C -23
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resolution can be made, the regulations look to the Council to help
resolve the matter. Id. § 800.5(c).
Resolving Adverse Effects
If the agency decides that adverse effects may occur, it must
consult with the SHPO and other parties "to develop and evaluate
alternatives or modifications that could avoid, minimize or
mitigate adverse effects on historic properties." Id. § 800.6(a).
.J
1.
11.
lll.
Memorandum of Agreement: If the Agency, the SHPO, and
the Council - if it is a consulting party - agree on how to
resolve the adverse effects, they are to execute a
Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") which details their
plans and governs the undertaking. Id. § 800.6(b)(I)(iv).
They also may invite the other consulting parties or any
party that assumes a responsibility under the MOA to be a
signatory, but even if those parties refuse to sign, the MOA
is still effective. Id. § 800.6(c)(2). If the Council does not
participate in this resolution process, then the Agency must
also submit the MOA to the Council before approving the
undertaking. Id. § 800.6(b)(1)(iv). The MOA evidences the
Agency's compliance with §106 and terminates the review
process. Id.
Council Involvement: The Council may become involved
in the process if the Agency and the SHPO cannot agree, or
if it is invited to join by the Agency or another consulting
party. Id. §§ 800.6(a)(1), 800.7(a). If it joins the process,
the Council will work with the Agency and the SHPO to
resolve the adverse effects and to sign an MOA. Id. §
800.6(b)(2).
Failure to Resolve Adverse Effects: If no agreement can be
reached or if the Agency terminates consultation, the
Agency must ask the Council to comment on the
undertaking. Id. § 800.7(a). The Council also may
terminate consultation on its own initiative (if it has been
involved) and opt to provide comments. The Agency then
must take the Council's comment into account in reaching
a final decision on the undertaking (but is not legally bound
by it). Id. § 800.7(c)(4). If the SHPO terminates the
consultation, the Council and the Agency may still agree
and sign an MOA. Id. § 800.7(a)(2).
C-24
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3.
Special Requirements for Protecting National Historic Landmarks
When the Agency determines that a National Historic Landmark ("NHL")
may be directly and adversely affected by an undertaking, Section 1l0(f)
of the NHPA requires the Agency to minimize harm to the maximum
extent possible. 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2(f); 36 C.F.R. § 800.10(a). The
Agency must request that the Council participate in consultation to resolve
the adverse effects on the NHL and must follow the process outlined in
above. 36 C.F.R. § 800.1O(b). The Agency also must notify the Secretary
of the Interior and invite him to participate in the consultation. Id. §
800.IO(c).
Similarities Between NEPA and NHPA
While not identical, NEPA and Section 106 of the NHPA are similar in a
number of respects. First and foremost, the requirement to prepare an EIS
and the requirement to engage in Section 106 consultation are both
procedural in nature, not mandating any particular result, but instead
specifying a particular process that must be followed in arriving at a result.
Further, both statutes explicitly call for coordination between the EIS and
Section 106 processes (among others) for projects that implicate issues
under each statute. Thus, proposed actions with some sort of federal
involvement, funding, or approval will often involve similar compliance
issues under both NEPA and Section 106.
Other similarities between NEPA's EIS requirement and Section 106
consultation include:
• Actions affected: Both statutes inject specific concerns-for NEPA,
environmental; for Section 106, historic preservation-into the
decision-making of federal agencies concerning proposed actions
within their jurisdiction. As a practical matter, an action that qualifies
as a "major federal action" under NEPA often will qualify as a federal
"undertaking" under Section 106 as well, and vice versa.
• Alternatives: Both statutes require a consideration of alternatives to
the proposed action, with a goal of avoiding or minimizing adverse
effects to the extent possible.
• Coordination with other agencies: Both statutes require the
responsible federal agency to coordinate with and involve other
federal, state, and local agencies that have jurisdiction over, or
expertise with respect to, the proposed action and its impacts.
• Public involvement: Both statutes require public notice and
opportunity to comment.
C -25
• Effect on project decision: Neither statute ultimately may hold up a
project decision, as long as the procedural requirements have been
satisfied. The responsible agency must consider and respond to
criticisms from other agencies and the public, and include such
responses in its final decision documents.
Despite these similarities, certain differences should be kept in mind:
• Study area: The area of potential effects studied under Section 106
may not be the same geographic area that should be studied under an
EIS or an EA.
• Adverse effects: Adverse effects may have a different level of
significance under NEPA and under Section 106. For example, a
particular effect that is "adverse" for Section 106 purposes may be
considc.:red an "indirect effect" under NEPA and, thus, may not be as
central in the NEPA analysis as it is under Section 106.
• Independent obligations: Although agencies routinely include impacts
to cultural resources or historic resources in their EIS analyses, their
obligations under Section 106 are independent from NEPA, and must
be met even when NEPA obligations do not arise.
B. Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act
'-I
J
-
Unlike NEPA and Section 106, which are procedural requirements, Section 4(f) ....
of the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 303 ("Section 4(f)"),
imposes substantive requirements on the Department of Transportation and its
constituent agencies (primarily the Federal Highway Administration, Federal ....
Transit Administration, and U.S. Coast Guard). Those requirements include the
avoidance of certain protected resources, where possible, and the minimization of
impacts to such resources, where avoidance is not possible. .J
1. The Statute. What is commonly referred to as Section 4(f) has been
recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 303 and provides:
(a) It is the policy of the United States Government that special
effort should be made to preserve the natural beauty of the
country-side and public park and recreation lands, wildlife and
waterfowl refuges, and historic sites....
(c) The Secretary [of Transportation] may approve a
transportation program or project ... requiring the use of publicly
owned land of a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and
waterfowl refuge of national, State, or local significance, or land of
C - 26
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an historic site of national, State, or local significance (as
determined by the Federal, State, or local officials having
jurisdiction over the park, area, refuge, or site) only if-
(l) there is no prudent and feasible alternative to using that land;
and
(2) the program or project includes all possible planning to
minimize the harm to the park, recreation area, wildlife and
waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from the use.
Judicial Intemretation.
a. Substantive standard. The seminal case interpreting Section 4(f) is
the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). In that case, the
Court found that Section 4(f) is a "plain and explicit bar to the use
of federal funds for construction of highways through parks-only
the most unusual situations are exempted." Id. at 411. "The few
green havens that are public parks [are] not to be lost unless there
[are] truly unusual factors present in a particular case or the cost or
community disruption [that would] result[] from alternative routes
[would] reach[] extraordinarymagnitudes." Id. at 413. See 23
C.F.R. § 771.135(a)(2) ("Supporting information must demonstrate
that there are unique problems or unusual factors involved in the
use of alternatives that avoid these properties or that the cost,
social, economic, and environmental impacts, or community
disruption resulting from such alternatives reach extraordinary
magnitudes.")
b. Review standard. In reviewing Section 4(f) compliance, a court is·
to consider first "whether the Secretary acted within the scope of
his authority," and second, whether the ultimate decision was
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law." Id. at 415-17. In applying the arbitrary
standard, the court must engage in substantial inquiry in order to
determine whether the agency, in its conclusions, made a good
faith judgment after considering all relevant factors, including
possible alternatives or mitigation measures. Coalition for
Responsible Reg'l Dev. V. Coleman, 555 F.2d 398, 399-400 (4th
Cir. 1977). The reviewing court will accord substantial deference
to the agency's findings, but must undertake a "thorough, probing,
in-depth review" and canvass the facts of Section 4(f) cases
"searching[ly] and careful[ly]" because the reviewing court is
entrusted to "ensur[e] that the agency looked hard at the pertinent
facts and thought hard about the relevant factors." Citizens
C - 27
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AaaiPit BUrtipatM ¥, rBUNY, 9a8 Flad l~O~ aoa (Diel Cir, 1991).
Nonetheless, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one-the
court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
Identification of Section 4(t) Resources
J
a.
b.
Historic properties. An historic property is consider;ed a~'Sectioljl
4(t) resource" if it listep 911, :or detennined to be eligible for listing
on, the National Register :of Historic Places. See.~, 23 'C.F.R. §
771.135(e).
Parks. recreation areas. wildlife and waterfowl refuges. Unlike ,"
historic properties, which may be considered Section 4(t) resources
whether publicly or privately owned, parks, recreation areas, and
wildlife and waterfowl refuges must be publicly owned in order to
qualify for protection under Section 4(t). Generally, the subject
property also must evidence indicia ofpublic access and use.
I
1
...,jj
4. Defining "Use" of a Section 4(t) Resource
A Section 4(t) resource may be "used" by a proposed project either
through a "direct use" of the land or through a "constructive use."
a.
b.
Direct use. A direct use occurs "when land is pennanently
incorporated into a transportation facility" or "when there is a
temporary occupancy of land that is adverse in tenns of the
statute's preservationist purposes . . .." 23 C.F.R. §
771.135(p)(I)(i), (ii).
Constructive use. A "constructive" use occurs "when the
transportation project does not incorporate land from a section 4(t)
resource, but the project's proximity impacts are so severe that the
protected activities, features, or attributes that qualify a resource
for protection under section 4(t) are substantially impaired.
Substantial impainnent occurs only when the protected activities,
features, or attributes ofthe resource are substantially diminished."
23 C.F.R. § 771.135(p)(2) (emphasis added). See 23 C.F.R. §
771.135(p)(4), (5) (discussion of when constructive use does and
does not occur). (NB: A "constructive use" is just as much a use
of the property as a "direct use," and the statute and regulations do
not call for any different treatment of the two.)
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6.
Avoidance Requirement.
An alternative that entirely avoids Section 4(f) resource must be selected
unless it is not "feasible and prudent."
a. Prudent. An alternative is to be considered "prudent" if it will
meet the transportation needs of the project. The DOT Act "is
similar to NEPA in that the agency bears the responsibility for
defining at the onset the transportation goals for a project and for
determining which alternatives would reasonably fulfill those
goals." Citizens Against Burlington, 938 F.2d at 203-04; see also
Committee to Preserve Boomer Lake Park v. Dep't of Transp., 4
F.3d 1543, 1550 (lOth Cir. 1993) (holding that "[t]he inability of an
alternative to accommodate future traffic volume is justification for
rejecting that alternative" and that "[s]afety and cost concerns are
also valid considerations in rejecting an alternative"); Hickory
Neighborhood Defense League v. Skinner, 910 F.2d 159, 164 (4th
Cir. 1990) ("Alternatives which will not solve or reduce existing
traffic problems may be properly rejected by the Secretary as not
prudent"); Coalition on Sensible Transp. v. Dole, 642 F. Supp.
573, 598 (D.D.C. 1986), affd, 826 F.2d 60 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(noting that many courts have concluded that an alternative may be
rejected as imprudent for failure to fulfill the traffic needs of a
highway project).
b. Feasible. An alternative is feasible if it is capable of being built,
given current engineering standards. This is generally not a source
of great controversey.
Minimization Requirement.
If there is no "feasible and prudent" alternative that would entirely avoid
the use of Section 4(f) resources, the agency then must undertake "all
possible planning to minimize the harm" to protected resources. However,
the statute has not been interpreted to require the agency to use all means
technically possible to minimize harm to the Section 4(f) resources.
Rather, under Section 4(f)(2), the agency must "utilize a balancing process
that totals the harm caused by each alternative so that an option can be
selected which does the least total harm." COST, 642 F. Supp. at 599
(quoting Druid Hills Civic Ass'n v. Federal Highway Adm'n. 772 F.2d
700, 716 (lIth Cir. 1985»; see also Conservation Law Found. V. Federal
Highway Adm'n, 827 F. Supp. 871, 883-84 (D.R.I. 1993), affd, 24 F.2d
1465 (1 st Cir. 1994) (noting that § 4(f)(2) calls for simple balancing). The
agency may freely choose between plans causing substantially equal
damage to Section 4(f) resources. See Druid Hills Civic Ass'n, 772 F.2d
at 717.
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C. Other Statutes
1. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: Many public and private projects
require permits from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for impacts to
"navigable waters," including wetlands, under Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344. Because the issuance of such permits
constitutes federal action, NEPA compliance is generally required for such
actions. The Corps' Section 404 regulatory program contains its own
substantive environmental standards, most notably in the EPA-
promulgated "Section 404(b)(I) Guidelines," 40 C.F.R. part 230. These
guidelines require the analysis of alternatives and measures to avoid,
minimize, and mitigate impacts to aquatic resources. Care must be taken
to harmonize the alternatives analysis requirements of NEPA and Section
404, as well as the evaluation of environmental consequences.
Current Hot Topics:
• "Replacement" Nationwide permits: These permits will restrict the
use of nationwide permits in situations in which Nationwide Permit 26 '!
could have been used formerly. To the extent that individual permits j
are required, NEPA compliance issues are complicated.
2.
3.
• NEPA1404 "merger": Efforts are being taken in some agencies to
integrate the NEPA process and 404 permit process to ensure greater
predictability and coordination between the two review processes.
Endangered Species Act: Section 7 of the federal Endangered Species Act
("ESA") requires consultation by federal agencies with the U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service (where
appropriate) to ensure that their actions are not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered or threatened species or result in
the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat. 16 U.S.c. §
1536(a)(2). Again, compliance with Section 7 of the ESA generally must
be coordinated with NEPA review efforts.
Environmental Justice: Executive Order 12898, "Federal Actions to
Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income
Populations," requires that "each Federal agency make achieving
environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as
appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health and
environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority
populations and low-income populations." The memorandum from the
President to the heads of departments and agencies specifically recognized
the importance of NEPA procedures for identifying and addressing
environmental justice concerns.
C - 30
IJil
·1
I
..J
i
,J,
J
1
..J
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
I
r
r
r
r
r
AVOIDING CRIMINAL LIABILITY
IN ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS
Marc S. Murphy
Stites & Harbison PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
Copyright 2000, Marc S. Murphy
SECTIOND
:1
J
J
I
.J
J
.J
!
J
I
J
:J
J
J
j
1
J
J
j
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
AVOIDING CRIMINAL LIABILITY
IN ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION D-1
II. MODERN CORPORATE CRIMINAL LAW:
THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE
AND OTHER DANGEROUS FICTIONS D-3
III. WHAT COUNSEL SHOULD DO BEFORE THERE IS AN INVESTIGATION D-4
IV. WHAT COUNSEL SHOULD DO UPON BEING CALLED BY THE CLIENT D-4
"Y. CONCLUSION D-7
ATTACHMENT A: SUMMARY OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE
EFFORTS FOR FY 1998, United States Environmental Protection Agency
Press Release of March 26, 1999 D-9
ATTACHMENT B: SELECTED RECENT CASES INVOLVING CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
FOR VIOLATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES,
United States Environmental Protection Agency Press Releases D-11
ATTACHMENT C: SUMMARY OF CRIMINAL PROVISIONS AND PENALTIES FOR
KNOWING VIOLATIONS OF MAJOR ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES D-17
ATTACHMENT D: SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY BEFORE FEDERAL GRAND JURY
AND TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS,
Environmental Investigation Example D-19
ATTACHMENT E: "THE PROS AND CONS OF SELF-REPORTING"
FACTORS IN DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF
SIGNIFICANT VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE OR
DISCLOSURE EFFORTS BY THE VIOLATOR,
U.S. Department of Justice, Document 102, July 1, 1991 D-23
ATTACHMENT F: "LEGAL ADVICE LETTER" D-27
ATTACHMENT G: GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM TO UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS
ON THE BRINGING OF CRIMINAL CHARGES
AGAINST CORPORATIONS,
U.S. Department of Justice-June 16, 1999 D-29
SECTIOND
JJ
J
J
;
..
.J
J
.J
."
,J
.J
The first days of a federal criminal investigation are usually the most important, yet, they
often occur without the assistance ofcounsel. As a result, your most important work may
actually be accomplished before there is any formal charge. Educating your clients to make
them sensitive to these issues, and to their need to call you immediately, is the most valuable
thing you may ever do for them.
INTRODUCTION
a. Relevant statistics
A review ofselect recent cases can be a sobering and important exercise for your
clients. (See, Attachment B).
D-l
A brief summary of criminal provisions and penalties
Criminal enforcement of environmental regulatory violations continues to rise. In
1998, 266 criminal cases were referred to the Department of Justice, and $92.8
million in criminal fines were assessed. (See, Attachment A)
i
I~/i.d:~ ,
.
"'Your rtsumistates that whileyou were G.E.O. no onegot busted.•
Marc S. Murphy
Partner, Stites & Harbison
b.
AVOIDING CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS
I.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
,,
....
i
c. Perspective - what is happening and why it is happening ..l
• Your clients are businessmen and women. They do not consider .~
themselves people who should have to know how to deal with the most .....
dangerous and most powerful branch ofour government: the criminal
investigator and prosecutor.
.-;
• Your clients are probably successful businessmen and women, who pride
themselves on having dealt successfully with people of all kinds as they
were building or growing their companies. They have dealt with the ....
government before, too, generally successfully. This will give them a
false sense ofsecurity and confidence that is dangerous under these
circumstances. i
..l
• The investigators and prosecutors do not care whether your clients have
'ibeen good and successful corporate citizens before now. In fact, the better
.J
and bigger the business, the bigger the professional challenge to the
prosecutor and those who investigate for him or her. j
• Know this: if the prosecutor believes that your client committed a crime,
he will think ofhim as the enemy, and as a bad person, or a bad company. .~
:]
He will consider it his sworn duty to convict and punish him. This is
.J
inconceivable to your client, who MAYBE has a parking ticket or two.
• Finally, it is likely that your client has no idea that regulatory violations J
can be punished as crimes.
d. 'Vhy the "first days" are so important ,
..l
•
•
•
•
•
•
Before the government arrives, they have been working on the
investigation for a long time - they have a huge head start.
They will use that head start to their advantage - and try to catch your
client and hislher employees and agents off-guard. You can "gird" them
against this.
The government investigative team will often arrive as a SWAT Team,
and create an atmosphere of fear, distru~t and panic among employees.
The investigators will arrive with a subpoena or search warrant and will
begin the execution of it immediately.
The press and media will also often learn of the investigation or search
and the company is usually ill-prepared to respond to inquiries or to put
the appropriate spin on the case.
The investigators will attempt to obtain statements from key personnel
before they "lawyer-up".
D-2
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rc. What type of compliance program does the corporation have? Is it followed?
Who is in charge?
b. In a heavily-regulated industry, the law presumes that the corporation knows
the law and regulations that apply. The corporation is presumed to be aware of everything
that is being done on its behalf by even the most lowly of employees.
d. Corporate Criminal Liability: the corporation can be charged with conduct
that was committed by a low-level employee, even if it is contrary to instructions by the
company, as long as the company benefitted in some way from the conduct.
a. Is your client in a heavily-regulated industry?
The only foolproof approach is to hire a full-time environmental
consultant.
Is there a designated compliance officer? Is that person qualified and
trustworthy? How does that person feel about federal prison?
• Memories fade. People do forget what they tell the authorities.
The breadth and depth of the subpoena
For practical purposes, your client should assume that the government will
demand the production ofnearly everything. (See, Attachment D) The lawyer
(not the client) should negotiate the tenns of the response. The primary goal of
counsel and client is to keep live witnesses from the grand jury.
• Does your client make paint, food, drugs, contract with the government, or
discharge matter into the sewers or into the air?
• Does your client have a good handle on the regulations that, in fact,
govern his industry?
•
•
• The working relationship between the company and the government will
often be established, for better or worse, during those first few days.
MODERN CORPORATE CRIMINAL LAW: THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE
OFFICER DOCTRINE AND OTHER DANGEROUS FICTIONS
Let us reflect upon Mr. Hanousek.
e.
e. The responsible corporate officer doctrine.
II.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r,
r
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III. WHAT COUNSEL SHOULD DO BEFORE THERE IS AN INVESTIGATION
a. The pros and cons of self-reporting (see attached Dept. ofJustice, Document 102,
Attachment E).
b. Address all of the questions and issues in section II, above with the client.
Consider it a "corporate check-up".
J
J
c. Good employment law practice can prevent bad environmental law experiences.
•
•
•
•
Many criminal investigations begin with an anonymous complaint, often
from "disgruntled ex-employees". Endeavor to not have any "disgruntled
ex-employees".
In lieu ofthat, conduct appropriate exit interviews;-as permitted by
relevant labor law principles and statutes. The employees should be asked
whether they are aware of any conduct - by the company or by any
individuals - that is violative of the relevant regulations. They should be
asked ifthey had heard any rumors or hearsay of any such conduct.
If the answer to any such questions is "no", that person is unlikely to ever
be an effective witness against the company. (Although this does not
necessarily prevent the anonymous complaint OR the fact that the
government will pursue the criminal investigation upon purely regulatory
or minor violations even if the original complaint is false).
lithe answers to any of the questions are "yes", then immediate and
documented action should be taken.
J
J
jj
.J
J
d. Finally, you must convince your client to call you immediately upon the arrival of
a subpoena or an investigator at the company premises. JJ
IV. WHAT COUNSEL SHOULD DO UPON BEING CALLED -BY THE CLIENT
."
il
....
a. Immediately advise the client to not talk, under any circumstances, with the
government agents. It is permissible, also, to advise him to tell his employees that they do not
have to speak with the government agents until you arrive, or, ever. It is their personal decision.
(It's not likely that the government will attempt to conduct any formal interviews on site that day,
anyway. They prefer to be "alone" when they do their interviewing.) A sample letter to your
client is attached as Attachment F.
I
-
client.
b. Get all ofthe facts ABOUT THE INVESTIGATION over the phone from the iJ
• What type ofdocument was he served with?
D-4
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r
r
r
r
•
•
Have him fax everything he has received from the government to you
immediately.
Who is there? Which agency? How many? Who is in charge? Have him
obtain identification/calling cards from all ofthe principals. The likely
agencies will be:
r
r
(i) The EPA
(ii) The state regulatory agency
(iii) The FBI
Ask to speak immediately with the lead investigator.
Call the supervising Assistant U.S. Attorney.
• Keep track ofthe documents that are being taken and reviewed.
• Advise him that you represent the company and, as much as they may be
considered to be speaking for the company, the employees. Advise him
that no one should be interviewed without your knowledge or presence,
and that you are on your way to the scene (if this is practical).
- - -
Find out immediately who has already spoken with the agents.
Determine precisely as possible where the agents have been, where,
physically, they are conducting any investigation or sampling, who is
escorting them from the company, if anyone.
(iv) An "escort" agency (state or local police)
•
•
• Obtain as much information as possible. You won't get much. You will
likely be referred for all ofyour inquiries to the supervising U.S.
Attorney's office, and a particular Assistant U.S. Attorney. His or her
name may also be on one or more of the documents that were served upon
the client.
c.
d.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
,.
I
•
•
•
•
Advise her that you represent the company, etc.
Advise her that no one should be interviewed without your knowledge and
presence.
Tell her that you are on your way to the site of the investigation.
Ask her everything about the case
r
• Promise her cooperation
r
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• Ask for a meeting as soon as possible, with her and the agents. She would
not likely meet with you outside the presence ofthe agents, anyway.
.:'
I
."
e. Go to the site of the investigation.
•
•
•
Take as many people as you can. The more bodies the better. Take a
video camera and a still photo camera. Take a dictaphone.
Your initial task will be to retrace and recreate, as best as possible, the
government's work to that point. Normally it will have been substantial.
You can accomplish a lot in that regard on that first day.
Follow the investigators around. Look over their shoulder. Have your
business cards ready and available. Videotape the actions of the
government agents. Pinpoint, especially, the precise points of any
sampling that is taking place. DEMAND SPLIT SAMPLES.
• Dictate what you observe immediately.
•
•
VERY CAREFULLY SUPERVISE THE PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS FROM COMPANY FILES. You mayor may not be able
to observe this very closely. But, your client has a right to a return on the
search warrant and an inventory.
Ensure that the scope ofthe warrant is not being exceeded. BE AWARE
OF AND AVOID CASUAL EXTENSIONS OR ENLARGEMENTS OF
THE SEARCH WARRANT. "Cooperation" doesn't = "being nice". .
J
f. Ensure that when the investigators leave, "their" crime scene is preserved
before it is disturbed, especially with regard to samples. Endeavor to duplicate those samples
(even if split samples were taken) as soon as possible, to duplicate the same environmental
conditions, etc.
g. Do a complete inventory of documents and items seized. j
h. De-brief all employees who had any contact, even non-verbal, with the
investigators. You may not have seen everything.
D-6
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r
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Theproofwas in thepudding. hut thepudding was ruled inadmissible as e'lJidmce. »
v. CONCLUSION
The Justice Department tells us who they will prosecute ahead of time. (See, Attachment
G). We might as well take advantage of it.
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ENFORCEMENTANDCOMPLMNCEA~URANCEPROG~
mGHLIGHTS FY 1998 EFFORTS
ft EnA United Stateso rM Environmental Protection Agency
Headquarters Press Release
Washington. DC
EPA announced today that 266 criminal cases were referred to the Department ofJustice
and $92.8 million in criminal fines were assessed in fiscal year 1998. EPA also referred
411 civil cases and assessed $91.8 million in civil penalties. The combined 677 referrals
and $184.6 million in fines and penalties were second only to the 704 referrals and
$264.4 million in fines and penalties assessed in fiscal year 1997. The Agency also
reached settlements to recover $230 million in Superfund Trust Fund expenditures. For
the third year, the Agency reported performance measure data on pollution reduction
amounts J:Csult from enforcement actions. The data show that during FY 1998
. chlorofluorocarbons were reduced by over five million pounds, asbestos by more than
seven million pounds, carbon monoxide by 188 million pounds and nitrogen oxide by
23.6 million pounds. About 46 percent of the civil enforcement settlements required
violators to change the way they manage their facilities or reduce emissions or discharges
into the environment, while another 54 percent required violators to improve their
environmental management systems, take preventive action to avoid future non-
compliance, or to enhance the public's right-ta-know. Also, polluters spent just over $2
billion dollars to correct violations, take additional steps to protect the environment, and
clean up Superfund sites - over $200 million more than was collectively spent the
previous year.
As a part of EPA's compliance incentive policies and strategies in FY 1998, at least 200
companies disclosed potential violations at 950 facilities under the auspices of the
Agency's self-disclosure (audit) policy and 63 companies have corrected violations at 390
facilities. Since the inception ofthe audit policy, a total of450 companies have disclosed
violations at 1,870 facilities and relief was granted to 164 companies at 540 facilities that
returned to compliance. Working in partnership with business and labor, EPA created
five new National Compliance Assistance{:enters for the paints and coatings industry,
small and medium sized chemical manufacturing, transportation and printed wiring board
industries, as well as one for local governments. There now are nine compliance
assistance centers. In another emphasis on compliance assistance, EPA published nine
new Sector Notebooks - a series of industry-specific multi-media profiles, which helps
tJ.
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Date
Published:
Title:
03126/99
ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM
IllGHLIGHTS FY 1998 EFFORTS
FOR REL~ASE:FRIDAY,MARCR 26, 1999
owners and operators of regulated industries understand their regulatory obligations and
identify ways to run their businesses more economically and efficiently. There are now a
total of28 Sector Notebooks. During fiscal year 1998, EPA also took a major step in
furthering the Administration's "public right-to-know" efforts by establishing the Sector
Facility Indexing Project. This project made environmental data publicly available on 653
facilities in five key industrial ~ectors - automobile assembly, pulp manufacturing,
petroleum refming, iron and steel production and primary smelting. The information
mcludes the size ofthe facilities, their aMual estimated release ofchemicals into the
environment and their historical compliance record. A summary ofmajor criminal and
civil enforcement actions and compliance activities, as well as, enforcement highlights
for FY 1998 are available upon request. Information regarding the Compliance Centers,
Sector Notebooks and Sector Facility Indexing Project, can be accessed at:
http://www.epa.gov/oeealbgs2.html.
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ft EnA United Stateso rM Environmental Protection Agency
Headquarters Press Release
Washington, DC
Date 0211012000
Published:
Title: ALABAMA MAN PLEADS GUILTY TO
CLEAN WATER ACT VIOLATION
FOR RELEASE: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY-:IO,2000
ALABAMA MAN·PLEADS GUILTY TO
CLEAN WATER ACT VIOLATION
Joseph Magazzu of Mobile, Ala., pleaded guilty on Feb. 2, in U.S. District Court in
Biloxi, Miss., to violating the Clean Water Act (CWA). Magazzu was the former
environmental coordinator for Morton International's Moss Point, Miss., plant which
produces synthetic rubber, sealants, adhesives, plasticizers and rocket polymers. The
plant has a CWA permit to discharge treated industrial and sanitary waste water into the
Escatawpa River. Magazzu admitted that in July 1995 he falsely reported the amount of
fecal coliform bacteria in the wastewater, which was 31 times the amount allowed under
the permit. High levels of fecal coliform bacteria in surface waters can cause a variety of
infections in people who are exposed and can harm birds, aquatic life and wildlife who
come into contact with the water. When sentence~ Magazzu faces up to two years in
prison and or a fine up to S250,OOO. The case was investigated by EPA's Criminal
Investigation Division and the FBI. The case is being prosecuted by the Environmental
Crimes Section ofthe U.S. Department ofJustice and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the
Southern District ofMississippi.
ft EnA United Stateso rM Environmental Protection Agency
Headquarters Press Release
Washington, DC
Date 0211012000
Published:
Title: ALASKA OIL EXPLORAnON FIRM SENTENCED
IN HAZARDOUS WASTE CASE
FOKRELEASElTHURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2000
ALASKA OIL EXPLORATION FIRM SENTENCED
IN HAZARDOUS WASTE CASE
British Petroleum Exploration (Alaska) Inc. (BPXA), was sentenced in U.S. Federal
Court in Anchorage, Alaska on Feb. I. to par S500,OOO in criminal fmes for failing to
report illegal hazardous waste disposals in Violation ofthe Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act. BPXA is a subsidiary ofBP Amoco, p.l.c.,
which is the third largest oil company in the world. From 1993 to 1995, employees of
Doyon Drilling. a contractor ofBXPA, illegally discharged hazardous substances,
including solvents, waste paint, paint thinner and waste oil containing lead and toxic
chemicals such as benzene, toluene and methylene chloride by injecting them down the
outer rim ofoil wells. All ofthese chemical contaminants make groundwater resources
undrinkable. BPXA failed to report these illegal injections as soon as it learned of its
contractor's conduct as required by CERCLA. Also, BPXA was ordered to establish a
nationwide.environmental management system to prevent future violations after
admitting that it failed to provide adequate oversight, audits and funding to ensure proper
environmental management at its Alaska facilities. This management program will cost
an additional SIS million to implement. A court-appointed environmental monitor will
ensure compliance with the management plan durmg a five-year probation term. Doyon
Drilling and three of its employees were previously convicted and sentenced. BPXA has
also paid S6.5 million in civil penalties in a related case. This case was investigated by
EPA's Criminal Investigation Division and the FBI. It was prosecuted by the
Environmental Crimes Section ofthe Department ofJustice and the U.S. Attorney's
Office for the District ofAlaska.
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FORRELEASE: THURSDAY, JANuARY ZO, ZOOO
COMPANY AND EMPLOYEE PLEAD GUILTY
TO CLEAN WATER VIOLATIONS
Chemetco Inc., a Delaware corporation, pleaded guilty to one count ofconspiracy and
one count ofviolating the Clean Water Act at its secondary copper smelter near Hartford,
Ill. The plea was made on Jan. II in U.S. District Court in East St. Louis, Ill. Chemetco
also pleaded no contest to charges that it made false statements to EPA and to the Army
Corps of Engineers. The charges arose from the installation ofa secret, illegal discharge
pipe at the smelter. From September 1986 through September 1996 the secret pipe was
used to discharge pollutants such as zinc, lead and cadmium into Long Lake, a tributary
of the Mississippi River, without a permit. In sufficient quantities these pollutants can be
harmful to fish and aquatic life and can make water undrinkable. When sentenced,
Chemetco faces up to $2 million in fines. The case was investigated by EPA's Criminal
Investigation Division, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Department of
Transportation, the Illinois State Police and the Illinois EPA. The case was prosecuted by
the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Illinois.
FOR RELEASE: THURSDAY, DEC: 22, 1999
AMERICAN AIRLINES TO PAY 58 MILLION FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE
VIOLATION
American Airlines, the nation's second-largest air carrier, pleaded guilty on Dec. 16 in
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Miami to violating the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act by illegally storing hazardous waste. The plea agreement
calls for American to pay a fine of$8 million and establish a court-supervised hazardous
materials safety program at every airport where American accepts cargo for shipment.
Two million dollars ofthe fine will be paid to the Miami-Dade Fire Department to
enhance its hazardous materials division. In its plea, American admitted that it illegally
stored a container ofDioxital at an American facility in Miami. Dioxital is an oxidizer
that can explode when it comes into contact with heat. Employees ofAmerican Airlines
violated federal law when they failed to properly dispose ofa drum ofDioxital that was
partially consumed by fire in Miami when its lid blew ofTafter it was taken from an
American flight that had arrived from Mexico City on July 27, 1995. After the fire was
put out, they also illegally stored the drum and remaining Dioxital at the Miami airport
for more than three years. The case was investigated by EPA's Criminal Investigation
Division with the assistance ofEPA's National Enforcement Investigations Center, the
U.S. Department ofTransportation Inspector General's Office, the U.S. Customs Service
and the FBI. The case was prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern
District ofFlorida.
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WWW.USOOJ.GOVTDD
ALLIED ENVIRONMENTAL CONVIcrED OF CONSPIRACY TO DUMP
WASTEWATER
Allied's President and a Trucking Company Officer Also Convicted in the Scheme
WASlllNGTON, D.C. - A federal jury today convicted Allied Environmental Services,
Inc. and its president with conspiracy to dump more than 300,000 gallons ofwastewater
contaminated with petroleum into underground wells - an activity that can pollute
drinking water. The jury in Tulsa, Okla., also convicted the owner ofOverholt Trucking,
which transported the wastewater to Oklahoma.
The jury found that both Allied Environmental and its president, Koteswara Attaluri,
conspired to violate federal clean water and hazardous waste laws and committed fraud.
Federal prosecutors identified Attaluri as the leader of an illegal scheme to dump the
wastewater into injection wells in Oklahoma. The jury also convicted Overholt Trucking
owner Mac DeWayne Overholt for the same conspiracy and fraud charges, as well as
criminal charges under the Clean Water Act and Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act.
"We are pleased with todays verdict," said Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General
for the Environment and Natural Resources Division. "We will continue to vigorously
prosecute cases involving threats to our nation's drinking water."
To protect underground drinking water sources, the Safe Drinking Water Act prohibits
the unauthorized use of injection wells that are associated with oil and gas production. As
part of its environmental consulting business, Overland Park, Kan.-based Allied was
involved in the removal ofunderground storage tanks and petroleum-tainted wastewater
from military facilities in Kansas and Missouri.
"Protecting drinking water is vital to the health of the American people," said EPA
Assistant Administrator Steve Herman. "Criminal disregard for public health and the
environment will not be tolerated. Today's action should serve as notice that clean water
and hazardous waste laws will be enforced and will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of
the law."
The government charged that Allied and Attaluri arranged with Overholt to transport the
wastewater to Oklahoma and inject it into wells in Cushing, Beggs, and Lincoln County
without a permit issued by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission.
The scheme occurred over a IS-month period during 1994 and 1995 and involved the
disposal ofmore than 310,000 gallons ofpetroleum-contaminated wastewater into
injection wells.
The defendants will be sentenced on January 31, 1999 in U.S. District Court in Tulsa.
They were immediately jailed following the verdicts today. The remaining defendant who
was charged in the case. Allied employee Gary Bicknell, was acquitted today.
The case was investigated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Criminal
Investigation Divsion; the Department ofDefense, Criminal Investigative Services; and
the Oklahoma Department ofEnvironmental Quality. It was prosecuted by United States
Attorney Stephen Lewis ofthe Northern District of Oklahoma and Senior Trial Attorney
Andrew Goldsmith ofEnvironment and Natural Resources Division ofthe Justice
Department.
ft EnA. United Stateso rM Environmental Protection Agency
Headquarters Press Release
Washington, DC
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE ENRD
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BP Exploration (Alaskal Pleads Guilty To Hazardous Substance Crime
Will Pal' $22 Million, Establish Nationwide Environmental Management System
WASHINGTON, D.C. - BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc. today pleaded guilty to one felony
count related to the illegal disposal ofhazardous waste; on Alaska's North Slope, and it
agreed to spend $22 million to resolve the criminal case and related civil claims, the
Justice Department announced.
BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., or "BPXA," admitted in U.S. District Court in Anchorage
that it failed to immediately notify authorities ofa release ofhazardous substances to the
environment, and it agreed to pay the maximum criminal fine of$500,000. As part of the
plea agreement, BPXA also admitted that it failed to provide adequate oversight, audits
and funding to ensure proper environmental management on Endicott Island, Alaska.
Under the terms ofthe plea agreement. the U.S. subsidiary ofBP Amoco p.l.c. - the third
largest oil company in the world - will establish an environmental management system at
all ofBP Amoco's facilities in the United States and GulfofMexico that are engaged in
the exploration, drilling or production ofoil. This system will be the first of its kind in the
oil industry to result from a federal prosecution.
"This has been one of largest and most complex criminal investigations ever conducted in
Alaska," said Robert Bundy, U.S. Attorney for the District OfAlaska. "The case
underscores our commitment to investigate and prosecute violations ofenvironmental
laws. Corporations that benefit from Alaska's resources must also be good stewards of
Alaska's environment."
The federal government and BPXA today also agreed to a civil'settlement involving
related environmental claims. The settlement, filed in federal court in Anchorage,
requires BPXA to pay $6.5 million in civil penalties to resolve allegations that BPXA
illegally disposed ofhazardous waste and also violated federal drinking water law.
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BP Exploration [Alaska] Pleads Guilty To Hazardous Substance Crime
Will Pay $22 Million, Establish Nationwide Environmental Management
System
''This case forces a company that should have known better to do better," said Lois J.
Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General for Environment and Natural Resources at the
Department ofJustice. "Our goal is to deter such violations by all oil companies."
The criminal plea and civil claims stem from the in~ection ofhazardous wastes on
Endicott Island over a three-year ~riod beginning In 1993. The manmade, gravel island
northeast ofPrudhoe Bay was budt for the purpose ofextracting and processing oil
reserves under the Beaufort Sea. Endicott Island is operated by BPXA, which contracts
with Doyon Drilling Inc. to drill oil-producing wells there.
From 1993 to 1995, Doyon Drilling employees illegally discharged waste oil and
hazardous substances by injecting them down the outer rim, or annuli, of the oil wells.
BPXA failed to report the illegal injections as soon as it learned ofthe conduct. in
violation of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act. The illegally injected wastes included paint thinner and toxic solvents containing
lead and chemicals such as benzene, toluene and methylene chloride.
Steven A. Herman, EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance, said, "Rules governing the proper management ofhazardous waste apply
everywhere, but it's ofcritical importance in areas like the North Slope. It is absolutely
essential that oil companies aggressively self-police their employees and their contractors
working in remote places."
In April 1998, Doyon Drilling pleaded guilty to IS counts ofviolating the Oil Pollution
Act. Doyon agreed to pay a $1 million fine and spend $2 million to develop an
environmental compliance program and environmental training program for employees.
Three Doyon employees were convicted in 1998, and one was sentenced to a year injail.
George Burttram, FBI Special Agent in Charge in Anchorage, said, "The FBI places a
high priority on investigating environmental crimes in Alaska. This investigation
demonstrates our commitment to dedicating the necessary resources to ensure that
corporations and individuals are held accountable for their actions. The FBI will continue
to investigate these complex cases in cooperation with other federal law enforcement
agencies."
BPXA spent approximately $5 million to improve environmental management within
Alaska during the criminal investigation, and the corporation has taken steps to cooperate
with the government's continuing investigation. Because ofthese efforts, additional
criminal charges relating to the illegal injections were not filed, in accord with the
Department ofJustice's 1991 Voluntary Disclosure Policy, which grants prosecutors the
discretion to forego prosecution when certain conditions - including cooperation,
remedial measures, and the existence ofan adequate compliance program - are met,
according to U.S. Attorney Bundy.
As a result of the criminal plea agreement, BPXA must use best environmental practices
to protect workers, the public, and the environment. The court will appoint an
environmental monitor to oversee BPXA's nationwide implementation of the $15 million
management system during a five-year probation.
"This case would not be possible without the outstanding efforts ofthe FBI and EPA's
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Criminal Investigation Division and Regional Counsel's Office," Bundy said. "I'd like to
thank the Justice Department's Environmental Crimes Section, especially the leadership
ofDeputy ChiefDeborah Smith, for extraordinary support and expertise during the
investigation." The Department's Environmental Enforcement Section handled the civil
settlement with BPXA.
Both the civil settlement and the plea agreement must be approved by the court before
they become final.
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OIL EXECUTIVE CONVICTED OF VIOLATING TWO LAWS IN MISSISSIPPI
John R. Cooke, an executive and part owner ofM&S Petroleum Inc., which operated the
Barrett oil refinery near Vicksburg, Miss., was convicted on ten counts ofviolating
environmental and other federal laws on July 8, by ajury sitting in U.S. District Court for
the Southern District ofMississippi in Natchez. Cooke, who is from the Houston, Texas
area, was found guilty ofone count ofconspiracy, four counts ofviolating the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), two counts ofviolating the Clean Air Act, and
three counts ofmaking false statements. Between April 1995 and May 1996, Cooke
engaged in a conspiracy to illegally discharge benzene and other pollutants into the
Mississippi River and Hatcher Bayou south ofVicksburg. He also made false statements
to the state Department ofEnvironmental Quality and intentionally failed to perform
required environmental testing at the refinery. An additional result was the release of
benzene into the air. In sufficient quantities, benzene is acutely toxic and a possible cause
ofcancer. In addition, more than one million gallons ofhazardous waste was abandoned
at the refinery in violation of the RCRA law. Cooke can be sentenced to a maximum
imprisonment of 50 years and/or fines ofup to $2.5 million. The case was investigated by
EPA's Criminal Investigation Division with assistance from EPA's National Enforcement
Investigations Center, the U.S. Department ofTransportation, the FBI, and the state
Department ofEnvironmental Quality, and was prosecuted by the U.S. Department of
Justice.
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FOR RELEASE:-FEBRUARY 19, 1999
BROOKLYN MAN AND COMPANY PLEAD TO ILLEGAL
ASBESTOS REMOVAL
Salvatore Napalitano and his company, ECCO Construction Inc., both ofBrooklyn, N.Y.,
pleaded guilty on Feb. 12, in U.S. District Court for the District ofConnecticut in New
Haven to violating the Clean Air Act Documents submitted at the time ofthe plea
agreement indicated that Napalitano and ECCO conspired with others to illegally use
unskilled workers to avoid the cost ofproper asbestos abatement at a former YMCA
building in New Haven in 1997. When,sentenced, Napalitano faces a maximum sentence
ofup to five years in prison and/or a fine ofup to $250,000. ECCO faces a maximum fme
ofup to $500,000. The case was investigated by EPA's Criminal Investigation Division
and is being prosecuted by the U.S. Department ofJustice.
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AUTO SALVAGE COMPANY AND MANAGER SENTENCED
Kempton Brothers Inc., an auto salvage firm operating in the Tampa area, and Robert B.
Kempton, owner and President ofKempton Brothers were sentenced on Jan. 15, in U.S.
District Court for the Middle District ofFlorida in Tampa for violating the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Kempton Brothers was ordered to pay a
$150,000 fine and serve five years ofprobation for its conviction on two RCRA Counts.
Robert Kempton, who previously pleaded guilty to one count of illegally disposing ofa
hazardous waste and one count ofmaking a false statement to a law enforcement officer,
was sentenced to one year in prison and was ordered to pay a $100,000 fine. Kempton
Brothers was in the business ofrecovering and cleaning used automobile~. In the
process, solvents, lacquer thinner and waste automobile fluids such as antIfreeze, oi~
gasoline, transmission fluid and brake fluid were illegally flushed into a gravel-lined pit
At various times, the defendants excavated sludge containing hazardous waste from the
pit and illegally disposed of it by placing it in automobiles destined for the scrap yard.
Groundwater studies conducted by the Florida Department ofEnvironmental Regulation
indicate contamination ofa well at the Kempton Brothers facility with benzene, toluene,
ethylbenzene xylene and other chemicals. Ingestion ofthese substances can cause
damage to the kidneys and other internal organs and benzene from gasoline
contamination is a cause ofcancer in humans. The case was investigated by the EPA's
Criminal Investigation Division with the assistance of the EPA's National Enforcement
Investigations Center, the FBI, the Hillsborough County Sheriffs Department and the
Florida Department ofEnvironmental Protection DiviSIon ofLaw Enforcement, and was
prosecuted by the U.S. Department ofJustice.
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STA'l'OTB ca'DfDfaL ACTS .au.TXU
Clean Air Act Itnowingly fails to pay a riae up to $100,000 aDd/orfee owecS the United States up to 1 year in prison(douJ)lecS for subsequent
42 U.S.C. I 7413 (e) (3) conviction)
Itnowingly makes false rine up to $250,000 aDd/or
statement, rerresentation up to 2 years ~ prison
or certificat on, in any (doubled for s\ll)sequent
application, or falsifies, conviction) .
tampers with or knowingly
renders inaccurate any
monitoring devices
42 U.S.C. I 7413 (e) (2)
ItnOwingly violate a rine up to $250,000 and/or
s\ll)stantive requirement of up to 2 years in prison
the act (such as a (douJ)led for s\ll)sequentl
requirement or prohibition
of an applicable state
implementation plan
requirement)
42 U.S.C. I 1413 (e) (2)
Clean Water Act Itnowingly violates of the rine up to $50,000 per day
Act and/or impriSOlllll8nt up to
3 years (douJ)lecS for
33 U.S.C. I 1319 (e) (2) s\ll)leauent conviction)
CERCLA Itnowingly fails to notify rine of up to $10,000
BPA of existence of aDd/or imprisoament of up
identified facilities to 1 year
42 U.S.C. I 9603 (e)
Itnowingly destroys, riae aDd/or imprisOlllll8rit
dispoles of or conceals of up to 3 years
recorda to be providecS to
the BPA
42 U.S.C. I 9603 (d) (2)
Failure to report a known Fine up to $250,000 and/or
release/ knowingly imprisOlllll8nt up to 3 yean
submitting false (or up to 5 lears for s\ll)-
information sequent CODY ction)
42 U.S.C. I 9603 (b)
RCRA Itnowingly transports to a ,b1e up to $50,000 per day
non-permit facility or and/or .1JIpr.tso%IIIM!Dt up to
knowingly treats, stores 5 years (doubled ~or sub-
or disposes of hazardous sequent CODv.tet.ton)
waste in violation or with
a permit
42 U.S.C. 5 6928 (a) (1)
Itnowingly violates of ,.tne up to $50, 000 per day
other requirements appli- and/or .1JIpr.tso.lllllent up to
cable to the handling of 2 years (doubled ~or sub-
hazardous waste sequent) •
42 U.S.C. S 6928 (d) (7)
~
n
~
n
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STATOTB CRIJIDtUo ACTS PJDtU.TIU
BPCRTn Knowingly v.iolates emer· Pine up to $25,000 and/or
gency notification up to 2 years imprisonment
requirements (up to $50,000 and/or up
to 5 years imprisonment
42 U.S.C. 511045 (b) (4) for SubseqUent conviction)
Violation with respect to Pine up to $20,000 and/or
trade secrets I imprisonment for up to 1
year
42 U.S.C. 511046 (d) (2)
PIPRA Knowing violation by Pine up to $50,000 and/or
registrant, applicant or imprisonment up to 1 year
producer
7 U.S.C. S 1361 (1) (b)
XDowing violation by any Pine up to $25,000 and/or
commercial applicator of a imprilonment up to 1 year
restricted use pesticide
7 U.S.C. S 1361 (1) (b)
Disclosure of information Pine up to $20,000 and/or
relative to formulas of imprisonment up to 3 years
products with intent to
defraud
7 U.S.C. S 1361 (l) (b)
MPRSA Knowingly violates the Act Pine up to $50,000 and/or
imprisonment up to 1 year
33 U.S.C. 5 1415(b)
Knowingly violates Pine up to $250,000 per
provision relating to day and/or imprisonment up
dumping of _dical waste to 5 years; in addition,
into ocean waters forfeiture to the United
State, of any property
33 u.s.c. 5 lU5(b) derived frCllll any proceeds
Obtained as a result of
the violation and of any
property used to commit or
facilitate the violation
TCS-' Knowingly or willfully Pine up to $25,000 for
violates the statute each day of violation and/
or imprisonment for up to
15 U.S.C. 5 2615(bJ 1 year
!
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5/25/99
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7/7/99 at 12:30 Pili
ROOM NO. 317-
..,.--
HAMI. ADDRESS ANJ Il'ttONE ........ f1I ASSISTANT U" ATTOlIICY
SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY
BEFORE GRAND JURY
... ."._.,. :.. ~ • • 0
See Attachlllents.
FEDERAL BUILDING
241 EAST MAIN STREET
BOWLING GREEN, ICY 42101
ca.pllance wUh thb .ubpoena can be ..de by turnbhlnt copl•• of Infol'lUtlon r.qu••ted 1a the au..... to S/A
Libby I..... EndC'Oftllleftt.l 'rotectlOfll At-ncr CJD, clo 'eden1 lutuu of Ibwe.t1,attOft,- 500 "'no L. Mllioll
"",._1 hUdl." .00 Ik. MuUn Luther liftl Jr. 'lec., LoulsdU.., ICY 4Q202, teiliphone $02-S"-H4I, Oft or
befote I/30/ft. for deUvery to the Grand ,Jury.
YOU ARE AlSO COMMANDED to bring wtth you lhe fOllowing documenl(l) or*(1):·
SUBPOENA FOR:
o PERSON ki,rocuMENT{S) OR OBJECT(S)
YOU ARE HEREBYCOMMANDED to appear and lestlly before lhe Grand .My oIlhe UnIIed Slates Dlslr1d Ccut alll1e
place, dale, and lime epecIlIed below. •
JOHN L. CAUDILL
510 WEST BROADWAY, 10'" FLOOR
BANK OF LOUISVILLE BLDG.
LOUISVILLE, ICY 40202
iVi:I
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ATTACHMENT A OF SUBPOENA FOR:
- 2 -
YOU ARE ALSO COMMANDED to bring with you the following
document(s) or objects(s):
tj
N
o
A.
I • INSTRUCTIONS
This subpoena requires that your company: through an
authorized, knowledgeable representative, appear before
the Grand Jury at the time and place specified and
produce to the Grand Jury all documents described
herein.
In lieu of personal appearance before the Grand Jury,
the documents may be submitted by personal delivery to:
special Agent Libby Zuege
EPA-CID
600 MLK Place
Rm 500
Louisville, KY 40202
(502) 569-3848
by 10 AM on June 30, 1999 or at such earlier time as is
convenient to you and the above identified
SA Libbey Zuege.
If you desire to comply without personal appearance,
each submission responsive to a paragraph or
subparagraph must be accompanied by a separate
affidavit.
Return of the documents should be accompanied by a
bate stamp, index, or outline, clearly stating the
specific Paragraph listed below to which the returned
documents are responsive.
director., officer., employees, ~present.tive.or
agents. Without. limitation on the term ·contro1,· a
document is deemed to be in your control if you have
the right to secure that document or a copy th.reof
from another person.
C. TIME: un1e.s oth.rwis. stated, this d.mand for
documents is limited to document. pr.pared., written
sent, dated, received or in effect at any time from
January 1, 1994 through the date of the aubpoena.
D. Any document demand.d by the subpoena that is withh.1d
on a claim of privileg., or oth.rwi...._t be
preserved.. If the document contains privileg.d
mat.rial, produc. the .ntir. document with the
privileged mat.ria1 deleted. For any document or any
portion of a document withheld under a claim of
privileg., submit a .worn .tatement from your counsel
or on. of your employe.s in which you identify the
document by author(s) addresse.(s), date, number of'
page., current location, and subject matter; specify
the nature and basis of the claimed privilege and
paragraph of this demand for document. to which the
document if responsive; and identify .ach person to
whom the document or its contents, or any part thereof,
was disclosed. "
E. If you claim that any of the required documents listed
below have already been returned pursuant to an earlier
subpoena, please ind.icate when and where.
F. If you have any questions regarding the .cope, meaning
or intent of these document demands, contact: Daniel W.
Dooher, Trial Attorney, Environmental Crimes Section,
(202) 305-0351 and/or John Caudill, Assi.tant U.S.
Attorney, (502) 625-7103.
B. Documents to be produced include all documents in the
possession, custody or control of your company,
wherever located, including documents in the
possession, custody or control of your company's
L~~,," L,,"~,"," l"4., 1_= l.M~ L_ l_~ L_,. L_ L,_ l-.~,# L_~... 1_.,,_ L~~.-. L~ __.~__~ L...."," L,__--__ L .._~. l_.
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II • DOCUMENTS TO BE PRODUCED
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1. Any and all documents. including memoranda. tabulations.
inventory sheets. used to estimate the volume of the discharge of
"910.000 gallons with possible contamination of styrene and
Ethyl-Benzne." as nported to the Kentucky Division of Water.
Department of Natural Reaources and EnvironmentilliliProtection. in
a letter dated Pebrua 19 1999 an e1gned by Plant
Manager. (Attachlne •
2. Any and all documents. including memoranda. tabulations.
production ncords used to estimate the time of the d1echarge
dates of "I April 1997 and 12 Pebruary 1999." as reported in the
letter referenced in Paragraph 1.
3. Any and all documents •. including memoranda,
environmental assessments, test nsults used to make the
conclusion "Bxpected environmental effects are minimal." as
reported to Kentucky Division of Water. Department of Natural
n r t ction. as reported by_
in the letter refere~
including cherts and memoranda that
rate structure and relationship
memoranda,
o
• I
• • • • • I; . .! -, ....~._ • , ,
5. Any and all documents. including and all production
records. requisition records. time sheets. inventory sheets. that
document the chemicals and subs
roduction in BUi,,-
4. Any and all documents. including and all production
records. time sheets. inventory sheets, production orders. that
document th<
Building 3.
located at
t:l
tv
.....
7. Any and all documents. invoices. purchase orders.
manifests. that document the disposal of solid and liquid wa
from oDerations and Droduction in Buildinq 3. located at the
Jl:r
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ATTACHMENT E
"THE PROS AND CONS OF SELF-REPORTING"
FACTORS IN DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS
IN THE CONTEXT OF SIGNIFICANT VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE
OR DISCLOSURE EFFORTS BY THE VIOLATOR
- U.S. Department of Justice, Document 102, July 1, 1991 •
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(rederal, state or local authorlty~ had alread,y obta.lned lalowledle re,al'd1Dg 1l0DOOmpU_
alICe. A dl.clo.ure Is Ilot collSlclei'ed to be ·voIUllt&r7' IC Ulat dlsolosure q &1read,y 'pecICI-
callY required by law, regulatloll, or pel'lll1t.·
B. CooperatlOD
The attorlley ror the Departmellt should colllider the desree and tlmeUlls.s or
cooperatloll b;y the persOIl. I'uJl alld Jl1'Ompt coopel'atloll q ....Ilual, whether III the COil-
text or a vOIUlltal'J' dlsclosure or aRel' the ,_enl IIu lIldePJlldell&J.y le&l'lled or a
vlolstloll. COlllldel'atloll should be IllV.D to the VIolator's WSlllIIIlu.s·to make all rslevant
InformatloD (1Il01ud1llll the complete relU1&8 or~ IIltel'll&1 01' ex&e1'll&1 IIlves&lllatloll and
the ll&IIle. or all poteDtl&1 wilDess.s) aVallable to IlOVtl'lllllellt IIlYe'&lIl&tors and J!l'O.ecu-
tor•• COllllderatloll should auo be Illv.1l to &he ex&ellt and quall&7 or the .Y1ola&or'. allis·
tallce to the IlOvel'lllllellt'. IIlve'&lIl&uolL .'
c. Pre",,",," MelllJlPO' IDd caMpl1tDCO !MUIJD'
The attol'Dey for &he Departmenl should 00IlI1der the a:1eteIlce and scope of~
regu1&l'lzed, IIlt8llllve, and comprehellIlft ell'ltl'onmemar fOmpllaDoe prl'1lI'am; noll a
PI'OIlI'&IIl III&J' 1IlO1ude' &Il 81lVlI'oIlm.1l&al _pU- 01' mID~·&iIdB.P&I'Uou1aI' con-
sldel'atloll should be lllvell to whether the _pUance.01' &lIlia PI'OIlI'&IIl lIloludee 8IIftlo1ellt
measure. to ldellUf)' aDd PNvem future~ and wM&IIu the JII'OlINIIL was
adop&ed Iia Il!J!Id f&1th .1Il a UIDeI,;y _. . • .
COmpU&Doe pl'OllI'&IIlS III&J' V&I'J' but the follo1rSDll (llISUODa sbould be ubel III evaluM-
1IlIl~ pl'OllI'am: WU there a iI&I'oDIl 1IlIUtaUoDal· polld;r to~ wfth all en'ltl'ollZllen&al
requll'emen&8? 'Bad .afell\l&l'd8 ~Dcl &hose I'SClldNd by uIIt1DI law been developed and
Implemellted to prevem IlOllOOIIlpl1anol fl'OlD -mDIl? w:- there rellu1&l' pl'ClOlld1ll'e',
lnoludlJll' lIl&el'll&l 01' .ex&e1'll&1 _pU&lloe and ID&D&(emID& aud1U. to enl1J&te, dMeol,
pNV'llt &Ill!. l'emec17 CllI'OWII8&&DOI. llke &hoM that led to the -.apl1&Iloe? Were t.htIre
pl'OOedures and eafellU&l'd to ensure the IIltell$T. ot aDT audl& oollduoted? Did &he aud1\
evalUte all 1IOIU'C8' of poUutloD (Le., all medla), 'lIlolDdlDll the poesllllllt7 of 0I'0IHDedI&
tl'&lllfsrs' of. poUutaDle? W'N &he &Dcl1tol'" l'8OOIIII!IadUlODll lIIt.pIemeDY4 III a UIDeI,;y
fashloll? Wei'll adeqUate~ oomml\ted. &0 the &lIdftIDI~ &Del to Implemen&1llll
1&8 reoommelld&\toDI? Was .Yll'oIlm8ll&al _pna- a~ 117 wtdoh emp1o;yel &Ild
COz1lol'lte depa1'tllle~ ~o_ was 'JudIledf . .
D. Addltlon" !toto" n,cb Kay be B'1«r,"'
I. porq."YlDo.. Or I'gnoomplllpoo
Pervasive IIOIl_PU&lloe ...,. lDclloate .;yItemlo 01' Npeated pUuolpaUoll III 01' coDdoDl-
tlOD .or 01'liDliaal behavlol'. It ...,. auo lIldloate &he laot of a Iilea.D1DIlflIl _pU&llol pro-
1lI'am. In· 'evalWLUng thU faotol', &he a&tol'Dey for the~t.ebould _ideI', &IIlO1lIl
other '~' ,&he ~UII1bel' ~~ or emp1o;yele ~.IIl'&he 1UI1&wful aeunue.
and the'o~, .. ~,II1IIort..,~ or _pllaDoe.
I. 'IpternaJ'- DflqipJ'Dm .AliJon
meouv.~,'~ aGUoIl.li·CIl'lIIlI&l &6'ioD,J:~'~ The atWro-
he;y fa;··&IIi 'ibilal4·ociD.ildel' .WIUithel' u-e' was ·an·. etreou..,. QfteI!l .of dlI01-
pUlle for emplo:v-. who ,solated opmp&117. 8IlYlrODmen&al plIpapll&IIlIe'~' DtiI &he
~~,~~~llIh aJi..&w8.reuN.1Il o&1Ia'.~ UW UDiawful ooDduat
woiIld' iQoC'lIe ......:.-.......!
~. ApbMQulDt ~1'ii;' itrgrt.j '.' _ . .
!he a&to,nl~~~.',~d ~1!1e1' ~Mot,·.~a:::.al'&e~":ed,y~'01lllO!DI' . '" '~' .' .' ...,P~~ •.:. '!PIll.. ..~•.. wq.~'1nOJ~~'U:koe~·.~.~~1lo~~~~·::7ftr:~~
. . ~ "OOd:f: etrqrJ SO· '" "iill~&al":""~~~,W1&tifidei'al or~~~ue.;··OP·~·i'an~i'u&noe"WithiUliJ('~ IhOill4 be·... 'f.. IIl.Uq
d'lClJIloIl wheth.r to proaeoute.
m.. AppJtMttgD "or ThO" "etan to JlYPOtlu!ttc&J BiampJnI '.
Th••e _pies are lIl&ended to ...lJIt federal pl'Os_ton thell' ezel'OlJle of dlIcreUon
III eVal~t1llll eDvlrOllIIlen.tal. caslll. The slt;ua~ facl,nll pro.eou&orl, of OOUl'tIe, .preseDt a .
w1de val'letJ' of fac& PI&&erlll. '!'herefoN, III a lllYeD CUe, lOme or the Cl'ltel'la III&J' be
satlJlfled while other. III&J' DOt.. KONOVel', .atUfaoUon or v&l'loul Ol'ltel'la III&J' be a _&tel'
of desree. COIll8qUen&J.T, &he etrect of a "ven mIX of faoloN &110 11 a IDI&tel' of dellNe.
In the Id.al 'Ituatloll, IC a -JIUIT tu1JT mNle all of &he ClI'lterla, the relQft III8Y be a
decllloll IlOt to pl'O.eoute that -JIUIT 0l'IJI:l1Il&l1T. Bveo IC .atuf&OUon of the Ol'lteI'U 11
Ilot complete, lUll the oomJl&lll' m..,. 1IeDem III tel'lll8 or clIsree or eDt_at re,pollle
by the IlOvel'lllllen&. '!'he followlDl ~tIOal eump1el &I'll lD&eDded &0 lUuItl'&&e &he
operatloll of the.e IlUJdeUllee.
Iumple J.
ThU q &he Ideal cue In tel'IU of Ol'ltel'la satufaotloll &Del COIll8qusot PI'O.ecutloll
leDlellOJ'. . .
I. ComP~ A NIlu1&I'I,y coDcluo&e a _PNheDllYe aadlt of J&I compl1&Diie wfth enn-
• I'OllIIlental requll'elDeDle. .
a. The audlt UI100YeN lIlfol'lDlUon a1loat _p1oJ'eee' dlIpoe1llll of Ilual'doue wane. by
dump1llll them III an UIlptl'lllMe4 looaUoD.' .
3. AD IIltel'll&1 comJl&lll' Inveatlll&UoD oollflnlll ~ ad' 1IltlIl'm&Uo~ (DepeDcl1llll UPOIl
&he DI&ure of the audit, thU tonow-up~ III&J' be 1IIIII8Ge.,ar.r.)
4. Pl'lOI' to the YlO1&UoIlI the·-JI&IQ' had a eOII!I4-oomsm- JIl'OIll'&III, wbJah In-
o1Dded aIe&l' pollolel. IIIlploJ'M tI'&1IllD& &Del a IIoWDI tOl' 81UpeCIted~.
8. As ._ u the -JI&IlI' 00IIf1rIDe UI8 'ficIl&UoU. It d1Io1aHI aD JI8I'UDID' lIII'ol'Iu-
UoIl to &he appl'Opl'late~ &CIII01l It 1JIIdel'&&bI ~na- p1aJmlDc WlUI.
that .,ellOTo and It. 0&1'1o'1II 0Ilt n&lIt&Otol'J' _ecl1dloIl.-
e. The comJIUIT altO 1IDIlel't&kee to OOl'l'llllt &rrI taIN lIlfOl'lD&tlOD prntGaIlo7 n1IlDltted
to the ,overnment III NlaUOD to the YlOlaUolll.
7. Intel'll&UT the oomJl&lll' dUolpllllee the _p1oJ'eee aotualJ,;y 1IlVOlved III the vlo1&Uolll,
lIlOlud1DIl &rrI eup8l'VU01' who was lu: III preven&1llll 01' deteGttIIC the 1oClllvlV. .AlIa. &he
oom~ revleWe RI oompl1&llOe Pl'OIlI'am to deterIDlDe IIow &he Ylol&tIoDI 'Upped 117
&Del col'l'eO&e the we&kD••es tDaDcl 117 thd l'nlew.
8. '!'he~ dl.eo1oIes to ~ COVernmeDt the __ of the~ aot;aaIJ.7
retpoDllllle fOl' the Yla1&Uolll, &114 It oooperatee wl&h the lOftl'mDeDt 117 PJ'OVidIIlIl
clooumellt&UoD _e&17 &0 the lDftItlpUoD of &bon~' ' .
11Dde1' theN~ OCImJl&lQ' .A would. etu4 a &COd o1I&Doe of beIDI taVOl'&bI,y
COI1I1derlId fOl' Pl'OI"QtoI'lal 1eIIleDa7, to the ateDt of 110& belDI~~
at an. '!'he deIlI'M of~ leDleDq. 1Iowenl', m..,. tul'D upoa ot.hel' re1AIftDt tactol'll DOt
'~ de&lt wfth In theee iIUlde11Ilee.. . .
171mB" I- , j
At the oppoelte eDcl of the eoau q OomJIUIT Eo whloh mNle tew ot the lll'ltel'lL The
1llI:ellhoo4 or~ 1eDleIlq, theNtore.. Ie NIIIOte.~ZOe.~ ...,.
1Ilclude &rrI of the tollDwlDC: .
1. B_ an 8IIlPlO7M 1IU UIN&teIuId to repoft .. vlo1atoloIl to tedel'&l .&1Ithol'lt.lee; the
-JIUIT q .atl'&I4 thd'!ImIUCUON m..,. beClIl·Joo1dDC.u IL. .AD &1lilI1CIe'~
but It t_~ 1IpclIl the parUoal&r.~ 1IDOrIDI.U18 ponlblllV U1U·the
Ylala&l9D 11III' be lDdlcl&Uft of· wfdeeprea4 In U1e:0J0flu'lM.'. .
a. .After ~leu1l1l the &1IdIt,.0ClIIIIl&rrI z repozte UI8 'fSOl&UIiu .d!IIcioftioed to the
.--. ... .
3. '!'he~ had a _pll&Doe JIl'OIll'&III, lid • 'was 'en:~ Do 1DlJioe. t.1I&Ii a
oolleoUoDof paper. "0 dol't Ie JIi&de to dlsMIIIIDate RI. iioDteDt,.lm~ upon em.PJo:Y-
_ Jte'e111Dl"Mn oe, k'&lD_~ III US applloaUoD, OI"~"lI:'8"__'eDtIuOlL
.. BveIl after.~ of the ftl1&UoD·the 6aJDp&IQ"'~DO':e«m'to~
. 1&8 oompl1&Me prooed!Il'eL . .
'8. '!'he -Pau.7 mabI DO tam to _e··to.&4tl'IU wWi...~ NP.l'\UiIIliII vJola-
.UoDI. It~NI1I&e:&rrI remedlsl·~k &Ild~fttUu.tiI·N'ut 8&DIItloU•
'e. B_ue of the _pU&lloe;IDf~81IIJIIIftteCl'to.~ ·.Over ~. inN
IIu been -tel'l&lJ.T 1ZLIccDrI&e,~~a··~f~'~,'of the -P&D:Y'.~ _pU&Doe eltu&UOD. The '~p&II,J' t ..... to talrA! ui,y: I&epItQ:ocil'l'eot th&& lD&oc1l-
\'&07. , .
7. The COlllJIUIT doe. IlOt coopel'fo&e ·wUh·~ IIlldellto1l1lDl·&bon timp1o;yele
(lDo1ud1llll lII&DIIlen) who aotu&llt were IIlY'Olved III the Yla1&Uoll, and It ....U&e.
dlsolosure of &rrI clooum'D&8 re1&tlDIl either &0 the VlolUIODII 01' to thtl J'lIIPOIlI1llle
lImplo;y.... .
EP~ Enfoft:ement__ 0cI0ber 1993
L._ l~_ L_._ L_4~ L=_ L_ L._.x., L-.~ L ..._ L_. L~%,., L_... ~ L.~ L~",_ L,~._ L_ L.-~ L-.. l .."....
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VI
In tbese clrcum8t&ncee leDlen07 18 unWteIT· Tbe onIT positive &CUon ill tbe .o-called
audlt, but tbat wu .0 narrow17 f0CU8ed as .so be of que.tlonable nIue, and It wu under-
taken onIT to bead off a poI.lble orlm1ll&l Inv••tII&uon. Otberwl8e, the ocmpaa.J' c1eIIlon-
strated no gooc1 faith either In terms of oclhpU&nce eftoN or In us18t1ng tbe COVel'lllll.'Dt
In obtalntng a tun understandInC of the vlol&Uon anc1 d1Icover1lll ltB .ource••
Nonetb.l.s., the.e factol'l dII DOt u.ure a CI'1m1Il&1 prcaecu~n of, Compaa.J' Z• .u Witb
CompaD3' A.. above, oth.r olrCWUt&DOe. ma)' be pre.ent w1I1ch &!teet the balance .truck
b7 prosecutor.. Per example, the efteet of the vtolaUCn (bec&W1e of substance, duraUCn,
or amount) ma)' be .uch that pro.ecutor. WOII1c1 DOt oonald.r It to be &11 approprlate
orlm1n&l cue. Ad.m1JI1.trative or olvU Proceec1lDCl m&7 be oonalc1ered a more approprlate
Nsponae.
Qtbor Drlmp!,,· Between these extremes there 18 a raace of po••lbWtl•••.. The prel-
.noe, absence, or degree of &lI7 orlterlon 111&7 &!teot th. prcaecuucn" exeralae of c1Iacre-
tlon. B.low are .ome exempl.. of suoh eftectl: .
1. In a .Ituauon otherwtl. IImI1&r to that of Comp&D3' A, abov" ComP&D,J' B performe
an audlt that Ia ver'7 limited In .oope anc1 probabIT rel1ect1 DC more tban an eftort to
avoid proiecuUCn. DespltB that b&oJtcroun4, ComP&D,J' B Ia ocoperau~ In terms of both
brlDClnC ItI.lf Into oompUlnce anc1 provlc1lllC lnform&Ucn re'&rc1lJIC·the orlme anc1 ·ICI
perpe&r&tcrl, The result ccuI4 be aa.J' of a Il1IDIber of CIIdoom.., lDclucIlDlI prosecution
of a 1••er char,e or a c1eolIlOn to prc.-" the lndlvlc1u&1l rather than the -p&D3'.
2. AlIalD the .ltuatlOn 11 IIml1&r to ComP&D,J' A'., 1nI1 ComP&D,J' C refWI.. to rensl
aa.J' lnformaUon reprd1Dll the lDd1Vl4u&1 vlOlatora. !flI8 1lIte1lhocc1 of the COvel'lllll.W'1
prosecutlnll the oomp&D3' are lUbeteDU&1J.T IncreuecL .
3. In another .Ituatlon 11ID11&r to Compaa.J' A'., ColpPaa.J' D ohocl.. to ".It on" the
audlt aDd take ocrreDUve &CUon Without teWnll the scv.rnmelll. The ,ov_ent learne
of the .ltuaUCn monthe or 7- after the fact.
A compUcat1lll fact here 11 that envlronment&! rell\ll&tCr'7 prolP'&ml are ••If P01lOlnll: thl)'
Include a subeteDUal number of report1lll requ1rementl. If reports whlOh In fact pru.nte4
fala. lnformaUOD are &llowec1 to IIt&Dc1 unocrrecte4, the rellabWt;y of tblI qstem 11 unc1er-
mined. The)' elIo 111&7 lea4 to a4vern &lid UDf&1r lmpactl upon other m_bere of the
regulated communlt)'. For _p1e, ComP&D,J' D f&11ec1 to report c1IacharlI" of:Z: contaml·
nant Into a munlclpal ....r l)'ltem, 4l8ch&r,.. that WIre termlD&tec1 u a result of an
audlt. The ....r authorlt;y, tbcJulIb, ItDow1DlI onIT that there ha" been _Ive lOa41IIII
of :z:, but DOt 1mcl1rlnlI that 00mJlUQ' D wu a _, t.lCh&eDI 1lmJt&Uons upon &ll JaIown
.ources of :z:. TbuI, &ll of thoI. source. 1IlclUr a4d1tlODIl trlltment ezr,anse., but ComPaa.J'
D Ia un&ftected. Ha4 ComP&ll7 D revealed Itl au.ut reBUltl, tlW other _p&Dle. would DOt
bav. BUttered UIlIlece"&r<7 expIneel.
In .om••ltuatlons, moreover, fallure to report 11 a crIm•• Baa. ..... 33 U.S.C.
11321(b)(8) and 42 U.S.a. 19803(b). To lUuItrate the efteet of tblI factor, ocnalc1er
Compaa.J' B, wblOh ocnduotl a tbol'OUllh audlt anc1 flDdI that ha&udouI wutel ha" baen
c1IaPOled of b)' clumP1lll them on the lIrDW14. The -Paa.J' c1.&DI up the area anc1 tIlIht-
ana up Itl oompUance pro8ftlll, but 4oe. DOt. rensl the .ttu&Uon to rellUlatore. AlBUm1III
that a report&b1e~ of to IIu&rc1ODI IUbIt&DCl ....releUe4, the -P&D,J' was· unc1er
a 1.,al ob1lll&UOn uDc1er 42 U.s.C. 19803(b) to report that re1eUe U _ u It ha4
ItDCwlec1lle of It, thereb)'.aI1oWIDlI regulatoN the opportwIlt.J' to UllIN proper 01_ up.
COmP&D,J' B'. 1mcl1rlnlI failure to report the re1eue upon~ of It 18 Itself a fo1oD3'.
In the 0&11I. of both ComP&ll7 D and ComJl&D3' JI, ooulc1er&UOD WCUl4 be ~ven b)' prca'
ecutore for remed1&l' eftortI; henoII pro.llCUUOll of·f_ or.111_ charlIeI! mllIht reBUlt.
However, ·becauIe Comp&D3' D'••n- &4veree17 &ftectec1 otheN wbo.· are entWecf to f&1r
regulato1'7 treatment and'becluee Com~:B..e1eprln4 tboI.1elIall7 relJ)Cl$lble.for evaln-
at1lll cleanup neec1I of the abWt;y to c&n'7 .out their f\uIctIoJI8o!.the likelihood or· thelr
tot&lJ.T 'eecaplnll crtm1Dal proBecu~n 11 .~tIT red.\IOec1.
4. ComP&D,J' ,.....uen ...1mI1&r to-that.,of ComPaa.J' B. However•. With reprc1 to
th. v&rloue vlOlatlOns shown b)': the auc11t, ~ ,000000000tel•.upon~ ,0DIT the
.uler, lee. expeDllv" len 'llPdflcant. &m!lDl them. ItI lacIta4rJI1ciI, approach.to oor-
recuen dOlI net make It a Bt.rOIllI~te for:-'!'Il1eDC)'.
8. CoDlpaa.J' G 18 .1mI1&r to ComP&D,J' D In that It performs &11 aucm an4 flnc1e vlol&-
tlODI, .but dOlI· DOt brlnll tbBm ~. the gov'l'IIIII.ll!It'. &tteD.tIOn. ftoIe vlOlatlODl do DOt
Involve fallures to ocmPI7 With repol'UD( ,reqUlrementl.~ ocmJlUQ' un4ert&ltee a
procram: of cra4ualJ.T ocrrecttng Itl vlolaUona. When th. conmment 1._ of the
IltuatloD, Compaa.J' 0 lUll has DOt remec1led Itl molt .!lIDltlO&nt vlOlatlOns, :but c1&1DlI
tbat It c.rt&1D1T planned to get to them.· ComP&D,J' G could receive .ome CODllc1eraUcin
for Its etrorts, but Its ranure to c1Iaclose anc1 the I:JWDeSS of Itl remec1l&l work prob-
ably mean tbat It canaot expect a substantial decree of l.nl.n07.
8. Compr.h.nslve audltl are CODlld.red positive efforts toward ,coc1 faltb compllance.
How.v.r, such audltl are not Inc1llpeDlable to enforc.ment lenlan07. Comp&D3' JI'.
Iituation 18 ...entl&l\F Id.ntlcal to that of Ccmpaa.J' A, except ror the fact that It doe.
DOt I1IllSertIb a ocmpreh.nelve aUd1t. It 4oe. not hav. a formal aUd1t prccram. but,
u &.part or Itl efforts to .naure oompUanc., doe. reaIIH that It 18 commlttlng an
envlronmental vlolatlOn. It th.reafter take. lteps oth.rwtle Id.ntlcal to tho.. of Com- .
P&D,J' A lD term. or compU&Dc. .ftorts anc1 cocperaUCn. ComP&D,J' H 18 &lao a UlteIT
C&Ild14&te for lelllel1llJ', lDc1uc1lllC poSSlbIT DC crlmln&1 prolecuUCn.
III IUID, mlUll&t1III eftorts ma4e b)' the regulated OC_UDlt;y Wlll be reocllnlZed &Dc1
.valuated. 'l'he creater the .howtllll of 'coc1 falltb, the more llIte17 It WlU be met With
1.nlan07. CoDvereeIT, the lei' ,coc1 faltb .hown, the Ie•• UlteIT that prc.ecutorlal c1Iaore-
tlon Wlll tellc1 toward. 1eDIa1lC7.
IV. HAture or 'btl GU'dance _. .
T4Ia lIUl4&noe explalnl the current ,eneral prlCUce of &he Departm.nt lD m&lt1lll
CI'1m1Il&1 proeecuUve &lid other declllOns after lllV1lll oonalc1eratlOll to the orlterla c1elcrlbec1
abov., u WIn U &Il7 other crlterla that are relevant to the exerc1Ie of orlm1ll&l
.pro.ecutortal 4l8cretlOn In a partlcular cue. ThIa 4l8cUIs1On Ia &11 expre••lon of, &Dc1 In
DC W&J' c1epartl from, the joDI trIdlUCn of ex.rclllnll prclecutorlal 4l8CretlOn. The 4ec1I1On
to prcIecute -,.ner&lJ.T NltI ..nUN!T In (the pro_tor'sl c1IaoretlOn." BPrd.DlrlmJvtr Y.
JI&DI, 434 U.S. a8'7, aM (1878).' Tbl8 4l8oreUcn 11 8IJlIOl&DT nrmJ1' he14 b)' the CI'1ml-
DIl prcIecutor.' 'l'he orIterl& .et forth &bon are Intended 0DIT U lntIrI1&1 lI\1ll1&DClI to
Department of Ju&Uoe ~rDI)'" The)' are DOt InteDc1ed .~, dII DOt, anc1 111&7 DOt be reUed
upon to oreate a rlCht or ben.fit, subltanUve or prcoedural, enforceable at law b)' a
part)' to UtII&tIOn with the United 8t&teI, DCr dII tbe)' In aa.J' W&J' llmIt the lawtul
Utlll&U" prerc,aUve., lnc1Ud1Dl1 clVll enforcement actlOnt, of the Department of JUluee or
the Bnvlronmental ProtectlOn AlI'IlC7. The)' are provl4ec1 to lIU1c1e th. eftectlve us.' of
llmIted enfo~nt resource., anc1 do not derlve from, fIn4 their bula In, nor 0CIIIUtute
aa.J' 1ellal requirement, wheth.r conaUtIltlOllIl, Itatlltor'7, or otherwl8., to foreco or IIIOc1lf7
aa.J' enfo~ent actlOn or the uee of aa.J' eV14enU&r'7 materlal. See PrlDQlp)" or Noral
rm'l'I!J!t!gp (U.S. Dept. of JUlUce, 1980) p. 4; Uult.od Bt.Ata' AttgMllJ" VauulJ (U.S.
Dept. of Jueuee; 1988) 1·1.000.
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'July U, 1997
Mr. John Jones
CEO
Big, Really Big Company
OUrtown. USA
RE: Legal Advice
Dear John:
tJ
I
IV
-..J
DON'T TALK TO ANYONE
FROM THE GOVERNMENT
FOR ANY REASON UNTIL
YOU CALL YOUR LAWYER.
Sincerely,
~
::
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JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE ON PROSECUTIONS OF CORPQRAnONS
u.s. Department or Justice be aware of the Important public benellts that may flOw 0from indicting a corporation In appropriate cases. For
0flIce of the DepulJ Attorney Genenli Instance, corporations are likely to take Immediate reo 2
June 16, 1999 medial steps when one Is Indicted for criminal condUct ..,
MEMORANDUM that Is pervasive throughout a particular Industry, and
thus an Indictment =terovldes a unIqull opportunlty ~ ~TO: Heed. ofDeplrtmenl~. for deterrence on a scale. In addition, a corpo- dAR UnIted Stet.Att~ rate indictment may residt In apecIftc deterrence by
=
.....
FROM: rIIc H. HoId«. k. chanJlng the culture of the indicted c:orporatlon and the t::lSUBJECT: 1"'CIlC CIImInaI Cl\elI.. AI...... CCNpcnt'- beltaYIor or Its employees.-FInaJly, certsIn crimes that ~ ~More and more often, federal e,.rcisecutors are faced any with them a substantial riak~t public harm,"r., environmental crimes or lin al frauds, are 'byWith criminal conduct committed or on behalf ofcor- their nature most likely to be committed by businesses, ~ (')Cratlons. The Department Is committed to prosecuting and there may, therefore, be a substantial federal Inter- ~ t'jth the culpable Indlvlduals and, when appropriate, est In indicting the corpo~tlon.the corporatlol! on whose behalf they acted. • ~The attached cIocument, Federal Plwecutfon of Cor· ChargIng a corporation, however, does nol mean thatporotlons, provides euJcIance u t~ what factors should individual directors, offtcers,em~, or lharehold- ~ 0generally Inform a prosecutor In DllI1dnI the dedslon en should not also-be charged. tlon of a co~
whether to charge a corporation ~arUcularcase. In ration Is not a substitute for the prosecution of crimI. rn ~
I
believe these factors pI'ovlde a fruteworlt In na1Iycul~duals within or Without thecJ:i:i 0 ~which prosecutors can analyze their cues andc:ade ration. ,~tlon 'Of"Indlvldual lDa common~aryfor them to dfscuss their n HabUlty on 1Uch. duals provides a strong deterrent iwith fellow prosecutors, supervisors, and defense coun- agalnst future corporate wrongdoing. ::1-set. These factors are,. however, .not outcome- cOrporations are "legal persons," capable of. suing adeterminative and are only guidelines. Feder8l prosecu· . . and being sued, and capable of committing crimes. Un. lD
tors are not required to reference these factors In i par- der the doctrine of respondeat superior, a.corporation :s ~....tlcular cue, nor are they requlred to Ifocument the may be held criminally Hable for the Dlegal acts of Its 0weight they accorded specific factors In reaching their directors, olftcers, employees, and agents. To be held II· .... ..,
ti decision. able 'for these actions, the government ~ust establish "'" (')The factors and the commentary were developed that the corporate agent's actions (l) were within the = 0I ... ~through the hard work of an ad hoc workingJ;up co- scope of his duties ind (II) were Intended, at least In ....N ~. ~\0 ordinated by the Fraud Section of the Crlmln Division part, to benefit the corporation. In all cases Involvingand made up of representatives of United Slates Attor· wrongdoing by' corporate. agents, prosecutors shOUld Ineys' Offices, the Executive Olftce of Unlted States At· consider the corporation, u well as the responsible In·torneys, and Divisions of the Department with criminal diYiduals. as potential criminal targets.
"'"
t'j t'jlaw enforcement responsibilities. ExperIence With these Agents. however, may a~t for mixed reasons - both = en t::lguidelines may lead to changes or adjustments in. the :sfor self·aggrandlzement (both 'direct and indirect) and lD >text and commentary. Therefore, please forward any for the benefit of the corporation, and a corporation ... encomments about the guidelines, as well as Instances In may be held liable u long as one motivation of Its agent F' ~§which the factorsrf.rowd useful or not useful In specific Is to benefit the corporation. Thus, In United Stotes Y. ... ~cases to Shirah elman, Deputy United States Attor· Automated Medico! Laborotories, 770 F.2d 399 (4th Clr. \0ney, Southern District of New York, and PhlUp Urofslcy. 1985), the court afflrmed the corporation's conviction \0Trial Attorney, Fraud Section, CrIminal Division. I look \0for the actions of a subsidiary's employee despite Its en enforward to hearing comments from the field as to the dalm that the employee was acting for his own benefit, ..,applic~tion of these factors In practice. namely his "ambitious nature and his desire to ascend (') ~FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF CORPORAnoHS the corporate hidder." The court stated, "Partuccl wasclearly acting In part to benefit AML since his advance· 0
I. Char&lnc CorponlUons: Genenll ment within the corporation depended on AML's well· ~ 0being and Its lack of difficulties with the FDA." Simi·A. General Principle: Corporations should not be larly, In United States Y. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241·42 0 ~treated leniently because of their artificial nature nor (1st Cir. (982), the court held, "criminal liability may beshould they be subject to harsher treatment. Vigorous Imposed on the corporation only where the agent is aet· ~ ~enforcement of the criminal laws against corporate Ing within the scope of his employment. That, In tum. ~Wrongdoers, where appropriate, results In great ben· requires that the agent be performing acts of the kind ..,eflts for law enforceme.nt and the public, particularly in which he Is authorized to perform, and th6se acts must ..... >the area of white collar crime. Indicting corporatloris be motlvated-atleast In part-by an Intent to benefit 0 (')for wrongdoing enables the government to address and the corporation." Applying this test, the court upheld 2be a force for positive change of corporate culture, alter the corporation's conviction, notwithstanding the sub-
==corporate behavior, and prevent, discover, and punish stantlal personal benefit reaped by Its miscreant agents, ~white collar crime. because the fraudulent scheme required money to pass
tr:l. B. Comment: In all cases Involving corporate wrong· through the corporation's treasury and the fraudulently
doing, prosecutors should consider the factors dis· obtained goods were resold to the corporation's CUI, 2
cussed herein. First and foremost, prosecutors should tomers In the corporation's name. ~ the court con· ~
~
~
w
o
!=ludeet: "MystIe:-not the individual defendail~
maklns money by seiling 011 that It had not paid for."
Moreover, the corporation need not eftIl necaarily
prollt from Its agent's actlons for It to be held liable. In
Automated MediaJl lAboratories, the Fourth Circuit
..ted:
(Blenellt Is not a "touchstone ofcrfmlnal co!'JlOrate II-
iblJlty; benellt at best Is an evidential, not an opera-
. tIve, fact." Thus, whether the agent's actions ulti-
mately redClUllded to the benellt of the corporation Is
less IIgnlllcant than whether the agent acted with the
Intent to benefit the corporation. Thebasic purpose of
requIrInc that an agent have acted with the Intent to
benefit the corporation, h_. Is to Insulate the
corporation from criminal liability for actions of Its
agents which be InImIc:aI to the Interests of the corpo-
ration or which may bave been undertaken so/.Iy to
advance the Interests of that agent or of a party other
·than the corporation.
Iff. at 407 (emphasis added: quotlns Old MOIIGSkry Co.
II. Urilted Stata, It7 F.2cI105. 908 (tth C1r.). CItt. ..
nled, 328 U.s. 73i (1945».
,
a. CharJllIC CorporaI\ons-FlIClDri .... eoa......
A. Genera/ I'rfndple: Generally, prosec:utors ahouId
apply the same fac:tois In determining whether to
c:narp a corporation a they do with respect to Indi-
viduals. Sec USAM. t 9-27.220, et seq. Thus, the.pros-
ecutor should weigh all of the factors normally consid-
ered In the -..cI exen:lse of proseeutorial judgment:
the sufficiency of the evIc1enee, the likelihood ofsueeess
at trial, the probable deterrent. rehablUtatJve, and other
consequences of convletion, and the adequacy. of non·
criminal approaches. Seeld. However, due to the nature
of the corporate "person," some additional factors are
present. In conducting an Investigation, determIning
whether to bring charses, and negotiating plea agree-
ments, prosecutors should epnslder the following fac-
tors In reaching a dedslon as to the proper treatment of
a corporate target:
I. The nature and seriousness of the o/fense, In-
c:tudlns the risk of harm to the public, and applicable
pollc:tes and priorities, If lIII)', governing the prosecu·
tlon lIf corporations for particular categories of crime
(see section UI,ln(ra): .
2. The pervasiveness ofwronEdolns within the cor-.
poratlon, Inc:tudlng the complicIty In, or condonation
of, the wrongdoing by corporate management (Ifle
section IV, Infra);
3. The corporation's history of slmUar conduct, In-
duding prior c:riminal dvll, and regulatory enforce-
ment ae:tlons against It (see section V, Infra);
to The corporation's timely and voluntary disclo-
sure of wrongdoing and Its wllllngne" to cooperate
In the investigation of Its agents, Induding, If neces·
sary, the waiver of the corporate attorney·client and
work'product privileges (see section VI, Infra);
5. The existence and adequacy of the corporation's
compliance program (see section VII, Infra):
6. The corporation's remedial actions, including
any e/forts to Implement an e1fec:tive corporate com·
pliance program or to Improve an existing one. to reo
place responsible m:u:agcment, to <!lsdpllM or termi-
nate wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate
with the relevant government agendes (see section
VIII, Infra);
12-&99
.i1 ~" Co,!~~.~~ Indandudlnc ~ropor-
onate ....... to: emp not
proven personally culpable (see ACtIon IX, Infra):
and . . .
8. The adequacy of non-crimlnal remedies; such a
civil or regulatory enforcement aetions (see section X.
Infra)·
B. Comment: As with the facton relevant to charglns
natural persons. the forepIJII factors an Intended to
provide auJdanee nther than to mandate a partieuJar
result. The facton Hated In this secdon an Intended to .
be WustratIft of those that ahouId be considered and
not a complete or exhausllve list. Some or aU of these
facton mayor may ftOt apply to IJIedIIc eases. and In
some cues one factor may oYerrlde all others. Further.
national law enforcement policies. In ftrious enforce-.
ment area may require. that more or less weight be
liven to c:ertaIn of these facton than to othen.
In maJcInc a dedslon to eharp a corporation, the
prosecutor generaDy hu ~.'1alJtude determining
when, whom, how. Ind ew:ft Whether to prosecute for
Wllatlons'of Federal crImIna\ law. lDexen:IsInI that
dIseretIon, pI'osecutoiIlhou\d COlIIIder the foIIowInI
pneralltatetnenlS ofpr1ndples that IUlIIIIIUtze appro-
priate considerations to be weJahed aDd cIesIrabIe prac-
tices to be followed In dIsc:harIIng their proseeutorial
responsIblUties. In doing 10, prosec:utOn ·should ensure
that the general purposes of the erimInaIlaw - usur-.
ance of warranted jIunlshment, deterrence of further
criminal conduct, protection of the public from danger--
ous and fraudulent conduct, rehabdltltion of o/fenders,
and restitution for victims and a1fec:ted coDllllunltles -
are adequately met, laIdng Into account the spedal na-
ture of the corporate "person."
m. C!talll1IC a CorporaIIon: Spec\aI Nc1 Conc:ems
A. General Princ:IpIC: The nature and seriousness of
the crime, Inc:ludlng the risk of harm to the public from
the c:rimlnal conduct, are C!bvIously primary factors In
determlnlns whether to charge a corporation. In addl·
tlon, corporate conduct, plrtlcularly that of national
and multl.natlonal corporations, nec:euarlly Intersects
with federal economic:. taxation, and criminal lawen-
forcement poIldes. In applying these prindples. pros·
ecutors must consider the praetices and polldes of the
approPriate Division of the Department, and must com'
ply with those polldei to the exteltt required.
B. Comment: In determining whether to charge a cor-
poration, prosecuton should take Into account federal
law eliforcement priorities a disc:ussed above. Sec I 9-
27.230. In addition, however. prosecutors must be
aware of the sped/lc policy goals and Incentive pro-
grams established by the respective Divisions and regu·
latory agendes. Thus, wherea natural persons may~
given Incremental degrees of credit (ranllng from Im-
munity to leuer charges to sentendng considerations)
for tumlns themselves In, making statements aplnst
thelr penal Interest, and cooperatlns In the govern-
ment'l investigation of their own and others' wrongdo-
Ing, the same approach may not be appropriate In all
drcumstances with respect to corporations. As an ex·
ample. It Is entirely proper In many Investigations for a
prosecutor to consider the corporation'S pre·lndlctment
conduct, ..g., voluntary d1sdosure, cooperation, reme-
diation or restitution, inc1etermining w1aether to seek an
Indictment. However, this would not nec:euarlly be ap-
propriate In an antitrust investigation, In which anti-
trust violations,by de\lnItIon, 10 to ihe heart of the _
porat!on'l busIneiI and forwhlch the Antitrust DIvIsIon
hu therefon ealablIsbed a IIrm policy. understood In
the business communlt)', that eredJt should not be liven
ar the chlrglns Itage for a compliance program and
that amnesty Is available only to the lint c:orporatIon to
make full disclosure to the lovernntfIIt. As another ex·
ainple, the Tax Division hu a atrons preference for
prosec:utlns responsible Individuals, rather than end-
ties. for corporate tax offenses. Thus, In determ1nInc
whether or not to c:hatp a corporadon, prosecuton
should eonsuJt with the Criminal, Antltrult, Tax, and
Environmental and Natural Resciim:es Divisions, If ap-
Jlf'CllPrlate or required.
IV. CIlartInIa CorporaIIon: f'emshll_ of Wroncdo1nI'
Wltldn the Corpora\\on
A. .General PrincIple: A corporation can only act
throulh natural persons, and It Is therefore held re-
spons\bIe for the acts ofsuch persons fairly attributable
to It. CIwIInIa corpontIon foreven mInOr mIseonduc:t
...- be app.......... where the wrtIlII'doInI was pava.
..andwai~by alarp INIIiberqfempl
ees or by.a11 the employees III •~ rale=
the c:orporalIoA,i! ..rem-or,-entotIIc:ers,
or was condoned U 1IIanqemenl. On the other
hand, In certain~ It may not be ap-
propriate to Impose liability upon a corpoi'atlon, p.....
tlcularlyone with a compliance JII'OII'lUIl iii place, under
a strict Ntpondent superior theoIy for the lingle !so-
lated act of a rogue employee. Thete Is. of course. a
wide spectnmI between these two extremes. and a pr0s-
ecutor Ihould exen:Ise lOund dIseretIon In evaluating
the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within a corporation.
B. Comment: Of these facton, the most Important Is
the role of management. Although aets of even low·
level employees may result In crimlnal Uablllty; a corpo-
radon Is directed by Its management and management
Is responsible for a corporate culture In which c:rimlnal
conduct Is either dIsc:ouraged or tadtly encouraged. As
stated In commentary to the Sentenc:tng Guidelines:
Pervulveness (Is) case speclllc and IwllI) depend on
the number, and degnee of responsib IIty. of Indlvldu·
als [with) mbstantlal authority ••• who partidpated
In, condoned, or were wlllfufly Ignorant of the of-
fense. Fewer individuals need to be Involved for a
flndlns of pervasiveness If those individuals exen:lsed
a relatively hlp degree of authority. PervasIveness
can oec:ur either within an arganlzatfon a a whole or
within a unit of an orpnlzatlon.
U.5.S.G. t 8C2.5, comment. (n.t).
V. Char&lllC the CorporaUon: The CorporaUon's Past
HIItoI7
A. General Prfndple: Prosecutors may consider a cor-
poration's history of similar conduct, InclUding prior
criminal, dvll, and regulatory enforcement actions
aplnst It, In detennlnlns whether to bring criminal
charps. .
B. Comment: A corporation, like a natura! person. Is
expected to learn from Its mistakes. A history of simllir
conduct mlY be probative of a corporate culture that
encouraged, or at leat condoned, such conduct, re-
gardless of any compliance programs. Criminal pros-
ecution (>f a col'JlOrlldon mlY be particularly appropri-
ate where the corporation previously had been subject
.to non-crimlnal guidance, warnings, or sanctions, or
p"nYIous afm1naI c:harpI, 'and ,. It 1l\ther had not
taken aclectuate action to ..-. future unlawful c:on.
cIuct orhad continued to enpp In the conduct In spite·
of the wamlnp orenforcement ai:t\ons taken apInIt It.
In mar.:ng this determination, the corporate structure It•.
self• ..,•• sublldiaries or operatIac cIMsIons. lhould be
1pOred, and entorc:ement actIona.==nstthe cor-
poration or any of Its divisions, and aIIIIl.
ales IhouId be considered. 8ft U.s.s.G. t 8C2.5(c:) &
COIIImen!. en. 8). .
VI. .........CoIperaIec Clllp.,..·.... VlllIIlIIaIJ
DlIcfosln •. , .
A. General I'rlndple: In determining whether to
eharp a corporation, that corporatIon'l timely and vol-
.unrary dlsdosure of wroJlIdoInI and Its wlllfngneSs to
cooperate with the pvemment'l investigation may be
.relevant factors. In eauctnI the extent of the corpora-
tion.. coopen.don, theJl.-tot'mayconsider tbe co"':
pontlon"~1cIentIfythe cuIpr\ls within the
CotporatIon, ....eacutIveI, to make wit-
. nessesllftllab1e, to. the COIIIPIete results of Its
Interna\ \nvestIpIIoa, and tllwa1ft the altonIe1-dIent
and -": product pdYI\epI.
. B. Comment: In~ -edoIns by or
within a corporadOlt, a p.-eutor"likeIY to encounter
several obst&des resuldns from the nature ofthe C!OrpG-
radon Itself. It will often be dIfIIcuIt to determine WhIch
individual took which aetiOll on behalf of the corpora·
don. Unes of authority and responsibility may be
shared -Ill operating divisions or departments, and
records and personnel may be sprud throughoUt the
United Stares or even -nssevenI ClIUntries. Where
the criminal conduct continued overan extended period
of time, tJ,e culpable or ItnowIedpabIe personnel may
have been promoted, transfetred, or fired. or they may
have quit or retired. AcconIIngIy. a corporatlon's coop-
eration mlY be critleliin Identlfylns the c:ulprits and 10-
catlns relevant evidence.
In some e1rc:umsranc:es, therefore, crantins a corpora·
don immunity or amnesty may be considered In the
course of the government's InftStlptlon. In such dr-
.eumsranees. prosecutors shou\d refer to the prindples
governing non·prosecutlon aareemenrs generally. See
USAM t 9·27.600-850. Spec:IIICaII1. these prindples per.
mit a non.prosecutlon agreement In exchange for eqop-
eratlon when a'corporation's "timely cooperadon ap-
pears to be necessary to the public InteNtt and other
means of obtaining the desired cooperation are ianavail·
able or would not be effectlve." Prosecutors should note
that In the case of national or multl·natlonal corpora·
tlons, multl-district or lIobai agreements may be neces-
sary. See USAM t 9-27.MI.
In addition, the Department, In conjunction· with
Rgulatory agendes and other execudve branch depart.
ments, encourales corporations, apart of theircompli.
ance programs, to conduct Intemallnvestlgatlons and
to dlsdose their findings to the appropriate authorities.
Some ageneies. such a the SEC and the EPA, a well
a the Department's Environmental and Natural Re-
sources DivIsion. have formal voluntary dlsc:\osure pro-
grams In which self.report!lI& coupled with remedla-
.lion and addldonal criteria, may quaiify the corporadon
l ... "".. l-=-_ 6-, L._ L~,_ l_~ L.~, L,..~..c._. ,~"'= L~..", I,~.~_ ..- L.,,=.=, l"", •...., L"",," L_ L".,.=. l,__~. 1.".".,. L
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for amnesty or reduced sanctions.' Even In the Bsence
of a formal procram. prosecutors may consider a c0rpo-
ration's timely and voluntary disclosure In evaluatln,
the adequacy of the corporation's compliance program
and Its management's commitment to the compliance
proJram. However, prosecution and economic policies
, speclllc to the Industty or statute may require prosecu-
tion notwlthstandln, a corporation's wllllnpess to co-
opente. For example, the Antitrust Division offera am-
nesty only to the IIrst corporation to asree to cooperate.
This creates a stroRJ incentive for corporations partIcI-
patlRJ In antl_petllive conduct to be the IIrst to c0-
operate. In addition, amnesty, Immunity, or reduced
sanctions may not be appropriate where the corpora-
tion's business Is permeated with fraud or other crimes.
One factor the prosecutor may welJh In assessln, the
adequacy of a corporation's cooperation Is the c0m-
pleteness of Its disclosure Including. If necessary, a
'waiver of the attorney-cllent and work product protec-
tions, both with respect to Its Intemal investigation and
with respect to commlllllcations between speclllc oll\c-
era, directors, and employees and counsel. Such wei...
era permit the pvemment to obtain statements of p0s-
sible witnesses, lIUbjects, and targets, without haYlRJ to
neptlate individual·'cooperation or Immunity ."..
ments. In acldltlon, they are often Cridcal In enabURJ
the JOYer1IIIIOIlt to evaluate the completeness of a c0r-
poration's volUlltal)' disclosure and cooperation. Pr0s-
ecutors may, therefore, request a welver In appropriate
circumstances.· The Department does not, however,
consider waiver of a corporation's privilegeS an abso-
lute requirement, and prosecutors should consider the
wllUngness of a corporation to welve the privileges
when necessary to provide timely and complete Info....
mstlon as only one factor In evaluatiRJ the corpora-
tion's cooperation. .
Another factor to be _IJhed by the prosecutor Is
whether the corporation appears to be protectln, Its
culpable employees and agents. Thus, while cases will
differ depending on the circumstances, a corporation's
promise of support to culpable employees and agents~
either through the advancing of attorneys fees,
through retalnin, the employees without sanellon for
their misconduct, or through providing Information to
the employees about the government's Investigation
pursuant to a Joint defense agreement, may be consid-
ered by the prosecutor In _Ighlng the extent and value
of a corporation's cooperation. By the same token, the
prosecutor should be wary of attempts to shield co~
rate omcers and employees from liability by a willing.
ne" of the corporation to plead guilty.
Finally, a corporation's offer of cooperation does not
automatically entitle it to Immunity from prosecution. A
corporation should not be able to escape liability merely
by offering up Its directors, omcers, employees, or
I In .ddltlon, .he Senllndnc Guldelln.. reward voIunt.ry di..
closure '.nd cooper.tlon wi.h • reduction In Ih. corporation's 01·
lens. level See u.s.s.G. 18C2.5"'. ,
• This wal""r should ordinarily be limked 10 th. l.ctu.llnt....
n.1 in_iption .nd .ny cont.mporaneous .dvlce Ii""n to the
corpor.tlon conceminc Ih. conduct.tlssue. Exe.ptln unusual dr·
tumst....... prosecuto.. should ROC s••k. waiver with respect to
communications .nd work product r.l.ted 10 .dvlc. conc.mlnc
Ihe~.mm.nt·s erlminal in....IC.tion.
. Som.lI.t.. require corporalions 10 pay the local I... 01 01·
nan und« illW'ltilltion ,rior to • formal determination 01 their
&\lilt. Obviously•• corporation". compliance with lOyernment law
shoul4 not be considered a failure 10 coopente.
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..ents as In lieu of Its 'own~ Thus, a corjlo-
ratlon'l wlWnsness to cooperate Is merely - relevant
factor. one that needs to be consl~ fn conJunellon
with the other factors, particularly those relatillJ to the
corporation's past hlltory and the role of management
In the wrongdoln,.
va. CIIa....... CaI1IOlIItIea: Corporate CompUInce
rrvcr-
A. General ptfndple:~ proJl'lllll ~ es-'
tabIIshed by COIJIOr.'&te manapment to prllftIlt and to
detect mIIconclud and to ensure, that.corporate ac:tIvI-
lies are concluded In accoi'dlince with. aD applicable
crfmlnal and cIvIIla_. repladons, and rules. The De-
partment enc:ouraps such corporate self-poUcIn& In-
dudInJ voluntary disclosures to the government of any
problems that a corporation discovers on Its own.-How,
ever. the ell1stence of a compliance program Is not suf·
Ilden.. In and of Itself. to justify not charglllJ a COipora·
don for crfmInIl conduct '!JIClertaken by Its olllcers, di-
rectors, employees, or apnts...1ndeed, the commission
ofsuch crimes In !he face ofa compUance JII'OP'UlI may
suaest that the c;orporate. manapmem Is not -ad·
eqU8te\y enforclnJ Its prosram. In ac\dItlon, the nature
ofsome crimes, &,., antItnIIt violations. may~ such
that national law enforcement pollc1es mandate pros-
ecutions of corporations notwI~1RJthe existence
of a compliance prosram.
B. Comment. A corporate eompllance Pl'OJfllll, even
one speclftcllly prohlbltiRJ the very conduct In ques-
tion, does not absolve the corporation from criminal li-
ability under the c10ctrine of respondeat superior. See
United Stoia II. Basle Construction Co., 711 F.2d 570
(4th C1r. 1983) ("a Corporation may be held criinlnally
responsible for antitrust violations committed by Its em·
ployees If they _re actIRJ within the scope of their au·
thority, or apparent authority, and for the beReftt of the
corporation even If ••• such acts were aplnst corporate
policy or expren Instruellons."). Thus, In Unlled Stotes
II. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 19n),
cart. denied, 409 U.s. 1125 (1973), the Ninth Circuit af·
firmed antitrust liability based upon a purchasing agent
for a sln"e hotel threatening a single supplier with a
boycott unless It paid dues to alocll marketing associa·
tlon, ....,. thOUfh the 0fent's octlons were cOntrol)' to
corporate polley and directly ofOlnst express lnsl7uc-
tlons (rom his luperfOrs. The court reasoned that Con-
gress. In enaellng the Sherman Antitrust Act, "Intended
to Impose liability upon business entities for the acts of
those to whom they choose to delegate the conduct of
their affairs, thus stimulating a maximum effort by own·
ers and managers to assure adherence by such agents
to the requirements of the Act...• It concluded that
"general policy statements" and even direct Instruc-
-tlons from the agent's superiors were not sumcient;
• A1thouch this case and Basfe Corutn<cIIon .re both .ntRruII
cu... their reuonlnc .pplies to other criminal vIoIallons. In tha
HIRon CU., lor lnatance.the NInth Circuit ROCed that Shennan Act
vIolatlona ore commercial ollenses .USIIOIIy IftOllvated by ~ desire
to enhance prollts,· lhus brineinc th. case within lhe normal ruJa
that • "purpose to _lit the corporation Is necessary 10 brine th.
• C.nl's .elS within the acopa of his .mpJo1ment." 467 F.2d.t 1006
.. n.4. In Iddklon, in Unlled Stala v. Automated Medicall.oboro·
lGries, 770 F.ld 399. 406 n.S (4th Cir. I~IS), the Fourth Circuk
IIlled that _ ConslrUClion lI.t.. a cenerally.ppllcable ",I. on
corporat. erlmlnal tiabmc)' ~..plt. the llelt.... k .-.. vIoI.-
tlons 0' the .ntlt..... rules.·
"Appellant could not pin excuipatlon by IssuInJ sen-
era! Instructions wltho,ut undertUln, to enforce those
instructions by means commensurate with the obvious
risks," See also UnIted Stoia II. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871,
878 (9th elr. 1979) ("(AI corporation may be liable for
the acts of Its employees done contrary to expren In·
structIons and pollc1es, but ••• the existence of such in-
structions and policies may be considered In determln-
In, whether the employee In fact acted to benefit the
corporation."): UnIted Stoia II.Am~n RadIator "
Standard Sanltory Corp.. 433 F.2d 17. (3rd Clr. 1970)
(alllrmIRJ convlc6on 01 corporation based u5tsoll1-
cer's arlid In prlee-1\xInJ ICMme. te cor-
poralon's=that olllcer'. conduct ¥lo Its
"rlJld anti-fraternization policy" ....nst any soclallza-
tlon (and exchange of price Information) with Its com·
petitors; "When the act of the agent Is within the scope
of his employment or his apparent authority, the corpo-
radon Is held IeJIIIy responsible for It, althOUJb what
he dld may be contrary to his actIW Instructions and
may be unlawful"). '
WhOe the Department recoplzes. that no C!HDPIl8nce
JIt'OIIUI can everprevent all CrImInal aetlv1ty by • COl'
jIoratlon'. emp1oJees, the critical factors In evaIuat1nI
anyproJraIII are Whether the prVJram Is adequately de-
alped for maximum etrectMnea In prevent!nl and
detectlRJ WI'OIIJdoInl by employees and whether COl'-
porate manllllment Is enforclRJ the~ or Is tac-
Itly encouraglnJ or pressurInJ~I~ to engage In
mIIconduct to achleve business ObjectIVeS. The Depart-
ment has no formal Juldellnes for co~rste compli-
ance programs. The fundamental questiOns any pros-
ecutar Ihould ask are: "Is the corporation'. compllence
proJram well designed?" and "Does the corporation's
compliance program _ric?" In answerInJ these ques-
tions, the prosecutor should consider the comprehen-
siveness ofthe compUance proJl'Ull, the extent and p8'"
vaslveness of the criminal conduct, the number and
level of the corporate employees Involved, the serious·
ness, duration, ~d frequency of the misconduct, and
any remedial actions taken by the corporation, Includ·
Ing restitution, disciplinary action, and revisions to cor·
porate compliance proJramS." Prosecutors .hould also
consider the promptnen of any disclosure of wrongdo-
Ing to the government and the corporation'. coopera·
tlon In the government'llnvestlgation.
Prosecutors 'should therefore attempt' to determine
whether a corporation'. compliance program Is merely
a "paper program" or whether It was deslped and
Implemented In an effective manner. In addition, pros-
ecutors should determine whether the corporation hu
provided for a staff sufticient to audit, document. ana·
Iyze, and utilize the results of the corporatlon'l compli-
ance efforts. In addition, prosecutors should determine
whether the corporation'. employees are adequately In·
formed about the compliance proJram and are con-
vinced of the co",",ratlon's commitment to It. This will
enable the prosecutor to make an Informed decision as
to whether the corporation has adopted and Imple-
mented a truly elrective comfliance program that, when
consistent with other federa law enforcement policies,
s For I det.11ed review of these and other l.ctorl co_mine
corporat. CIOmpli...... pnlCrIms. see Unked St..es SenteneInc
Commlsslon, GuldeUnes Manual 11A1.2, CIOmment. (n.3(k) (Nov.
1111). s.. oIso U.s.s.G.IIC2.5(l).
, may result In a decision to charP only the corporation'•
employees and .......
Compliance proirams should be deslltlO.d to detect
the particular types of misconduct most likely to OCCUr
In a particular corpoa:atlon'.lIne of buslness. Many COr.
poratlons operate In complex regulatory environments
outside the normal experienca of criminal prosecutors.
Al:COrdlnllY, prosecutors should consult with relevant
federal andstate agencies with the expertise to evlluate
tha adequac1 of a JII'OP'UlI's deslgn·and implementa-
tion. For Instance, state and federal banldng. Insurance
and medical board, the Department ofDefense, the 0..:
partJnel!t of H.,Ith IDd Human services, the EnvIron-
inentaI Protection Apncy. and the Securltles and Ex- .
c:hanP Commlsslon haveconsiderable experience with
comPliance proJramS and can be YerY helpful to a pros-
ecutor In evaluating such prosrams. In addition, tlie
Fraud SeCtIon of the Crlmlnal'Dlvlslon, the,Commerclal
.Utlgation Branch of the CivIl DIvIsIon, and the Environ·
mental CrImes 5eclion of the Environment and Natural
Resources DIvIsIon can assist U.s. Attorneys' 0IIIces In
IlndinI the appropriate agency olllce and In provldlRJ
copies of compUanoe programs that were deve\oped In
pmtous cases.
¥1IL C1IaIIfac. CetpGI.... 1lest\bdloII a"
..............
A. General Piindple: A1thOUJb neither a corporation
nor an Individual target may avoid prosetutlon merely
by paylllJ a sum of money. a prosecutor may consIder
the corporation's wlllinpess to make restitution and
steps already taken to do 10. as well u other remedial
actions such as Implementation an effeclive corporate
compliance program, Improvln, an exlldllJ one, and
discfpUnllIJ wrongdoers, In determining whether to
charge the corporation.
B. Comment: In detennlnln, whether or not a corpo·'
ration should be prosecuted, a prosecutor may consider
whether meaningful remedial measures have been
taken, Including employee discipline and full restitu·
tlon.· A corporation's response to misconduct says
much about Its willingness to ensure thlt such miscon-
duct does not recur. Thus, corporation that fully recog·
nlze the seriousnen of their misconduct and accept re-
sponsibility for It should be seen to be taking steps to
Implement the personnel, operational, and organiza.
tional chanses necenal)' to establish an awareness
among employees that criminal conduct will not be tol·
erated. AmORJ the factors prosecutors should consider
and _IJh are whether the corporation appropriately
disciplined the wrongdoers and disclosed Information
concerning their Illegal conduct to the government.
Employee discipline Is a dimculttask for many corpo-
rations because of the human element Involved and
sometimes because of the seniority of the employees
concerned. However, while corporations'need to be fair
to their employees, they must also be unequivocally
committed, at all levels of the corporation, to the high-
est standards of legal and ethical behavior. Effective in-
temal discipline can be a powerful deterrent against im-
proper behavior by a corporation's employees. In evalu-
ating a corporation'S response to wrongdoing•
prosecutors may evaluate the wllllnpess of the corpo-
• For oxample, the Anlkl'Ull DIvIsion's .mnesi, polic:1 spedft-
cally requl.... thal·lwlher.poSslb",the ..."....tlon (m.kp] _i·
IUlIoa to Injured part........
o
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ration to d1sdpllne culpable employees of .u nnks and
the adequ~ofthe discipline Imposed. nw prosecutor
should satl himself or henelf that the col1lOratfon's
focus Is on e Integrity and credibility of Its remedial
and dlsdpllnary measures rather than on the protection
of the wrongdoers.
In addition to employee discipline, two other factors
In evaluating a COI1lOralion's remedial efforts are restI·
tution and refonn. /Is with natural persons, the dedslon
whether or not to prosecute should nol depend upon
the tarpt's ablUty to pay restitution.~COI1lOnlfon'a ef·
forts to pay restitution even In advance of any coun 0r-
der Is, however, evIcIence of Its "acceptance of respon·
siblllty" and, consistent with the pncdces and polldes
of the appropriate DIvIsIon of the Department eillnlsted
with enfordng spedfic criminal laws, may be consld·
ered In deteimlnlng whether to bring criminal charges.
Similarly, although the Inadequacy of a col1lOrate com·
pliance program Is a fador to consider when deddlng
whether to chatp a corporation,· that corporation's
quldt rec:ognJtion of the naws In the program and Its ef·
forts to improve the program are aJso factors to con·
sider. .
IX. Cltlqinf the CoQ!ontIaa: CeIateraI~
A. General Prlnc:lp/e: Prosec:uton may consider the
coIIateraJ consequences of a corporate criminal c:omIc-
tion In determining whether to charge the corporation
with a criminal offense.
B. Comment: One of the fadors In detennlning
whether to charge a natural person or a Corporation Is
whether the likely punishment Is appropriate given the
nature and seriousness 'of the crime. In the corporate
context, prosecutors may take Into account the possible
substantial consequences to a corPoration's officers, dl·
redors, employees, and shareholders, many of whom
may, depending on the size and nature (e.g., pubUdy w.
closely helel) of the corporation and their role In Its 0p-
erations, have played no role In the criminal condud,
have been completely unaware of It, or have been
wholly unable to prevent it. Further, prosecutors should
also be aware of non·penal sancli,,:>~ lhat may accom·
pany a criminal charges, such as polentlal suspension
or debarment from eligibility for government contrads
or federal funded programs such as health care.
Whether or not such non-penal sanctions are approPri'
ate or required In a particular case Is the responsibility
of the relevant agency, a decision that· will be made
based on the applicable statutes, reculations, and poli.
des.
Virtually evelY conviction of· a corporation, like virtu·
ally evelY convidlon of an Individual, will have.an 1m·
pact on Innocent third parties, and the mere existence
of such an effed Is not suffident to preclude prosecu·
tlon of the corporation. Therefore, in evaluating the se-
verity of collateral consequences, various fadors a1.
ready discussed, such as the pervasiveness of the crI~l.
nal condud and the adequacy of the corporation's
compliance programs should also be considered In de-
tenninlng the welghl to be given to this fador. For In·
stance, the balance may tip I~ favor of prosecutin~cor·
porations In situations where the scope of the mlscon·
duct In a case is widespread and sustained within a
COrpOrale division (or spread throughout pockets of the
corporate organization). In such cases, the possible un·
fairness of vis:l!ng punlshm~l!t for lhe col'!'onllon's
crimes upon shareholders may be of much less concern
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where those shareholders have substantially proftted;
even unknoWInIIY. from widesPread or peryasm crimi·
nal.activlty. Sltiidarty, where the.top layers of the cor·
poratlon's management.or the ahaieholders of a
dosely·held corporation _re engaged In or aware of
the wrongdoing and the condud at Issue -accepted
as a way of doing business for an extended period. de-
barment may be deemed no collateral but a dIred and
entirely appioprlate consequence of the corporatlon'a
wrongdoing. .
nw appropriateness of considering such collateraJ
consequences and the weflht to be &1_It-may de-
pend on the apecIaI poUcyconcerns CIIacussed In section
III, aupra.
X. CltalIIIII a CotpomIon: ffon.CrIinlnal AItemIIIna
. A. General Principle: Although non·crimlnal alterna·
tives to prosecution often exist, prosecutors may con-
sider whether such nnctlons would adeqUately deter,
I:nlsh, and rehabilitate a corporation that h.. engagedwroMfuJ condue:t.1n ~uating the adequacy ofnon·
crlm/nafalternatlws to ptosecutfon, e.g., cI¥II or regu-
.1atoI)' enfon:ement actIOns. the prosee:utor may COlI-
llder .u relevant factors, including:
t. The aanc:tI_ available under the alternative
means or disposition: .
2. the Ukeflhood that an effective sanction will be
Imposed; and
3. the effad on non-crlmlnal dispOsition on Federal
law enforcement Interests.
B, Comment. 11Ie primary goals of criminal law are
deterrence, punishment, and rehabilitation. "'on·
criminal sanctions may not be an appropriate response
to an egregious violation, a pattern of wrongdoing, or a
hlst01Y of non-crlmlnal nnctlons without proper reme·
dlation.ln olhercases,h~,these goals maybe sat·
Isfied without the necessity of Instltutlnc criminal pro-
ceedings. In detennlnlng whether federal criminal
chutes are appropriate, the prosecutor should con·
sider the same factors (modilied appropriately for the
regulatolY context) considered when determining
whether to leave prosecution of a natural person to an·
other jurlsdidlon or to seek non·crlminal alternatives to
prosecution, I.e., the strength of the regulatolY authori·
ty's Interest, the regulatolY authority's ability and will·
Ingness to talce eIfectIve enforcement action, the probe
able sandion If the reculatolY authority's enforcement
action Is upheld, and the effect of a non-crlminal dispo-
.sitlon on Federal law enforcement Interests. See USAM
'f f 9·27.240, 9·27.250.
XL Chaflilll a Corporslilln: SelectIng Charps
A. General Principle: Once a proseculor has dedded
to charge a corporalion, the prosecutor should charge,
or should recommend that the grand julY charge, the
most serious offense that Is ('Onsistent with the nature
of the defendant's condud and that Is likely to result In
a sustainable convldlon. .
B. Comment: Once the decision to charge Is made, the
same rules as govern charging natural persorlS apply.
These rules require "a faithful and honest application of
the Sentencing Guidelines" and a "Individualized as·
sessment of the extent to which particular charges fit
the spedfic drcumstances of the case. are consistent
with the 'purposes of the Federal criminal code, and
maximize the Impad of Federal resources on crime."
See USAM f 9·27.300. In making lhls determination, "it
Is appropriate that the attomer for the government con-
llder, Inter alia, such fadors .. the aentenc:Ing guide-
line ranp yielded by the charge, whether thepe~
. yielded by such aentendng nnge •.• Is propotUonaI to
.the ..m-ness of' the defendant'a concIUd, and
whether the charge achieves such purposes of the
criminal law as punishment, protection of the public.
spedllc and general deterrence, and rehabilitation."
See Attorney General's Memorandum, dated Odober
12,1993.
xu. Plea .......... wIIIl CoqIolaa-
A. General Prfndple: 'n negotiating plea qreements
with corporations, prosecutors should _k a plea to the
most serious, readily provable offense charKed. In 'addI.
don, the terms or !be plea agreement shouldcontain ap-
propriate provisions to ensure punishment, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and compliance with the plea agreement
In .the corporate context. Although special c:Ircwn-
stances may mandate a different c:oiIduslon, pr0secu-
tors genenlly should nol acree to accept a corporate
guDty plea In udIanp for IlClft1lI'ORCUt or dis-
mlssa1 of charps against individuai olllcen and ein·
ployees.
B. Conunent: Prosecutors may enter Into plea qree-
ments with COIpOIa\IonI for the _ reasons and un-
der the same constnJnta as ~I)' to plea agreements
with natunI.--s-sa. USAM f f 9-27.400·500. ThIs
means, Inter a/fa, that the corporation should be re-
quired to plead to the most~ readily provable or·
fense i:JWced. As Is the case with lnillvlduals, the attor·
ney maldng this determination should do so "on the ba·
sis of .an individualized assessment of the extent to
which particular charges ftt the spedftc drcumstances
of the case, are consistent with the purposes or the fed·
.... ~mlnalcode, and maximize the impad of federal
resources on crime. In maldng this determination, the
attorney for.the covemment consider, Inter olio, such
fadors as the sentendng guideline range yielded by the
charge, whether the penalty yielded by such sentendng
range ••• Is proportional to the seriousness of the de-
fendant'S conduct, and whether the chatp achIeves
such purposes of the criminal law as punishment, pro-
tecllon of the public, specific and general deterrence.
and rehabRitatlon." See Attorney General's Memoran·
dum, dated Odober 12, 1993. In addition, any negotl·
ated departures from the Senlendng Guidelines must
be justifiable under the Guidelines and must be dis-
closed to the sentendng Court. In addition, corporations
should be made to realize that pleading guilty to crimi·
nal charges constitutes an admission offIlllt and not
merely a resolution of an Inconvenient dlstradlon from'
Its business. Thus, as with natural persons, pleas should
be structured so that the corporation may nol later
"prodalm Iatk4f culpabblty or even complete fano.
cenc:e." sa. .Us.ut •• 9-27.420(b)(4), .. 9-27Mo
9-27.500. '1'IIu, for Instaace. there SJloiiliI be placed
UJlOIl the-.s• aullldent factual basis for the plea to
preftllt later corporate assertions of Innocence.
A corpOrate plea~ should also conteln cere
taln provisions that recOgnize the nature of the COI'po-
rate "person" and ensure that the principles of iIWI&h.
ment, cIeterrence,and rehabIIItatIoil are met. In the COr.
porate context, punishment and dttenence are
pneraIIy accomplished by auIMtantlo1 ~".~. '.l'Mdatory
IestitutlOn, and lnstltutIoft or appI'OlJr;:'.' "'5
-. lncIucIIn& If -.y, W,,:'h"~.,
ovenI&ht or the use of apec:laI masters. sa. .s.s.G.
f f IBU, ICU, ct 88q. In addition,~ the COrpOra.
tIonls a pvemment contrador, pennaneJIt or tempO.
my debarment may be apprOpriate. Where the C0rpo-
ration _ engapd In government contracting fraud, a
prosecutor may not negotiate away an ~l::''''<Y' right to
debar or to list the corporate defendanl.
In neptiadng a plea qreement, proseaitors should
aJso corisIder the detemnt value of prosecutions or In.
dlvldual within IhiI corporat\on. Therefore, one-factor
that a prosecutor 11III1c:imaIder In detmnlnlng whether
to enter Into • S..-m Is whether the corpora.
tIcm Is -kini for Its employea and oIIIcers
orwhether the on Is wIIIIn& to cooperate In the
Inveadgallon of culpable 1ndfvIduaJs. Generelly, p~
ecutors ahould rarely negolIate away individual crimi.
naI IlaIHIlty In a corporate pleL .
Rehabilitation, of course, requires that ·the corPora.
tion undertake to be Iaw·ablding In the future. It Is,
therefore, appropriate to require the corporation, as a
condition of probation, to implement a compliance pro-
gram or to refonn an existing one. As discussed~,
prosecutors may consult with the appropriate state and
federal agendes and components of the Justice Depart·
ment to ensure that a proposed compliance program Is
adequate and meets IndUsll)' standards and best prac-
tices. See sedlon VII, :supra.
In plea agreements in which the corporation agrees to
cooperate, the proseculor should ensure that the coop-
eration Is complele and truthful. To do so, the prosecu·
tor may request that the corporation waive the attorney·
client and work produCt privileges. make employees
and agents available for debriefing, disclose the resullS
of Its internal investigation, file appropriate certilled fi·
Randal slatements, agree to government or third-party
audits, and take whatever other steps are necessary to
ensure that the full scope of the corporate wronKdoln,
Is disclosed and.that the responsible culprits areldentl-
fled and, If appropriate, prosecuted. See generally sec·
tlon VIII, supra.
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Introduction
Twenty years have passed since the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)1 first imposed
liability for the environmental sins of predecessors in interest in real estate. All
people involved in buying and selling land now understand the need to consider
some "environmental stuff' before closing the deal. Unfortunately, for most
buyers, sellers, realtors, appraisers, bankers and lawyers, the understanding of
the need to consider the "environmental stuff' extends only that far.
Most sophisticated clients today understand 'that the deal's due diligence
includes a review of the property's environmental condition. Investigating the
environmental condition of a property can be complicated. An elementary
understanding of the requirements of environmental due diligence should at least
include the knowledge that a preliminary survey of commercial or industrial
properties is necessary to avoid the potentially astronomical liability associated
with contaminated properties. However, it is not enough to know that an
environmental assessment should be performed, you should also know where to
find a qualified consultant to do the survey, what to ask for, and then how to
decipher the information contained in the report.
The purpose of this presentation is to provide practical advice on
answering the most basic questions concerning environmental due diligence on
commercial and industrial properties. Since few involved in real estate
transactions maintain the technological expertise required to assess with the
impacts of hazardous pollutants on land, or an understanding of the implications
of those impacts under the complicated environmental regulatory scheme, a
basic "How To Guide" for finding, hiring, and using environmental consultants in
land transactions has been designed to answer the following questions:
E - 1
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1. Why do you need an environmental survey?
2. How do you find a competent environmental consultant?
3. What is the scope of work you ask for in a Phase I Environmental Site
Assessment (ESA)?
4. What do you need to watch out for in consultant contracts?
5. How do you read and interpret a Phase I ESA?
6. What do you do with the recommendations and conclusions offered by
the consultant?
Why Do You Need An Environmental Survey
J
J
J
J
J
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The primary federal statute governing the ownership of contaminated
properties is the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA), as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
R~authorization Act (SARA},2 commonly known as "Superfund". This statute
imposes liability for the cleanup of historic releases of hazardous substances,
outlines available defenses to such liability, defines appropriate inquiry under the
exclusions to CERCLA; and provides a statutory definition of hazardous
substances, petroleum products, and petroleum exclusion to CERCLA. Kentucky
has essentially adopted the provisions of Superfund in KRS 224.01-400 and both
state and federal statutes apply to contaminated land in Kentucky.
A. Statutory Liability for Cleanup
1
.J
J
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J
I
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The effect of Superfund was to make current and/or former owners and/or
operators of property contaminated with hazardous substances responsible for
the remediation of the substances and for environmental impacts to land as a
result of the contamination. This liability includes damages to adjacent and
1 42 U.S.C § 9601 et seq.
2 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.
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adjoining properties not owned by the actual polluter. CERCLA provides a right
to sue for damages to the government and to third parties, -such as neighbors
and certain public interest groups, when a court finds that they have a legal
interest in the quality of the environment. The law imposes "joint and several"
liability on potentially responsible parties (PRPs) for the contamination.
Superfund is a "strict liability" statute, in that if a party meets the statutory
definition of a potentially responsible party, then it has liability for the cleanup.
Effectively, Superfund requires PRPs prove they are not a responsible party
under the definitions in the law on the site.
B. Defenses to Liability
Among the statutory defenses to CERCLA liability are acts of God, acts of
war, and an act or omission of a third party who does not have a contractual
relationship with the PRP, if the PRP can establish that he "(a) exercised due
care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned..., and (b) he took
precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the
co~sequences that could foreseeably be a result from such actions or
omissions...3
Under Section 9601 (35)(A), a contractual relationship includes, but is not
limited to "land contracts, deeds, or other instruments transferring title or
possession . . . ". These contractual relationships eliminate the defense to
liability unless the defenqant is an innocent purchaser.
Present owners of a CERCLA facility are liable for the costs incurred in
removing hazardous substances from the facility unless (1) they can establish by
a proponderance of the evidence that the release of the substances and the
damages resulting from the release were caused soley by a third party who had
no relationship with the owner and that the owners exercised due care with
3 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
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respect to the substances in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and that
they took precs.tJtions against the foreseeable actions and-omissions of third
parties.4 The "innocent purchaser" defense also requires that a PRP must have
undertaken, at the time of the acquisition, "all appropriate inqUiry" into the
previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or
customary practice in an effort to minimize liability.
In considering whether "all appropriate inquiry" was made, courts will take
into account factors such as: any specialized knowledge of the PRP; the
relationship between the purchase price to the value of the property if
uncontaminated; commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about
the property; and the ability to detect such contamination with appropriate
inspection.5
.J
J
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"Appropriate inspection" is generally considered to include a Phase I
Enyironmental Site Assessment (ESA) and a follow-up Phase " if the Phase I
recommends further investigation of suspected environmental concerns on the
property. The PHASE I ESA is a preliminary tool designed to assess
environmental liability associated with the site. It is a non-invasive process that
generally consists of a record review, a site visit, data base review and a written
report. The PHASE I ESA is intended to constitute "all appropriate inquiry into
the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good
commercial or customary practice" as is required to meet the innocent purchaser
exclusion from CERCLA liability found at 42 U.S.C. Section 9601 (35)(8).6
c. Appropriate Inspection J
J
i
.J
J
J
4 United States v. 150 Acres of Land. More or Less Located in Medina County. Ohio, 204 F 3d
698 (6th Circuit, 2000).
5 42 USC § 9601 (35)(8).
6 Standard Practice for Environmental Site Assessments: Phase I Environmental Site
Assessment Process. American Society for Testing and Materials, ASTM Standard E 1527-97.
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If the PHASE I ESA indicates that furthf Jestigation is required, then a
Phase II Environmental Site Assessment (PhE' 11) wjIJ. be recommended. The
Phase II may include the collection and analysis of soil, surface water and/or
groundwater samples to determine the presence or absence of hazardous
constituents in these media.
While there are legitimate reasons to consider using an environmental
consultant to assess the environmental condition of a residential property, (lead
paint, radon, heating oil tanks, asbestos), the competitive nature of residential
loans usually prevents lenders from requiring PHASE I ESAs on residential
properties. Most lenders do not require Phase I ESAs on residential properties
because of the added cost to the loan.
While environmental due diligence would inappropriately raise the cost of
closing a residential loan, banks are generally willing to assume the calculated
business risk factors associated with residential properties. Exceptions occur in
cases involving older properties where the likelihood of asbestos or underground
pe~roleum storage is higher, or in areas with known environmental hazards.
Commercial, industrial and large agricultural properties are another
matter. The United States Office of the Comptroller of the Currency requires
environmental due diligence on commercial properties when the loans are made
by federally insured banks. Some sites bear no more risk of environmental
hazards than residential properties. For instance, sandwich shops, restaurants,
clothing stores, depending on their location, would not generally give rise to the
concern of the potential for significant environmental problems. Paint stores, any
business using underground petroleum storage or chemical storage or usage
would likely warrant at least a PHASE I ESA, whether or not the lender insists.
Again, the neighborhood in which the property lies should be a major factor in the
determination of whether environmental investigation in appropriate. Industrial
E - 5
properties will almost always warrant a due diligence investigation, including
Phase II sampling and analysis.
D. Why Do YmLWant a Phase I ESA?
"Don't ask the question unless you know what you'll do with the
information." This major law of litigation applies doubly to environmental issues.
Creating "knowledge" of an environmental condition may require action on the
part of the owner, whether current or future. It may require reporting to the
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, and/or remediation of
the site? While its very important for a potential owner of property to have this
information before the purchase, if you represent the current owner you should
consider the risks associated with allowing any investigation that would confirm a
release of hazardous substances on the property.
J
J
I
I
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II. How Do You Find A Competent Environmental Consultant?
A. Look for a Competent, Experienced Professional
Environmental consultants, like lawyers, are a necessary evil in the due
diligence process. In the limited context of real estate transfers, consultants
assist in the assessment of the risk that environmental concerns will either
impact the value of the property, result in remediation costs to correct a problem,
or present a threat of ,third party actions. Phase I and II ESAs should be
performed by competent professionals with a background in the environmental
issues commonly involved in real estate transactions. Not all environmental
consulting firms perform ESAs, and some that do, shouldn't. While Phase I
ESAs are not rocket science, an insufficient scope of work, or a poorly performed
investigation, may result in millions of dollars in losses to those who purchase
property in reliance on an incompetent consultant's report.
7 KRS 224.01-400 .
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While health and safety concerns are a factor, the primary reason
consultants are engaged in real estate transactions is to establish whether there
is a real or potential environmental threat to the value of the property. It is safe
to say that the majority of environmental due diligence investigations on
commercial properties are likely to be prompted by the financiers of the
transaction. Beyond the liability associated with environmental impacts to
property, environmental concerns, whether real or merely perceived may have a
major impact on the property's market value and therefore, to the value of the
loan for which it is collateral.
While there are no statutes or regulations requiring that a consultant
perform environmental due diligence, common practice dictates that a
competent, experienced professional do the work. It is doubtful that hiring a
consultant of questionable credentials at an unreasonably low price will meet the
requirements for "appropriate inquiry".
Environmental consultants can be found in the Yellow Pages, through
professional and business groups, through a bank loan officer, or through word of
mouth. Finding a consultant competent to perform PHASE I ESAs is no easy
task. Environmental consultants have no licensing requirements per se. Firms
are generally staffed with engineers, geologists and various denominations of
earth scientists. Kentucky certifies geologists and engineers, but there is no
specific training required for these people to call themselves "environmental
consultants" to perform Phase I ESAs.
In addition to a lack of certification requirements, the search for a
competent consultant is made even more difficult by the fact that the result is
only as good as the professional performing the work. Consulting firms work on
notoriously low margins, usually between 5 and 8 percent. Phase I ESAs are
loss leaders for many firms. Therefore, most of the work on due diligence
E-7
investigations are generally performed by the lowest paid, least experienced,
professionals on the staff. Good firms assure quality through strict oversight by
more experienced members of the company. Many firms do not.
Lenders typically maintain a list of pre-qualified consultants, approved for
the sole purpose of providing PHASE I ESA reports to the bank. The pre-
qualification will generally require that the company have a minimal level of errors
and omissions insurance coverage (usually $1 million), that the contract meet
certain requirements for the bank's ability to rely on the report, that contractual
limitations of liability aren't prohibitive, and that the report comply with the
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standard for environmental
site assessments. They may also require a specified format for the report. The
competence of the consultant staff may n'ot have been addressed in the lender's
assessment of the company; however, some lenders set minimum requirements
for personnel performing work on developed sites.
B. Who Should Hire the Consultant?
A threshold question that should be addressed is whether to have the
consultant hired through an attorney in order to protect the information gained
through the assessment. While Kentucky law offers an environmental audit
privilege,8 the privilege offers little if any protection from federal inquiry and is
burdensomely specific in its requirements for qualification. The attorney client
privilege is therefore the most reliable means of protecting information and the
thought processes that would be in inherent in the decision as to whether to
disclose a problem. The need to run the request for a Phase I ESA through an
attorney should be made in consideration of the circumstances specific to the
property. The higher the potential for discovering contamination, the greater the
need for legal counsel at the outset.
8 KRS 224.01-040
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C. Preliminary Questions An Informed Client Should Ask of the
Environmental Consultant
When contacting an environmental consultant to perform a PHASE I ESA
there are a number of preliminary questions an informed client should ask:
• Who will perform the site work?
• How many PHASE· I ESA's of this type has the person
performed?
• What is his/her educational background and training for PHASE
I ESAs?
• What are the company's training requirements for this level of
work?
• Who will review the work of the underling doing the
investigation?
• What are that person's qualifications?
• What are the firm's quality assurance procedures for PHASE I
ESAs?
• What are the firm's limits on its errors and omissions policy?
• What does the contract say about liability should the report miss
something significant?
The answers to these questions should confirm that:
• the individual doing the work is competent, having done several
PHASE I ESAs on the type of property at issue;
• the training has included supervised work on PHASE I ESAs on
this type of property;
• the reviewer has much more experience with PHASE I ESAs
than the person doing the records review and field work;
E-9
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• the QAlQC includes a double check of all information used by
the person doing the field work;
• the insurance is sufficient to address losses associated with
mistakes; and
• the consultant's contract gives the client access to all of the
insurance and that there are no unreasonable limitations of
liability in the event that the report is inadequate.
What is the Scope of Work for a Phase I ESA?
i
.J
J
J
A. Factors to Consider J
The level of environmental inquiry that is appropriate to afford a purchaser
protection under CERCLA cannot be the same for every property or every party
to a real estate transaction. The "innocent purchaser" defense requires that a
"potentially responsible party" (PRP) must have undertaken, at the time of the
acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the
prC?perty consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to
minimize liability.9 In considering whether "all appropriate inquiry" was made,
courts will take into account factors such as: any specialized knowledge of the
PRP, the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property, if
uncontaminated commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about
the property and the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate
inspection.1o
As with most anything else, you can buy a Ford version of a PHASE I ESA
right up to a Mercedes. Competition for the work has lead to a shakeup in the
market for PHASE I ESAs. Consulting companies have been developed that do
nothing except Phase I ESAs. These companies compete with full service
9 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (35)(A).
10 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (35)(8).
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consulting firms that generally have much higher overhead, and therefore cannot
meet the bargain prices offered by the boutique firms. What is included in the
assessment is often greatly affected by the amount the consumer is willing to
pay.
B. ASTM Minimum Standard
If the goal is to meet the due diligence requirements of CERCLA, the
minimum scope of work should be the ASTM E 1527-97 Standard Practice for
Environmental Site Assessments: Phase I Environmental Site Assessment
Process. The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)11 developed
the scope of work in response to a public pleading for an answer to the question:
"What is an "appropriate inquiry" to meet the CERCLA innocent purchaser
testT. Compliance with the ASTM standard does not guarantee that the
CERCLA requirements are met, however, court decisions since its adoption
indicate that conformity with the standard is a factor in determining eligibility for
the innocent purchaser defense. The standard states that its objective "is to
id~ntify, to the extent feasible, pursuant to the process described herein,
recognized environmental conditions in connection with the property.,,12
The ASTM standard includes four primary elements. They are: 1) Review
of publicly available records, from standard environmental sources, including
data bases and/or documents concerning the environmental status of the site;13
2) Site Reconnaissance of the subject site and surrounding properties; (3)
Interviews with local government officials, site personnel and persons with
11 The standard can be obtained through the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM),
100 Barr Harbor Drive, West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania 19428.
12 ASTM E 1527-97 Section 6.1.
13 Documentation may include agency records, aerial photographs, USGS maps, Sandborn
insurance maps, and/or computer databases.
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knowledge of the uses and environmental condition of the property; and 4)
Evaluation and written report.14
While the ASTM standard is comprehensive, it does include limiting
language designed to define the scope of the issues it addresses. In defining a
standard of good and customary practice for conducting an ESA, ASTM limited
its goal to the identification of "recognized environmental conditions."
"Recognized environmental conditions" means, within the context of the
standard,
the presence or likely presence of any hazardous substances or
petroleum products on the property under conditions that indicate
an existing release, a past release or a material threat of a release
of any hazardous substances or petroleum products into structures
on the property or into ground, groundwater, or surface water of the
property. The term includes hazardous substances and petroleum
products even under conditions in compliance with laws. The term
is not intended to include de minimis conditions that generally do
not present a material risk of harm to public health or the
environment and that generally would not be the subject of an
enforcement action if brought to the attention of appropriate
governmental agencies.15
The ASTM standard gives a detailed description of the minimum, and
expanded requirements for a PHASE I ESA. Additional inquiry, or reduced
inquiry, may be appropriate depending upon the condition of the property, its
history of use, and its intended future use. For example, the standard calls for
an historical review back to the property's first use, or until 1940, whichever is
earlier.16 However, if it can be confirmed that the property was a farm until 1975,
further investigation of available historical data may not be warranted, given the
expense of collecting the information, to confirm that it had the same use in 1940.
14 Section 6, ASTM E 1527-97.
15 ASTM E 1527-97 1.1.1.
16 ASTM E 1527-97 7.3.2.
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On the other hand, there may be issues that the parties may wish to
include in the scope of work that are outside the defined limitations of the ASTM
standard, or that would be imposed because of regulatory agency concern.
These may include: the presence of asbestos containing materials, radon, lead-
based paint, lead in drinking water, and the existence of wetlands. While none of
these items meets the definition of "recognized environmental concerns" they all
may impact either the value of the property, costs associated with the
development of the property, or in the case of wetlands, the ability to develop the
property at all.
C. Permit Review
In addition to the standard scope of work for the Phase I ESA, the
preliminary inquiry for properties that will be developing undeveloped land or that
have existing industrial activity may warrant a permit review. The purpose of a
permit review is to determine the transferability of environmental permits or
licenses necessary to operate the business. Outstanding violations and/or fines
m~y prevent a new owner from continuing operations at the facility, making the
property useless for its intended purpose.
D. Tailorthe Work to the Property
A competent consultant will tailor the scope of work to the specific
property, and should be. able to readily explain to the client why the scope of the
inquiry should be revised. This is why it is important to have a comprehensive
discussion with the consultant prior to contracting for a Phase I ESA. The
consultant needs to know as much of the history of the property as possible, as
well as its intended future use, before developing a scope of work. Further,
some properties will obviously warrant invasive, Phase II testing even before a
PHASE I ESA is completed. Therefore, a Phase I report will likely be a waste of
E - 13
the client's time and money since it will recommend a Phase II and the Phase I
and Phase II reports can be combined.
.J
J
IV. What Do You Need To Watch Out For In Consultant Contracts?
A. Key Elements of the Consultant Contract
Consulting contracts vary greatly from company to company, but key
elements remain the same in those offered by informed companies. As far as
the consultant is concerned, there are two primary reasons for a contract: to
assure payment and to limit the company's liability in the event that the client
makes a claim for errors in the report.
The client should also have two primary goals in contracting with the
consultant. The first is to attempt to assure the highest professional standards
on the part of the consultant in providing the product. The second is to guarantee
access to the consultant's insurance and other assets in the event that
something significant is missed in the environmental assessment.
Environmental consulting contracts are most often based on the
prototypes developed by professional design engineering companies.17 There is
a significant body of case law that has guided the development of design
engineering contracts over the last 20 years. Many of these decisions have
resulted from lawsuits involving environmental issues.
B. Limitation of Liability for Professional Errors
While assuring payment is fairly straightforward, the limitation of liability for
professional errors is more complicated for both consultants and clients. Like
17 These prototypes are pUblished by the National Society of Professional Engineers, the
American Consulting Engineers Council, the American Society of Civil Engineers, and the
Construction Specification Institute.
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most professionals, environmental consultants use insurance in their risk
management planning. Premiums for professional liability coverage range from
about 1 percent to about 5 percent of gross revenues with deductible limits or risk
retentions ranging from $250,000 to $500,000. 18 With deductibles like that, the
contract language becomes essential for consultants doing law margin, high risk
Phase I ESAs.
The contract provisions of choice used to limit liability are limitations on
the amount of recovery available to clients and indemnification for the
consultant's losses to third parties.
Consulting firms may attempt to limit their liability to a specific dollar
amount or to the limits of their insurance coverage. The economic rationale for
the limitation is straightforward. There must be some link between the risk and
the reward involved in the provision of professional services. PHASE I ESA's
constitute the highest liability item for consultants. Environmental consultants are
sued more often and lose more money for Phase I work than any other area of
th~ir practice. Phase I ESAs usually run less than $2,000. Margins for this kind
of work are very narrow, usually between 5 and 8 percent. Agreeing to a
limitation of liability of $50,000 is a highly leveraged approach to risk: This is 25x
the fee.
Consulting firms may attempt to limit liability to the amount of fees
collected on the project, the amount of their insurance coverage, or something
less than the deductible on their errors and omissions policies. A typical
limitation provision that has survived more than one skirmish in the courts, and
yet has not met with total success, is this one used by a large multi-national firm:
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY. For additional consideration from
Firm of $10.00, receipt and adequacy of which is hereby
18 Bundschuh &Collings, Risk Management Study of Large Design Firms, in 1997 Wiley
Construction La~ Update. 39, fig. 2-21 (N.Sweeny and John Wiley &Sons, Inc. Eds, 1997).
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acknowledged, Client agrees that Firm's liability, and that of its
officers, directors, employees, agents and subcontractors, to Client
or any third party due to any negligent professional acts, errors or
omissions or breach of contract by Firm will be limited to an
aggregate of $50,000, or Firm's total charges, whichever is greater.
If Client prefers to have higher limits of professional liability, Firm
agrees to increase the aggregate limit, up to a maximum of
$1,000,000, upon Clienfs written request at the time of accepting
our proposal, provided Client agrees to pay an additional
consideration of ten percent of Firm's total charges, or $500
whichever is greater. The additional charge for the higher liability is
because of the greater risk assumed by the Firm and is not a
charge for additional professionar liability insurance. This limitation
shall not apply to the extent prohibited by law.
The enforceability of these limitations of liability has ,often been found to
be dependent upon demonstrating to a court that the professional consultant is in
jeopardy of a meaningful "hit" in the event of negligence. There should be some
penal nature to the amount, so that there is an incentive for the consultant to
exercise due care. Limitations of liability clauses are not always enforced. They
can fail because of considerations of public policy, application of anti-indemnity
statues in the state, ·or a specific defect in the limitation of liability clause itself. 19
On the other hand, a missed underground storage tank (UST) or on-site
landfill may mean hundreds of thousands of dollars to an unknowing landowner.
The purpose of having a Phase I ESA done, in addition to securing the innocent
landowner defense under CERCLA, is to protect the owner from economic
impacts resulting from environmen"tal conditions. The Phase I ESA is often
looked to as an "insurance policy" or at least a risk management tool for the
property owner. There is some truth to the analysis, but only to the extent that
the consultant's report is sound, its contract requires that it adhere to a
reasonable standard of care, and its financial condition and insurance are such
that losses by the client will be covered.
19 Dillingham v. CH2M Hill Northwest. Inc., 873 P.2d 1335 (Alaska 1994) and W. William Graham
v. City of Cave City, 709 S.W. 2d 94 (Ark. 1996).
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In actuality, due to the competitive market in which environmental
consultants operate, many consultants will raise limits of liability without the
additional charge. The ability of local personnel to revise the contract is
influenced by the control exercised over the staff by the company's lawyers and
risk managers. Another factor influencing the consultant's ability to negotiate
contract terms is that in order to receive errors and omissions coverage, firms are
required to present their terms and conditions to the underwriter. Excursions
from the approved language may compromise the firm's insurance coverage, and
in turn, compromise the client's ability to recover damages under the contract.
Consultants will also attempt to limit their liability to their clients through
indemnification and "hold harmless" clauses. Since such clauses are disfavored
generally, they are interpreted strictly when challenged in court. Because the law
prefers persons to be responsible for their actions (or inactions when a duty
exists) such clauses are permitted but are scrutinized closely by the courts.20
With that in mind, you wonder why consultants would attempt to use the
following language as their standard.
a. General. CLIENT agrees to defend, indemnify and hold
CONTRACTOR, its directors, officers, employees, subcontractors and
agents harmless against any claims by third parties for personal injury,
property damage, or economic loss caused by the negligence of
CLIENT or arising from the work performed by CONTRACTOR under
this Agreement, unless such injury or damage is caused by
CONTRACTOR's sole negligence or willful misconduct.
In the event a claim is made by CLIENT against CONTRACTOR for
negligence, misconduct, or design errors, and subsequent
investigation reveals that the claim is unfounded, the reasonable cost
of such investigation, including CONTRACTOR personnel time and
expenses, and outside consultant and attorneys' fees, shall be
deemed a change of the Scope of Work and will be reimbursable
under the standard billing rates and other terms set forth in the
Proposal.
20 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp.• 806 F. Supp. 74, 77 (D.S.C. 1992).
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CONTRACTOR shall not be liable to CLIENT for any indirect or
consequential damages (including, but not limited to, lost production
revenue or profits) incurred due to the actions of CONTRACTOR, its
subcontractors or agents.
CLIENT agrees that CONTRACTOR will assume no responsibility
resulting from the implementation of instructions by CLIENT with which
CONTRACTOR ·is in· disagreement, provided CONTRACTOR has
communicated the objections in writing to CLIENT.
Courts have also taken into account the relative sophistication of the
persons entering into the contract in determining the validity of indemnity clauses
in consulting contracts.21 In commercial transactions, often the parties are not on
the same level in their understanding of the law. This may impact the
enforceability of the terms, but that is unlikely when lawyers are involved.
Another means of limiting consultant liability for Phase I ESAs is to limit the
ability of third parties to rely on the report. Most consulting contracts limit the
use of the reports to the parties to the contract, absent :specific authorization for
other third party use. Courts have generally upheld this interpretation of the
law.22
In general these terms will be negotiable. Clients can almost always get
the benefit of the additional insurance without paying additional funds. Further,
onerously limiting language, such as provisions requiring "sole" negligence in
order to recover damages from the consultants, may not be enforceable on the
one hand, and are often negotiable on the other.
j
J
J
j
j
J
C. Pointers For Negotiating Consulting Contracts to the Benefit of the
Client
21 Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Associates. Inc., 44 F. 3d 195 (3rd Cir. 1995).
22 Maxwell Morris v. Dames and Moore. Inc. { 1997 Conn. Super LEXIS 1248, (May 2, 1997);
William Fords v. Hartford Courant, 232 Conn. 557; 657 A2d 212 (1995); Markborough v. Superior
Court. 227 Cal. App. 3rd 705 (1991); Florida Power and Light v. Mid Valley Inc., 763 F 2d 1316
(1985);and Long Island Lighting Company v. IMO Delaval. Inc., 668 F. Supp. 237 (1987).
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A careful reading of the consultant's contract is warranted before engaging
any environmental consultant to perform environmental assessments of real
estate. If the consultant has no financial incentive to follow professional
standards, then the report may be less than useless. It may offer a false sense
of security that can result in significant costs to the client. The following pointers
are geared only to Phase I ESAs and cover only the minimum standards for
these contracts:
1. Make sure that the contract names the correct clients. In most
cases both the client and the lender should be named as clients
so that they will both have the ability to legally rely on th~
content of the report.
2. Review the scope of work to assure that it addresses the
questions the client needs answered.
3. The standard of care should require at least the degree of care
and skill ordinarily exercised under similar conditions by
reputable professionals performing the same work.
4. Minimum insurance amounts for professional liability should be
$1 million and the client should have access to the full amount
of those limits.
5. Indemnification clauses should not require the client to
reimburse the consultant for losses to third parties, unless the
client is at fault.
6. The contract should require that the consultant keep all
information gained through the assessment confidential.
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V. How Do You Read and Interpret a Phase I ESA?
The publication of the ASTM standard for Phase ESAs inarguably
achieved one of its primary goals - the standardization of environmental reports.
The standard not only defined the content of the Phase I ESA, but it also resulted
in reports that are easier to read and understand. The meaning of the results
however, can still be evasive.
"So what does this mean to me?" remains the most common question
associated with Phase I ESA reports. For non-environmental types, the
"Executive Summary" or the "Findings and Conclusions" are the only sections of
the report that they read because the rest of the report seems to have little use to
the question at hand. That is, whether the property is clear of environmental
concerns that would impact the loan value of the property or would lead to
significant financial liability resulting from environmental contamination.
The ASTM standard includes a recommended report format.23 It
recommends that supporting documentation be included with the report, along
with the credentials of the environmental professional, any information provided
by the user, the opinions, findings and conclusions of the environmental
professional, an explanation of any deviation from the standard, any additional
services contracted for by the user and a signed certification of the document
from the environmental professional performing the assessment. Supporting
documentation should include copies of documents reviewed by the consultant,
photographs of the property, and a site plan illustrating the boundaries of the
property assessed.
The significance of the information included in the report varies with the
property, however, every section is there for a reason.
23 ASTM 1527 E at 11 and Appendix X2.
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A. Introduction
Generally, the report will include an introduction that will restate the scope
of work and its limitations. This should confirm that the client received what it
requested. If the scope varied from the proposal or from the ASTM standard, the
deviation and the reason .for it should be stated up front.
B. Site Description
The site description should first confirm that the appropriate property was
assessed. It should describe the current and past uses of the property. Geology
and hydrogeology will also be included. This information is included in the report
because it assists in the formation of the basis for the consultant's opinion.
Subterranean data is vital to the assessment of contaminant migration. Property
use is indicative of the types of contaminants that would be expected to be found
on the property.
c. Records Review
The record review affords the consultant the benefit of known
environmental contamination in doing the assessment. The search includes
computer database searches of records maintained by environmental regulatory
agencies. Local agencies will also be contacted for information about reported
spills, releases, fires. or other incidents that may impact the environmental
condition of the site.
D. Site Reconnaissance
The site reconnaissance information is only as good as the person
performing the work. This is the portion of the assessment where unreported
landfills and underground storage tanks are found. The report of the
reconnaissance should include only those items that have significant
E - 21
environmental impacts and not minor concerns such as trash or insignificant soil
staining.
V I. What to do with the Recommendations and Conclusions Offered by
the Consultant
Any report of a review of the environmental condition of real estate should
include a conclusion that, within the scope of work performed, the consultant
sees no reason for further inquiry, or that the findings indicate that further
investigation is warranted. The frustration of many Phase I ESA reports is that
the consultant will not take a position with regard to the environmental condition
of the property. Also, consultants whose primary business in Phase "
assessments will use the Phase I investigation to mine for additional work and
will recommend environmental testing when its logic is questionable. Any item
listed in the Findings and Conclusions as a potential environmental concern
should include a clear explanation as to why the item is of concern. However,
there are no hard and fast rules concerning what is "acceptable" contamination of
a property.
The analysis of what is acceptable to the user of the Phase I is personal,
and the Phase I ESA report is but a tool in cost/benefit analysis that must be
completed to assess the economic value of the property. Environmental liability
concerns need not be automatic deal killers. Costs associated with UST
remediation may be reimbursed by the state assurance fund. Contamination
may be the responsibility of an off-site polluter.
Specific recommendations for further action, whether it is additional
investigation, remediation of known contaminants, or a report to a regulatory
agency, generally should not be included in the report. In some cases the
circumstances of the underlying transaction would suggest that the
recommendations be included in a separate document. Determinative
E- 22
jj
J
1
..
I
.J
,
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
t
J
s
J
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
circumstances may include whether the report will be a matter of pUblic record,
whether it is to be submitted to a regulatory agency, or whether it will be released
to other third parties.
The client's decision to act upon the consultant's recommendation should
not be based solely on the consultant's opinion. Reporting requirements, for
instance, are a matter of legal interpretation, which engineers and scientists are
not qualified to make.
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ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AFFECTING REAL ESTATE
ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES
AND ALLOCATING RISK
Clinton J. Elliott
Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs
Louisville, Kentucky
Copyright 2000, Clinton J. Elliott
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ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES AND ALLOCATING RISK
Environmental Laws Affecting Real Estate
A. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA") - 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et. seq.
1. strict, joint and several liability
2. broad categories ofPRPs
[a] United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. 1876 (1998) (corporate
affiliates and piercing the corporate veil)
[b] Carter-Jones Lumber v. Dixie Distributing Company, 166 F. 3d
840 (6th Cir. 1999) (shareholder and "arranger" liability)
[c] IBC Manufacturing Company v. Velsicol Chemical Corporation,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 15140 (6th Cir. 1999) (successor liability)
[d] Kelley v. Tiscomia, 104 F. 3d 361 (6 th Cir. 1996) (lender safe
harbor)
3. innocent landowner defense
[a] "all appropriate inquiry"
[b] due care requirements
[c] United States v. 150 Acres ofLand, 204 F. 3d 698 (6th Cir. 2000)
(inheritancelbequest)
[d] Anheuser-Busch. Inc. v. Ford Motor Company, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3556 (W.D. Ky.1997) (failure to disclose upon sale can
void defense)
B. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")- 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et. seq.
1. waste management and permitting requirements
2. citizens suits enjoining "imminent and substantial endangerment"
[a] "against any person ... contributing to. , ,"
F - 1
D. Clean Air Act - 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et. seq.
1. permit and compliance status
2. operational flexibility
[a] PSD/non-attainment areas
[b] MACT
E. OSHA
1. asbestos containing material
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G.
3. underground storage tanks ("USTs")
Clean Water Act - 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et. seq.
1. prohibits the discharge ofpollutants ...
[a] KPDES permit
2. storm water permitting requirements
[a] Phase II storm water regulations - 64 Fed. Reg. 68721 (Dec. 8,
1999)
3. Section 404 dredge and fill permits
[a] recent modification ofNWPs - 65 Fed. Reg. 12818 (March 9,
2000)
[a] disclosure, management and abatement requirements
Endangered Species Act
1. prohibition against "taking" endangered species
[a] potential impact on development
Comparable State and Local Laws and Regulations
F-2
II. Due Diligence Investigation
Buyer's Concerns
Seller's Concerns
2. identify environmental conditions, impacts and use restrictions
Practical Considerations For Both Parties
3. confidentiality/disclosure issues
2. protection from future action/conditions
r,
r
r
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A.
B.
C.
1.
3.
1.
innocent purchaser defense
avoid liability for pre-existing conditions
no contingent residual liability
r
r
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D.
1. right to rely on report
2. establish factual baseline
3. sufficient information to support business decision
4. sufficient information to support risk allocation
Assessing the Assessment
1. ASTM E 1527
r
r
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2.
3.
sufficiency of "all appropriate inquiry"
[a] BCW Assoc. v. Occidental Chem. Com., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
(E.D.Pa. 1988) (court held that buyer should have investigated
further based on suspicion)
Phase II investigation and beyond
F-3
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E. Additional Considerations
1. site access
2. reporting obligations
1. environmental baseline
[a] due diligence
7. necessary schedules
[a] KC 1986 Limited Partnership v. Read Manufacturing, 33 F. Supp.
2d 820 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (claims against prospective purchaser and
consultant as PRPs under CERCLA)
F-4
[b] evidentiary presumptions
[a] White Consolidated Industries. Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, 179 F. 3d 403 (6th Cir. 1999)
scope ofcoverage
[b] ejusdem generis
1. scope ofdue diligence
4. compliance with regulatory obligations
2. past and present activities/operations
3. presence or absence ofhazardous substances/wastes
5. status ofnecessary permits
6. past, present or pending notices, NOVs, administrative or judicial actions
2.
Risk Allocation
B. Representations and Warranties
A. Defined Terms
C. Indemnification
III.
r
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D. Addressing Known Conditions
1. reduction ofpurchase price
2. escrow funds
3. "carve out"
4. lease rather than purchase
5. creation ofseparate entity
6. pre-purchase remediation agreement
7. environmental insurance
Brownfields Redevelopment
A. EPA Comfort Letters - 62 Fed. Reg. 4624 (Jan. 30, 1997)
1. EPA's intentions concerning CERCLA response action
2. "purely informational only"
B. EPA Prospective Purchaser Agreement - 65 Fed. Reg. 1381 (Jan. 10,2000)
1. PPA criteria - 60 Fed. Reg. 34792 (July 3, 1995)
r
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IV.
3.
4.
5.
2.
3.
[c] legal "requirements"
[d] basket and cap
financial strength
avoid inadvertent admissions of liability
indemnification beneficiaries
covenant not to sue
[a] limitations
public participation
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D.
Kentucky "Brownfields" Statute - KRS 224.01-450
1. public entity application
KRS 224.01-400 and Kentucky's Voluntary Cleanup Program
1. September 10, 1998 guidance
2. risk management
[a] engineering controls
[b] institutional controls
F-6
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ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
STATE AND CITIZEN ABILITY TO INFLUENCE
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP ACTIONS
Thomas J. FitzGerald
Kentucky Resources Council
Frankfort, Kentucky
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EXECUTIVE ORDER 12898
FEDERAL ACTIONS TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
IN MINORITY POPULATIONS AND LOW-INCOME POPULATIONS
February 11, 1994
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws ofthe United States of
America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
~ection 1-1. IMPLEMENTATIONI
1-101. Agency Responsibilities. To the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law, and consistent
with the principles set forth In the report on the National Performance Review, each Federal agency shall
make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate,
disproportionately high and adverse human health or enviromriental effects of its programs, policies, and
activities on minority populations and low-income populations in the United States and its territories and
possessions, the District ofColumbia, the Commonwealth ofPuerto Rico, and the Commonwealth of the
Marian islands.
1-102. Creation ofan Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice (a) Within 3 months of the
date ofthis order, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency ("Administrator") or the
Administrator's designee shall convene an Interagency Federal Working Group on Environmental
Justice ("Working- Group"). The Working Group shall comprise the heads of the following executive
agencies and offices, or their designees: (a)Department ofDefense; (b) Department ofHealth and
Human Services; (c)Department ofHousing and Urban Development; (d) Department of Labor; (e)
Department ofAgriculture; (t) Department ofTransportation; (g) Department of Justice; (h) Department
of the Interior; (i) Department ofCommerce; (j) Department ofEnergy; (k) Environmental Protection
Agency; (1) Office ofManagement and Budget; (m) Office of Science and Technology Policy; (n)
Office ofthe Deputy Assistant to the President for Environmental Policy; (0) Office ofthe Assistant to
the President for Domestic Policy; (P) National Economic Council; (q) Council ofEconomic Advisers;
and (r) such other Government officials as the President may designate. The Working Group shall report
to the President through the Deputy Assistant to the President for Environmental Policy and the
Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy.
(b)The Working Group shall: (1) provide guidance to Federal agencies on criteria for identifying
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects on minority populations and
low-income populations;
(2)coordinate with, provide guidance to, and serve as.a clearinghouse for, each Federal agency as it
develops an environmental justice strategy as required by section 1-103 ofthis order, in order to ensure
that the administration, interpretation and enforcement ofprograms, activities and policies are
undertaken in a consistent manner; (3) assist in coordinating research by, and stimulating cooperation
among, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department ofHealth and Human Services, the
Department ofHousing and Urban Development, and other agencies conducting research or other
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activities in accordance with section 3-3 ofthis order;
(4) assist in coordinating data collection, required by this order;
(5) examine existing data and studies on environmental justice;
(6) hold public meetings at required in section 5-502(d) of this order; and
(7) develop interagency model projects on environmental justice that evidence cooperation among
Federal agencies.
1-103. Development ofA~encY Strategies. (a) Except as provided in section 6-605 of this order, each
Federal agency shall deve op an agency-wide environmental justice strategy, as set forth in subsections
(b) - (e) of this section that identifies and addresses disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income
populations. The environmental justice strategy shall list programs, policies, planning and public
participation processes, enforcement, and/or rulemakings related to human health or the environment
that should be revised to, at a minimum: (1) promote enforcement ofall health and environmental
statutes in areas with minority populations and low-income populations: (2) ensure greater public
participation; (3) improve research and data collection relating to the health ofand environment of
minority populations and low-income populations; and (4) identify differential patterns ofconsumption
ofnatural resources among minority populations and low-income populations. In addition, the
environmental justice strategy shall include, where appropriate, a timetable for undertaking identified
revisions and consideration ofeconomic and social implications of the revisions.
(b) Within 4 months of the date ofthis order, each Federal agency shall identify an internal
administrative process for developing its environmental justice strategy, and shall inform the Working
Group ofthe process.
(c) Within 6 months ofthe date of this order, each Federal agency shall provide the Working Group with
an outline of its proposed environmental justice strategy.
(d) Within 10 months of the date of this order, each Federal agency shall provide the Working Group
with its proposed environmental justice strategy.
(e) Within 12 months of the date of this order, each Federal agency shall finalize its environmental
justice strategy and provide a copy and written description of its strategy to the Working Group. During
the 12 month period from the date of this order, each Federal agency, as part of its environmental justice
strategy, shell identify several specific projects that can be promptly undertaken to address particular
concerns identified during the development of the proposed environmental justice strategy, and a
schedule for implementing those projects.
(f) Within 24 months of the date of this order, each Federal agency shall report to the Working Group on
its progress in implementing its agency-wide environmental justice strategy.
(g) Federal agencies shall provide additional periodic reports to the Working Group as requested by the
Working Group.
1-104. Reports to The President. Within 14 months of the date of this order, the Working Group shall
submit to the President, through the Office of the Deputy Assistant to the President for Environmental
Policy and the Office of the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, a report that describes the
implementation of this order, and includes the final environmental justice strategies described in section
1-103(e) of this order.
•
• •
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Executive Order 12898
(including populations) from participation in, denying persons (including populations) the benefits of, or
subjecting persons (including populations) to discrimination under, such, programs, policies, and
activities, because of their race, Color, or national origin.
ISec.3 -3. Research, Data Collection, and Analysis I
3-301. Human Health and Environmental Research and Analysis. (a) Environmental human health
research, whenever practicable and appropriate, shall include diverse segments of the population in
epidemiological and clinical studies, including segments at high risk from environmental hazards, such
as minority populations, low-income populations and workers who may be exposed to, substantial
environmental hazards. .
(b) Environmental human health analyses, whenever practicable and appropriate, shall identify multiple
and cumulative exposures.
(c) Federal agencies shall provide minority populations and low-income populations the opportunity to
comment on the development and design ofresearch strategies undertaken pursuant to this order.
3-302. Human Health and Environmental DaUl Collection and Analysis.To the extent permitted by
existing law, including the Privacy Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. section 552a): (a) each federal agency,
whenever practicable and appropriate, shall collect, maintain, and analyze information assessing and
comparing environmental and human health risks borne by populations identified by race, national
origin, or income. To the extent practical and appropriate, Federal agencies shall use this information to
determine whether their programs, policies, and activities have disproportionately high and adverse
human health or environmental effects on minority populations and low-income populations;
(b) In connection with the development and implementation of agency strategies in section 1-103 of this
order, each Federal agency, whenever practicable and appropriate, shall collect, maintain and analyze
information on the race, national origin, income level, and other readily accessible and appropriate
information for areas surrounding facilities or sites expected to have substantial environmental, human
health, or economic effect on the surrounding populations, when such facilities or sites become the
subject ofa substantial Federal environmental administrative or judicial action. Such information shall
be made available to the public unless prohibited by law; and
(c) Each Federal agency, whenever practicable and appropriate, shall collect, maintain, and analyze
information on the race, national origin, income level, and other readily accessible and appropriate
information for areas surrounding Federal facilities that are: (I) subject to the reporting requirements
under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. section 11001-11050 as
mandated in Executive Order No. 12856; and (2) expected to have a substantial environmental, human
health, or economic effect on surrounding populations. Such information shall be made available to the
public unless prohibited by law.
(d) In carrying out the responsibilities in this section, each Federal agency, whenever practicable and
appropriate, shall share information and eliminate unnecessary duplication ofefforts through the use of
existing data systems and cooperative agreements among Federal agencies and with State, local, and
tribal governments.
ISec. 4-4. Subsistence Consumption OfFish And Wildlife[
4-401. Consumption Patterns. Inorder to assist in identifying the need for ensuring protection of
populations with differential patterns ofsubsistence consumption of fish and wildlife, Federal agencies,
whenever practicable and appropriate, shall collect, maintain, and analyze information on the
consumption patterns of populations who principally rely on fish and/or wildlife for subsistence. Federal
agencies shall communicate to the public the risks of those consumption patterns.
4-402. Guidance. Federal agencies, whenever practicable and appropriate, shall work in a coordinated
manner to publish guidance reflecting the latest scientific information available concerning methods for
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evaluating the human health risks associated with the consumption of pollutant-bearing fish or wildlife.
Agencies shall consider such guidance in developing their policies and rules.
(b) Each Federal agency may, whenever practicable and appropriate, translate crucial public documents,
notices, and hearings relating to human health or the environment for limited English speaking
populations.
(c) Each Federal agency shall work to ensure that public documents, notices, and hearings relating to
human health or the environment are concise, understandable, and readily accessible to the public.
(d) The Working Group shall hold public meetings, as appropriate, for the purpose of fact-finding,
receiving public comments, and conducting inquiries concerning environmental justice. The Working
Group shall prepare for public review a summary of the comments and recommendations discussed at
the public meetings.
JSec. 6-6. General Provisions)
6-601. Responsibility for Agency Implementation. The head of each Federal agency shall be responsible
for ensuring compliance with this order. Each Federal agency shall conduct internal reviews and take
such other steps as may be necessary to monitor compliance with this order.
6-602. Executive Order No. 12250. This Executive order is intended to supplement but not supersede
Executive Order No. 12250, which requires consistent and effective implementation ofvarious laws
prohibiting discriminatory practices in programs receiving Federal financial assistance. Nothing herein
shall limit the effect or mandate ofExecutive Order No. 12250.
6-603. Executive Order No. 12875. This Executive order is not intended to limit the effect or mandate
ofExecutive Order No. 12875.
6-604. Scope. For purposes ofthis order, Federal agency means any agency on the Working Group, and
such other agencies as may be designated by the President, that conducts any Federal program or activity
that substantially affects human health or the environment. Independent agencies are requested to
comply with the provisions of this order.
6-605. Petitions far Exemptions. The head ofa Federal agency may petition the President for an
exemption from the requirements of this order on the grounds that all or some ofthe petitioning agency's
programs or activities should not be subject to the requirements of this order.
6-606. Native American Programs. Each Federal agency responsibility set forth under this order shall
apply equally to Native Amencan programs. In addition the Department of the Interior, in coordination
with the Working Group, and, after consultation with tribal leaders, shall coordinate steps to be taken
pursuant to this order that address Federally- recognized Indian Tribes.
6-607. Costs. Unless otherwise provided by law, Federal agencies shall assume the financial costs of
complying with this order.
6-608. General. Federal agencies shall implement this order consistent with, and to the extent permitted
by, existing law. .
6-609. Judicial Review. This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive
branch and is not intended to, nor does it create any right, benefit, or trust responsibility, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or
any person. This order shall not be construed to create any right to judicial review involving the
compliance or noncompliance ofthe United States, its agencies, its officers, or any other person with
this order.
William J. Clinton
THE WHITE HOUSE,
February II, 1994.
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Background Information on Brownfields and Title VI
Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, citizens can file complaints with EPA alleging
discriminatory effects resulting from the issuance of pollution control permits by state and local
government agencies that receive EPA funding. In February 1998, EPA issued an interim guidance to
inform the public ofEPA's current approach for processing Title VI complaints and to provide an
opportunity for public comment. On June 20, 1998, the U.S. Conference of Mayors passed a resolution
which raises concerns that EPA's interim guidance is at odds with efforts to cleanup and redevelop urban
brownfields and calls for its immediate suspension. EPA strongly believes that there is no inherent
contradiction between Title VI and good, community-centered brownfields cleanup and redevelopment.
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Introduction
This interim guidance is intended to provide a framework for the processing by
EPA's Office ofCivil Rights (OCR) of complaints filed under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (Title VI)l, alleging discriminatory
effects resulting from the issuance ofpollution control permits by state and
local governmental agencies that receive EPA funding. ..
In the past, the Title VI complaints filed with EPA typically alleged
discrimination in access to public water and sewerage systems or in
employment practices. This interim guidance is intended to update the Agency's
procedural and policy framework to accommodate the increasing number of
Title VI complaints that allege discrimination in the environmental permitting
context.
As reflected in this guidance, Title VI environmental permitting cases may have
implications for a diversity of interests, including those of the recipient, the
affected community, and the permit applicant or permittee. EPA believes that
robust stakeholder input is an invaluable tool for fully addressing Title VI
issues during the permitting process and informally resolving Title VI
complaints when they arise.
Background
No person in the United States shall, on the ground o/race. color,
or national origin. be excludedfrom participation in, be denied the
benefits oJ. or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
- Title VI
On February 11, 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898,
"Federal Actions To Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations
and Low-Income Populations." The Presidential memorandum accompanying
that Order directs Federal agencies to ensure compliance with the
nondiscrimination requirements ofTitle VI for all Federally-funded programs
and activities that affect human health or the environment. While Title VI is
inapplicable to EPA actions, including EPA's issuance ofpermits, Section 2-2
of Executive Order 12,898 is designed to ensure that Federal actions
substantially affecting human health or the environment do not have
discriminatory effects based on race, color, or national origin. Accordingly,
EPA is committed to a policy ofnondiscrimination in its own permitting
programs.
Title VI itself prohibits intentional discrimination. The Supreme Court has
ruled, however, that Title VI authorizes Federal agencies, including EPA, to
adopt implementing regulations that prohibit discriminatory effects. Frequently,
discrimination results from policies and practices that are neutral on their face,
but have the effect ofdiscriminating) Facially-neutral policies or practices that
result in discriminatory effects violate EPA's Title VI regulations unless it is
shown that they are justified and that there is no less discriminatory alternative.
EPA awards grants on an annual basis to many state and local agencies that
administer continuing environmental programs under EPA's statutes. As a
condition of receiving funding under EPA's continuing environmental program
grants, recipient agencies must comply with EPA's Title VI regulations, which
are incorporated by reference into the grants. EPA's Title VI regulations define
a "[r]ecipient" as "any state or its political subdivision, any instrumentality of a
state or its political subdivision, any public or private agency, institution,
organization, or other entity, or any person to which Federal financial
assistance is extended directly or through another recipient ...."2. Title VI
creates for recipients a nondiscrimination obligation that is contractual in nature
in exchange for accepting Federal funding. Acceptance ofEPA funding creates
an obligation on the recipient to comply with the regulations for as long as any
EPA funding is extended.:!.
Under amendments made to Title VI by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987,~ a "program" or "activity" means all of the operations ofa department,
agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality ofa state or ofa local
government, any part ofwhich is extended Federal financial assistance.!!
Therefore, unless expressly exempted from Title VI by Federal statute, all
programs and activities ofa department or agency that receives EPA funds are
subject to Title VI, including those programs and activities that are not
EPA-funded. For example, the issuance ofpermits by EPA recipients under
solid waste programs administered pursuant to Subtitle D of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (which historically have not been grant-funded
by EPA), or the actions they take under programs that do not derive their
authority from EPA statutes (e.g., state environmental assessment
requirements), are part ofa program or activity covered by EPA's Title VI
regulations if the recipient receives any funding from EPA.
In the event that EPA finds discrimination in a recipient's permitting program,
and the recipient is not able to come into compliance voluntarily, EPA is
required by its Title VI regulations to initiate procedures to deny, annul,
suspend, or terminate EPA funding} EPA also may use any other means
authorized by law to obtain compliance, including referring the matter to the
Department of Justice (D01) for litigation.£ In appropriate cases, D01 may file
suit seeking injunctive relief. Moreover, individuals may file a private right of
action in court to enforce the nondiscrimination requirements in Title VI or
EPA's implementing regulations without exhausting administrative remedies.~
Overview of Framework for Processing Complaints
While this guidance is directed at the processing of discriminatory effects
allegations, as a general proposition, Title VI complaints alleging either
discriminatory intent and/or discriminatory effect in the context of
environmental permitting will be processed by OCR under EPA's Title VI
regulations at 40 C.F.R. Part 7. The steps that the Agency will follow in
complaint processing are described below. EPA's Title VI regulations
encourage the informal resolution ofall complaints with the participation of all
affected stakeholders (see step 8 below).
J. Acceptance o/the Complaint
Upon receiving a Title VI complaint, OCR will determine whether the
complaint states a valid claim. If it does, the complaint will be accepted for
processing within twenty (20) calendar days ofacknowledgment of its receipt,
and the complainant and the EPA recipient will be so notified. If OCR does not
accept the complaint, it will be rejected or, if appropriate, referred to another
Federal agency. 40 C.F.R. § 7.120(d)(l).
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2. Investigation/Disparate Impact Assessment
Once a complaint is accepted for processing, OCR will conduct a factual
investigation to determine whether the permit(s) at issue will create a disparate
impact, or add to an existing disparate impact, on a racial or ethnic population.
If, based on its investigation, OCR concludes that there is no disparate impact,
the complaint will be dismissed. IfOCR makes an initial finding ofa disparate
impact, it will notify the recipient and the complainant and seek a response
from the recipient within a specified time period. Under appropriate
circumstances, OCR may seek comment from the recipient, permittee, and/or
complainant(s) on preliminary data analyses before making an initial finding
concerning disparate impacts.
3. Rebuttal/Mitigation
The notice of initial finding ofa disparate impact will provide the recipient the
opportunity to rebut OCR's finding, propose a plan for mitigating the disparate
impact, or to "justify" the disparate impact (see step 4 below regarding
justification). Ifthe recipient successfully rebuts OCR's finding, or, if the
recipient elects to submit a plan for mitigating the disparate impact, and, based
on its review, EPA agrees that the disparate impact will be mitigated
sufficiently pursuant to the plan, the parties will be so notified. Assuming that
assurances are provided regarding implementation of such a mitigation plan, no
further action on the complaint will be required.
4. Justification
If the recipient can neither rebut the initial finding ofdisparate impact nor
develop an acceptable mitigation plan, then the recipient may seek to
demonstrate that it has a substantial, legitimate interest that justifies the
decision to proceed with the permit notwithstanding the disparate impact. Even
where a substantial, legitimate justification is proffered, OCR will need to
consider whether it can be shown that there is an alternative that would satisfy
the stated interest while eliminating or mitigating the disparate impact.
5. Preliminary Finding ofNoncompliance
If the recipient fails to rebut OCR's initial finding ofa disparate impact and can
neither mitigate nor justify the disparate impact at issue, OCR will, within 180
calendar days from the start of the complaint investigation, send the recipient a
written notice ofpreliminary finding of noncompliance, with a copy to the
grant award official (Award Official) and the Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights. OCR's notice may include recommendations for the recipient to
achieve voluntary compliance and, where appropriate, the recipient's right to
engage in voluntary compliance negotiations. 40 C.F.R. § 7.1 15(c).
6. Formal Determination ofNoncompliance
If, within fifty (50) calendar days of receipt of the notice of preliminary finding,
the recipient does not agree to OCR's recommendations or fails to submit a
written response demonstrating that OCR's preliminary finding is incorrect or
that voluntary compliance can be achieved through other steps, OCR will issue
a formal written determination of noncompliance, with a copy to the Award
Official and the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. 40 C.F.R. §
7.115(d).
7. Voluntary Compliance
The recipient will have ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the formal
determination ofnoncompliance within which to come into voluntary
compliance. 40 C.F.R. § 7.1 15(e). If the recipient fails to meet this deadline,
OCR will start procedures to deny, annul, suspend, or terminate EPA assistance
in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 7. I30(b) and consider other appropriate action,
including referring the matter to DOJ for litigation.
8. Informal Resolution
EPA's Title VI regulations call for OCR to pursue informal resolution of
administrative complaints wherever practicable. 40 C.F.R. § 7.120(d)(2).
Therefore, OCR will discuss, at any point during the process outlined above,
offers by recipients to reach informal resolution, and will, to the extent
appropriate, endeavor to facilitate the informal resolution process and
involvement ofaffected stakeholders. Ordinarily, in the interest ofconserving
EPA investigative resources for truly intractable matters, it will make sense to
encourage dialogue at the beginning of the investigation ofcomplaints accepted
for processing. Accordingly, in notifying a recipient of acceptance ofa
complaint for investigation, OCR will encourage the recipient to engage the
complainant(s) in informal resolution in an effort to negotiate a settlement.
Rejecting or Accepting Complaints for Investigation
It is the general policy ofOCR to investigate all administrative complaints that
have apparent merit and are complete or properly pleaded. Examples of
complaints with no apparent merit might include those which are so
insubstantial or incoherent that they cannot be considered to be grounded in
fact.
A complete or properly pleaded complaint is:l.!!
I. in writing, signed, and provides an avenue for contacting the signatory
(e.g., phone number, address);
2. describes the alleged discriminatory act(s) that violates EPA's Title VI
regulations (i.e., an act of intentional discrimination or one that has the
effect ofdiscriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin);
3. filed within 180 calendar days of the alleged discriminatory act(s).L!; and
4. identifies the EPA recipient that took the alleged discriminatory act(s).
EPA's Title VI regulations contemplate that OCR will make a determination to
accept, reject, or refer (to the appropriate Federal agency) a complaint within
twenty (20) calendar days ofacknowledgment of its receipt. 40 C.F.R. §
7.120(d)(I). Whenever possible, within the twenty-day period, OCR will
establish whether the person or entity that took the alleged discriminatory act is
in fact an EPA recipient as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 7.25. If the complaint does
not specifically mention that the alleged discriminatory actor is an EPA
financial assistance recipient, OCR may presume so for the purpose of deciding
whether or not to accept the complaint for further processing.
Timeliness of Complaints
Under EPA's Title VI regulations a complaint must be filed within 180 calendar
days of the alleged discriminatory act. 40 C.F.R. § 7.120(b)(2). EPA interprets
this regulation to mean that complaints alleging discriminatory effects resulting
from issuance ofa permit must be filed with EPA within 180 calendar days of
issuance of the final permit. However, OCR may waive the 180-day time limit
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for good cause. 40 C.F.R. § 7.120(b)(2).
OCR will detennine on a case-by-case basis whether to waive the time limit for
good cause. EPA believes that, in order to encourage complainants to exhaust
administrative remedies available under the recipient's pennit appeal process,
thereby fostering early resolution ofTitle VI issues, it is appropriate to consider
in making a good cause detennination a complainant's pursuit of its Title VI
concerns through the recipient's administrative appeal process. Under such
circumstances and after considering other factors relevant to the particular case,
OCR may waive the time limit if the complaint is filed within a reasonable time
period (e.g., 60 calendar days) after the conclusion of the administrative appeal
process.
In addition, it is OCR's policy not to reject automatically complaints
challenging pennits where such complaints are filed prior to final pennit
issuance by the recipient. Rather, OCR should provide the recipient with the
infonnation contained in the complaint for consideration in the pennit issuance
process. OCR also may notify the complainant that the complaint is premature,
but that OCR is keeping the complaint on file in an inactive status pending
issuance of a final pennit by the recipient. Should the recipient issue a final
pennit, OCR could initiate an investigation ifOCR or the complainant believe
that issuance ofthe final pennit may be discriminatory.
Permit Modifications
EPA believes that pennit modifications that reduce adverse impacts and
improve the environmental operation ofthe facility should be encouraged.
Similarly, the Agency does not want to discourage merely administrative
modifications, such as a facility name change, or otherwise beneficial
modifications that are neutral in tenns of their impact on human health or the
environment. Because such modifications do not cause or add to adverse
impacts, Title VI discriminatory effects claims based on them are likely to be
dismissed.
Pennit modifications that result in a net increase ofpollution impacts, however,
may provide a basis for an adverse disparate impact finding, and, accordingly,
OCR will not reject or dismiss complaints associated with pennit modifications
without an examination of the circumstances to detennine the nature of the
modification.
In the pennit modification context (as opposed to pennit renewals), the matter
under consideration by the recipient is the modified operation. Accordingly, the
complaint must allege, and, to establish a disparate impact OCR must find,
adverse impacts specifically associated with the modification.
Investigations of Allegedly Discriminatory Permit Renewals
Generally, pennit renewals should be treated and analyzed as if they were new
facility pennits, since pennit renewal is, by definition, an occasion to review
the overall operations ofa pennitted facility and make any necessary changes.
Generally, pennit renewals are not issued without public notice and an
opportunity for the public to challenge the propriety of granting a renewal
under the relevant environmental laws and regulations.
Impacts and the Disparate Impact Analysis
Evaluations ofdisparate impact allegations should be based upon the facts and
totality of the circumstances that each case presents. Rather than use a single
technique for analyzing and evaluating disparate impact allegations, OCR will
use several techniques within a broad framework. Any method ofevaluation
chosen within that framework must be a reasonably reliable indicator of
disparity.
In tenns of the types of impacts that are actionable under Title VI in the
pennitting context, OCR will, until further notice, consider impacts cognizable
under the recipient's pennitting program in detennining whether a disparate
impact within the meaning ofTitle VI has occurred. Thus, OCR will accept for
processing only those Title VI complaints that include at least an allegation of a
disparate impact concerning the types of impacts that are relevant under the
recipient's pennitting program.g
The general framework for detennining whether a disparate impact exists has
five basic steps.
Step I: Identifying the Affected Population
The first step is to identify the population affected by the pennit that triggered
the complaint. The affected population is that which suffers the adverse impacts
of the pennitted activity. The impacts investigated must result from the
pennit(s) at issue.
The adverse impacts from pennitted facilities are rarely distributed in a
predictable and unifonn manner. However, proximity to a facility will often be
a reasonable indicator ofwhere impacts are concentrated. Accordingly, where
more precise infonnation is not available, OCR will generally use proximity to
a facility to identify adversely affected populations. The proximity analysis
should reflect the environmental medium and impact ofconcern in the case.
Step 2: Determining the Demographics of the
Affected Population
The second step is to detennine the racial and/or ethnic composition of the
affected population for the pennitted facility at issue in the complaint. To do so,
OCR uses demographic mapping technology, such as Geographic lnfonnation
Systems (GIS). In conducting a typical analysis to detennine the affected
population, OCR generates data estimating the race and/or ethnicity and density
ofpopulations within a certain proximity from a facility or within the
distribution pattern for a release/impact based on scientific models. OCR then
identifies and characterizes the affected population for the facility at issue. If
the affected population for the pennit at issue is of the alleged racial or ethnic
group(s) named in the complaint, then the demographic analysis is repeated for
each facility in the chosen universe(s) offacilities discussed below.
Step 3: Determining the Universe(s) of Facilities and
Total Affected Population(s)
The third step is to identify which other pennitted facilities, if any, are to be
included in the analysis and to detennine the racial or ethnic composition of the
populations affected by those pennits. There may be more than one appropriate
universe of facilities. OCR will detennine the appropriate universe of facilities
based upon the allegations and facts ofa particular case. However, facilities not
under the recipient's jurisdiction should not be included in the universe of
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facilities examined.
Ifin its investigation OCR finds that the universe offacilities selected by the
complainant is not supported by the facts, OCR will explain what it has found
and provide the complainant the opportunity to support the use of its proposed
universe. If the complainant cannot adequately support the proposed universe,
then OCR should investigate a universe of facilities based upon the facts
available and OCR's reasonable interpretation of the theory of the case
presented. Once the appropriate universe(s) offacilities is determined, the
affected population for each facility in the universe should be added together to
form the Total Affected Population.
Ordinarily, OCR will entertain cases only in which the permitted facility at
issue is one ofseveral facilities, which together present a cumulative burden or
which reflect a pattern ofdisparate impact.!l EPA recognizes the potential for
disparate outcomes in this area because most permits control pollution rather
than prevent it altogether. Consequently, permits that satisfy the base public
health and environmental protections contemplated under EPA's programs
nonetheless bear the potential for discriminatory effects where residual
pollution and other cognizable impacts are distributed disproportionately to
communities with particular racial or ethnic characteristics. Based on its
experience to date, the Agency believes that this is most likely to be true either
where an individual permit contributes to or compounds a preexisting burden
being shouldered by a neighboring community, such that the community'S
cumulative burden is disproportionate when compared with other communities;
or where an individual permit is part ofa broader pattern pursuant to which it
has become more likely that certain types ofoperations, with their
accompanying burdens, will be permitted in a community with particular racial
or ethnic characteristics. .
Step 4: Conducting a Disparate Impact Analysis
The fourth step is to conduct a disparate impact analysis that, at a minimum,
includes comparing the racial or ethnic characteristics within the affected
population. It will also likely include comparing the racial characteristics of the
affected population to the non-affected population. This approach can show
whether persons protected under Title VI are being impacted at a disparate rate.
EPA generally would expect the rates ofimpact for the affected population and
comparison populations to be relatively comparable under properly
implemented programs. Since there is no one formula or analysis to be applied,
OCR may identify on a case-by-ease basis other comparisons to determine
disparate impact.
Step 5: Determining the Significance of the Disparity
The final phase of the analysis is to use arithmetic or statistical analyses to
determine whether the disparity is significant under Title VI. OCR will use
trained statisticians to evaluate disparity calculations done by investigators.
After calculations are informed by expert opinion, OCR may make a prima
facie disparate impact finding, subject to the recipient's opportunity to rebut.
Mitigation
EPA expects mitigation to be an important focus in the Title VI process, given
the typical interest of recipients in avoiding more draconian outcomes and the
difficulty that many recipients will encounter in justifying an "unmitigated." but
nonetheless disparate, impact. In some circumstances, it may be possible for the
recipient to mitigate public health and environmental considerations
sufficiently to address the disparate impact. The sufficiency of such mitigation
should be evaluated in consultation with experts in the EPA program at issue.
OCR may also consult with complainants. Where it is not possible or
practicable to mitigate sufficiently the public health or environmental impacts
ofa challenged permit, EPA will consider "supplemental mitigation projects"
(SMPs), which, when taken together with other mitigation efforts, may be
viewed by EPA as sufficient to address the disparate impact. An SMP can, for
example, respond to concerns associated with the permitting of the facility
raised by the complainant that cannot otherwise be redressed under Title VI
(i.e., because they are outside those considerations ordinarily entertained by the
permitting authority).
Justification
Ifa preliminary finding ofnoncompliance has not been successfully rebutted
and the disparate impact cannot successfully be mitigated, the recipient will
have the opportunity to "justify" the decision to issue the permit
notwithstanding the disparate impact, based on the substantial, legitimate
interests ofthe recipient. While determining what constitutes a sufficient
justification will necessarily tum on the facts of the case at hand, OCR would
expect that, given the considerations described above, merely demonstrating
that the permit complies with applicable environmental regulations will not
ordinarily be considered a substantial,legitimate justification. Rather, there
must be some articulable value to the recipient in the permitted activity.
Because the interests ofa state or local environmental agency are necessarily
influenced and informed by the broader interest of the government ofwhich it
is a part, OCR will entertain justifications based on broader governmental
interests (i.e., interests not limited by the jurisdiction of the recipient agency).
While the sufficiency of the justification will necessarily depend on the facts of
the case at hand, the types of factors that may bear consideration in assessing
sufficiency can include, but are not limited to, the seriousness of the disparate
impact, whether the permit at issue is a renewal (with demonstrated benefits) or
for a new facility (with more speculative benefits), and whether any of the
articulated benefits associated with a permit can be expected to benefit the
particular community that is the subject of the Title VI complaint.
Importantly, a justification offered will not be considered acceptable if it is
shown that a less discriminatory alternative exists. If a less discriminatory
alternative is practicable, then the recipient must implement it to avoid a
finding ofnoncompliance with the regulations. Less discriminatory alternatives
should be equally effective in meeting the needs addressed by the challenged
practice. Here, again, mitigation measures should be considered as less
discriminatory alternatives, including additional permit conditions that would
lessen or eliminate the demonstrated adverse disparate impacts.
•••••
The statements in this document are intended solely as guidance. This
document is not intended, nor can it be relied upon, to create any rights
enforceable by any party in litigation with the United States. EPA may decide
to follow the guidance provided in this document, or to act at variance with the
guidance, based on its analysis of the specific facts presented. This guidance
may be revised without public notice to reflect changes in EPA's approach to
implementing the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act or the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, or to clarify and update text.
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1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7
2. Department ofJustice, Attorney General's Memorandum for Heads of
Departments and Agencies that Provide Federal Financial Assistance, The Use
ofthe Disparate Impact Standard in Administrative Regulations Under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (July 14, 1994).
3.40 C.F.R. § 7.25 (1996). Title VI applies to Indian Tribes as EPA recipients
only when the statutory provision authorizing the Federal financial assistance is
not exclusively for the benefit ofTribes. Otherwise, Tribes are exempt from
Title VI.
4.40 C.F.R. § 7.80(a)(2)(iii)(1996).
5. Pub. L. No.1 00-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988); S. Rep. No. 64 at 2, 11-16, lOOth
Cong., reprinted in 1988 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News at 3-4,13-18.
6.42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a.
7.40 C.F.R. §§ 7.115(e), 7.130(b)(l996); Id. at 7.11O(c).
8.42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l; 40 C.F.R. § 7.130(a).
9. Chester Residents Concerned for Ouality Living v. Seif, No. 97-1125, U.S.
App. LEXIS 36797 (3d Cir. Dec. 30, 1997).
10. EPA's Title VI regulations require that the complaint be in writing, describe
the alleged discriminatory acts that violate the regulations, and be filed within
180 calendar days of the alleged discriminatory act(s). 40 C.F.R. §
7.120(b)(1),(2). The criteria listed above satisfy these regulatory requirements.
11. Also, see discussion below on Timeliness ofComplaints.
12. Even where a recipient's authority to regulate is unclear concerning
cumulative burden or discriminatory permitting pattern scenarios (see step 3
below), OCR will nonetheless consider impacts measured in these terms
because Title VI is a Federal cross-cutting statute that imposes independent,
nondiscrimination requirements on recipients ofFederal funds. As such, Title
VI, separate from and in addition to the strictures of state and local law, both
authorizes and requires recipients to manage their programs in a way that
avoids discriminatory cumulative burdens and distributional patterns. Thus,
while Title VI does not alter the substantive requirements ofa recipient's
permitting program, it obligates recipients to implement those requirements in a
nondiscriminatory manner as a condition of receiving Federal funds.
13. In some rare instances, EPA may need to determine whether the impacts of
a single permit, standing alone, may be considered adequate to support a
disparate impact claim. While such a case has not yet been presented to EPA, it
might, for exampl.e, involve a permitted activity that is unique (i.e., "one ofa
kind") under a recipient's program
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EPCRA Compliance and Enforcement Issues
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 USC §§ 11001 et
seq. ("EPCRA"), also known as Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
("SARA") Title ill, establishes requirements concerning local emergency planning and the filing of
information concerning the identification, location, and amounts of hazardous chemicals present in
communities.
The scope of this presentation is limited to addressing recent enforcement initiatives by the
United States Environmental Protection Agency Region 4 against facilities that fail to comply with
EPCRA Section 311 - relating to the filing ofMaterial Safety Data Sheets with emergency planning
agencies, and EPCRA Section 312 - relating to the annually filing of emergency and hazardous
chemical inventory information. The EPCRA provisions relating to release notification and the
filing of toxic chemical release information are beyond the scope of this presentation.
I. Applicable Definitions
"Extremely Hazardous Substance" means a substance listed in the Appendices to 40 CFR
Part 355.
"Hazardous Chemical" means any hazardous chemical defmed under 29 CFR §
1910.1200(c), but does not include:
(a) any food, food additive, color additive, drug, or cosmetic regulated by the
Food and Drug Administration;
(b) any substance present as a solid in any manufactured item to the extent
exposure to this substance does not occur under normal conditions of use;
H-l
(c) any substance to the extent it is used for personal, family, or household
purposes, or is present in the same form or concentration as a product
packaged for distribution and use by the general public;
(d) any substance to the extent it is used in a research laboratory or hospital or
other medical facility under the direct supervision of a technically qualified
individual; or
(e) any substance to the extent it is used in routine agricultural operations or as
fertilizer held for sale by retailer to the ultimate customer.
"Local Emergency Planning Committee" or ''LEPC'' means the local committee to assist
in the implementation ofEPCRA.
"Material Safety Data Sheet" or ''MSDS'' means the sheet required to be developed under
29 CFR § 191O.1200(g).
'Threshold Planning Quantity" or "TPQ" means the threshold planning quantity for an
extremely hazardous substance as defined in 40 CFR Part 355.
II. Administration of EPCRA in Kentucky
In Kentucky, EPCRA is administered by the Kentucky Emergency Response Commission,
established pursuant to the provisions of KRS Chapter 39E and 106 KAR Chapter I. The KERC is
assisted administratively by the Division of EI!lergency Management of the Department of Military
Affairs.
Local responsibility for administration of EPCRA is handled by Local Emergency Planning
Committees. Although the members of the LEPCs are appointed by the KERC, pursuant to KRS
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39E.I00(2), the appointments are essentially made by the County Judge/Executive, who
recommends the appointments to the Commission.
The local fire department with jurisdiction over a facility is also involved in emergency
planning.
ill. Compliance with EPCRA Section 311
EPCRA Section 311, 42 USC § 11021, requires the owner or operator of any facility which
is required to prepare or have available a Material Safety Data Sheet for hazardous chemicals to
submit a copy ofthe MSDS for each such chemical to:
(1) Kentucky Emergency Response Commission;
(2) The LEPC; and,
(3) The fire department with jurisdiction over the facility.
This requirement applies to facilities that have quantities of a hazardous chemical exceeding
minimum threshold levels.
This minimum threshold levels are:
(1) Extremely Hazardous Substances - 500 pounds or the Threshold Planning
Quantity, whichever is lower;
(2) Gasoline at a retail gas station - 75,000 gallons (all grades combined), in tanks
entirely underground, if the facility was in compliance at all times during the previous preceding
calendar year with all applicable underground storage tank requirements (40 CFR Part 280 or 401
KAR Chapter 42). Retail gas station means a retail facility engaged in selling gasoline and/or
diesel fuel principally to the public, for motor vehicle use on land;
H-3
(3) Diesel Fuel at a retail gas station - 100,000 gallons (all grades combined), in tanks
entirely underground, if the facility was in compliance at all times during the preceding year with all
applicable underground storage tank requirements (40 CFR Part 280 or 401 KAR Chapter 42);
(4) All other Hazardous Chemicals - 10,000 pounds.
j
40 CFR Section 370.20.
A facility is only required to submit the MSDS once. The original submittal was to have
been on or before October 17, 1990. Subsequent submittals are required to be made within three
months after the facility first stored quantities of a hazardous chemical in excess of the minimum
threshold, or new hazardous chemicals are stored at the facility.
IV. Compliance with EPCRA Section 312
Any facility subject to EPCRA Section 311 is subject to EPCRA Section 312, 42 USC §
11022. The owner or operator ofa facility shall submit a Tier Ilinventory form to:
(a)
(b)
The Kentucky Emergency Response Commission;
The Local Emergency Planning Committee;
(c) The fire department with jurisdiction over the facility.
40 CFR 370.25.
Reporting shall be made on Form DES/SARA-312. The Tier IT form shall be updated and
submitted annually by March 1 ofeach year.
v. Enforcement
I
J
1
...
Failure to comply with EPCRA Section 311 or 312 is subject to the assessment of civil
penalties. Federal penalties are established by 40 CFR 370.5, which applies a maximum civil
penalty of $10,000 for failure to submit MSDS in compliance with EPCRA Section 311, and a
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maximum civil penalty of $25,000 for failure to submit a Tier II form. Each day that the violation
continues constitutes a separate violation.
Although Kentucky also establishes penalties for violation of these provisions in KRS
39E.990, the Kentucky Emergency Response Commission has yet to pursue enforcement.
Federal enforcement is conducted pursuant to the Interim Final Enforcement Response
Policy for Sections 304, 311 and 312 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act and Section 103 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (January 8, 1998).
Under the penalty policy, the minimum penalty for a violation of EPCRA Section 311 is
$625, but if the violation is not abated within 30 days after the violation first occurred, the minimum
penalty is $2,500. The minimum penalty under EPCRA Section 312 is $1,562, but if the violation
is not abated within 30 days after the violation first occurred, the minimum penalty is $6,251. These
amounts are increased annually based upon the rate of inflation.
VI. Voluntary Disclosure
A facility that may be in violation of EPCRA Section 311 or 312 may conduct an
environmental audit and voluntary self-disclose any violations under the Incentives for Self
Policing: Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, Final Policy Statement, 60 Fed.Reg.
66706 (December 22, 1995). The Self-Disclosure Policy authorizes EPA to substantially reduce or
eliminate gravity-based civil penalties. However, EPA may in its discretion recover any economic
benefit gained as a result of non-compliance. The economic benefit of non-compliance with
EPCRA Section 311 or 312 is considered by USEPA to be negligible, and is usually waived.
To qualify for waiver of the penalty, a facility must
H-5
(1) Discoverthe violations as part of a systematic, documented, periodic and
objective audit of the facilities operations;
(2) The audit must have been conducted voluntarily, and not through a legally
mandated monitoring or sampling requirement;
.J
(3) The violations must be promptly disclosed, typically within 10 days of the I
.J
discovery of the violation;
(4) The discovery of the violations cannot be the result of
(i) commencement of a federal, state or local agency inspection or
investigation, or the information ofan information request;
(ii) a notice of a citizen's suit;
(iii) the filing of a complaint by a third party;
(iv) reporting of the violations to the EPA by a ''whistle blower" employee;
or
...
...
J
(v) the imminent discovery of the violations by regulatory agency; .~
...
(5) The violations must be promptly corrected, typically within 60 days;
(6)
(7)
The facility must take steps to prevent recurrence of the violations;
The violations cannot have occurred within the previous three years at the same
facility;
(8) The violations must not have resulted in serious actual harm, nor did the present an
imminent and substantial danger to human health or the environment, or violate the specific terms
of any judicial or administrative order, or consent agreement; and
J
(9) The facility must agree to cooperate voluntarily with EPA.
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CONCLUSION
The conclusion is simple. Detennine whether the facility is storing Extremely Hazardous
Substances or Hazardous Chemicals in excess of the minimum threshold level. If so, submit the
necessary MSDS and Tier Two fonns to avoid costly civil penalties.
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THE EMERGENCY PLANNING
AND COMMUNITY RIGHT TO KNOW ACT
Section 301
(42 USC § 11001)
§ 11001. Establishment of State commissions, planning dis-
tricts, and local committees
(a) Establishment of State emergency response commissions
Not later than six months after October 17, 1986, the Governor of
each State shall appoint a State emergency response commission.
The Governor may designate as the State emergency response com-
mission one or more existing emergency response organizations that
are State-sponsored or appointed. The Governor shall. to the extent
practicable, appoint persons to the State emergency response com-
mission who have technical expertise in the emergency response
field. The State emergency response commission shall appoint local
emergency planning committees under subsection (c) of this section
and shaIl supervise and coordinate the activities of such committees.
The State emergency response commission shall establish procedures
for receiving and processing requests from the public for information
under section 11044 of this title; including tier II information under
section 11022 of this title. Such procedures shall include the desig.
nation of an official to serve as coordinator for information. If the
Governor of any State does not designate a State emergency response
commission within such period, the Governor shall operate as the
State emergency response commission until the Governor makes
such designation.
(b) EstablIshment of emergency planning dIstricts
Not later than nine months after October 17, 1986, the State
emergency response commission shall designate emergency planning
districts in order to facilitate preparation and implementation of
emergency plans. Where appropriate, the State emergency response
commission may designate existing political subdivisions or multiju-
risdictional planning organizations as such districts. In emergency
planning areas that involve more than one State, the State emergen·
cy response commissions of all potentiaIly affected States may desig.
nate emergency planning districts and local emergency planning
committees by agreement. In making such designation, the State
emergency response commission shall indicate which facilities sub-
ject to the requirements of this subchapter are within such emergen·
cy planning district.
(c) Establishment of local emergency planning committees
Not later than 30 days after designation of emergency planning
districts or 10 months after October 17, 1986, whichever is earlier,
the State' emergency response commission shall appoint members of
a local emergency planning committee for each emergency planning
district. Each committee shall include, at a minimum, representa.
tives from each of the following groups or organizations: elected
State and local officials; law enforcement, civil defense, firefighting,
first aid, health, local environmental, hospital, and transportation
personnel; broadcast and print media; community groups; and
owners and operators of facilities subject to the requirements of this
subchapter. Such committee shall appoint a chairperson and shall
establish rules by which the committee shall function. Such rules
shall include provisions for public notification of committee activi-
ties, public meetings to discuss the emergency plan, public com-
ments, response to such comments by the committee, and distribu-
tion of the emergency plan. The local emergency planning commit-
tee shall establish procedures for receiving and processing requests
from the public for information under section 11044 of this title,
including tier II information under section 11022 of this title. Such
procedures shall include the designation of an official to serve as
coordinator for information.
(d) Revisions
A State emergency response commission may revise its designa-
tions and appointments under subsections (b) and (c) of this section
as it deems appropriate. Interested persons may petition the State
emergency response commission to modify the membership of a local
emergency planning committee.
(Pub.L. 99-499, Title III, § 301, Oct. 17, 1986, 100 Stat. 1729.)
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THE EMERGENCY PLANNING
AND COMMUNITY RIGHT TO KNOW ACT
Section 311
(42 USC § 11021)
§ 11021. Material safety data sheets
(a) Basic requirement
(I) Submission of MSDS or list
The owner or operator of any facility which is required to
prepare or have available a material safety data sheet for a
hazardous chemical under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 [29 U.S.C.A. § 651 et seq.] and regulations promul.
gated under that Act shall submit a material safety data sheet for
each such chemical. or a list of such chemicals as described in
paragraph (2). to each of the following:
(A) The appropriate local emergency planning committee.
(B) The State emergency response commission.
(C) The frre department with jurisdiction over the facility.
(2) Contents of list
(A) The list of chemicals referred to in paragraph (1) shall
include each of the following:
(I) A list of the hazardous chemicals for which a material
safety data sheet is required under the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970 [29 U.S.C.A. § 651 et seq.] and
regulations promulgated under that Act. grouped in catego-
ries of health and physical hazards as set forth under such
Act and regulations promulgated under such Act. or in such
other categories as the Administrator may prescribe under
subparagraph (B).
(II) The chemical name or the common name of each such
chemical as provided on the material safety data sheet.
(III) Any hazardous component of each such chemical as
provided on the material safety data sheet.
(B) For purposes of the list under this paragraph. the Admin-
istrator may modify the categories of health and physical hazards
as set forth under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 [29 U.S.C.A. § 651 et seq.] and regulations promulgated
under that Act by requiring information to be reported in terms
of groups of hazardous chemicals which present similar hazards
in an emergency.
(3) Treatment of mixtures
An owner or operator may meet the requirements of this
section with respect to a hazardous chemical which is a mixture
by doing one of the following:
(A) Submitting a material safety data sheet for. or identi-
fying on a list. each element or compound in the mixture
which is a hazardous chemical. If more than one mixture
has the same element or compound. only one material safety
data sheet, or one listing, of the element or compound is
necessary.
(B) Submitting a material safety data sheet for. or identi-
fying on a list, the mixture itself.
(b) Thresholds
The Administrator may establish threshold quantities for hazardous
chemicals below which no facility shall be subject to the provisions of
this section. The threshold quantities may. in the Administrator's
discretion. be based on classes of chemicals or categories of facilities.
(c) Availability of MSDS on request
(I) To local emergency planning committee
If an owner or operator of a facility submits a list of chemicals
under subsection (a)(1) of this section. the owner or operator,
upon request by the local emergency planning committee, shall
submit the material safety data sheet for any chemical on the list
to such committee.
(2) To public
A local emergency planning committee. upon request by any
person. shall make available a material safety data sheet to the
person in accordance with section 11044 of this title. If the
local emergency planning committee does not have the requested
material safety data sheet, the committee shall request the sheet
from the facility owner or operator and then make the sheet
available to the person in accordance with section 11044 of this
title.
(d) Initial submission and updating
(I) The initial material safety data sheet or list required under this
section with respect to a hazardous chemical shall be provided before
the later of-
(A) 12 months after October 17. 1986, or
(B) 3 months after the owner or operator of a facility is
required to prepare or have available a material safety data sheet
for the chemical under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
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of 1970 [29 U.S.C.A. § 651 et seq.] and regulations promulgated
under that Act.
(2) Within 3 months following discovery by an owner or operator
of significant new information concerning an aspect of a hazardous
chemical for which a material safety data sheet was previously
submitted to the local emergency planning committee under subsec-
tion (a) of this section, a revised sheet shall. be provided to such
person.
(e) "Hazardous chemical" defined
For purposes of this section, the term "hazardous chemical" has
the meaning given such term by section 1910.1200(c) of title 29 of
the Code of Federal Regulations, except that such term does not
include the following:
(1) Any food, food additive, color additive, drug, or cosmetic
regulated by the Food. and Drug Administration.
(2) Any substance present as a solid in any manufactured item
to the extent exposure to the substance does not occur under
normal conditions of use.
(3) Any substance to the extent it is used for personal, family,
or household purposes, or is present in the same form and
concentration as a product packaged for distribution and use by
the general p~blic.
(4) Any substance to the extent it is used in a research labora-
tory or a hospital or other medical facility under the direct
supervision of a technically qualified individual.
(5) Any substance to the extent it is used in routine agricultur-
al operations or is a fertilizer held for sale by a retailer to the
ultimate customer.
(Pub.L. 99-499, Title III, § 311, Oct. 17, 1986, 100 Stat. 1736.)
THE EMERGENCY PLANNING
AND COMMUNITY RIGHT TO KNOW ACT
Section 312
(42 USC § 11022)
§ 11022. Emergency and hazardous chemical Inventory Corms
(a) Basic requirement
(1) The owner or operator of any facility which is required to
prepare or have available a material safety data sheet for a hazardous
chemical under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 [29
U.S.C.A. § 651 et seq.] and regulations promulgated under that Act
shall prepare and submit an emergency and hazardous chemical
inventory form (hereafter in this chapter referred to as an "inventory
form") to each of the following:
(A) The appropriate local emergency planning committee.
(B) The State emergency response commission.
(C) The fire department with jurisdiction over the facility.
(2) The inventory form containing tier I information (as described
in subsection (d)(1) of this section) shall be submitted on or before
March I, 1988, and annually thereafter on March I, and shall
contain data with respect to the preceding calendar year. The
preceding sentence does not apply if an owner or operator provides,
by the same deadline and with respect to the same calendar year, tier
II information (as described in subsection (d)(2) of this section) to the
recipients described in paragraph (1).
(3) An owner or operator may meet the requirements of this
section with respect to a hazardous chemical which is a mixture by
doing one of the following:
(A) Providing information on the inventory form on each
element or compound in the mixture which is a hazardous
chemical. If more than one mixture has the same element or
::I:
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compound. only one listing on the inventory form for the element
or compound at the facility is necessary.
(B) Providing information on the inventory form on the mix-
ture itself.
(b) Thresholds
The Administrator may establish threshold quantities for hazardous
chemicals covered by this section below which no facility shall be
subject to the provisions of this section. The threshold quantities
may. in the Administrator's discretion. be based on classes of chemi-
cals or categories of facilities..
(c) Hazardous chemicals covered
A hazardous chemical subject to the requirements of this section is
any hazardous chemical for which a material safety data sheet or a
listing is required under section 11021 of this title.
(d) Contents of form
(I) Tier I Information
(A) Aggregate Information by category
An inventory form shall provide the information described
in subparagraph (B) in aggregate terms for hazardous chem-
icals in categories of health and physical hazards as set forth
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 [29
U.S.C.A. 651 et seq.] and regulations promulgated under
that Act.
(B) Required Information
The information referred to in subparagraph (A) is the
following:
(I) An estimate (in ranges) of the maximum amount of
hazardous chemicals in each category present at the
facility at any time during the preceding calendar year.
(Ii) An estimate (in ranges) of the average daily
amount of hazardous chemicals in each category pres-
ent at the facility during the preceding calendar year.
(III) The general location of hazardous chemicals in
each category.
(C) Modifications
For purposes of reporting information under this para-
graph. the Administrator may-
(I) modify the categories of health and physical haz-
ards as set forth under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 [29 U.S.C.A. 651 et seq.] and regula-
tions promulgated under that Act by requiring informa-
tion to be reported in terms of groups of hazardous
chemicals which present similar hazards in an emergen-
cy. or
(11) require reporting on individual hazardous chemi-
cals of special concern to emergency response person-
nel.
(2) Tier II Information
An inventory form shall provide the following additional infor-
mation for each hazardous chemical present at the facility. but
only upon request and in accordance with subsection (e) of this
section:
(A) The chemical name or the common name of the
chemical as provided on the material safety data sheet.
(B) An estimate (in ranges) of the maximum amount of
the hazardous chemical present at the facility at any time
during the preceding calendar year.
(C) An estimate (in ranges) of the average daily amount of
the hazardous chemical present at the facility during the
preceding calendar year.
(D) A brief description of the manner of storage of the
hazardous chemical.
(E) The location at the facility of the hazardous chemical.
(F) An indication of whether the owner elects to withhold
location Information of a specific hazardous chemical from
disclosure to the public under section 11044 of this title.
(e) Avadabdlty of tier II information
(1) Availability to State commissions. local committees. and flre
departments
Upon request by a State emergency planning commission. a
local emergency planning committee. or a fire department with
jurisdiction over the facility, the owner or operator of a facility
shall provide tier II information. as described in subsection (d) of
this section. to the person making the request. Ariy such request
shall be with respect to a specific facility.
(2) Availability to other State and local officials
A State or local official acting in his or her official capacity
may have access to tier II information by submitting a request to
the State emergency response commission or the local emergen-
cy planning committee. Upon receipt of a request for tier II
information. the State commission or local committee shall.
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pursuant to paragraph (1), request the facility owner or operator
for the tier II information and make available such information
to the official.
(3) Avallabl1lty to public
(A) In general
Any person may request a State emergency response com-
mission or local emergency planning committee for tier II
information relating to the preceding calendar year with
respect to a facility. Any such request shall be in writing
and shall be with respect to a specific facility.
(B) Automatic provision of Information to public
Any tier II information which a State emergency response
commission or local emergency planning committee has in
its possession shall be made available to a person making a
request under this paragraph in accordance with section
11044 of this title. If the State emergency response commis-
sion or local emergency planning committee does not have
the tier II information in its possession, upon a request for
tier II information the State emergency response commis-
sion or local emergency planning committee shall, pursuant
to paragraph (1j, request the facility owner or operator for
tier II information with respect to a hazardous chemical
which a facility has stored in an amount in excess of 10.000
pounds present at the facility at any time during the preced-
ing calendar year and make such information available in
accordance with section 11044 of this title to the person
making the request.
(C) Discretionary provision of Information to public
In the case of tier II information which is not in the
possession of a State emergency response commission or
local "emergency planning committee and which is with
respect to a hazardous chemical which a facility has stored
in an amount less than 10,000 pounds present at the facility
at any time during the preceding calendar year, a request
from a person must include the general need for the infor-
mation. The State emergency response commission or local
emergency planning committee may; pursuant to paragraph
(1), request the facility owner or operator for the tier II
inbrmation on behalf of the person making' the request.
Upon receipt of any information requested on behalf of such
person, the State emergency response commission or local
emergency planning committee shall make the information
available in accordance with section 11044 of this title to the
person.
(D) Response In 4S days
A State emergency response commission or local emergen-
cy planning committee shall respond to a request for tier II
information under this paragraph no later than 45 days after
the date of receip.t of the request.
(0 Fire department access
Upon request to an owner or operator of a facility which files an
inventory form under this section by the fire department with juris-
diction over the facility. the owner or operator of the facility shall
allow the fire department to conduct an on-site inspection of the
facility and shall provide to the fire department specific location
information on hazardous chemicals at the facility.
(g) Format of forms
The Administrator shall publish a uniform format for inventory
forms within three months after October 17. 1986. If the Adminis-
trator does not publish such forms. owners and operators of facilities
subject to the requirements of this section shall provide the informa-
tion required under this section by letter.
(Pub.L. 99-499. Title III. § 312, Oct. 17. 1986. 100 Stat. 1738.)
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MILITARY AFFAIRS
39E.OI0. Kentucky Emergency Response Commission - Duties.
The Kentucky Emergency Response Commission is established to:
(1) Implement all provisions of Title III, Pub. L. No. 99-499, associated
federal regulations, and subsequent related legislation and regulations
related to hazardous substances; develop policies related to the re-
sponse of state and local governments to releases of hazardous sub-
stances; develop standards for planning for these events; develop.
reporting requirements for those who manufacture, use, transport, or
store these substances; provide information to the public concerning
hazardous substances in the community; develop training require-
ments; and develop requirements for local governments and covered
facilities to exercise plans related to hazardous substance response; and
(2) Perform any other functions assigned by statute or by the chairman.
(Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 226, § 58, effective July 15, 1998.)
39E.020. Definitions for chapter.
As used in this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise:
(1) "Commission" means the Kentucky Emergency Response Commission
and those persons appointed by the Governor to implement provisions
of Title III, Pub. L. No. 99-499 and this chapter.
(2) "Local emergencl planning committee," hereafter referred to as the
"local committee, means those persons apJ>Ointed by the commission to
assist in the implementation of Title III, Pub. L. No. 99-499 and this
chapter. .
(3) "Release" means, but is not limited to, any spilling, leaking, pumping,
pouri~g, emitti.ng, e!Optying, dischar~ng, injec~ing, e~caping, leaching,
dumpmg, or dlsposmg mto the environment, mcludmg the· abandon-
ment or discarding ofbarrels, containers and other closed receptacles, of
any hazardous substance.
(4) "Reportable quantity" means an amount of hazardous substances
released which requires notification to local and state warninf. points.
(5) "Hazardous substance" means a substance specified by Title II , Pub. L.
No. 99-499, subsequent federal regulations, this chapter, and subse-
quent administrative regulations as requiring notification ifreleased or
if stored, manufactured, or used.
(6) "Warning point" means that location, operated by state or local govern-
ment, and identified by the state commission or local committee, and
which is continuously staffed, and which has the capability or respon-
sibility to contact governmental emergency response organizations and,
if capability exists, to warn the public of hazards which may affect
them.
(7) "Emergency response organization" means a unit of local government
or a unit authonzed by local government which may be called to make
a response because of a release of a hazardous substance, and whose
responsibilities are included in plans developed under this chapter.
(8) "Facility" means all buildings, equipment structures, and other station-
ary items which are located on a single site or on contiguous or adjacent
sites and which are owned or operated by the same person, or by any
person which controls, is controlled by, or under common control with
such person, and which manufactures, stores, or uses substances
covered under this chapter. For purposes of KRS 39E.190, the term
includes motor vehicles, rolling stock, and aircraft.
(Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 226, § 59, effective July 15, 1998.)
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PHASE II NPDES STORM WATER PROGRAM
SUMMARY
On December 8, 1999, EPA promulgated Phase II of its storm water program. This
second phase extended permit requirements to smaller municipal separate storm sewer systems
(MS4s) and smaller construction activities than had previously been regulated. It also expanded
incentives for industrial facilities to cover areas where materials and equipment are stored to
prevent exposure to precipitation. The application deadline for newly covered municipalities and
activities is March 10, 2003.
The regulation now covers small MS4s in urbanized areas which serve populations of
less than 100,000. These newly regulated small MS4s must obtain an individual NPDES permit
or coverage under a general permit and must develop, implement and enforce a storm water
management program to minimize pollution of storm water.
The regulation sets out requirements for a new class of discharges of storm water
associated with "small construction activity," consisting of construction which disturbs one to
five acres. Previously only sites disturbing five acres or more were regulated. The EPA
addressed many comments received from the public concerning the proper scope of the
regulations by providing for flexibility with the possibility of waivers and designations. The
permitting authority may waive otherwise applicable requirements for small construction
activities where little or no rainfall is expected during construction or where the agency
determines in a particular instance that controls of discharges from such construction sites are not
needed to protect water quality. The latter waiver requires consideration of actual or potential
impairment of the receiving water body, generally by use of Total Maximum Daily Load
(TMDL) assessments. In addition, the permitting authority may determine that normally
unregulated construction activities disturbing less than one acre must be permitted due to their
potential impact on water quality.
Finally, the new regulations provide additional incentives for operators of industrial
activities to prevent exposure of their handling and equipment areas to storm water by extending
the "no exposure" exclusion to all industrial facilities, rather than the limited types which could
previously benefit. To qualify for the exclusion, the operator must cover material and equipment
areas to prevent exposure to precipitation, unless the items in such areas are sealed or otherwise
would not pollute storm water. Operators must also certify that no storm water discharged from
the entire facility is contaminated by exposure to industrial materials or activities, and must
allow the permitting authority to inspect the facility and to make inspection reports available to
the public. Construction activities are not eligible for this exclusion.
In Kentucky, the Division of Water plans to adhere to the scheduled deadline for
applications of March 10,2003. The Division will likely publish draft general permits sometime
in 2002 and submit them to public comment. Once they have been finalized, regulated entities
may apply for coverage by submitting a Notice ofIntent.
1- 1
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PHASE II NPDES STORM WATER PROGRAM
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND--PHASE I
Outline prepared by Laura D. Keller
1. Construction;
2. Coal runoff;
Operators of covered activities could apply for an individual permit, a group
permit, or for one of several general permits. Id.
Phase I regulations, promulgated on November 16, 1990, covered (1) MS4s
generally serving, or located in, incorporated areas or counties with populations of
100,000-249,999 people (medium MS4s) or 250,000 or more (large MS4s) and
(2) 11 categories of industrial activities, including construction activities
disturbing five acres or more ofland. 55 Fed. Reg. 47990 (1990) (codified in
40 C.F.R. §§ 122.26 and 122.28).
In Kentucky, general storm water permits were issued for:
3. Primary metals industries;
B. The application deadline for newly covered municipalities and activities is
March 10,2003. The permitting authority (in Kentucky, the Natural Resources
and Environmental Protection Cabinet, Division of Water (DOW)) may prescribe
an earlier date, but does not currently plan to do so.
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY COLLEGE OF LAW
May 19,2000
16th ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE
A. On December 8, 1999, EPA promulgated Phase II of its storm water program,
generally covering (1) regulated small municipal separate storm sewer systems
(MS4s), (2) construction activity disturbing from 1-5 acres, and (3) revision of the
"no exposure" exclusion for industrial facilities.
A. In 1987, the Clean Water Act was amended to require EPA to develop a tiered
strategy for implementation of storm water controls, using the existing National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting program. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(P).
B.
C.
D.
I.
II.
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4. Wood preserving--creosote;
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5. Wood preserving-arsenic, chromium;
6. Oil and gas exploration-production;
7. Landfill-land application; and
8. Other facilities.
E. In Kentucky, the most recent Phase I general permits were issued in October 1997
and are due to expire on September 30, 2002.
PHASE II: EXPANDED COVERAGE FOR MUNICIPAL SEPARATE STORM
WATER SEWER SYSTEMS
A. The Phase II regulation expands coverage to include certain "small MS4s." Small
MS4s are generally defined as separate storm sewers not defined as large or
medium MS4s. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(l6). Regulated small MS4s are:
1. Small MS4s located within urbanized areas, except for systems waived
from the requirement by the NPDES permitting authority. Urbanized
areas are determined by the latest Decennial Census by the Bureau of the
Census; and
2. Other small MS4s meeting designation criteria to be established by the
permitting authority. 40 C.F.R. § 122.32(a).
B. Regulated small MS4s must:
1. Apply for an individual NPDES permit or for coverage under a general
permit. 40 C.F.R. § 122.33. An alternative is to apply to be a copermittee
with an existing medium or large MS4 (through modification of that
MS4's permit). 64 Fed. Reg. at 68768 ("Joint Permit Programs").
2. Develop, implement and enforce a storm water management program
designed to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent
practicable (MEP).
a. Applications for an individual permit or for status as a copermittee
with a medium or large MS4 allow for development of an
individualized management program. 64 Fed. Reg. at 68752.
b. Under a general permit, the program must include at least six
"minimum control measures" as follows:
(i) Public education and outreach on stormwater impacts.
40 C.F.R. § 122.34(b)(l).
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r (ii) Public participation/involvement, including providing
r
opportunities for citizens to participate in program
development and implementation. This measure could
include encouraging citizen representation on a storm water
r
management panel. 40 C.F.R. § 122.34(b)(2).
(iii) Illicit discharge detection and elimination: This measure
r
should include developing, implementing, and enforcing a
program to detect and eliminate illicit discharges, including
development of a storm sewer system map, prohibiting
r
through ordinance or other mechanism non-storm water
discharges into the storm sewer system, implementation of
a plan to detect and address non-storm water discharges,
r
and informing the public of hazards associated with illegal
discharges and improper disposal of waste. 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.34(b)(3).
r (iv) Construction site storm water runoff control: The MS4must develop, implement, and enforce a program to reduce
r
pollutants to the MS4 from construction activities
disturbing greater than or equal to one acre. The program
must include an ordinance or other regulatory mechanism
r
to require erosion and sediment controls, as well as
requirements for construction site operators to implement
appropriate erosion and sediment control best management
r
practices (BMP) and to control waste at the construction
site. It must also include procedures for site plan review,
receipt and consideration of information submitted by the
r
public, and procedures for site inspection and enforcement.
40 C.F.R. § 122.34(b)(4).
(v) Post-construction storm water management in new
r development and redevelopment. The MS4 must develop,implement and enforce a program to address storm water
r
runoff from such projects that disturb greater than or equal
to one acre or designated smaller sites that discharge into
the small MS4. The MS4 must implement strategies for
r
structural and non-structural best management practices,
use an ordinance or other mechanism to address post-
construction runoff from such projects, and insure adequate
r
long-term operation and maintenance of BMPs. Locally
based watershed planning efforts are encouraged.
40 C.F.R. § 122.34(b)(5).
r (vi) Pollution prevention/good housekeeping for municipal
operations: The MS4 must develop and implement an
r
operation and maintenance (O&M) program that includes
f
r
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employee training to prevent and reduce water pollution
from municipal operations, developing maintenance
schedules and inspection for storm water controls, proper
waste disposal, etc. Other pollution prevention measures
suggested are regular street sweeping, reduction in the use
of pesticides or street salt, and frequent catch basin
cleaning. 40 C.F.R. § 122.34(b)(6).
3. Evaluation/reporting requirements. The general permit regulation requires
reports to be submitted to the permitting authority annually during the first
permit term and in years 2 and 4 of subsequent permit terms. The reports
must include, among other information, an evaluation of the effectiveness
of the chosen BMPs and an assessment of the MS4' s progress in achieving
the program's measurable goals. 40 C.F.R. § 122.34(g)(3). Monitoring is
not required. 40 C.F.R. § 122.34(g).
PHASE II: DISCHARGES ASSOCIATED WITH SMALL CONSTRUCTION
ACTIVITY
A. The new regulation lowers the threshold for regulated construction activities from
five acres to one acre through the definition of "storm water discharges associated
with small construction activity." 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(9)(i)(B); 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.26(b)(l5).
B. The site is automatically designated if construction activities, including, clearing,
grading, and excavating, result in land disturbance equal to or greater than one
acre and less than five acres. "Small construction activity" would include
disturbance of less than one acre if that area is part of a larger common plan of
development or sale which will disturb one to five acres.
C. The NPDES permitting authority will have the option of providing a waiver of
otherwise applicable requirements for small construction activity in two cases.
1. Where little or no rainfall is expected during the period of construction.
To qualify, the activity must occur where the value of the rainfall erosivity
factor ("R" in the Revised Universal Soil Loss Equation) is less than five
during the period of construction activity. 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.26(b)(l5)(i)(A).
2. When a TMDL or equivalent analysis indicates that controls on
construction site discharges are not needed to protect water quality.
a. Usually this waiver would be available only after the state or EPA
develops and implements TMDLs for the pollutants of concern
from the storm water discharges associated with construction
activity.
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b. If the receiving water body is a non-impaired water that does not
require TMDL, an equivalent analysis can be provided
demonstrating that controls on small construction sites are not
needed, based on consideration of existing in-stream
concentrati.ons.
c. For purposes of this waiver, "pollutants of concern" include
sediment or a parameter that addresses sediment (such as TSS,
turbidity, or siltation), and any other pollutant that has been
identified as a cause of impairment of the water body.
d. In order to obtain this waiver, the operator must have certified to
the permitting authority that the constmction activities and
discharges will occur within the drainage area addressed by the
TMDL or equivalent analysis. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(l5)(i)(B).
D. The permitting authority has residual designation authority. As in the case of
small MS4s, the permitting authority may regulate small constmction activities of
less than one acre on a case by case basis if it determines that the storm water
discharge contributes to a violation of a water quality standard or is a significant
contributor of pollutants to waters of the United States. 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.26(b)(l5)(ii).
PHASE II: EXPANSION OF "NO EXPOSURE" EXCLUSION FOR INDUSTRIAL
ACTIVITIES
A. Phase I storm water regulations for discharges associated with industrial activities
provided that/or categories ofindustries listed in 40 CF.R. § 122.26(b)(14J('d), a
permit was not required for storm water discharges from areas (such as material
handling and equipment areas) if they were not exposed to storm water.
Subsection (b)(l4)(xi) included only facilities having certain designated standard
industrial classification (SIC) codes. The exception has now been expanded to be
a conditional exclusion/or all industrial activities except construction.
B. In order to qualify for the "no exposure" exclusion, dischargers must satisfy
certain conditions as follows:
I. Provide storm resistant shelter to protect industrial materials and activities
from storm water, except for certain listed materials, such as sealed, non-
leaking containers; adequately maintained vehicles; and some products.
40 C.F.R. § 122.26(g)(l)(i) and (g)(2).
2. Submit a certification to the permitting authority, and to the MS4, if
applicable, that, throughout the entire facility, there are no discharges of
storm water contaminated by exposure to industrial materials or activities,
except for materials in sealed containers, adequately maintained vehicles,
and products as referenced above. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(g)(l)(ii) and (g)(4).
1-6
rDischargers are required to advise the permitting authority if
circumstances change so that materials or activities become exposed, and
must obtain a permit before the changed circumstances subject it to
enforcement for discharging without a permit. 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.26(g)(3)(iii).
40 C.F.R. § 122.26(g)(l)(iv-vi).
1. Construction activities are not eligible for the exclusion.
2. The exclusion applies only facility-wide, not to individual outfalls at a
facility.
There are limitations on the "no exposure" exclusion. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(g)(3).
b. to make its "no exposure" inspection reports available to the public
on request.
a. to inspect the facility to verify the "no exposure" certification, and
Allow the permitting authority, and the MS4, if applicable:
4. The permitting authority may require a permit and deny the exclusion if it
determines that a discharge causes or has reasonable potential to cause or
contribute to an instream excursion above the applicable water quality
standard. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(g)(3)(iv).
KENTUCKY IMPLEMENTATION
C.
VI.
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B.
EPA regulations allow the states to require applications to be submitted earlier
than March 10,2003. The DOW advises that it does not intend to exercise that
option.
EPA regulations also allow the permitting authority to dispense \vith notices of
intent to be covered by a general permit for discharges from small construction
activity. The DOW, however, plans to model its Phase II program after the
existing Phase I program. It will develop one or more general permits. Once the
general permit becomes final, operators seeking coverage under it must submit a
Notice ofIntent, which must include information concerning the operator and the
project, along with storm water best management practices plan. Once all storm
water discharges associated with the construction site are eliminated, or when
another operator has taken over control of the site, the operator will submit a
notice of termination.
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Wetlands Pennitting and (Fonner) Nationwide Pennit 26
Eric A. Braun
GREENEBAUM DOLL & McDONALD PLLC
INTRODUCTION
Few areas ofenvironmental law affect as broad a spectrum of individuals and entities as the law ofwetlands
permitting. Although most permitting regimes place commands and controls on the industrial discharger,
emitter, or waste handler, the requirements of Clean Water Act Section 404 can restrict the activities of
everyone from heavy industry down to the individual homeowner. Historically, General Permits such as the
Nationwide Permits have provided relief to developers and allowed a significant number of development
projects to proceed with little delay or federal interference. However, a recent overhaul to the Nationwide
Permits has severely limited the extent to which development - of all kinds - will be permitted under the
nationwide permit-by-rule program. These materials focus on recently-promulgatedchanges to the Nationwide
Permitting regime, and are intended to provide the practitioner an introduction to and working knowledge of
the changes that the overhaul has created. They are not intended to be a comprehensive look at wetlands
permitting.
BACKGROUND
Section 404 ofthe Clean Water Act ("CWA") and Section 10 ofthe Rivers and Harbors Act ("RHA") require
individuals and entities planning to undertake construction activities (i.e., dredging and/or filling) in waters
ofthe United States, including wetlands, to obtain appropriate permits for such activity from the Army Corps
ofEngineers ("the Corps"), which has jurisdiction over such waters. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344. Section
10 of the RHA requires a permit for construction in or obstruction ofSection 10 waters (defmed to generally
include all waters actually navigable by boat), and Clean Water Act Section 404 requires a permit for
'discharges ofdredge or fill material into waters ofthe United States, including non-tidal and isolated wetlands.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 ("CWA Section 404").
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II.
A. Individual versus Nationwide Permitting
Section404 provides for individual dredge and fill permits under Section404(a), and 404(e) provides
for General Permits. Nationwide Permits are a type of General Permit that expressly allow
individuals and entities to engage in broad categories ofactivity with little prior input from the Corps
or the public, based on the fact that such activities have previously, by category, been determined by
the Corps to pose only a minimal threat ofadverse impacts to the aquatic environment. Activities
which do not fall within the parameters of a Nationwide Permit (or other General Permit, such as a
Regional Permit) must be permitted by an Individual Permit under Section 404(a).
Corps regulations at 33 C.F.R. Part 330 identify the procedures and conditions under which one may
become authorized to conduct a particular activity via a Nationwide Permit. The regulations specify
that Nationwide Permits are intended to permit activities that have minimal adverse effects on the
aquatic environmentwith "little, ifany, delay or paperwork," and also expressly state thatNationwide
Permits may be issued to satisfy both RHA Section 10 and CWA Section404. 33 C.F.R. §§ 330.1(a),
(g).
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B. Key Defmitions and Basic Principles (33 C.F.R. Parts 323. 328)
NaVigable Waters - this always controversial term ofart is what provides the Corps the jurisdictional
hook with which it ensnares activities in wetlands and other water bodies into federal regulation.
"Navigable Waters" is defmed to include all "waters of the United States." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
[Note: "Navigable waters of the United States" for purposes ofRHA Section 10 - i.e., those waters
that are actually navigable by boat, is separately defmed at 33 C.F.R. § 329.4]
Waters ofthe United States - according to 33 C.F.R. § 328.3, includes all waters which are currently
used, were used or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including:
1. All interstate waters;
.J
J
2. All other waters (including intrastate waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams,
intermittent streams, mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows,
playa lakes, natural ponds, etc.), the use degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate or foreign commerce, including waters: J
a.
b.
which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or
other purposes;
from which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in interstate or foreign
commerce;
j
J
3.
4.
c. which are or could be used for industrial purposes by industries in interstate
commerce;
All impoundments of waters otherwise dermed as waters of the United States;
Tnbutaries ofwaters defined above;
J
5. The territorial seas; and
6. Wetlands adjacent to waters dermed above.
Wetlands - those areas that are: (1) inundated or saturated; (2) by surface or ground water; (3) at a
frequency and duration sufficient to support a prevalence of(a) hydrophytic vegetation in (b) hydric
(saturated) soils
Individual Permit - a Department of the Army authorization that is issued following a case-by-case
evaluation ofa specific project involving a proposed discharge ofdredge or fill material
GeneralPermit - a Department ofthe Army authorization that is issued on a Nationwide or Regional
basis for a category or categories when those activities are substantially similar in nature and cause
only minimal individual and cumulative adverse environmental impacts
Discharge offill material - the addition of fill material into waters of the United States; this
dermition now expressly excludes incidental fallback, but has been interpreted to include sidecasting
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Fill material- any material used for the primary purpose ofreplacing an aquatic area with dry land
or of changing the bottom elevation of a waterbody [note: a recent proposal would change this
deftnition and the EPA definition to eliminate the "primary purpose" language and replace it to cover
all activities that "have the effect" ofeither replacing any portion of a water of the United States to
make it dry land or changing the bottom elevation of any portion of such water. See 65 Fed. Reg.
21292 (April 20, 2000)].
Single and complete project - the total project proposed or accomplished by an owner/developer
NATIONWIDE PERMITS ("NWPs")
r
r
r
r
A. General Rules Regarding NWPs - The basic concept behind NWPs is that they authorize activities
that individually and cumulatively will cause no more than minimal adverse effects to the aquatic
environment. As a general rule, NWPs can be considered "pennits-by-rule" because they do not
require any prior involvement with or pennission from the Corps, and do not mandate any public
participation in the authorization process. 33 C.F.R. § 330.l(b). In order to be authorized by a given
NWP, an activity must comply with the terms of the NWP and any General Conditions that may
apply. Although they were originally published as regulations, the terms and conditions (including
the General Conditions applicable to all NWPs) are considered pennits and are no longer published
in the Code ofFederal Regulations. See 61 Fed. Reg. 65873,65874 (December 13, 1996). They are
instead published as "Final Notiftcations" in the Federal Register. Therefore, in order to review the
terms of a given NWP to determine whether an activity may be authorized pursuant to it, one must
consult the latest version of the pennit as printed in the Federal Register.
r
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2.
Preconstruction Notice
Prospective pennittees are required to provide the Corps District Engineer ("DE") with
Preconstruction Notiftcation ("PCN") ofthe proposed activity under certain circumstances.
Activities undertaken pursuant to NWPs also must comply with state water quality
certiftcations. 33 C.F.R. § 330.4(c). Whether a given NWP requires PCN depends upon the
terms of the NWP itself. Even where PCN is not required, however, pennittees may seek
pre-veriftcation from the DE that their proposed activities will comply with a NWP prior to
engaging in the activity. 33 C.F.R. § 330.6(a).
Ifa pennittee is required to give PCN by the terms of the particular NWP, it must do so in
writing "as soon as possible"prior to commencing the activity, and await authorization from
the Corps. The new tinletables and procedures for PCNs are discussed below.
DE Discretionary Authority
The decision whether a proposed activity is authorized by the a NWP is made by the DE,
which is vested with a great deal ofdiscretion in making that determination. Pursuant to 33
C.F.R. § 330.4(e), the DE may assert "discretionary authority" and deny authorization for
a proposed activity under a NWP by modifying, suspending or revoking the pennit-by-rule
authority to engage in that activity "whenever he determines sufficient concerns for the
environment or any other factor ofthe public interestso requires." 33 C.F.R. § 330A(e)(2).
The DE's discretion appears nearly unchecked:
Whenever the DE determines that a proposed speciftc activity covered by
an NWP would have more than minimal individualor cumulative adverse
J-3
effects on the environment or otherwise may be contrary to the public
interest, he must either modify the NWP authorization to reduce or
eliminate the adverse impacts, or notify the prospective permittee that the
proposed activity is not authorized by NWP and provide instructions on
how to seek authorization under a regional general or individual permit.
33 C.F.R. §330.4(e)(2) (emphasis added).
The regulations set forth a number of other factors the DE may take into account in
determining whether to modify, suspend or revoke a NWP authorization for a specifically
proposed activity, including:
.J
...
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a. changes in circumstances since the NWP was promulgated or since the DE
provided written verification of authorization to the permittee; J
b. the adequacy of specific conditions of the authorization;
c.
d.
any significant objections to the authorization not previously considered;
cumulative adverse effects that have occurred pursuant to that particular NWP
authorization; j
e. the extent of the permittee's compliance with terms and conditions of the NWP;
f.
g.
the extent to which asserting discretionary authority would effect plans,
investments and actions the permittee bas made or taken in reliance of the
authorization; and
"other concems for the environment," including the CWA Section 404(b)(1)
Guidelines (which include consideration of whether there are practicable
alternatives to a project, aesthetics, and economic values) and "other relevant
factors of the public interest."
j
3.
33 C.F.R. § 330.5(d)(1). The regulations also provide for an informal consultation process,
during which the DE and the prospective permittee may meet and attempt to determine
whether special conditions to modify the authorization may be mutually agreeable or
whether the permittee can supply the DE with information to alleviate his concerns. 33
C.F.R. § 330.5(d)(2). No public notice is required for the DE's fmal decision, whether it is
to authorize the activity via NWP or assert discretionary authority to require an individual
permit. 33 C.F.R. § 330.5(d)(3).
The DE is expressly authorized to condition approval of an activity by adding additional
requirements on a case-by-case basis in order to insure that the activity will result in no more
than minimal adverse environmental effects. 33 C.F.R. § 330.6(a)(3)(i).
Effects on Endangered Species
No activity may be authorized under any NWP if the activity is likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of a threatened or endangered species as listed or proposed for listing
under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). 33 C.F.R. § 330.4(f). Prospective permittees
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5.
6.
must notify the DE if any endangered or threatened species or critical habitat "might be
affected or is in the vicinity of the project." 33 C.F.R. § 330.4(f)(2). If the DE determines
that the activity may affect any listed species or critical habitat, the DE must initiate ESA
Section 7 consultation, and at the conclusion of the consultation may either authorize the
activity with special conditions or assert discretionary authority to require the permittee to
apply for an individual permit. 33 C.F.R. § 330.4(f)(2)(i)-(ii).
Effects on Historic Properties
No activity that may affect properties listed or proposed for listing on the National Register
ofHistoric Places may be authorized by NWP until the DE has complied with the National
Historic Preservation Act ("NHPA"). Again, the prospective permittee is under a duty to
notify the DE of any potentially listed property or upon discovery of any previously
unknown property after the activity has begun. The DE may authorize the activity with
conditions or require an individual permit after complying with the requirements of 33
C.F.R. Part 325, Appendix C.
Use ofMultiple NWPs
Two or more different NWPs may be used to authorize a "single and complete project."
However, a single NWP may not be used twice on the same single and complete project.
33 C.F.R. § 330.6(c). The "project" can often be difficult to defme, and this defmition is
often critical in determining whether the project can go forward under a NWP (or a series
of NWPs) or whether it must be permitted individually. In addition, portions of a larger
project may proceed under authority of a NWP, provided that the smaller portions of the
project have "independent utility"- i.e., ifthe permittee would go forward with the smaller
portions if the other portions were not permitted and could not be completed. 33 C.F.R. §
330.6(d).
Appeal Process
r
r
r
,.
f
r
r,
r
r
B.
Effective August 6, 1999, the Corps added an administrative appeal process for permit
applications that are denied. However, this appeal process was provided only for individual
permit applications that are denied, and proffered individual permits (i. e., those permits that
the Corps issues but that the prospective permittee declines to accept). 33 C.F.R. Part 331.
The Corps recently amended and expanded the appeal process, but refused to extend it to
the refusal to authorized projects under NWPs. See 65 Fed. Reg. 16486 (March 28,2000).
The new appeal process does not apply to the DE's exercise of discretionary authority to
require an individual permit.
Proposed Changes to NWPs
Previously, most NWPs authorized the specific activity involved to proceed without any limitation
on the acreage of waters of the United States filled, tempered only by the requirement that no more
than minimal adverse environmental effects occurred. The former NWP 26, which governed fills and
discharges into headwaters and isolated waters, including wetlands, was no exception to that rule.
Although the 1977 predecessor to NWP 26 allowed unlimited filling without PCN to the Corps, it has
gradually been reigned in over the years. In 1984, the Corps promulgated the first limits on NWP 26,
establishing a maximum project-specific impact limit of 10 acres, and requiring PCN of all fills in
excess of 1 acre. In a December 13, 1996 fmal rule, the Corps ratcheted those thresholds down to 3
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acres maximum impact and 1/3 ofan acre for PCN. See 61 Fed. Reg. 65873 (Dec. 13, 1996). In that
fInal rule, the Corps also limited "stacking" NWP 26 with other NWPs on the same project, and
announced that it would continue to scale back and eventually eliminate NWP 26.
On July 1, 1998, the Corps began following through with the NWP scale back, This controversial
process began with the proposal of 6 new "activity-based" NWPs to replace NWP 26: NWPs A,
residential, commercial and institutional activities affecting non-tidal waters of the United States of
between one-third and three acres in size; B, master-planned development activities affecting up to
10 acres ofnon-tidal waters; C, stormwater management facilities involving construction on up to 2
acres in non Section 10 waters; D, passive recreational facilities that would disturb between one-third
and one acre ofnon-tidal waters or 500 linear feet of stream bed; E, mining activities resulting in fIll
ofup to three acres ofnon-tidal waters; and F, reconfIguration ofexisting drainage ditches. ld. As
an alternative to specifIc acreage limits for each NWP, the proposed rule also cited a sliding scale
acreage limit, where the amount ofmaximum fill allowed would be based on the size of the overall
development. Finally, the 1998 proposedruleprovided for greater emphasis onregional conditioning
by District Engineers, proposed to modify 6 General Conditions, and proposed a new General
Condition. The July 1, 1998 proposed rule has beenvery controversial, and has come under fIre from
environmentalists and developers alike.
In an October, 1998 proposal, the Corps issued notice ofits intent to eliminate the proposed NWP for
"master-planned" development activities (proposedNWP B), and left open the possibility that it may
be proposed again in the future. The Corps also extended the expiration ofNWP 26 until September
of 1999. See 63 Fed. Reg. 55095 (Oct. 14, 1998). Subsequently, in response to comments received
on the two previous notices, the Corps modifIed the new NWPs and General Conditions, and
reopened the comment period on July 21, 1999. 64 Fed. Reg. 39252 (July 21, 1999). The Corps
again extended the expiration date for NWP 26 (until January 5, 2000) and provided an additional
comment period on September 3, 1999. 64 Fed. Reg. 48386 (Sept. 3, 1999). After extending NWP
26's expiration two additional times, the Corps fmally issued its Final Notice of Issuance and
ModifIcation ofNationwide Permits, 65 Fed. Reg. 12818 (March 9, 2000). A copy of the portion of
this fmal notice containing the terms of the new NWPs and the General Conditions is attached as
Exhibit A for your reference. The new NWPs and General Conditions become effective on June 5,
2000, the date on which the former NWP 26 is set to expire.
Efforts to derail the new rules have been swift and furious. The National Association of
Homebuilders fIled a lawsuit challenging the NWPs on March 9, the same day they were issued. The
suit challenges the Corps' requirements for vegetated buffers, the Yz acre limitation and 1/10 acre
notice re.quirements, and the Corp's failure to defme "minimal impact." Certain legislative and
appropriations efforts have also been lodged to delay or stifle the new NWPs.
Overview of the March 9.2000 Final Notice (65 Fed. Reg. 12818 (March 9.2000»
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1. In general, the Corps abandoned the proposal to utilize a sliding scale to limit the number
ofacres allowed to be fIlled under the new NWPs. The sliding scale was rejected in favor
ofmuch tighter limits on the maximum number ofacres that may be affected, and smaller
thresholds requiring PCN to beprovided to the Corps. More specifIcally, the following three
themes permeate the preamble to the fmal notice:
a. Almost every NWP affected by the new rules limit total wetlands losses to Yz
acre;
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(1) in fact, all NWPs except NWP 41 (reshaping ofexisting drainage ditches)
are limited to Y2 acre; some of the modified NWPs are also limited to Y2
acre;
Effective Dates
The Corps acknowledges that the decreased acreage limits will result in substantial cost and
delay increases to the regulated public.
Linear Foot Limits- For new NWPs 39, 40, 42, and 43, anew 300 linear foot limit has been
created for fIlling and excavating stream beds.
b. In support of the NWPs as promulgated, the Corps claims that the newly-minted
nationwides will result in 40% fewer Individual Permit applications, 30% less in
compliance costs, and a mere doubling of the permit processing time compared to
what the July 21,1999 proposal would have caused. Id.
Almost every NWP affected by the new rules requires PCN to the Corps if the
project will cause the loss of greater than one-tenth (1110) of an acre; and
Reliance on the discretion of the District Engineer to add regional and case-
specific conditions to NWP authorizations is significantly increased.
(1) Any permittee granted an authorization according to this grandfather
provision will have an additional 12 months (i. e., until February 11, 2003)
to complete the project, provided they begin the work or have it under
contract by February 11,2002.
PCNs submitted prior to March 9, 2000 will be reviewed under the existing NWPs,
and if authorized, they will remain authorized until February 11, 2002.
NWP activities that are authorized under the existing permits and which do not
require PCN are authorized until June 5, 2000; provided that construction begins
or is under contract prior to that time, the permittee will have an additional 12
months to complete the project under the current NWPs.
The new NWPs and General Conditions become effective on June 5, 2000 and
expire on June 5,2005. When the other current NWPs are proposed for reissuance
in 2002, the new NWP are likely to be reproposed also in order to consolidate the
repromulgation schedule.
b.
c.
a. The Corps cited a Workload and Compliance Costs Study that was conducted on
the July 21, 1999 reproposal, which estimated that the number ofIndividual Permit
applications received by the Corps would increase by 4,429 per year, costing
regulated entities an estimated 46 million additional dollars and increasing the
Individual Permit processing time to three to four times the 1998 average. 65 Fed.
Reg. at 12820.
a.
c.
b.
3.
4.
2.
r
r
r
r
r
t
r
r
f
r
f
r
r
r
r
r
5. Time frames for NWP authorizations - the Corps has imposed a new PCN review period of
30 days. Far from a model of clarity, the new provision still requires PCN to be provided
r
r
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by the pennittee "as soon as possible" prior to commencing the activity; however, the new
rule provides that:
a. The Corps has 30 days in which to detennine whether the application is complete; J
(1)
(2)
(3)
if the PCN is not complete, the Corp has one opportunity to request
additional information;
45 days from the date of receipt of complete information (which the
pennittee has no way to detennine), the Corps must review and take
action on the PCN;
ifno action is taken within 45 days of the date of receipt, the pennittee
may consider the activity authorized and proceed.
6.
7.
8.
9.
"Minimal Effects" - the Corps refused to elaborate further on what sorts of effects can be
considered more than "minimal" for purposes ofNWP authorization, stating that "minimal
effect as it is used in the context of general pennits, including NWPs, cannot be simply
dermed." 65 Fed. Reg. at 12822.
Jurisdictional Issues - the Corps refused to revise the NWP regulations and the teons of the
NWPs themselves to delete all references to "excavation" as an activity being regulated,
based on National Mining Ass 'n v. Corps ofEngineers. 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
The Corps maintained that some excavation activity results in the discharge of fIll material
(through, for example, temporary sidecasting), and is therefore regulated under CWA
Section 404. In addition, all construction activity (including excavation) in Navigable
waters requires a RHA Section 10 pennit, and therefore, according to the Corps, references
to excavation in the NWPs is required.
Applicable waters - the new and modified NWPs apply to activities that are proposed to take
place in all non-tidal waters (including non-tidal wetlands), except for non-tidal
wetlands adjacent to tidal waters.
Mitigation
a. If the NWP activity does not require PCN, no compensatory mitigation will
generally be required.
b. IfPCN is required, then an acre-for-acre (i.e., 1:1 ratio) compensatory mitigation
plan will be required;
(1)
(2)
the DE has the discretion to require more mitigation on a case-by-case
basis;
in-kind, on-site replacement is preferred; however, off-site (preferably
within the same watershed) is acceptable, and out-of-kind mitigation may
also be used in some cases.
.J
c. Vegetated Buffers may be used as an alternative form ofcompensatory mitigation,
but is limited in the amount that may be used;
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D. The Modified NWPs
NWP 3 - Maintenance. This NWP authorizes:
The Corps imposed a 6 month moratorium on Regional General Permits.
the repair, replacement, or rehabilitation of any previously authorized, currently
serviceable structure or fill, provided the fill or structure is not to be put to any use
differing from those specified;
discharges ofdredged or flll material, including excavation, into waters ofthe U.S.
to remove accumulated sediments and debris in the vicinity ofand within existing
structures, and the replacement ofnew and existing riprap; and
r
r
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1.
a.
b.
(1)
(1)
vegetatedbuffers are required ifthere are perennial or intermittent streams
or open waters on the project site;
(a) where wetlands are being filled, vegetated buffers will only be
required where a 1:1 acreage ratio of compensatory mitigation
has be achieved, and only 1/3 of the additional mitigation
required may be vegetated buffers.
PCN is required for activities under this portion ofNWP 3
NWP 7 - Outfall Structures and Maintenance. This NWP authorizes:
d. Maintenance dredging for the primary purposes ofnavigation or beach restoration
are not authorized by NWP 3.
r
r
r
r
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2.
c.
a.
b.
discharges of dredged or fill material, including excavation, associated with the
restoration ofupland areas damaged by storm, flood or other discrete event;
(1) permittee must notify the Corps within 12 months of the damage, and
work must commence or be under contract within 2 years ofthe damage.
construction ofoutfall structures and associated intake structures for outfalls related
to NPDES (or NPDES exempt) discharges; and
maintenance excavation, including dredging, to remove accumulated sediments
blocking or restricting outfall and intake structures.
r
r
r
r
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(1)
(2)
PCN is required for all activities.
(a) PCN must include details ofthe original design capacities ofthe
intake and outfall structures when maintenance dredging or
excavation will be involved.
amount of excavated or dredged material must be kept to a minimum
necessary to restore the outfalls', intakes', or canals' original design
capacities;
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(3)
(4)
excavated or dredged material must be deposited and retained at an
upland site; and
proper soil erosion measures must be used.
J
3. NWP 12 - UtUity Line Activities. This NWP authorizes:
Utility Lines - the construction, maintenance, or repair ofutility lines, including
outfall and intake structures and the associated excavation, backfill, or bedding for
utility lines, provided there is no change in preconstruction contours.
a.
(1)
(2)
maximum loss allowed: Y2 acre; loss is defmed to include the filled area
plus the area adversely affected by flood as a result of the fill; temporary
losses (i.e., where a trench is excavated and then backfilled for an
underground line) do not count as "losses";
"Utility Line" is defmed as any pipe or pipeline for the transportation of
any gaseous, liquid, liquefiable, or slurry substance, for any purpose, and
any cable, line, or wire for the transmission for any purpose ofelectrical
energy, telephone, and telegraph messages, and radio and television
communication;
-
i
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(a) the defmition includes pipes conveying drainage from another
area; it excludes french tile or other tile drainage systems.
...
(3) Temporary sidecasting of dredged or fill material is permitted for up to
three months (may be extended to 180 days at the discretion of the DE);
-(4) the top 6 to 12" ofsoil must be backfilled over the trench, and the trench
must not be constructed so as to cause excessive draining through the
trench.
b. Utility Line Substations - the construction, maintenance, or expansion of a
substation facility associated with a power line or utility line in non-tidal waters,
provided the activity does not result in the loss ofgreater than Y2 acre ofnon-tidal
waters of the U.S.
(1) maximum loss allowed: Y2 acre.
c.
d.
Foundations for Overhead Utility Line Towers. Poles and Anchors - the
construction, maintenance of foundations for overhead utility line towers, poles,
and anchors in all waters of the U.S., provided that the foundations are the
minimum size necessary and separate footings for each tower leg are used where
feasible.
(1) maximum loss allowed: Y2 acre.
Access Roads - the construction of access roads for the construction and
maintenance of utility lines, including overhead power lines and utility line
substations, in non-tidal waters ofthe U.S., excluding non-tidal wetlands adjacent
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NWP 14 - Linear Transportation Crossings. This NWP authorizes activities required for
the construction, expansion, modification or improvementoflinear transportation crossings
(i.e., highways, railways, trails, and airport runways);
Public crossings are authorized:
to tidal waters, provided the discharge does not cause the loss of greater than Y2
acre of non-tidal waters of the U.S.
r
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4.
a.
(1)
(1)
(2)
maximum loss allowed: Y2 acre.
in non-tidal waters, excluding non-tidal wetlands adjacent to tidal waters,
provided the discharge does not cause greater than Y2 acre of losses; and
in tidal waters ornon-tidal wetlands adjacent to tidal waters, provided the
discharge does not cause greater than 1/3 acre of losses and does not
exceed 200 linear feet.
r b.
Private crossings are also authorized, but the discharge cannot exceed 1/3 acre and
200 linear feet.
a. The activity is conducted on
NWP 27- Stream and Wetlllnd Restoration Activities. This NWP authorizes activities in
waters of the u.s. associated with the restoration of former waters, the enhancement of
degraded tidal and non-tidal wetlands and riparian areas, and the restoration and
enhancement of non-tidal streams and non-tidal open water areas, provided:
r
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5.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)
(2)
PCN is required for all types oftransportation crossing activity resulting
in greater than 1110 acre losses or which involve discharges to special
aquatic sites;
PCN must include compensatory mitigation proposal to offset permanent
losses;
the width of the fill must be limited the amount necessary for the
structure; NWP 14 cannot be used to authorize vehicle maintenance or
storage buildings, parking lots, train stations, aircraft hangars, etc.; and
the crossing must be a single and complete project for crossing a water of
the U.S.
non-federal public lands and private lands, in accordance with the terms
and conditions of a binding wetland enhancement, restoration creation
agreement between the landowner and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
("FWS") of the Natural Resources Conservation Service; or
any federal land; or
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(3)
(4)
reclaimed surface or coal mined lands in accordance with a SMCRA
permit; or
any private or public land;
(a) PCN is required for (4) above only;
(b)
(c)
only native plant species may be used to vegetate the site;
separate permits are required for reversion to original (i. e., non-
waters) status.
6. NWP 40 - Agricultural Activities. This NWP authorizes discharges of dredged or fill
material to non-tidal waters of the U.S., excluding non-tidal wetlands adjacent to tidal
waters, for the purpose ofimproving agriculturalproduction and the construction ofbuilding
pads or farm buildings.
a. If the permittee is a USDA program participant:
(1) the permittee must obtain a minimal effect exemption;
J
(2)
(3)
the activity cannot result in loss greater than Yz acre;
the permittee must have a NRCS-certified wetland delineation;
i
-
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(4) the permittee must implement an NRCS approved mitigation plan; and
(5) the permittee must submit a post-project report to the DE.
b. If the permittee is not a USDA program participant:
(1)
(2)
the activity cannot result in a loss greater than Yz acre; and
PCN is required for losses greater than 1/10 acre; the PCN must include:
(a) a wetlands delineation; and
J
(b) a mitigation plan.
c. For the construction of building pads for farm buildings, if the proposed activity
does not involve the filling of non-tidal wetlands that were in agricultural
production prior to December 23, 1985, the activity is authorized.
(1) PCN is required for such activity.
d. Activities in other waters of the U.s. are limited to relocation ofexisting drainage
ditches constructed in non-tidal streams;
(1) this activity cannot exceed 300 linear feet.
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e.
The NewNWPs
"Farm Tract" refers to a parcel of land identified by the fann service agency;
activities authorized by NWP 40 may not exceed Vi acre for a single farm tract.
r
r
1. NWP39-Residential, CommercialandInstitutionalDevelopments. This NWP authorizes
discharges of dredged or fIll material into non-tidal waters except non-tidal wetlands
adjacent to tidal waters for the construction or expansion of residential, commercial and
institutional building foundations and building pads and attendant features that are necessary
for the maintenance of the structures.
r
r
I
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a.
b.
c.
Commercial developments include construction and expansion of retail stores,
industrial facilities, restaurants, business parks and shopping centers;
Institutional developments include schools, flIe stations, government office
buildings,judicial buildings, public works structures, libraries, hospitals, places of
worship;
Residential developments include single and multiple unit developments (i. e.,
apartment buildings);
Conditions:
(1) "attendant features" include roads, parking lots, garages, yards, utility
lines, stormwater management facilities, and recreation facilities such as
playgrounds, playing fields and golfcourses (provided the golfcourse is
an "integral part" ofthe residential development), but NOT new ski areas
or oil and gas wells.
e. PCN is required:
The activity must involve a single and complete project.
r
r
r
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d.
f.
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(3)
discharge cannot cause the loss of greater than Vi acre of waters of the
U.S.; and
discharge cannot cause loss ofgreater than 300 linear feet of stream bed.
for discharges causing losses greater than 1/10 acre;
for discharges that cause the loss ofopen waters; and
where NWP 39 is used in conjunction with any other NWP, the
cumulative loss ofgreater than 1/10 acre requires PCN.
r
r
r
r
g.
h.
PCN must include a written statement as to how avoidance and minimization of
losses of waters were achieved on the project site.
For discharges involving less than 1/10 acre, the permittee must provide written
report to the COIp after the work is complete which must include:
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(1) the name, address and telephone number of the pennittee; ...
(2) the location of the project;
(3) a description of the work; and
(4) the type and acreage of the loss involved.
i.
j.
Ifthe project site was previously used for project purposes and the owner/operator
used NWP 40 to authorize activities in waters ofthe U.S. to increase production or
construct fann buildings, NWP 39 cannot be used by the developer to authorize
additional activities in waters of the U.s. on the project site in e:uess of the
acreage limit for NWP 39 (i.e., the combined waters loss under NWPs 39 and 40
cannot exceed Yz acre).
Subdivision Waiver - subdivisions resulting in greater than 1/10 acre must be
noticed; subdivisions which will cause an aggregate loss greater than Yz acre cannot
be authorized unless:
(1) the DE exempts a particular parcel (on a subdivision basis) by making a
written determination that:
(a)
(b)
the individual and cumulative effects will be minimal; and
the property owner had, after October 5, 1984 but prior to July
21, 1999 cOImnitted substantial resources in reliance onNWP 26
with regard to a subdivision, in circumstances where it would be
inequitable to frustrate the property owner's investment-backed
expectations.
J
I
-
i) the waiver appears to apply across the board once the
exemption is granted to a subdivision
'I
-
2. NWP 41 - Reshaping Existing Drainage Ditches. This NWP authorizes discharges of
dredged or fill material into non-tidal waters of the U.S., excluding non-tidal wetlands
adjacent to tidal waters, to modify the cross-sectional configuration ofcurrently serviceable
drainage ditches constructed in these waters.
a. The reshaping activity cannot increase drainage capacity or expand the area drained
by the ditch;
b. compensatory mitigation is NOT required for NWP 41, because it is designed to
improve water quality by regrading the ditch with gentler slopes to reduce erosion,
increase vegetation growth, and increase uptake ofnutrients; I
...
c. PCN is required ifmore than 500 linear feet ofditch will be reshaped;
d. temporary sidecasting (3 months which can be extended to 180 days) is pennitted;
e. NWP 41 does not pennit stream channelization or stream relocation projects.
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,;,
-
r
r
r
3. NWP 41 - Recreational Facilities. This NWP authorizes discharges off dredged or fill
material into non-tidal waters of the U.S., excluding non-tidal wetlands adjacent to tidal
waters, for the construction or expansion ofrecreational facilities, provided:
a. the loss does not exceed Y2 acre;
(1) Discharges to special aquatic sites must include a delineation ofthe site;
the discharge does not cause the loss ofgreater than 300 feet of linear stream bed;
PCN is required for losses greater than 1/10 acre;
examples: hiking trials, bike paths, horse paths; nature centers
and campgrounds (excluding trailer parks);
the construction or expansion ofgolfcourses and the expansion
(but not new construction) of ski areas may be authorized,
provided they do not substantially deviate from natural
landscape contours and they are designed to minimize adverse
effects to waters of the U.S. through:
PCN must also include a compensatory mitigation proposal providing for
1:1 replacement.
(b)
For NWP 42, the primary function of recreational facilities does not
include the use ofmotor vehicles, buildings, or impervious surfaces;
(a)
(2)
"Recreational Facility" means a recreational activity that is integrated into the
natural landscape and does not substantially change preconstruction grades or
deviate from natural landscape contours.
(1)
b.
d.
c.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
(1) does NOT authorize other buildings, such as restaurants, hotels, etc.;
NWP 42 also authorizes the construction or expansion ofsmall support facilities,
such as maintenance and storage buildings and stables, that are directly related to
the recreational activity; ,
iv) reduced fertilizer use, etc.
does NOT authorize ball fields, such as tennis courts, baseball and softball
fields, soccer fields, and football stadiums.
adequate stormwater management facilities;
vegetated buffers;
integrated pest management;
ii)
i)
iii)
(2)
e.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
4. NWP 43 - Stormwater Management Facilities. This NWP authorizes discharges of
dredged or fill material into non-tidal waters of the U.S., excluding non-tidal wetlands
r
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adjacent to tidal waters, for the construction and maintenance of stonnwater management
facilities, including activities for the excavation of stonnwater ponds/facilities, detention
basins; the installation and maintenance of water control structures, outfall structures and
emergency spillways; and the maintenance dredging of existing stonnwater management
ponds/facilities and detention and retention basins, provided:
a. the discharge cannot cause the loss ofgreater than ~ acre of waters;
b. the discharge cannot cause the loss ofgreater than 300 linear feet of stream bed;
c.
d.
the construction of new stonnwater management facilities in perennial streams
cannot be authorized;
PCN is required for losses exceeding 1/10 acre; the notification must include:
(1) a stonnwater maintenance plan;
-
(3) a compensatory mitigation plan to offset water losses; and
(2) a delineation ofany special aquatic sites;
-
NWP 44 - Mining Activities. This NWP authorizes discharges ofdredged or fill material
into:
e. The stonnwater management facility must comply with GC 21 and be constructed
using Best Management Practices ("BMP") and watershed protection techniques.
s.
a.
b.
c.
(4) a written statement detailing the permittee's efforts to minimize
discharges and effects on water quality.
isolated waters, streams where the annual average flow is 1 cubic foot per second
or less, and non-tidal wetlands adjacent to headwater streams, for aggregate mining
and associated support activities (i.e., rock, sand, gravel, and crushed stone mining,
etc.);
lower perennial streams, excluding wetlands adjacent to lower perennial streams,
for aggregate mining activities (but NOT associated or support activities); andlor
isolated waters and non-tidal wetlands adjacent to headwater streams, for hard
rock/mineral mining activities (i.e., the extraction ofmineral ores from subsurface
locations) and associated support activities; provided:
-
-
j
(2) discharges must be avoided to the maximum extent possible.
(1)
(3)
the mined area in waters of the U.S. plus any acreage loss cannot exceed
~acre; and
PCN is required, which must include:
(a) a statement detailing compliance with minimization;
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(b) a description of the waters affected by the project;
(4) Other conditions. The permittee must:
The New and Modified General Conditions ("GCs ")
r
,.
r
r
r
r
r
t
r
r
r
r F.
(c)
(d)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
a description ofmeasures taken to comply with the conditions of
the permit; and
a reclamation plan.
not substantially alter the sediment characteristics of shellfish
beds;
implement measures to prevent increases in stream gradient and
water velocities and prevent upstream and downstream effects
to channel conditions;
not affect the course, capacity or condition of the navigable
water;
take measures to minimize downstream turbidity;
implement a compensatory mitigation plan;
refrain from engaging in beneficiation and mineral processing
activities within 200 feet of the ordinary high water mark; and
comply with GCs 9 and 21, certain flow and location limitations,
and the single and complete project requirement.
r
r
As a housekeeping matter, the Corps combined the Section 404-only GCs with the others, providing
for a single comprehensive list ofconditions. Additionally, the Corps pointed out that all of the new
GCs apply to all NWPs (i.e., including those still left in effect from the December 13, 1996 Final
Notice, 61 Fed. Reg. 65873), unless a particular GC expressly limits its application to certain NWPs
only. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 12861.
The new and modified GCs are as follows:
r
r
r
1.
2.
GC 4 - Aquatic Life MQvemellts. The Corps added a provision to this GC requiring that
culverts placed in streams to maintain low flow conditions.
GC 9 - Water Quality. The Corps added a paragraph requiring that for NWPs 12, 14, 17,
18, 32, 39,40,42,43, and 44, where a state's water quality certification does not require a
water quality management plan, the permittee must include design criteria and techniques
that will insure that the proposed work does not result in more than minimal degradation of
water quality.
r
r
r
a. This GC does NOT create a no-degradation policy.
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GC 11 - Endangered Species. The Corps added a provision to this GC requiring the
permittee to identify any potentially affected listed species in the vicinity of the proposed
project by name in the PCN.
3.
a.
b.
The Corps declined to elaborate on the "vicinity" requirement.
The Corps rejected a proposal to make all projects potentially affecting listed
species to be permitted by IP.
-
4. GC 13 - Notification. The Corps made several important changes to this GC. The
permittee is still required to notify the Corps "as early as possible" where the terms of the
NWP require PCN. The PCN may still be submitted by letter or via IP application form.
The DE then "must determine if the PCN is complete within 30 days of the date ofreceipt
and can request the additional information necessary to make the PCN complete only once."
Ifthe permittee does not provide all ofthe requested information, then the DE can continue
to notify the permittee that the PCN is incomplete (but apparently cannot request any
additional information).
The DE has 45 days from the day of receipt of a complete PCN to authorize the activity
(with or without additional conditions), require a mitigation plan, or require an IP. If the
PCN includes losses ofgreater than Y2 acre ofwaters, the DE must inunediately (by fax or
overnight mail) notify the FWS, the NMFS, and the SHPO, who then have 10 calendar days
to state that they will submit substantive comments; the DE must then wait an additional 15
days before making a decision on the notification.
a. The Permittee cannot begin activity:
J
j
...
(1)
(2)
(3)
until it receives written notice from the DE that the activity is authorized
or authorized subject to additional conditions;
ifnotified in writing that an IP will be required; or
unless 45 days have passed since the DE's receipt of complete
information and the permittee has not received any written notice from the
DE.
b.
c.
d.
The Corps claims that the 30 and 45 day periods are NOT intended to be
independent periods, and should not amount to a cumulative 75 day period;
It is unclear how the permittee will know that his 45 days have passed; the DE is
not obligated to notify the permittee that it has received the PCN or that the PCN
is complete.
Contents of notice (the Corps added several specific provisions for purposes of
particular NWPs):
(1) name, address and telephone numbers of the permittee;
(2) location of the proposed project;
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r
r
r
(3) brief description of the project; the project's purpose; the direct and
indirect adverse environmental effects the project will cause; any other
permits, NWPs or IPs the permittee intends to use on the project;
r
(4) ForNWPs 7,12,14,18,21,34,38, 39,40,41,42,and43, the PCNmust
include a delineation ofspecial aquatic sites, including wetlands;
r
(5) For NWP 7, outfall structures and maintenance, the PCN must include
information regarding the original design capacities and configurations of
those areas where maintenance dredging is proposed;
For NWP 14, Linear Transportation Crossings, the PCN must include:
(a) a compensatory mitigation proposal to offset waters losses; and
For NWP 21, Surface Coal Mining Activities, the PCN must include an
OSM or state approved mitigation plan;
r
r
r
(6)
(7)
(b) a statement describing how temporary losses are minimized to
the maximum extent practicable.
r
r
(8)
(9)
For NWP 27, Stream and Wetland Restoration, the PCN must include
documentation of the prior condition of the site that will be reverted by
the permittee;
For NWP 29, Single Family Housing, the PCN must include:
(a) any past use of the residence by the permittee or their spouse;
For NWP 33, Temporary Construction, Access and Dewatering, the PCN
must include a restoration plan;
For NWPs 39, 43, and 44, the PCN must include a statement regarding
how the permittee has achieved avoidance and minimization of losses of
waters of the U.S.;
For NWP 31, Maintenance ofExisting Flood Control Projects, the PCN
must include a five year maintenance plan and detailed information about
configuration of the existing facilities;
a description of the entire parcel, including delineation of
wetlands (except for parcels smaller than 1/4 acre);
a statement that the single-family housing is for personal use of
the permittee;
a written description of all land owned by the permittee or the
permittee's spouse within a one mile radius of the project.
(d)
(b)
(c)
(12)
(11)
(10)
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r,
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(13) For NWP 39, the PCN must also include a compensatory mitigation
proposal or an explanation why such mitigation is not required;
(14) For NWP 40, Agricultural Activities, the PCN must include a
compensatory mitigation proposal;
(15) For NWP 43, Stormwater Management Facilities, the PCN must include
a maintenance plan and compensatory mitigation plan for new facilities;
(16) For NWP 44, Mining Activities, the PCN must include:
(a) a description ofall waters affected;
,
..J
(d) a reclamation plan.
(17) For activities that may affect endangered species, the PCN must include
the name ofthe potentially affected species and/or the designated habitat
that may be affected;
(b)
(c)
a description of all measures taken to minimize adverse effects
on waters of the U.S.;
a description of the measures taken to comply with the criteria
of the NWP; and
..J
,
-
-
-(18)
(19)
For activities that may affect historic properties, the PCN must include a
description of such property and a vicinity map; and
For NWPs 12, 14,29,39,40,42,43, and 44, where the activity involves
permanent, above-grade fills in waters ofthe United States in the 100-year
floodplain, the PCN must include documentation that the proposed
construction complies with FEMA construction requirements.
<'1
-
-
5.
6.
GC 15 - Use ofMultiple Nationwide Permits. The Corps added language to this GC to
clarify that multiple NWPs may be used to authorize activities on a single and complete
project provided that the total acreage of losses on the entire project does not exceed the
maximum acreage limit ofthe NWP with the highest limit (i.e., iftwo NWPs are to be used,
one with a Y2 acre limit and another with a 1/3 acre limit, the total losses for the entire project
cannot exceed Y2 acre).
GC 19 - Mitigation. This GC was modified to require a 1:1 replacement ratio for all
wetlands impacts requiring a PCN.
j
WIll
a.
b.
Mitigation proposal must be "practicable," meaning it must be available and
capable ofbeing accomplished in light ofcosts, existing technology, and logistics
in light ofoverall project purposes.
Vegetatedbuffers now take on increased importance inmitigationplanning; buffers
are required to be made ofnative plant species and will generally be 25 to 50 feet
wide along all open waters.
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-
c. Mitigationplanning cannot be used to reduce the threshold number ofacres that are
to be ftlled for purposes ofdetennining whether a given activity may be authorized
by the NWP in the first instance.
GC 20 - Spawning Areas. The Corps modified this GC by adding the word "important"
before "spawning area." The GC now only prohibits the destruction ofimportant spawning
areas, i.e., those that are used by species harvested commercially for human consumption.
r
r
r
r
r
r
7.
(1) if there are open waters on the project site and the DE requires
compensatory mitigation for wetlands losses, the vegetated buffer
requirement will comprise no more than 1/3 of the remaining mitigation
required (i.e., after a 1:1 ratio of wetlands replacement has been
achieved).
r
r
r
r
8.
9.
GC 21 - Management ofWater flows. The Corps modified this GC to require permittees
to maintain, to the maximum extent practicable, preconstruction surface water flows.
GC 25 - Designated Critical Resource Waters. This is a new GC which limits NWP
authorized activities in "Critical Resource Waters."
a. Critical Resource Waters ("CRWs")- are defined to include: NOAA-designated
marine sanctuaries, National Estuarine Research Reserves, national Wild and
Scenic Rivers, critical habitat for federally listed threatened and endangered
species, coral reefs, state natural heritage sites, and outstanding national resource
waters or other waters officially designated by a state as having particular
environmental significance which are identified by the DE through notice and
comment.
GC 26 - Fills Withi" the 1OO-Year floodplain. (This GC was originally proposed as GC
27; the proposed GC 26, Impaired Waters, was withdrawn, and this GC was redesignated
GC 26). This is a new GC which governs the discharge of dredged or fill material into
waters ofthe U.S. resulting in permanent, above-grade fills within the lOO-year floodplain.
The activities are broken down into the following categories:
NWPs 7,12,14,16,17,21,29,31,35,39,40,42,43, and 44 cannot be used to
authorize activity within, or directly affecting CRWs, including wetlands adjacent
to CRWs; however,
r
r
r
r
r
10.
b.
(1)
(2)
activities in Wild and Scenic Rivers may be authorized if they comply
with GC 7; and
activities affecting listed species or habitats may be authorized if they
comply with GC 11 and the FWS or NMFS concurs in the authorization.
r
r
r
r
a. Discharges below headwaters - discharges below the point on a stream where the
average annual flow is five cubic feet per second are not authorized by NWPs 29,
39,40, 42, 43, and 44. For NWPs 12 and 14, PCN is required and must include
documentation that FEMA construction requirements are met;
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b. Discharges in headwaters - discharges above the point in the stream where the
average annual flow is five cubic feet per second:
(1)
(2)
Flood Fringe - discharges in the flood fringe resulting in pennanent above
grade fills are not authorized by NWPs 12, 14,29,39,40,42,43, or 44
unless the pennittee provides PCN, including documentation ofFEMA
construction compliance.
Floodway - discharges in the floodway resulting in pennanent above
grade fills are not authorized by NWPs 29, 39, 40, 42, 43, and 44. For
NWPs 12 and 14, PCN is required, including documentation ofFEMA
construction compliance.
.J
J
IV. OTHER CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Rules and Proposals of Interest
1.
2.
3.
4.
Final Rule Revising the Clean WaterAct Defmition of"Discharge ofDredged Material", 64
Fed. Reg. 25120 (May 10, 1999) - this Final Rule responded to the Tulloch Rule decisions
by expressly excluding "incidental fallback" from the defmition ofdischarge ofdredged or
fill material.
Final Policy on the National Wildlife Refuge System and Compensatory Mitigation Under
the Section 10/404 Program, 64 Fed. Reg. 49229 (Sept. 10, 1999) - this Final Rule,
promulgated by the Fish and Wildlife Service, establishes guidelines for use ofthe National
Wildlife Refuge System for compensatory mitigation programs in which pennittees are
required to participate under RHA Section 10 and CWA Section 404.
Final Rule Establishing an Administrative Appeal Process for the Regulatory Programofthe
Corps of Engineers, 65 Fed. Reg. 16486 (March 28, 2000) - this Final Rule expands and
clarifies the internal appeals process for appealing denials ofIndividual Pennits which was
originally promulgated in 1999.
Proposed Revisions to Clean Water Act Regulatory Defmitions of "Fill Material" and
"Discharge ofFill Material", 65 Fed. Reg. 21292 (April 20, 2000) - this Proposed Rule, if
promulgated, will modify both the EPA and Corps defmitions ofdischarge of fill material
to be identical; all references to the "primary purpose" ofthe fill activity in the current Corps
role will be eliminated. "Fill material" will be any material that "has the effect of' replacing
a water of the U.S. with dry land or changing the bottom elevation of such waters.
j
.J
l
....
i
-
B. Significant and Interesting Cases
1. National Ass 'n ofHomebuilders v. Corps ofEngineers, 2000 WL 433072 (E.D. Va.) -
dismissed a challenge to an internal Corps policy, holding that a Corps Guidance
Memorandum directing field offices to continue asserting jurisdiction over isolated waters
(including wetlands) that serve as habitat for migratory birds despite the Fourth Circuit's
holding in United States v. Wilson was not "final agency action" and therefore the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
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r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
United States v. Deaton, 2000 WL 359755 (4th Cir.) - this case retreats significantly from
the Fourth Circuit's holding in United States v. Wilson, and declares that the defmition of
discharge as "any addition ofany pollutant to navigable waters" appropriately encompasses
sidecasting.
Solid Waste Agency o/Northern Cook County v. Corps o/Engineers, 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir.
1999) - upholds Corps authority to regulate isolated waters based on the migratory bird rule,
because the destruction ofmigratorybird habitat "substantially affects" interstate commerce.
Allens Creek/Corbetts Glen Preservation Group, Inc. v. Caldera, 88 F. Supp.2d 77
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) - rejected a citizen challenge to the authorization ofa fill by Nationwide
Permit on laches grounds where plaintiffs had been involved in and vocally opposed to the
proposed project from the outset but waited 8 months after the Corps authorized the fill and
after most of the work was complete to file their complaint.
Vaizburd v. United States, _ F. Supp. 2d _,2000 WL 309787 (E.D.N.Y.) - holds that
where plaintiffs seek damages based on the alleged negligence ofthe Corps in carrying out
a beach nourishment project, the Corps is immune from such claims under the "discretionary
function" exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act.
De/enders o/Wildlife v. Ballard, 73 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Ariz. 1999) - held that the Corps
DE failed to carry out its duties under NEPA to take a "hard look" at the cumulative
environmental impacts of the issuance ofNWPs 13, 14, and 26. The court enjoined any
further authorizations under those NWPs until the DE, as the Corps promised in the
December 13,1996 Final Notice, performs an EA or EIS regarding them.
BroadwaterFarms Joint Venture v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 154 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 1999) - held
that where a sophisticated developer has actual knowledge of the CWA and the potential
presence ofnon-tidal wetlands on his property, his investment-backed expectations were not
"reasonable," and therefore his takings claim was rejected.
r
i
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
v. CONCLUSION
In general, several themes dominate the new NWPs and GCs: an across-the-board decrease in the amount of
acreage any given activity may affect; broadened notification requirements; more specific mitigation rules; an
increase in discretion of the DE and additional reliance on setting case-specific and regional conditions on
projects; and fmally, overall increased burden on the regulated public.
Unless industry or legislative efforts to stop the new rules are successful, it is clear that the new and modified
NWPs and GCs will (1) cause many activities that would have previously been authorized on a nationwide
basis to be captured in the more arduous Individual Permitting process; (2) cause increased delay to the
regulated public; (3) cause substantial cost increases to industry and developers; (4) increase the burden on the
Corps DEs; and (5) generally complicate wetlands regulation. It is also arguable that the Individual Permitting
process will begin to ensnare activities that pose a minimal threat to the aquatic environment. While the
Nationwide Permits previously provided a certain assurance of streamlined action to developers and
landowners, the use of NWPs will be limited substantially in the future. In addition, the likelihood of
inadvertent violations may increase given the widened grasp of the Individual Permitting process.
Practitioners, members ofindustry, developers, and environmentalists should consult the new NWPs in detail
to determine compliance in the event activity involving any waters, including wetlands, is contemplated.
J - 23
J - 24
J
j
J
,
i
J
!
I..
I
..
I
J
J
J
..
--, -, --, -, --, -, --, --, -, -, -, --, ......., -., ---, -, -, -, -,
12818 Federal Regisier/Vol. 65, No. 47/Tbursday, March 9. 2000/Notlces
'-4
I
N
VI
o
• 1~~
~
Thursday,
March 9, 2000
Part ill
Department of
Defense
Department of the Army, Corps of
Engineers
F1naI Notice of Issuance and Modiftcatlon
of Nationwide Permlts; Notice
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
0epattmenI of the Army. Corps ofEngI"",,
F1n"N£'!J"~Modlllcat N Perm1t8
AGENCY: Army Corp. ofEnstn-.. DoD.
ACTmN: Final notice.
~ The Corps ofEnsineen
(Corp.) i. I.sulns 5 new Nallonwlde
Permit. (NWP.) and modlfyinB 8
exl.tins NWPs 10 replace NwP 28
which expl.. on 'une 5. 2000. The
Corp. is elso modlfylns nine NWP
seneral conditions end eddlns two new
NWP senenl condition•. The new NWP
seneral conditions wlllincreue
protection of deslgneted crltk:al
ftlSOurce WIlen .nd w.le.. of the
United Stales within l00-year
Ooodpl.Ins.ln December 1_. the
Corp. decided to replace NWP 28.
whl~h .uthorlzes discharges ofdredsed
or fill m.terl.llnlo h..dwat.... and
Isol.led _ ... of the Unlled States.
with actlvity..peclfic NWPs. Tbe new
.nd modified NWPs .uthorlze many of
the ssme ectIvllles th.1 NWP 28
• uthorlzed. hoi the new and modlfted
NWPs .re ectlvlly..peclfic. with lerms
.nd conditions 10 ensure that these
actlvitie. result In minimal adverse
effects on the aqu.tic environmenl. The
new .nd modified NWPs will
subslsnllally Incre... prolectlon of the
aqustic environmenl. while efficiently
suthorizinB activities with mlnlmsl
.dverse effects on the aquatic
environment. The maximum oaease
Iimlls of mosl of the new .nd modlfted
NWPs i. '10 acre. Most of the new and
modified NWPs require notification to
the dillricl eosineer for actlvilies that
result In the 10•• of sreater then 'I•• acre
of WlI.... of the Unlled Slates. This
notk:a .Iso collllituies the Corps
.pplication 10 SI.les, TrIbes. and the
Environmenl.1 Protection Asency (EPA)
for Section 401 water qu.lily
certification (WQC) .nd Coastal Zone
Manasemenl Act (CZMA) consl.l.ncy
determinations. Th_ asencles have 90
daya 10 determine If the new .nd
modified NWP. meet ltale or Tribal
water quelity sl.ndards and .re
con.i.lent with "'.Ie coalllallODe
manasemenl plan•.
DATEa: The new .nd modified NWPs
and senenl condition. will become
effective on 'une 5. 2000. The expiration
dete for NWP 26 Is'une 5, 2000.
ADDRESSEa: HQUSACE. A1TN: CECW-
OR. 20 M....chuletl. Avenue. NW.
W••hington.DC 20314-1000.
FOR FURTHER IlFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.
David Olson or Mr. S.m Collinson .1
(202) 761-6199 oracceutheCorp. of
Ensineers Regulalory Home Pose .1:
hllp:llwww.usace.army.mil/inetl
funetlonslcw/cecwo/rest.
IUl'I'U!IIEIlfARY _TION:
BacJcsro-I
In the December 13. 1_. Issue of the
Federal Register (81 FR 65874) the
Corps "'Issued NWP 28 for • period of
two years and announced It. Inlenllon
to replace NWP 28 with ectlvlty..pecllic
NWPs. NWP 28 .uthorlzes discharges ofdredsed or fill m.lerI.llnlo headw.t...
and lilolated w.I.... JllUvided the
discharse does not resull in the loss of
srwler then 3 acres of weters of the
Unlled States or 500 linear feet of
_ bed. Headwaters.'" non-tld.1
_ •• lakes. and Impoundmanta thel
aN put of e surface trlbulary sylllem 10
Inlersl.le or navis.ble _ ... of the
United State. with an .verase annu.1
flow of les. than 5 cubic feet per second.
Isol.led waters aN non-tidal walen of
the United SI.tes thai.", not part of.
.urface trlbulary .ylIIern to Inl_te or
n.visable w.tars and aN not edjecenllo
such surface trlhotary sylIIems 10
In_or navlsable Wllers.
In the 'uly 1. 1998.ls.ue of the
Federal RegIster (83 FR 38040) the
Corps published Its initial proposal to
",pr.ce NWP 28. includlns 8 new
NWP•• modifylns 8 exlstins NWPs.
modlfylns 8 NWP seneral condition••
and addins one new NWP senenl
condition. In the October 14. 1998. Issue
of the Federal R........ (83 FR 55095J.
the Corps pubiUbed • supplementary
proposal to limit the use of the proposed
new .nd modifted NWP.ln l00-year
Ooodplalns. Impaired waters. and
deslsneted critical ftIIOurce walen. In
the October 14. 1998. Federal Register
notice. the CoriJt .Iso announced the
withdraWlI of the proposad NWP for
malIIer planned d....lopmenl ectivltles
and the _slon of the expiration date
of NWP 28 to September 15. 1999. The
Corps elto .nnounced. In the October
14. 1998. Federal RegIster notk:a. Its
inlenl to sollclt eddltlon.1 commenls on
the proposed new and modified NWPs
and resJonaI conditions proposed by
Corps dI.trlcts.
As • ftIIUll of the commenta received
In response 10 the'uly 1. 1998••nd
October 14. 1998. Federal RegIster
notk:at. the Corps made cbanses 10 the
proposed NWPs .nd seneral conditions.
The Corps also modified and
"'proposed the three new NWP sen_I
condilion.lo limit tha u.. of NWP. in
l00·year Ooodpl.ln•• Impaired w.lers.
• nd deslgn.ted critical resource walers.
The draft NWP. and sen_I condition.
were publi.hed in the 'uly 21. 1999.
I••ue of Ihe Feder.1 Reglsler (64 FR
39252) for. 45-<1.y comment period.
ConcurNnl wllh Ihl. Feder.1 Reglsler
nolice. Corps dl.tricts proposed tha
latelll draft. of their proposed rsslon.1
conditions for the new .nd modifted
NWPs. In the September 3. 1999. I.sue
of the Federal RegIIter (84 FR 48386).
the Corps .nnounced th.1 the commenl
period for the dr.ft NWPs .nd saner.1
condillons was exlended .n .ddlllon.1
30 d.ys 10 provld•• 75-d.y commenl
period. The commenl period for the ,uly
21.1999. Federal RegIster notice ended
on October 7. 1999. In the September 3.
1999. Federal RtIIIater notlca. the Corps
.Iso announced dial the expiration dale
of NWP 26__ded 10 'anuary 5.
·2000.
A•• ftIIUll of the number of
auhlllantl.1 comments received In
respon.. to the ,u~ 21. 1999, Federal
R.....er notice .n the need for
adilitionsl time 10 ftlview those
comments and d....lop the final NWPs
and sen_I condition•• the Corps issued
another Federal Regillar notlee on
December 15. 1999 (84 FR 89994). Thl.
Federal RegIster notk:a .nnounced •
""'Ised expiration d.le for NWP 28 .nd
the procell for eccepllns NWP 28 PCNs.
Tbe expiration d.le for NWP 28 w••
extended 10 April 14. 2000.
Since the sclledule published In the
December 15. 1999, Federal RegIster
notk:a has c:banJted. we aN extendins
the expiration date of NWP 28 to 'une
5. 2000. NWP 28 PCNs .ubmilled on or
before March 9. 2000. (whether required
or notJ wlli be reviewed under the
existing terms and conditions of NWP•.
If those activities aN .uthorized by
NWP 28. their authorizations will be
v.lid until Febru.ry 11. 2002. If the
ectivlly Is under conlllruction or under
conlrect prior 10 February It. 2002. the
permillee wlli have 12 eddltlonal
months to complete the .uthorlzed
ectlvity. NWP 26 PCNs for ectlvltles thai
requi", notification which aN submitted
.fter March 9. 2000. will be ftlviewed
under the new .nd modified NWP. or
other types of DA .uthorlzetlon. such as
Indivldu.1 permits. NWP 28 ectivltles
thel do not require. PCN aN .uthorized
by NWP 28 until'une 5. 2000. For those
NWP 28 ectlvilies that do not require
notification, the permillee has t 2
months 10 complele the work If
conlllruction hegln. or Is under contract
before 'une 5, 2000.
The lerm. and limits of the new .nd
modified NWPs aN Inlended 10
.uthoriza ectlvlties that have minim.1
adv.... effects on the .qu.lic
envlronmenl. Individu.lly .nd
cumul.tively. Mosl of the new NWP•
.ulhorize .ctivlties in non·tld.1 w.lers
olthe Uniled SI.le•• excluding non·lidal
wetl.nd. adjacenllo tidal w.le...
i~
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Dolo: Februory 21. 2000.
Ha..A. V.. WhoItIo,
DepuIyCommanderforCiviI Worb.
Ac:cord~ th_ NII;:;wlcle
Prilt. I Jiea!flu;
Nationwide Permit•• Condition•• Further
Informotlon, ond Definition.
.... I~de of Nationwide PeQnIt.
Conltions. Fl(rther lnfonn.tiDQ ,nd
I&fiiiIiiliIiI
r'ationwide Permit.
3. M.inlenance
7. Outfall Structures and Mllntenlnce
12. Utility Line ...ctivities
14. L1lt1l1r T..nsportltion Crossings
27. Stream Ind Wetland Restoration
"'ctlvities
39. Residential, Commercial, Ind
Institutional Developments
40. "'gricultural ...ctivities
41. Reshaping Existing Drainage Ditches
42. Recreational Facilities
43. Storm_er Management Facilities
44. Mining "'ctivltles
Notionwide Permit GMerol Condition.
1.Nlvlptlon
2. Proper MllntenallCl
3. Soil ErosIon Ind Sediment Controls
4. "'quetlC Lifo Movemenll
5. Equipment
8. Regional end CeH-by.c...
Conditlont
7. Wild Ind Scenic Riven
8. Tribel Rlghll
8. Water Quality
10. Coastal Zone Manasamenl
11. EndeR8ered Special
12. Historic PropertIes
13. Notillcetion
14. Compllence Certl6cetlon
15. Use of Multiple Nltlonwlde Parmill.
18. Wlter Supply Intekes
17. Shellfish Beda
18. Sultlble Material
19. Mltlgetlon
20. Spawnl... Areas
21. Manasement of Wster F10ww
22. "'dverse EIfactt from Impoundments
23. Waterfowl Bnedl... Areas
24. Removal of Tempenry Filla
25. Designated Critical Ruource Wators
26. Fills Within l00-year FIoocIpialns
Further In{ormotJon
Dennlt/on,
Best Manasament PnctIces
Compensatory mltlaatlon
Creation
Enhancement
Ephemenillreem
Firm trect
Flood Fringe
F100d_y
Independent utility
Intermittent stream
Lon of_tars of the United SlItes
Non·tldal _land
Open water
PerennIal stream
Permanent eIJove.trede 611
Preservation
Rettoretlon
RIRIe and pool complex
Single end complete project
Storm_er management
Storm_ter tIWIIIgeIIIent facllitlal
Streambed
Stream channellutlon
Tidal_lind
Vegetated buffer
Vegetated shilloww
Waterbody
B. Nstlonwlde Parmlll Ind Conditlont
3. Maintmonce. Actlviti.. rellted to:
(il The repair,l'ehabililltlon, or
replacement of any previously
luthorized. currently servlcelble,
structure. or fill. or of eny currently
aerviceable .tructure or fill authorized
by 33 CFR 330.3. provided the Itructure
or fill Is not to be put to u_ differing
&om those uses specl6ed or
contemplsted for It In the orialnel
permit or the most recently authorized
modification. Minor devletioRlln the
structure's conllauratlon or filled area.
includi... those Clue to changes In
meterill., construction techniques, or
current conltructlon codas or safety
standards which are IlICISIIfY to meb
repair, rehabilitation. or replacement.
.... permitted. provided the ad_
enYlronmental effectt resultl... from
tueh repair. rehabilitstlon, or
replaceinent Ire minimal. Currently
aervlCIlIble meant _bIe a Is or with
lOme maintenance. but not 10 d....ed
a to lI_tlally "'CJUlre reconstruction.
Thl, nationwide permit authori_ the
repair, rehabilltstlon, or repl_ant of
thoes structu... or fill. deltroyed or
damaged by storm.. Booda. 6re, or other
diecrete-II, provided the repair.
..habilltetlon. or replacement Is
commenced. or Is under contrect to
commence, within two years of the date
of their dastructlon or damep. In C8IIS
ofcatutJophlc evenll. such II
hurricanes or torIIedoes. this _year
limit may be waived by the DIstrict
Engineer. provided the permitlae can
demonllrall fundi.... contrIct, or other
similar deleys.(Iii DlacIWges ofdredpcI at 611
material, Includlns excavation. into III
"Iters of the United Stet. to remove
accumulated sediments end debri, In
the vicinity of, end within. ellli...
structures (e.,.. bridges. culverted ioed
crosai..... _ter Intake structures. ate.1
end the placement of new or Iddltlontl
rip rap to protect the structure. provided
the permittel aotlfies the DIttrIct
Engineer In aa:ordance with General
Condition 13. The removal of sediment
II limited to the minimum necessary to
restore the w_y In tha Immediate
vicinity of the Itructure to the
approximate dimensions thet elated
when the structure WII buIlt, hut cannot
extend further thin 200 feet In any
direction &om the structure. The
placement of rip rap must be the
minimum necessary to protect the
structure or to ensure the safety of the
structure....11 _ated materials muot
be deposited and retained In an upland
area unl... otherwiae ,peclfically
approved by the DIstrict Engineer under
llparate authorization. Anybank
lIabUiutlon maim... not direct"
alOCiated with the structure will
require a separate luthorizatlon &om
the District Engineer.
(1111 Discharges of drBdged or nil
materill. Includi... excavotion. Into III
wate.. of the United Stales for activities
associated with the restoration of
upland areas damaged by a storm. flood.
or other discrete event, including the
construction. placement, or in.tallatlon
of upland protection structures and
minor drBdglng to remove obstructiona
In _tors of the United Stites. (Upland.
lost as I ...ult of I storm, flood. or other
discrete event can be replaced without
e Section 404 permit provided the
uplands are ...tured to their original
~t location. This NWP Is for the
ectlvltlll In _tors of the United Stetes
ellOClated with the repl_ent of the
uplanda.1 The permltlae must notify the
District EnsJn_, In eccordanee with
GenenI Condition 13, within 12 monthl
of the dete of the de..... and the work
must commence. or be under _ to
commence, within two yean of the date
of the da...... The permltlae should
provide evidence••uch a a recent
topapphlc eurvey or pholograpba. to
Justify the extent ofthe ...-d
.....oretlon. The~on'ofthe
dernaged area cannot !XC8ed the
contoon. or ordinary high _tor mark.
that !Xlsted prior to the damap. The
DIttrict EngI_ retalna the right to
delermlna the extent of the~Istlng
condltlona and the _ of any
_tIon work authorized by this
permit. Minor dndgl... to remove
Obstruction. from the edjacent
w«erbody Is limited to 50 cubic yarde
below the pllne of the ordinary high
_er marl. and Is limited to the
emount necessary to ...tore the pre-
elstl... bottom contoun of the
waterbody. The drBdgI... mey not be
done primarily to obtain fill for any
.....ontlon ectIvities. The ditcherge of
dndged or fill materilll and all related
work needed to restore the:;::land muat
be part of a sl...le and com .... project.
Thl. permit cannot be u In
conlunetlon with NWP 18 or NWP 19 to
.....ore damaged upland .... Thi.
permit does not luthorize the
repllcement of land. lost through
pual erosion proces_.
Mllntenanee drBdgIng for the primary
purpoae of Dlvlption and beech
....._tlon are not euthorized by thl.
permit. Thl. permit doea not luthorize
new stream channelization or stream
relocation projects....ny work
authorized by this permit must not
cause more than minimal degradation of
_tar quality. more than minimal
cha..... to the flow cherecter!stlca of the
stream. or increa.. noodlng (See
General Condition. 9 and 21).ISections
10 and 4041
N_ Thi. NWP authorizes the minimal
Impact repair. rehabilitation. or replacement
of any previously authorized structure or nn
thlt does not quaJily lor the Section 400l1O
exemplion for mainlenance.
t~.." l._~ l~,. _ L L_~... l._.... L_._. L,,~.. L~ L c._ ... L ... L" l._., L._.. L L~.< l.",.,. l
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. Actlvlti.. ",(sted to: (II
con.tructlon ofoutfall .truetu.... and
essoci.ted intake .truetu.... where the
emuent from the outfall is authorized.
conditionally authorized. or specifically
exampted. or is otharwite In compliance
with regulations Issued ..nder the
Nationsl Pollutant Discha..
Elimination System prosram (Section
402 of the Clean W.ter Actl. and (III
maintenance excavation. Including
cJredslns. to l1lMova accum..1ated
aedlment. b10ckins or restrIctIns outfall
and Intake atruetu..... aa:umulated
sediments &om smallimpoundmants
usoclated with outfall and Intake
ltnIetuI1lO••nd accumulated sediments
&om canal. usoclated with o..lfalland
Intake .truetu..... provided the ectivlty
meat. all of the fohowl"8 crll....a:
.. The pannlttaa noUfIiIs the DistrIct
Ensinaar In accordance with General
Condition 13:
b. The aJI\OIInt ofexcamed or
dI1ldgad mat....al m..st be the mInimum
nacessary to I1lstora the outfall•• Intak...
small Impoundments. and canals to
original design capacitl.. and d..1gn
conOJllll'8tlona (I..... d"l'th .•~wldthl;
c. The excavatad or dradpd malm.1
I. deposited and I1ltslned at an upland
.Ite. unl... otharwi.. appnwad Iiy the
District EJI8In_ und..r separate
authorization: and
d. Proper 1011 erosion and aedlment
control m............. used to minimize
I1l8Otry of aedimant. Into _ers of th..
United States.
The conItnIetlon of Intake .tructu....
I. not authorized by this NWP. unl...
lbey .... dlraetly ISIOClated with an
.uthorlzed outf.1I .truct...... For
malnlenanca excavation .nd dI1ldllns to
",mOYll 8CCUlIIulated sediments. the
notifICation m..st Incl..de Information
"'IBfdlns the orIlln.1 d..lgn capacitl..
and conllJllll'8tion. ofthe facility and
the pI1lMtIClt of .paclal aquatic .It..
( ated .beIlowslln the Vicinity
ofthe propoaed work. (Saetlons 10 and
4041 .
1% !¥tltr.Adty!tlea. Actlvltl..
llICJUi con.tructlOn.
mal_. and repair of ..tility lines
and anoctaled facilities In __ of the
United Stataa a' follows:
OllOllty linea: The construction.
m.lntenance. or repair of ..tlllty linea.
Incl..dins o..tfall and Intske .tructu....
and the ..sociatad excamion. beckOIl.
or beddlns for the ..tillty linea. In .11
waters of the United Stat... provided
th.... I. no cha..... In pI1lCOD.truclion
conto..... A "utility line" I. defined as
any pipe or pipeline for the
tI1lnsportatlon of .ny.._ .... liquid.
IiqueOable. or .Iurry substance. for .ny
purpose. and .ny cable. line. or wire for
thetran.ml••lon for .ny purpose of
elactricalanaraY.tel.phona••nd
telegraph m........ and radio and
t.levlSlon communication (_ Note I.
belowl. Matarlall1llUlilns from tI1lnch
excavation may be t..mporarily .Ideca.t
(up to tIuee month.llnto w.tara of the
United Stat... provided the m.t....all.
not placed In .uch • m.nner that II I.
dl.persed by currants or other forces.
Tboi D1.lrIct Enslnear may extend the
period of temporary .Ide castlnl not to
excaad a total of 180 days. where
appropriate. In _lands, tha top 6" 10
lZ" of the tranch abould normally be
backDlled with topaoll from the tranch.
Furtherm_. tha trsncb cannot be
constructed In such • m.nner as to
drain _ers of the United Stat.. (..., .•
backDllIns with exten.ivell"'vellayers.
crastins a &ench drain .ffaetl. For
exemple...tility line tI1lncbes can be
becklllled with clay blocks to 8I1SU'"
that the tranch does not drain tha _ers
of tha United Stat.. throuah which the
utility line I. Installed. Any ex""""
.Iopes and _ benks muat r..
lIlabIlizad immediat.ly upon completion
of tha ntillty line eros.lns ofeach
watarbody.
(II) Utility 11118 substotlom: The
constnIction. maintenance. or
expansion 01 ••ubstatlon facility
asaoclated with • power line or utility
line In non-tldal waters of tha Unlled
Stat... excludllll non-tldal_landa
adjacent to tidal waters. provided the
activity does nol ",suIt In tha loss 01
I"'aler than '/> acre of non-tidal waters
of tha United St.t...
(IIIJ Foundation.for overheod ul/llIy
lin.. towers. pol.... ond anchors:Th.
construction or m.lnlananca of
foundations for overheacI ..tillty line
towers. pol... and .nchors In .11 w.ters
ofthe United Slat... provided the
foundations .... tha minimum size
nacessary and sap8I'Ite footlnp for each
tower ... (rather \han a I......Inlle
padJ .'" uaed wh8l1l f_lbIe.(lvl A....,... roods:The conItnIetlon of
_ roads for tha construction and
matntanancaofutility lines. Includlns
overhead power linea and ntllity line
substations. In _-tidal _ers of the
United States. excludlns non-tldal
_lands edjacentto tidal waters.
provided the dlscbalJll does not causa
the loss oll"'aler then '/> acre of non-
tidal waters of the United Stat... Acces.
rood••h.1i be the mlnlmnm width
necessary (_ Nota 2. belowl. ACC8SlI
roads must be constructed '0 that th..
I.nsth of the road minimizes the
adverse .f1ect. on water. of th. United
Stat...nd as near •• ponlble to
preconstrudion contoun 8nd elevations
(e.,.• at ared. corduroy road. or
IOOtextil./lr.v.1 roads'. Acces. roads
constructed above pl1lCOnstruction
contou...nd elevation. in water. ofth.
United St.t.s mu.t be properly bridled
or culv.rted to m.lnt.ln surface now•.
Th. term "utility lin." does nol
Include actlviti.. which drain a w.ter of
the Unlt.d Slat....uch a. drain... til.
or french drains: however. It does apply
to pipe. CODveyins drainage from
another ...... For the purpos.. 01 this
NWP. the loss of waters of the United
Stateslncl..des tha Oll.d e.... plu.
_ers of the United Stataa that.",
edvarsely .ffaeted by noodlns.
excavation. or drain••• a ....ult of the
project. Actlvltl...uthorlzed by
..........ph. (II throuah (Ivl may not
excaad • total ol'/> 8CI1l108l of waters
of the United Stst... Watara oftha
United Stste. t.mporarily affaeted by
Olllns. flooding••xcav.tlon. or dralnag••
wh8l1l the project ..... I. restored to
pl1lCOOstructlon contou" and
.1....llon...... not included In the
calculation of permanent los. of waters
of the United Stat... Thl. Include.
temporary construction mat. (e.,..
timber. steel.potextll.J ueed durins
construction and l1lMoved upon
completion of tha work. Where cert.ln
function. and valu.. of waters of the
United Stat...'" permanently adv.rsely
.ffactad. such •• the con.....lon of.
f_ad _land to a herbaceous
_land In the perman.ntly maintained
utility lin. riaht.of-way. mltlaatlon will
be required to reduca tha adverse .f1ect.
of tha project to the minlmallev.1.
Machenlzed landclearinl necessary
for tha con.tructlon. malnt.nance. or
repair 01 utility linea and tha
construction. maintenance. end
expansion of ntillty line .ubstatlon••
foundation. for ovarh.ed utility linea.
.nd acces. road. I. authorized. provided
tha cleel1ld ..... i. kaptto tha minimum
nacassary and praconstructlon contours
.... malnt.lnedas near a. possible. The
..... ofwatara oftha United States that
I. filled. excavated. or fIoodad m..st be
limited to the minimum necesaary to
constnIct the ..tillty line••ubstatlon••
foundations. and acces. road•. Exce••
mat.....1must be I1lMOved to ureland
...... Immediat.ly upon comp etion of
con.tructlon. Thi. NWP may .uthorlze
utility line. In or .f1ectlns navllable
waters of the United Stat... even if the",
I. no ••soclated dlsche.. of dredged or
lill m.terial (See 33 CFR P.rt 3zzl.
Notification: Th. permittee mu.t
notify the Di.trlct Enainaer In
accord.nce with Gen.ral Condition 13.
If .ny 01 the followins crit.ri••'" met:(.J Mech.nized I.nd c1..rinlln a
fore.t.d w.tland for tha utility lin.
right-of-w.y:
(b' A Section 10 permit is requir.d:
(cl The utility line In watars of the
United States, excludlns overhead lines.
exceed. 500 feet:
(d) The utility lin. Is placed within.
jurisdlctlonal ..... Ii..... a water of the
United Stat..l. and It runs parallel to •
.tream bed that Is within that
jurisdlctlonal_:
(.1 Disc...... associated with the
construction of utility lin••ubstations
that I1lIUltln the los. ofgreater than 'It.
ac", of waters of the United Stat..;(0 Permanent accaa. rood.
constructed above arsde In __ of the
United Stat.. for • distanca of mora
than 500 feat: or(g) Permanant ICC8U roads
constructed 10 wat... of the United
Stat.. with impervious malarial•.
(Section. 10 and 4041
_I: o-hasdutllltJ 1I__ed
over Sect10D to__and utility U-Ihal
... rouled lJI or undar SectIoD 10_...
without. diKlwp ofdredpd or BD
material_Ire. Sect10D to penalt: except
far plpeo or pipelines used to ......pmt
.-.. liquid, 11quefIabI•• or s1WTJ
subalancH r naylpble ......of the
United SIs which ... con.ldered to be
bridpa. not uUllty'-' and _y NqUIre •
penall"- the U.s. Caul Guard punuant
10 Section • of the RI..... and Horbon Act
of 1.... "0_. IDY cIIac:haIps ofdredpd
or BII material _ed with such pipelines
.111 nqube. Corps penal' under Sec:tIon
404.
Nole 2: _ roads used far bath
c:onotruc:tlon and IIIIIntSDIDC8 may be
authorized. tmJYIded they _ the _ and
concllU.... "'this NWP. _ roads used
salo1J far COD_Ion of tho uU1I1J line must
be nmoved upon completion of the worIt and
~:'':':t~r.::r::..u~contaun.
TemJlOfll1 aa:eu _ far _Ion m.y
be autharlzad by NWP 33.
_ 3: Whore tho PtoPMed utility llneta
constnK:ted or IDataIfed in navtpbIe ••1...
of the United Slat.. II..... Sect10D 10 _ ).
....._ of the PCN and NWP werIfIcatIan will
ba _ by the Corps to tho NatIonal O<:aanlc
and AbDaapherlc Admlnlalrsllon, NaUonaI
O<:aan Sarvlce, for clwtIns the uUlllyllne 10
pruIe<t -ptton.
It'r~Qpuing·ActiviT"requ~~COnltruction.
expansion. modiDcatlon. or
Improvement of II.-transportatlon
crossi..... (..., .. blahwaya. nllway••
trail•• and .Irport runway. and
taxlway.1 in waters of tha United States.
Incl..dlns _land•• provided tha
activity meet. the followlns crtt.....:
•. Thl. NWP I. subject to the
followinl~ and linear limits:
(II For public lI"""r transportation
project. In non-lidal waters. excludins
non-tidal _I.nd. edjacent to tidal
waters. provided the dische.. doe. not
cau.. the 10•• of .....t.r th.n '/> 8CI1l of
wal... of th. United SI.tes:
(ZI For public lI"""r tran.portotion
project. In tidal _ers or non-lldal
_lands edjacant to tidal walara.
provided tha did... does not cau..
tha los. of .....ter then 'f> acre of waters
of the United Stat.. and the length of
011 lor tha eros.lns In _an of tha
United Stat.. does not axcaad 200 11.-
feat. or:
(31 For prim" lI"""r Iron.potfatlon
project. In all watan of the United
St.t... provided the dlscharga does not
causa tha lou of8"'8lar than 'IJ 8CI1l of
watars oftha United Stat.. and the
III\lIIb of 011 for tha crolI.lns In w.ters
of tIta United Stat.. does not exceed ZOO
linear feat:
b. The permlttaa m..st notify the
District Enl!n_ln accordance with
General Condilion 13 lfany of tha
followlns crtt....a .... met:
(II The dlschelJll ca.._ th.1oss of
lI1laler than 'It. 8CI1l of waters of the
United Stat..: or
(zl There I•• dlscba.. ln ••peclal
aquallc .Ite. InclOOlns _land.;
c. The notlDcation must Include.
companaatory mitigation propoaal to
oIIset permanent losses of w.ters of the
United Stat.. toensu", that thoaa I......
",.ult only In mlnljnal ad_ .ffacts to
tha aqu.tIc environment and •
statement descrlbllll how temporary
101_ of watara of the United Stat.. will
be minimized to the maximum .xtant
pI1lcllcable;
d. For discharaes In apacIalaqualic
.It... InclOOIDl wetland•• the
notlDcatlon must Include a dellne.tion
oftha allected .peclal aquallc .It..:
•. The width of tha 11111. limited to
tha minimum nacassary for the crosslns:
f. Thl. permit dOH not authorize
_m channelization. and tha
authorized ectlvitles must not ca....
more than mlnlm.1 ch to the
hydraulic Dow cbanct stlcs of tha
_m. IDCI1l8sa noodlns. or causa m_
than minimal degradation of water
quality ofany .tream (_General
Conditions 9 and ZI):
.. This permit cannot be used to
a..thorize non-linear f..to.... commonly
uaoclated with tran.pottatlon projects.
such as vehicle m.intenance or st_1"
bulldl..... parklnllot•• train stations. or
aircreft h.n....; and
h. Th. crosslns i•••lnII. and
complatn project for crosslns • _er of
tha United St.t... Wh8I1l. road SllMent
(I..... the .horlest segment ofa road with
Independent utility that Is part 01 a
I...er projectl has multlpl. cros.ln.. of
_m. (_I.lnll••nd compl.t.
project.) the Corp. will con.lder
whethar It should use its dlscretlon.rY
authority to raqul", .n Individual
permit. (S.ction. 10 and 404)
_ Soma dloch_ for Iho conslJUctlon
of farm rood••"- roads. or .omJlOfll1
rood. for IIIOYinI mlnina aquipmonl moy be
oIlglblo for an exemption In>m the need for
• Section 404 penn" ,... 33 CFR 323.41.
27, StRPm owl lferlqqdlle8t0'll!ion
a1ie!l1" Activities in w.tersore
n t I.t•••ssoclated with tha
",atorstlon of former wat.... the
enh.ncement ofdear.ded tidal and non-
tld.I_land••nd riparian ....... the
creation of tidal and non-tld.1 _land.
and riparian ....... and tha ",storatlon
and anhancament of non-tidal_m.
and non-tidal open water ...... e.
follows:(.J The activity I. conducted on:
(I) Non-Fedarll public land. and
private Ianda. In accordance with the
term. and conditions of. blnd1ns
_land enhancement. l1lstorstion. or
creation........-t batwaan tha
I.ndowner and tha U.S. FI.h and
Wildlife ServIce (FWSI or the Natural
Resources Con.....ation ServIce (NRCSI
or vol..ntary wetland l1lstoratlon.
anhencamant, and creation actions
documented by tha NRCS pursuant to
NRCS regulatlona: or
(ZI An)' Federelland; or
(31 Reclaimed surface coal mined
lands. In .ccordance with a Surface
Mln1ns Control and RacllJDltlon Act
permit laauad by tha Office of Surface
Mlnlns or the appllcabl. state agency
(tha fu""" _Ion does not apply to
_.or _land. created. ",stored. or
enhanced a. mllllation for the minlns
Impacts. nor naturally due to hydrologic
or topoarsphlc faetul1l8. nor for a
mitl..tlon bankl: or
(4' Any,prlvate or public land:
lbl NotIJlcafIon: For ectlvltl.. on .ny
privata or public I.nd thai .... not
iIaocrIbad by paraarapba (aHtI. (a)(ZI. or
(aH31.bove. the permlttaa mu.t notify
tha District Enain_ In accord.nce with
General CondItion 13; and
(cl Only natlva plant specI...hould
be planted at tha site. Ifperml"_ i.
..-atins the project site.
Actlvltl.. aulhorlzed by this NWP
Include. but .... not limited to: the
l1Imov.1 ofaccumulated sediments: the
Installation. ",moval. and maintenance
of small water control .truetu..... dlk...
.nd berm.: tha In.t.llatlon ofcurrant
d.nectors; the enhancement.
l1lstorslion. or creation of rim••nd pool
st....m .truetu",; the placement 01 in-
stl1l8m h.bltat.truetu....; modiOcation.
of tha .lrsIm bed and/or banks to
restol1l or create .tream m..nders: the
beckfillinl of .rtlflci.1 channel. and
drainage dltch.s: th.l1Imoval of .xlstlng
drain... structu....: th. con.tructlon of
.mall nestillll.l.nd.: the construction
of open water areas: ectlvill•• needed to
reestabli.h vlletation.lncluding
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plowi"ll or dlscl"ll far IIlIId bed
prepll1'.tlon: mechanized I.ndclearl"llto
remove und..lrable veget.tlon: and
other related actlvltl...
Thl. NWP does not authorize the
conversion 01. Ilream to .nother
aquatic use. IUCh as the creation oran
Impoundment far _erfowl habitat.
Thll NWP does not.uthorlze Ilream
ch.nneliwlon. Thll NWP does not
authorize the conversion or naturel
wetlands to another aquatic use. IUCh al
creation or _erfowl ~ndmanll
where. Ioteated _land -'auoly
existed. However. thll NWP authorizes
the relocation or non-tldel waters.
InciudIna _·tldaI _Iaads. on the
project .Ite provided there ere net pins
In aquatic I'IIIOUICllIunctlona aad
vel_. For example. thIa NWP may
.uthorlze the creation 01 an open water
Impoundmantln e non.tldal .........t
_land. provided the _-tId.1
emergent_land Ie replaced by
creath" thet -'.nd type on the project
lite. Thll NWP does not authorize the
relocation or Ud.1 w.ters or the
conversion 01 tidal wat.... Includl"ll
tidal wetlands. to other .qwltlc u....
IUCh .1 the conversion or tidal wetlands
intoopen_lm~.
n......nIon. For en"h._.
_Ion. and creation projectI
conducted under pa......pha laltzJ and
1.)(4). this NWP does not .uthorlze .ny
future dlocharp 01 dredged or 1111
m.terial UIOCIated with the reversion 01
the .... to ill prior condition. In .uch
cases • eepuete permit would ba
required lor .ny reversion. For
restoration. enhancement. and creation
f,roject. conducted under p8I'III'lIphl
.X1I and le)(3). this NWP also
• uthorlzes anr future diacharp or
cIredsed or 61 materlsl UIOCIated with
the reversion or the .... to ill
documented prior condition .nd use
(I.•.• prior to the restoratton,
enh.ncement. or creation actIYlU..)
within live years .ft.. expiration ora
limited term w«Iand _Ion or
creation ...........t or permit. even lIthe
dlocharp oceura .fter thl. NWP expl....
Thli NWP .Iso .uthorlzes the reversion
or wetlands that were restored.
enhanced. or created on prIor-converted
cropI.nd thet hal not been abandoned.
in Iccordance with a blndinl qreement
batween the I.ndowner .nd NRCS or
FWS1_thoush the restoration.
enhancement. or creetlon activity did
not raqulre • Section 404 permitJ. Th.
live-year reversion limit does not .pply
to .....ment. without time limit.
...ched under pansr.ph I.XIJ. The
prior condition will be documented In
the orllinal qreem.nt or permit. and
th. determln.tlon or relum to prior
condition. will ba m.d. by the Feder.1
asencY or .pproprlat. St.t....ncy
executi"ll the .....ment or permit. PrIor
to .ny reversion activity. the permill..
or th. approprl.te Federal or Stet.
asencY must notiry the Diltrlct Ensin_
and include the docum.ntatlon or the
prior condition. Once .n .... hal
reverted beck to III prior physical
condition. It will ba IUbject to whatever
the Corpa resulatory raquiremenll will
ba et thet Inture d.t•. ISectlons 10 .nd
404J
_ e::-penoatory aoIl1pllon 10 DOl
nqaIred far aetI_ autharlzed by thli
NWP. proriclod IIIe authorlnd wor\ .....hs
In.not_Inaquatlc_
functl-.lIIlCIvaI_1n IIIe pnIjIIct _ ThIs
NWP .... be UHd 10 autharlu COIlIjIODI8lory
aoIllp11an ........... lacIudl,. 1ftll\plloD
bonb. proOtcIod tho p_IIU..-'- IIIe
DiItrId~ ID ........_ with General
Condition 13. and IIIe PtaIect IDcludas
_.........., aoIllpllOn lor Impoclllo
_oflile Unlteil _caUHd bylile
outhorlnd won._, tbla NWP"-
DOl autborlzelile _ ofan _ UHd
=::====e':=t~11s
authorize Impacts at • aoIllptlOR bonk, but
OIIIyln_...... lt ..........
appnwed under IIIe~ FoderaI
Mltipt\oa Banb GuldeIlDeo.
.m 1Icaid_1IdI ~'i!'t.~f$f.!.1ir.:.srf~~ non.~1
w.ters 01 the United St.""'••xcludlnl
non-tidal wetlandl adjacent to Udal
_ .... lor the construction or
expansion or residential. commercl.I,
.nd Instltutlonsl build1ns Ioundstlon.
and bulldl"ll padl .nd .llendent
_tu... that are necessary far the use
and m.lntenanco orth. _ ....
Allendsnt featuree may Include. but are
ftotlimlted to. roads. PUidnlIlotl.
10..... yards. utility lines.ltormwater
m.nasement Iscllitles, and recreation
ractlitl.. IUCh as playpound•• pl.y1"ll
fields. and 8011coureu Iprovided the
8011 course Ie an Inlaplll part or the
restdential developmentJ. The
constructlan ornew11tI_or 011 aad
pi _III II not .uthorlzed by thll NWP.
Resldenti.1 developmenllinciude
multiple and linBI. unit developm.nll.
Exampl.. or commercial developmenll
Includ. retail .tores. Indullrial raclllti...
restauraola. bu.llt8ll parks. and
.bopplnl cent.... Ex.mp.... or
Instltutlonsl developmentl Includa
school•• Ilre stetlons. sovemment office
bulldl•• judlcl.1 buildlnp. public
works bulldlnl"' librari... hosplt.I••
.nd places or worship. The activities
listed .bove .re .uthorlzed. provided
the actlvitl.. meet .n or the rollowlnl
crlterl.:
•. Th. disch.1Jl8 does not cause the
los. or....l.r than 'h acre 01 non-tld.1
wat.rs or th. United St.t....xcludinl
non-tld.1 wetlandl .djacentto tid.1
wlten: .
b. Th. dlsch.1Jl8 does not cause the
loss ol....ter th.n 300 line.r reel 01
stream bed:
c. The permill" mu.t notlry the
D1strlcllln8ln_ In eccord.nce with
General Condition 13. ir any or the
Iollowins crlteri••re mat:
(lJ TIui disch.... cau... the los. or
sreater then V,. acre 01 non-tld.1 w.t...
or the United Stat... excludinl non-lidal
_Iandlad~ttotldalwat...: or
IZ) The dlicberp cauaes the lou or
.ny open w.ten. Includl"ll perennial or
Intermillant Itreams. balow the ordinary
him water mark 1_ Not•• balowJ.
a. For discharps In lpecI.1 aquatic
lit... Includi"ll Watlandl. the
notillcatlon must Include. d.lineatlon
01.1Jected~.I aquatic lit..:
.. The disCltarp II part or a .Inll. and
complet. project;
I. The permittee must .vold .nd
minimize dlscharps into wetare or the
United Slat...t the project lite to the
maximum extent practlcabl•••nd the
notilicatlon. when raqulred. mu.t
Include. wrlllen stelementexpl.inlnl
how .voIdance and minimization 01
losses 01 waters or the United Sta"",
..... achieved on the project .It•.
Compensatory mltlptlon will norm.lly
ba raqulred to offset the Iossea 01 w.t...
01 the United Stat... ISee Gener.1
Condition 19.J Th. notIlicatlon must
.Iso Includ•• compensetory mltis.tlon
propos.1 far ofIsetlins unavoidable
Ioseu or w.ters or the United St.t... II
.n .pplicant_. thet the adverse
.ffecta 01 the project .re minlm.1
without mltlption. then the .ppllcant
may submit jullillcation expl.ini"ll why
compensatory mltlption lbould not ba
required lor the Di.trlct Enllneer'l
conslderetlon:
I. When thl. NWP I. used In
conjunction with any other NWP••ny
combined total permanent Ion or water.
of the United St.t.. exceedl"ll'A. acre
raqulres thet the permill.. notify the
Diltrict E"llI_ln eccord.nce with
General Condition 13:
h. Any work .uthorlzed by thll NWP
must not cause more than minimal
dssredatlon or water quality or more
then minimal chanp.to th. Row
charact.rlstlcs ol.ny stream (-
General Condition. 9 .nd ZI):
I. For discha cauII"ll the los. or
'A. acre or or waten or the United
St.t... the permill" mu.tlubmit •
reporl. within 30 days or completion 01
the work. to the District Enlln_ th.t
cont.in. the followlnllnform.tion: (I)
Th. n.m., .dd......nd t.lephone
numbar or the permlll..: IZI Th.
location or th. work: (3) A deacrlption
or th. work; (4) Th. type .nd .creas. of
the loss or w.ters or the United Stat..
(e.,.. 'tu acre or emergent wetlands):
.nd 15J The typa and ecrease ol.ny
compensetory mltlptlon used to offset
the loss or waters or the United St.t..
1•.1.• 'I" ecre 01 enterpnt wetland.
creeted OlHlteJ:
I. If there ere.ny open waters or
st...ms within th. project ..... the
permill.. will est.blilh .nd maintain. to
ibe maximum extent pnclIcabl••
wetland or upland veplIted bulfen
next to those open waters or _ms
consistent willi General Condition 19.
Deed restrictions. conserv.tlon
._11. protaclIve covenants. or
other means or land conaervatlon and
preserv.tlon are raquired to prolact .nd
m.lntaln the vasetated bulfen
..tablished on the IJlOIect lit.; and
It. Stream channelization or Ilream
relocation downstream 01the point on
th••_ where the annu.1 averep
Row is I cubic root per second II not
.uthorlzed by this NWP.
Only ...bfential. commercIal••nd
Institutionsl activit.... with structures
on the IoundationllJ or bulldlns padllJ.
eo _II .1 the attendant featuree. are
.uthorlzed by thli NWP. The
compensatory mitlptlon proposal
required In panpapb If) 01 this NWP
may ba .Ithet conceptual or detailed.
The watland or upltind veR8leled bulfar
required In p8I'III'lIph (IJ Of thli NWP
will normally ba 25 to 50 feet wid. on
each .ide 01 the .-.n. but the District
Enlli_ J1!8! require wider veptaled
bulrers to edilresa documented water
quality concernl. The required wetlend
or upl.nd veplIted buffer II part or the
overall compensatory mitiBalfon
requirement lor this NWP. Irthe project
lit. w.. preYlaully used lor qrIcuItural
pur(JOIIeI and the farm _fopemor
used NWP 40 to .uthorlze actlvItl.. In
waters or the United Stateato increase
production or construct farm bulldlnp,
NWP 39 cannot ba used by the
dev.loper to .otborlze additional
activities In _ olth. United Stat..
on the project lila In _ 01 the
ecrease limit far NWP 39 (I.e.. the
combined ecrease lou .uthorlzed under
NWPs 39 and 40 cannot exceed .... acreJ.
Subdivisions: For any real _la
lubdlvl.lon created or subdivided aft.
October 5. 1984•• notllicatlon pursuant
to paresreph IcJ or thll NWP II raquired
lor eny discharp whlcb would cause
the .llIlI"'IIal.total loss 01 waters or the
United Sia"", lor the entire lubdlvi.lon
to exceed V,. ecre. Any dischalJl8 in any
re.1 ulat. lubdivl.1on wblch would
cause the ......t.tot.llos. or waters
or the United St.t.. In the subdlvllion
to ••ceed 'h acre I. not .uthorlzed by
thl. NWP. unl... th. District Ensin-
exempli. particul.r lubdivl.lon or
parcel by m.ItI"ll. wrlllen
d.termlnatlon thet the Individual .nd
cumul.tlve adverse envIronment.1
errecta would ba minimal and the
property owner had••fter October S.
1984. but prior to July 21.1_.
committed lubstantlal_ln
rellanco on NWP Z6 with reprd to •
subdiYlllon. In cln:umstances where It
would ba lnequltabl. to &IIltnt. the
property _'lln_ant-backed
expectation•. Once the exemption II
established lor a subdivision,
IUbsequentlot development by
Indivldu.1 property owners m.y
proceed u.1"ll NWP 39. For the
purpoeu orNWP 39. the term "real
eetat. subdiYlsion" lhall ba Interpreted
to Include circum.u- where a
Ia~ or d....oper dlYldes.lracl
or land Into smaller parcell far the
purpose oraellins.con~""
tranarerrlns. ........ or deveIoplns seld
parcell. This would Include the entire
.... or. residential. commercl.l. or
other real estate subdlYillon. Includlns
all paIClIlI .nd parts 0.-1. ISectlons
10 tind 404J
__when"""" liDO_land
......,uOR_ ......Iltedbylile p...-or
.........oranord!'*Y ..... _awk or
bod and bonk. _tlIat aN _ 0I1ile
l.IaIled _ baaed OR thlo crIlerl. would
requInt. PCH ...... thouP_1o
\ofnlquRtly,..-t1n tIio _ channoI
I.... far opboIftenI-,.
ol~'WmSYfni~=~~
waters or the United Stat... excIudlns
non·tldal_lands .dJacent to tidal
_. far the purpose or Improvinl
asrIcultural prtiductlon and the
construction 01 bulidIna padl ror farm
bulldinp. Authorized actlvlti.. Includ•
the Install.Uon. placement. or
construction 01 drainap til... ditch...
or I....: mechanized landcleeri"ll:
land laveII..-: the relocation or .xlllins
serviceable Clralnap ditches constructiJd
In _ ... or the United Stataa; and
Ilmllar activities. proYIded the
permillee compll" with the Iollowl"ll
terml and conditions:
•. For dlscha.... lnto non-tldel
wetlandlto Improve asrIculturei
production. the IoIlow1ns crlterls must
La mel lithe permlll.. I•• USDA
~ participant:
(I) Tha permfll" must obtain.
caleBorlcal minlm.l.ffects exemption.
minimal eIfect exemption. or mltlpllon
exemption rmm NRCS In accordance
with the provl.lons or the Food Security
Act or 1965. as .mended 116 u.s.c. 3801
etseq.J:
IzJ The disch.... lnto non-tld.1
wetland. does not result In the los. or
....ter than 'II acre or non-tidal
_ll.nds on • farm treet:
(3) Th. permi".. must h.ve.n NRCS-
certined watl.nd delineation:
14J Th. permltt.. must impl.m.nt.n
NRCS..pproved compensatory
mltll.Uon pl.n th.t fully offaet.
wetland los_. II required: and
15) The permill.. mu.tsubmlt a
report. within 30 d.y. orcomplaUon or
the .uthorlzed work. to the DI.trlct
Enslneer that cont.lnl the lollowlns
infarmatlon: laJ The nam•••ddres•••nd
t.lephone number 01 the permlll.... lb'
The location or the work: IcJ A
tIeat:riptIon or the work; IdJ The type
...... Ior square leetJ or the lou
of_landll••I" 'II acre or em....nt
_landsJ: .nd leJ The type. ecrease lor
llJuant feetJ. and location of
COlIlJl"llI8lory mlllption Ie.,.• 'II acre 01
.........t_land. on the farm lraclJ: or
h. For dlachaJtles Into non-tld.1
wetlandl to Improve asrIculturai
production. the Iollowlns criteria must
ba mel II the permill" II not • USDA
pl'tJlll'llm participant lor • USDA
~clpant lor whlcb thework does not qu.llfy lorau orizellon under p8I'III'lIph (.J or thll
NWP);
11) The dlaclterp Into non·tldal
_lands does not ......1t In the lou 01
sreeter than .... ecre 01 non-tIdel
_lands on • farm lracl;
IZ) The permi_ must notify the
D1'trict EnsJn- In eccordance with
General Condillon 13, II the dlschaIJI.
...ulllin the loss ol,llfIlIIlet' th.n 'II.
acre or non-tld.1 _I.nds:
(3) The notUlcatlon must Include •
d.llneatlon or .ffected wetland.: .nd
(4) The notillcatlon must Includ••
compensatory mitiptlon proposelto
orraet 100_ or waters or the United
Stal.l:or
Co For the construction orbulldl"ll
padl lor larm buildi•• the dlsch....
d_ not cause the lou ol....ter than
.... acre or non-tld.1 _Iandl that were
In asrIculturel production prior to
Oecambar 23.1985. (I.e.• fimned
_IandsJ .nd the permittee must notify
the Diltrlct Iln8Ineer In eccord.nco with
General Condition 13: or
d. Any activity In other waters or the
United Sta"", II limited to the relocation
01existlns .....Iceabl. dnlnap ditche.
constructed in _-tidaillreami. Thi.
NWP does not authorize the relocation
or....ter then 300 linear feet or exllllnl
serviceable dnlnap ditches con.tructed
in non-tldal_ml: end
•. Activities located In IOO-year
Roodplalns Identllled by FEMA'I Flood
Insurance Rat. M.ps or FEMA-.pproved
local Roodpl.in map. must comply with
General Condilion Z6.
Th. t.rm "rarm tract" rer... to •
parcel oll.nd id.ntified by the Farm
Service AI.ncy. Th. Corp. willld.ntlry
l_. L_ L_ L.,,,... L=> L- L-.. L- L_ L-..-. L_ L....~ L_. L.. L~_ Lc_~ L_", L=c l~~
--, --, -...., --, --, -, -, -, -,
,.....,
-, -, --, .... -, .'1 -, -, -,
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other waten of the United Stat.. on the
fann tract. NRCS will determine If e
proposed agricultural ectlvlty meets the
lerms end conditions of per"8"'ph (a) of
this NWP. except .. provided below.
For those ectivlties thet requl...
notification. the DI.trlct Engineer will
determine If e proposed agrIculturel
ectlvlly Is euthorlzed by paragraph. (b).
(c). andlor (dl of this NWP. USDA
J>l'OlIrem partlclpent. requestllll
authorl..tlon for dlsclWps ofCIredged
or fill meterlallnto waten of the United
Stein authorized by parlI8r8phs (c) or
(d) orthi. NWP.ln addition to
......ph (.). must notify the DImIct
EnsI_ln IICCOI'lIance with General
Condition 13 and the DI.trIct Enslneer
will det.mlne If tho ontln.~and
complete project Is authorized thl.
NWP. Dischsrges ofdrodaod or II
mllerlallnto wilen of the United Stll..
•SIOciated with comP\elllll required
compensatory mitlBBlIon ore authorized
by thl. NWP. Howevar. tolIllmpects.
Includllll other .uthorized Impects
under thl. NWP. may not exceed the 'I!I
acre limit of this NWP. Thl. NWP does
not .ffect. or otherwise ........te.
dlschs'll" _lated with agricultural
ectlvitles when the dlscharpi qualifin
for an exempllon under SectIon 404(Q of
the Clean Water Act. even though a
categorical minimal etrects exeDIptlon.
mlnlm.1 effect exemption. or mlliBBllon
exemption from NRCS pursuant to the
Food~ Act of 1985••s amended.
may be required. Actlvlti.. authorized
by per"llJ'llphs (.llbroush (d) IM1 not
exceed a tot.1 of ac... on a .IIIIle farm
trecl. Actlvltl uthorized by
JIlII'IF.phs (c) and (d) ore not Included
In the 'I!I acre limit for the f_ tracI. If
the tlte WII used for "8ricuIturel
purposes .nd the farm _/opei'IIor
used either peropaphs (.). (b). or (c) of
thl. NWP to authorl.. actlvltl.. In
w.ten of the United StII.. to Increase
agrIcullural production or construct
farm bulldi..... and the_I
I.ndowner wants to use NWP 3910
authori.. resldentl.l. _1aI. or
Industrial daYelopmenl ectlvltles In
walen of the United 51.1.. on tho .lIe.
the combined 8C1'81Be Ion authorized by
NWP. 39..,d 40 cannot exceed ...... acre.
(Section 404)
Dl1JiJ!.~':p.~9~1II
malerl.1 inlo non·lldel waten of the
Uniled 51.111. excluding non-tldel
wet"nds adjac:enllo tidal waters. 10
modify the cross-sectlon.1 confiSUrlllon
of currently serviceable dralnese dilches
conslructed In th_ waters. The
....h.ping of the ditch cannot Increase
drainage capacity beyond Ihe orIgin.1
d••ign cepacily or .xp.nd the .....
dr.lned by the ditch •• orIgin.lly
dulgned (I.•.• the capacity of tha ditch
must be the Slm••• originally designed
.nd II cannot drain .ddition.1 wetl.nds
or other waters of the United Slat..l·
Compensalory mitigation I. not required
because the work Is duignod 10 Improv.
water qualilY (•., .• by ngrodilll tha
drainage ditch with gentler slopes.
which can reduce erosion.In~
growth of vegetation. Increase uptake of
nulrients .nd other.u~by
...tlOII. etc.1. The permillee mual
_Ify the Di.trIct EngIneer In
accord.nce with General Condition 13.
Ifgrealer than SOO Ii.... feet of dralnese
ditch will be reshaped. MIIerlal
multllll from 8XCIVIlIon may _ ba
pennanontly tldecast Into waters but
m.y ba temporarily .Idecast (up 10 three
IIIOnth.11nto wal.rs of the United
Stetn. provided the m.terI.ll. _
placed In such • IllIDDfJI' thalli I•
di.persed by eumnts or other forces.
The District EngIneer may Illtend the
period of temporary .Idecastllll_ to
exceed .Iotal of 180 days. where
approprlall. Thi. NWP does not apply
10 mtiapllll drainage ditches
constructed In uplands••Ince~
......... not wal.rs of the Unlled Slates.
and thus DO permit from the Corps Is
required. or to the malnl_nce of
exlstllll dralnese dltche.lo thalr
original dlmen.ions .nd conflsurallon.
which does not requl.... Section 404
permil (see 33 CFR 323.4(aK3)). Thll
NWI' does DOt .uthorl.. the relocalion
of drainage ditches con.tructod In
w.ters of the United Ststes; the locallon
of tha cenlerllne of the reshaped
dralnese ditch must be 'pproxlmat.ly
the Slme .s the location of the
cenlerIlne of the original drainage ditch.
Thl. NWP does not .uthorlte stre.m
channell..tlon or _m relocation
proIect•. (Section 4041
~illff,' FqslUtlrlt Dite:herRe.
;iFmalerl.llnlo non-llilal
_ers of tha United Slates. excludllll
non·lldal _'-Dd. adjac:entto tidal
_ers. tor the construction or
expansion of_lIonal facllltl...
provided tha ectlvlty meets .11 of the
lollowlntl criteria:
•. The dltclwp does _ cause tha
1011 of greeter th.n 'l!Iacre of non-lId.1
w.ters of the United Stet... excludilll
non-tid.1 wet"nds .djacentlo tid.1
waters:
b. The dltclwp does _ caus.lh.
Ion of greeter than 300 line.r feet of
.treambed;
c. For disch.rges cau.lng the 10•• of
greater than 'A. ac... of non-tld.1 Wlters
of th. United St.tes.tha permittee
notifl•• the District Engineer In
accordlnce with Gen.ral Condition 13;
d. For discharges In .peei.1 .qu.tic
sites. Including wetl.nds. the
notification must includ•• d.lin••tion
of .ffected .~i.1 aqultiC siles;
e. The disCharge Is part of. singl••nd
complet. project: and
f. Compensatory mitlgetlon will
norm.lly be reqUired to orrset the lasses
of waters of the United Stetes. The
_lfIcation must .Ito include.
compensatory mitigation proposal
which provides for 1:1 "'rlscementlo
oD'set authorized losses 0 w.ters of tha
United Slates.
For tha purposes ofthi. NWP. the
term "_tlon.1 facility" I. d.flned u
• _tlODaI ectivlty thells Int"8"'ted
Into tha natural "ndscape .nd does not
tuhstantl.11y cbsnge preconstructlon
gredu or devlat. from natural "ndscape
contours. For the purpose of this permit.
the prhnary function of_lIon.1
f.cllIties does not Include tha use of
motor vehicles. buildl..... or Impervious
tunaces. Exempl.. of recre.tlon.1
facllill.. thll may ba authorized by Ihis
NWP Includ.; hlklllltralls. hike path.,
horse paths. neture centers. and
campgrounds (excludlllltr.iler perksl.
Th. construction or expenslon of gnlf
couraes and tha expenslon of ski ......
maybe authorized bythi. NWP.
provided the gnlf course or ski ..... does
_ tubltanll.lly deviate from n.tural
landscape contours and Is designed 10
minlmlte edverse effects to w.t.rs of
Ihe Unlled St.tes .nd riparl.n ......
through the use of such practices ..
integrlled pest m.nagement. edequ.l.
stormwater m.nagement facilities.
veget.ted burrers. reduced fertili_ us••
etc. The facility mu.t h.v••n edequ.te
waler qu.lily mllllg8m.nt pl.n In
accordance with General Condltion 9.
such as • stonnwater management
facility. 10 en.u... that the recrealional
facility results in no tublt.nli.1 adv.rse
eIfects 10 w.ter quality. This NWI' also
authorl_ the construction or
expeDllon of small.upport facllitie.,
such .s maintenance .nd .Iorage
buildlngt and st.bl... th.1 .... directly
...llIed to the _tlonal ectivlty. This
NWP does DOt authorl.. other
bulldi......uch as hotell. rest.uranll.
etc. The construction or expan.lon of
p1ay1111 fields (..., .• batebell. soccer. or
toothall fields). be.ketball and tennis
courts. recatracks. ltedium., ....n••••nd
the construction of new ski areas are not
.uthorlzed by thl. NWP. (Section 404)
Fi I' Ie . Disc a'll" of re g.d Dr fill
maleri. into non-tldal wst.rs ofth.
United Stat.s. excluding non-tidal
wetland••djacentto tidal w.ter•• for the
constnadion and maintenance of
stormwater management facilities.
including activities for the excavation of
.tormw.ter pondtffaciliUes. det.ntion
ba.lns. and retention ba.int; the
In.I.II.tion and maintenance of w.ler
control structures. outf.1I structures .nd
em.rgency spillways; .nd the
maintenance dredging ofexlstllll
stormw.ter m.nagemenl pondtf
facilities and detention .nd retention
beslns. provided the ectlvlty meets all of
tha followina criteria:
•• The dlllCharge for the construcllon
of new .Iormw.ter managemenl
f.cilities does _ cause tha Ion of
grealer than 'l!Iacre of non-lidal waters
of tha United SlItes. excludllll non-tldal
_I.nda .djacentto tidal waters;
b. The dlsi:lwp does _ cause the
Ioat of greater than 300 linear feet of
_mbod:
c. The discharge of cJredcod or fill
m.lerlal for tha con.tructlon of new
stormwster manesemenl facllilies In
Jl8I:IIUII.1 stream. I. _ .othorizod;
d. For dlschsrges or 8XCIvstlon for the
construction of new stormwaler
manegemont facilities or for the
m.lnt.nance of exlstllll stormwaler
m.nagemenl facilities causllll the Ion
of greater than 'A. acre of non·tldal
wat.rs. excIudllll non-tldal wetlands
adjacent 10 IIdal waters. the permill..
notifle. the DIstrict Engineer In
accord.nce with General Condition 13.
In .ddltlon. the _Iflcetion mual
Include:
(II A m.lnlenance plan. The
m.lnlenance plan .hOuld be In
accordance with Stete and local
requirements. If any tuch requlnments
exist;
(2) For dlscherges In specI.1 aquatic
.Ites. Including wetlands and
.ubmerged equ.lic veget.tlon. tha
notification must Include a dellnestlon
of .ffected ......; and
(3) A compmSllory millgetion
III'OPOSII th.t offsets the Ion of waters
or the United Stel... Malnt.nance In
constructed ...... will not requln
mitlg.tion provided .uch maintenance
I. accomplished In designated
maintenance .......nd not within
compensllory mltlg.tlon ...... (I.e..
district ....ineers m.y d••lgnale non-
maintenance ....... normally II the
down_m end oftha stormw.ter
m.nesemont facility. in ."lltlIII
stormwater manesement faclllliesl. (No
mitlgetion will be required for ectlvltl..
which ere exempt from Section 404
permit requl...mentsl;
e. The permillee mu.1 .vold and
minlml.. dlschs'll" Into waters of the
United Stetes .1 tha proIect tile to the
m.ximum ext.nt practicebl•• and the
notlfic.llon must include a wrillen
st.t.mentto the District Engineer
det.i1ing complianc. with this
condition (I..... why the discherge must
occur In w.ters of tha United SI.t...nd
why additional mlniml..lion cannot be
achlevedl;
f. The .tormwater manesemenl
facility must comply with General
Condition 21 and be dulgnod uslIII best
manesemenl practices (BMPsI.nd
wetershed protection lechniques.
Exemples may Include foreb8ys (deeper
.....s .t tha upstream and of tha
•Iormwater manesement facility thst
would be malnteinod Ibroush
excevllion). vegelIled bulTers. IIId
.ltlIII consld_lonslo minimise
edverse errscts 10 aquaI\c resources.
Another example ot. 8MI' would ba
bioenglneerilll methods Incorporated
Into tha facility dulgn 10 benefit Wlter
quelity .nd minimize adverse effects to
aqu.tlc resburces from storm I\ows,
..pecI.lly downstream of the facility.
thII provIda. to tha maximum Illtent
practicable. for long term aqu.llc
resource protection and anliancement;
g. Maintenance excavation will ba In
accordance with an approved
m.lnten.nce plan and will not exceed
tha orIgln.1 contours of the faclllly ..
.pproved .nd constructed; and
h. The ditclwp I. part of. sI.....
and complet. project. (Section 404)
~n~~~.Dlschs'll"ofOr~ma"Inlo: (I) IIO..ted
w.ters••!raIms where the annu.1
.verage Row I. 1 cubic foot per -..nd
or less. and non-tld.1 watland. edjacent
to heodw.ler .!raImo. for aggregate
minilll (I..... lind, gravel. and crushed
and broken stone) .nd lSIOCieted
.upport .ctlvlll..; (II) lower perennial
_m•• excludlntl wetl.nds adjacenllo
lower perennl.1 _ms. for aggregate
minilll activities (support ectivill.. In
lower perennial _ or edjacenl
wetlands .re _ .uthorized by thI.
NWPI; .ndlor (1II)lsoI.led w.ters .nd
non-tldsl wet"nda .djacentto
heodw.ter_. for herd rockf
mineral mlnllll actIvilles (I.•.•
extracllon of met.lllferou. ores from
tubsunsce locallons) .nd llsoc1at'"
.upport ectlvlll... provided tha
discharge meets the followllll criteria:
•. The mined _ within weters of
the UnIted Stales. plus the screege Ioat
of w.lers of the United Steles resullintl
from tupport.ctlvltles. cannot exceed
1hacre;
b. The permlllee must .vold and
minimi.. dischs'll" Inlo waters of the
United St.le••llhe project sit. to tha
meximum Illtent precticable••nd tha
_iflcatlon must include. wrI11en
.tatement detailing compll.nce with
thi. condition (I..... why the discharge
must occur In w.ters of the United
States .nd why .ddition.1 minlmi..tion
cennot ba achieved);
c. In addition to Gen.ral Condition.
17 .nd 20. activiU.. authorlz.d by this
permit must not subst.ntl.lly alt.r the
sedim.nl cherecterl.tlct of ...... of
concentrated .h.Ilf1.h bods or fish
spawning ....... Norm.lly. tha
m.ndated Wlter qu.lity m.nagement
pl.n .hould eddrass~ impacts;
d. The permillee must Implement
nec_ary mes.ures to preventlncreal8S
In _m gredlenland wlt.r velocltl..
and to prevenl adverse.treets (...g.. head
cultlng, bank eroslonlto upstream .nd
downstream channel conditions;
e. Activities .uthorlzed by this permit
must _ reauilin advorse elfscts on the
COIIIIIl. capacity. or condilion of
naviaabl. _ers of tha United SIIles;
f. 'fhe permill.. mual utilize meetures
10 mlnlml.. downstream turbidity;
g. Wetland Impact. mual be
compeDtaled through mitlg.llon
·ro.:o~:~c:r;;ml__1
proces.IIII for hard rockfmlneral mining
actIvltI.. m.y not occur within 200 feet
of the ordinary high waler mark of .ny
open weterbody. Although tha Corps
does _ resulat. discharges from these
ectlvllies•• Clesn W.ler Act Section 402
permit may be required:
l. All activities .uthorized by this
NWP mual comply with General
Conditions 9 and 21. Further. the
Di.trlct EngIneer may requln
modlflcallont to the requlnd WIler
qu.lity lIIIDIIlement plan to ensure thai
the .uthorized work result. In mlnim.1
.dv_.ffect. to water qu.llty;
j. Except for aggregat. mlnllll
ectlvitles In Iowar perennl.1 _s. DO
aggregate mlnllll con occur within
.traam beds where the .verag••nnu.1
Row Is grealer th.n 1 cubic foot per
second or In w.ters of tha United Stat.s
within 100 feet ofth. ordinary high
w.ter mark of headw.ter s!ralm
segment. where the .vorsge .nnu.1 Row
of the stream I. greater th.n 1 cubic foot
per second (aggregat. mlnllll can occur
In ..... Immodi.t.ly adjacent to the
ordinary high water merit of a .!raIm
where the averege ennu.1 Row Is 1
cubic fool per second or less);
k. Single and complel. project: The
discharge must be for • Ii......nd
complete project. Including support
activities. Dlschargea of drlldgod Of fill
m.leriallnto waters of tha United St.t••
for multiple mining ectivlli.. on IBveral
designaled percels of. single .nd
complete mining operation con be
authorized by this NWP proVided the 'I!I
acre limit I. not .xceeded: and
I. Notlflcolion: Th. permillee must
notify tha Di.trlct Engineer in
accordance with General Condition 13.
Th. notiflcetion must includ.: It I A
d.scription of waters of the United
Federal R."llister/Vol. 65. No. 47/Thunday. March 9. 2000/Nolices 1Z893 1Z894 Federal R.esl.ter/Vol. 65. No. 47/Tbund.y. M.rch 9. 20110/Nollc..
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o
Stat... ad_ly affected by th. project:
(2) A written .t.tement to the DI.trict
Engineer det.1Il118 compliance with
perosraph (h). above (I.e.• why the
dlscharp must occur In _ten of the
United Stet... and why .dditlonal
minimization cannot be achieved): (3) A
descriptIon of m_ures taken to ensure
that the proposed work compll... with
perosrapbt ic) throush (0••bov.: end (4)
A reclamation plen (For....te
mlnlll8 In Isoleled w.ten and __Udal
wetlends adjacent toh~enand
bard roc:kImlnerel mlnill8 only).
This NWP does not authorize bard
roc:kIml....1mlnill8. IncludllI8 placer
mlnlna.ln -..... No bard rocW
mlnerel mlni118 can occur In _ of
the Unlled States within 100 Feet of th.
ordinary hiBb weier nwIr. of head_ter
etreams.1'b8 term. "head_" .nd
"1soI.tad waten" ... defined .t 33 CFR
330.2(d) and (.). respactlvely. For the
plllp08lll ofthl. NWP.the term "lower
perennial stream" I. d.llned es follows:
"A _In wblcb the padlent Is low
and _ velocity is .Iow.there I. no
tldellnO_. some _ter Oows
iJuouabout the yeu••nd the substrate
consists mainly ofaand and mud."
(Section. 10.nd 404)
&:miwlde Permit GenenI
The fo0owill8 seneral conditions
must be followed In order for any
authorizatl!m by an NWP to be v.lld:
1~". No activity may cause
more • m nlmal advene.ffect on
n.vlgatlon.
~~~~mAny.tructure
or ..... • properly
malntelned. Includlll8 malnteDlnca to
ensure public .fety.
3. Soli Eroslon.nd Sadlmtmt
ControlS. Approprl8i. IOU erosion .nd
'ieiIliii8iit control. must be used and
malntelned In effective operetI"I
condition durl... construction. and .11
expoead 1011 and other fill•• III wall .s
.ny work below the ordinary hiBb water
m..... or hi'" tid. line. must be
permanenlly ...bllI..... st the nrlleIt
practicable dal•.
4. Aquaticu~~.No
actlvlly m.y lIilnnayrsrupt the
movemenl of lhoes spacies of aqu.tlc
life Indlpnou.lo the w.terbody.
Includlns~ .pecl which normally
mlgral.lhrousJlthe unl.. the
actlvlly·. primary purpoes Is to
impound weter. Culvert. pieced In
streams must be Insl.lled to m.lntain
low Oow conditions.
5. t;9ulpmenl. Heavy equipment
workJIIS in wetl.nds must be placed on
mats. or other measures must be taken
10 minimize soil dislurbance.
, Jlts,;pd Qat-Ry-CeU
!Conhdilion7 e actlvily mu.1 comply
wil .ny i1lglon.1 conditions which m.y
hev. been added by the division
....Ineer (sea 33 CFR 330.4(.)) .nd with
.ny case .peclfic conditions added by
the Corps or by the St.I. or tribe In Ita
Section 40t _ter qu.llty certlllcation
.nd Cosstal Zona Manapmenl Act
conslst.ncy determln.Uon.
7. Wild .tSgplc Riyen· No actlvlty
may occur n. componenl of the
N.llonal Wild and Scenic RI_ S,-tem;
or In • rI_ officially deslpaled by
Congraes III • "study rI_" for poaslbl.
Inclu.lon In the ')'IlaIII. whll.the rI_
iI In an official study .talus; un.... the
appropriate Federal apncy. with direct
manapmenl responsibility for such
rI_.bu determined In wrItI... thal the
proposed activity will not advarealy
affect tba Wild .nd Scenic RI_
desiBn"lon. or study stslUs. Informallon
on Wild .nd ScanIc Riven may be
obtained from the .pproprlat. Federal
land manapmenl.sencY In the_
(II" •• Natlon.1 P..... ServIce. U.S. Forest
Servlca, Bureau of Land Manapm.nl.
U.S. FI.h and Wildlife ServIce).
A. Tribal R1'hts. No activity or Ita
operation m.y Impair reserved tribal
rllIb'" Includlna. but notlimlled to.
reserved water ilsbts and treaty flshl...
.ndhUnU~I"
. W Iv (.)In cert.ln Slat...
•n1wefll... Individual 401 water
quality carlIllc!llon musl be obtslned or
w.lved (See 33 CFR 330.4(cJl.
(b) For NWP.12. 14. 17. 18.32.39.
40.42.43••nd 44. where the Stal. or
tribal 401 certilication 1.lther
pnerlcally or Individually) does not
require or .pprove • waler qu.llty
managamenl pi.... the permltt... must
Includ. dIlIlllO crlieria and lechnlqu...
thel will ensure that the .uthorlzed
wori< does not_ullin more than
minimal desradatlon of_ter qu.lity.
An Import.nl component of. w.ler
quality m...........t pl.nlncludes
stormwalar III8JI88lIIIIlIlthel mlnlmi...
degradation of the down.tream aquatic
.ystam.lncludill8 w." quality. Refer 10
General Condilion 21 for Ilorm_ar
m.napmenl requirements. Another
Important component of. weter qu.llty
managamenl plen lithe establilhmenl
and m.lnlen.nca of .....led bulfen
naxllo open weten.lncludins streams.
Refllr 10 General Condillon 19 for
.....Ied buffer requlremenl. for the
NWPs.
'O.Conta!~~l.ln
cert.ln .t.t....; tidJYUaSi8ie coasl.1
zone m.napmenl CODIlstency
concurrence must be obtained or waived
(see Section 330.4(dJl,
}1. End.!I8~s~. (.) No
activity is .ut~ztKhl;;er any NWP
which is likely 10 )eopardize the
conlinu.d .xisl.nca of. threalened or
end.nsered IpeeleS or a lpecles
proposed for such d.sisn.Uon. as
IdenUlied under the Federal End.npred
Species Act. or which will destroy or
.dversely modify th. critical hebilet of
.uch species. Non-federal permi"'"
.hall notify the District Ensln_ if .ny
listed specl... or desiBneled crllical
h.bll.1 miBbl be .ffacted or Is In th.
vlcinlly of the project. or 1.localed In
the daslpaled crlUcal habllat .nd .heil
not basin work on the activity unlll
notified by the DI.trIct EngI_ thelth.
requlrementa of the End.ngered Specl...
Act have been .U.lled .nd that the
actIvily I••uthorl...... For actlvlUes thel
m.y .lfect Federally·listed andanpred
or threatened .pacIes or design.ted
critical habilat. the notification mu.1
Includ.the nama(.) of the .ndanpred
or tbreetaned .pacles that may be
affectad by tha proposed work or thai
utill.th. d...lpated critical hebil.1
that may be .ffected by the proposed
work. As • _II of formal or Inform.1
consultation with the FWS or NMFS.
the District Engineer m.y .dd .pacI.s·
IpacIfic reslonal end.nsered spacles
condition. to th. NWP••
(h) Authorlzallon of .n actlvlly by •
nationwide permit does nol authorize
the "I.ke" of • threatened or end.npred
spacies III delined under the Federal
Endsnpred Spacies Act. In the .bsence
of aeperete .uthorlzaUon (•.S.• an ESA
Section 10 P.rmll•• 81010llIcai Opinion
with ..lncldent.II...... provl.lons. etc,)
from th. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
or the N.tlonsl Marlne Fisheries
Service. both lethal .nd non-leth.1
"lakes" of protected .pecies .re In
vlol.tlon olthe Endsripred Species Act,
Inform.Uon on lha location of
lhreetened .nd end.lI8ered specl...nd
th.1r critical h.bltal can be obtained
directly from the oIfI_ of the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service .nd N.tlon.1
Marine Fisheries Servlca or their world
wid. web paps .1
hllp:llwww.fws.p/rgendsppl
endspp.hlml .nd
hllp:1fwww.nfma.p/prot-Jlll/
esahome,blml. respectively.
!2. Hlllorlc Pnn!pr!!es No .ctivlty
which m.y .ffect historic properties
listed. or .lisible for listlns. in lhe
NsIIon.1 Reglsler of Historic Places Is
• uthorl...... unUllhe DE hes complied
wilh the provisions of 33 CFR part 325•
Appendix C. The prospective permill..
must notify the District Ensineer If Ihe
.ulhorized activity m.y .lfect .ny
hlsloric properties IIsled. d.lermined 10
be .liBibl•. or which the prospective
permllt.. h.s reason to believ. may be
ellsibl. for IIstinS on the N.tion.1
Resister of Historic P18CIlI••nd Ihall nol
belln the activity until notirJad by the
Di.trIct ElI8lneer th.lthe requlrem.nts
of lhe Nsllonal Historic Preservation Act
h.ve been satlslled and that the activity
I••uthorlzed. information ... the
location .nd exlstance of billoric
resouFClll can be obtained from the Stal.
Hi.loric Preserv.tlon Office .nd th.
Nation.1 Resister of HI.lorlc Pl8Clll (sea
33 CFR 330.41s1). For actIvll... that may
.ffect historic properti.. listed In. or
.liBlbl. for Iisti118 In. th. National
Regllter of Historic P18C1l1. tba
nolillcatlon must _ which historic
property may be .ffected by the
proposed work or Include. vicinity
map Indlcalill8the location of the
historic JII!IIl8r!Y.
l~ (.)TlmIn&:Wbera
requ' terms of the NWP. the
prospec:tlve permittee must notify the
DI.trlct Ensm- with • pnlCOIIItructlon
notlllcalion (PCN) u nrly •• poasIble.
The District Enslneer must determine If
the PCN I. complet. within 30 day. of
th. date of recalpt and can request the
additional Information IltIC8II8I}' to
m.ke the PCN complet. onI)' once.
However. If the prospec:tlve penaltt...
does not provIde.1I of the~Ied
Information. than the Dlstrlct EngIneer
will notify the prospective permittee
thelthe PCN Is stllllncomPJet••nd the
PCN revi_ JHOC8IS will not commance
unlil .11 of the requested Informetlon
hal been recalved by the District
Engineer. The prospective permltt...
shall not~n the activity:
(t) Until notified In wrftlnaby the
DI.trlct EnsJn_that th. activity may
proceed under the NWP with any
.pect.1 conditions Imposed by the
District or Division~In-:or
(2)11 notilled In wrI"lI8 by the District
or Division EngIneer that an Indlvldusl
permllil required: or
(3) Un.... 45 days have passed from
the District EngIneer'. recalpt of the
complet. notillcatlon and the
prospec:tlve permltt... has not rec:eIvad
written notice from the District or
DlvI.lon EngIneer. Subaequently. the
permittee'. ri8ht to proceed under th.
NWP m.y be modllled.suspended. or
revoked only In accordance with the
procedure set forth In 33 CFR
330.S(d)(2).
(h) Conlent. of Nollllc!llon: The
notillc!lion must be In wrltl... end
Include the foIlowt... Inform.tlon:
(1) Nsm•• address. and t.lephon.
numben of.the prospective permitt...;
(2) Locallon 01 tba IlIOPOIiId project:
(3) Brief description of the piopOsad
project: th. project•• purpoes: direct .nd
Indirect adverse environmenl.1 elfectl
the project would cause; .ny other
NWPI.). reslon.1 seneral permills). or
Indlvidu.1 permit(s) used or Int.nded to
be used 10 .utborlze .ny part of the
proposed project or .ny rel.led activity;
.nd
(4) For NWPs 7.12. t4. te. 21. 34. 38.
39.40.41.42••nd 43. the PCN musl
.110 Include. delineation of .ffacted
.pect.1 aquatic .11... Includlns
wetlends. vesetated sh.llows (11.1..
.ubmersed aqu.tlc .....tlon.......
bed.)••nd riffle .nd pool complex..
1_paragraph 13(01:
(5) For NWP 7. Outfall Structures .nd
Malnl_nca.the PCN must Includa
Information regardl... the orIBinal
deslllO capactlles and conlilUraliODl of
lhoes areas of tba facility wlMre
maintenance clradsllI8 or excavation Is
proposed.
(6) For NWP 14.U_
Transportallon Crossl..... tba PeN must
Include. compensatory mlUplion
propoeaIto offMt plII'l!ianenll_ of
weters of the Unlled Stalae and •
ststament daecrIbI... bow lamporary
I...... of_len ofth. Unlled 5_will
be mlnlml..... lo the maxlmum_
practicable.
(7) For NWP 21. Surface CosI Mini...
Aetlvll.... the PCN must Include en
0ft1ce ofSurfaca MIni... 108M) or .....
.W-ed mltlgatioll plen.
(8) For NWP 27. Stream and Wetland
Restoration. the PCN must Include
documentation of the prior condition of
the .11. thel will be reverted by the
perm"".(9) For NWP 29. SI......Family
HODIlns. the PCN must .110 Include:
(I) Anyr:st u..of thl. NWP by th.
Indlvldua permltt....ndlor the
permltt...•••pou..:
Iii) A stet.menl thai the .lnaJa-f.mily
bou.11I8 activity Is for • personal
resldance of the permltt...:
(III) A description of the entire parcel.
Includi118 Ita .Ize. and • dallneatlon of
wetlands. For tba purpoes of thl. NWP.
parcel. of lend mNOllrinB V. acre or1_
will not require • formal OII-Ilt.
dellneetlon. Ho_. tba .ppllcanl
sh.11 provld••n Indlcallon of where the
wetlends era and the amounl of
wetland. that exists on th. property. For
parcel. srealar th.n V. acre in .Ize••
formal _I.nd dellneallon must be
prepared In aa:ordance with tba currenl
inethod required by the Corps. (See
perosraph 13(1)):
(Iv) A written description of .11 land
(lncludl.... If .vail.bIe.1ega1
descriptionl) owned by the proapec:tIve
permll" end/or the prospective
permltt...•••pou". within. one mil.
radlu. of the parcel. In .ny form of
ownership lincludins .ny I.nd owned
••• partner. corporetion. Jolnll.nant.
co-Ienanl. or III • I.n.nl·by-th.....ntlrety)
.nd .ny I.nd on which. purchase .nd
sele agreemenl or other conlrect for .1.
or purchase h.1 been .xecuted:
(10) For NWP 31. M.lnlenance of
Exlstlns Flood Control Projects. the
prospective permill... must .Ither notify
th. District Eosin_ with • PCN prior
10 each m.lnl_nc••ctivlty or submit
• five y_ (or "'s) malnl.nance plen.
In .ddillon. the PCN mu.llnclude .11 of
the followlns:
(I) Sufficl8nl baseline Informallon 10
u 10 Idantlfy the approved ch.nnel
dapths and confiKureUon••nd exIst1...
facllilies. Minor aevl!llons ...
authorized. provided the .pproved flood
control protection or dralnaga I. not
Incraued;
(OJ A dallneatlon of any .ffected
speclel aquatic .It.... Includi118
wetlends; and.(lU) Location of the dredpd m.lerI.1
dl.posaI site.
(11) For NWP 33. Temporary
Construction. Accasa. and Dewaterl....
the PeN must .Iso Includ. a restoration
pl.n of..-ble_10.void
8nd mlnlmla advena .lfacta to aquatic
resources.
(12) For NWPs 39. 43••nd 44. the
PCN must also Includ•• written
stat_Ito lb. District EngI_
explelni...bow avold.nce UId
mlnlmlallon of losses of w.len of th.
United States were acbievad on the
project Ilta.
(13) For NWP 39. Resldenlial.
Commercial. and Institutional
Developmenll. and NWP 42.
Racreatlonal Facilll.... the PeN mu.1
Include. compensatory mitlptlon
propoeslthal olfsets unavoldsbl. losses
ofwalen of the United St.les or
)ustillcation axplslni118 why
compaIIAlory mitigation .hould not be
required.
(t4) For NWP 40. A¢culturel
Activities. the PCN musllnclud••
compansslory mlllgation propoasl to
oIfset ...... of_len of the United
St_.
(15) For NWP 43. Storm_Iar
M.napment Factlilies. the PeN must
Include. for lhe construction of new
stormwater manapmenl facllllles••
m.lntenance pl.n (In accordance with
SI.I. and local requirements. If
applicable) and • compensatory
mitigation propoesllo offset loases of
w.len of the Uniled SI.Ies.
(18) For NWP 44. Minlll8 Activities•
th. PCN must Includ•• description of
.11_... of the United Stal....d_ly
.ffected by the project•• description of
measures taken 10 minimize advarea
effect. 10 w.ten of lhe Unlled St.tes••
description of m_uresl.ken 10 comply
with th. crit.rI. of Ih. NWP••nd •
reel.m.llon plan (for assres.t. minill8
activities In Isol.led w.ten .nd non·
l4"'..""
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tidal _land. adjacent 10 headwsten
and ...y hard rocItIminenl mlnlns
actl"lli..l.
(171 For acliYllle. thst m.y.dversely
.ffect Fed_lIy-Ii.led endangered or
threslened .pecI.., the PCN must
Include the 118IIIII(.1 of those .ndangered
or threotened .pecI.. th.1 may be
.ffectad by the Juoposed work or utilize
the desf&nated crIl1cal beblt.t that m.y
be .rJacted by the proposed work.
(1t11 For actl"ltl.. thot may affect
historic propeI1l.. listed In, or eliJible
for Iistlnsln. the National Resi.ler of
HI.toric 1'Iaces, the PCN must stale
which historic property may be arJacted
by the proposed.work or Includ••
vicinity map Indlcatlllfl the location of
the historic property.
1191 For NWPa 12, 14. 29, 39, 40, 42.
43, .nd 44, w the proposed work
In""'_ diecba ofdredpd or fill
matarlallnto__ 01 the United Slates
resullinsln pwmanent. alJova.srade fill.
within 1011-yeu floodplain. (as
IdentiOed on J'EMA'. Flood Insurance
Rate Maps or J'EMA..pprovad lacsl
fIoodpl.ln mapsl, the notlRcatlon must
Include documentation demon-Ina
thet the proposed warl< complies with
the .ppraprtale FEMA or J'EMA-
apprOYedlocal Ooodpl.in con.truction
""",Iramenll.
(c) Form 01 Notlflcotlon: The standard
IndlYidual permit application form
(Form ENG 43451 m.y be used as the
nollRcetlon but must c1_ly Indicate
lbat It I•• PCN and mu.t Includ••11 of
the Information required In lbl (IHI9)
01 General Condition 13. A letter
contalnlna the ""!ul.lt. Inform.tlon
may elso be used,
(dl DlstrIcl ElIttineer'. DecI.lon: In
....Iewlng the PCN for the proposed
acli"lty. ilia District Enalneer will
determine whether the acti"lty
• uthorit.ed by the NWP will result In
more than mlnbllllllndlYidu.1 or
cumul..l..edverse envIronment.1
effects or m.y be contrary to the public
Inlerest. The prospectl.. perm,".. may.
optionally••ubmlt a proposed
mltlptlon pl.n with the PCN to
expedlta the process .nd the District
Enalneer will con.lder any proposed
compensatory mitlptlon the .ppllcant
be. Included In the proposel In
determlnlllfl whether the net ad.....
en"lronment.1 effects to the aquatic
en"lronment of the proposed work .re
minimal. If the District EnsJn_
determines thot the actlYlty complies
with the term. and condllion. of the
NWP .nd thet the .d".... effect. on th.
oquatic en"lronm.nl.re minimal, the
Di.trict EnJineer will notify the
permlltee .nd Include any condition.
the Dislrict Engineer deem. necessary.
Any compensatory mltlgalion
proposal must be approved by the
DI.trlct Engineer prior to commencing
work. If the prospective permittee I.
",,!uired to submit. compen..tory
mitigalion proposal with the PCN, the
proposal may be either conceptu.1 or
detailed. If the prospective permittee
elect. to submit. compen..lory
mltlgalion pl.n with the PCN. the
DI.trIct Engln_ will expedltlou.ly
re"lew the proposed compen..tory
mltlg"lon plan. The District Engineer
must ....Iew the plan within 45 days of
recel"lns. complete PCN and
determine whether the conceptual or
speclOc proposed mltlptlon would
en.ure no IIIOnt then mlnlm.1 ad"....
effect. on the aqustlc enYlronment. If
the net adverse effects of the proJect on
the oqustlc enYlronment (.lIer
COIlJI~IOII01 the compenaatory
mitigation propoaall_ datermln8d by
the 0istrIct EnaI- to be minimal. the
DIstrict Engineer will provide. timely
written responae to the applicant statlns
thet the proJect can proceed under the
tarm. end conditions 01 the IIlltionwid.
\Nlf!1Iit.
If the DistrIct EntIn- datMmlnes
thot the ad..... eIfilcts 01 the I'fOlIOI8d
work ... more than minimal. then he
will notify the applicant either: (II Thet
the proJect does nol qualify for
authorizetion under the NWP .nd
inatruct the .ppllcant on the procedures
10 seek .uthorizatlon under en
Indl"ldual permit; (2) that the project I.
.uthorized under the NWP subject 10
the applicant'. lubtnlaslon of.
mitigation proposal th.. would reduce
the ad_ affects on the oqu.t1c
en"lronment to lhe minimal 1...1; or (31
th.. the project I. authorit.ed under the
NWP with .peclftc modification. or
conditions. Where the District EnsJneer
determines thet mitigation I. ",,!ulred In
order to en.ure no more then minimal
ad_ effect. on the aquatic
envlronm.nt. the actl"lty will be
•uthorlsed within the 45-day PCN
period, Includina the necessary
conceptual or .pectflc mitigation or •
",,!ulrement thet the .pplicanlsubtnlt •
mitigation proposel th.. would reduce
the .dvenoi effects on the aquatic
en"lronment to the mlnim.1 1...1.
When conceptu.1 mitigation I.
included, or • mitigation pl.n Is
",,!ulred under item (2) above. no worl<
In wsten of the United St.tes will occur
until the District EnsJneer baa .pproved
• specific mltiptlon plen.
(el Ageney Coordination: The Dislrlct
Ensineer will con.lder eny comm.nt.
froin Federal and Stat. apncles
concerning the propoaed acti"ity·.
compliance with the terms and
condition. of the NWP. and the need for
mitigation 10 reduce the project'.
.d".... effect. on the .quatic
.n"lronment to • mlnimall..el.
For acti"ltIes ",,!uirlng notification to
Ihe DI.trlct EnJineer that re.ult In the
loss ofgre.ter than 'I. ecre of wat.rs of
the United States. the Di.trict Engineer
will, upon receipt of. nolillcation,
provide Immediat.ly (e.g., "ia facsimll.
Iron.mlnlon, overnight mill. or other
expeditlou. mannerl•• copy 10 the
.ppropriat. offices of the Fi.h .nd
Wildllf. Service. State nalural resource
or _er quality &goney. EPA. State
Historic Preservation OfIlcer (SHPOI.
and. If approprlst., the Natlon.1 Morine
Fisherie. Service. With the exception of
NWP 37. tbeseapncl.. will then beve
10 calender days &om the d.te the
material I. transmitted to talephone or
fax the District Enalneer notice th.t they
Intend to provide substantive, .It..
specific comments. Ifso contacted by an
apncy, the DI.trlct E.'llineer will walt
.n additional 15 calender day. before
m.king a decl.lon on the notification.
The DI.trlct EnsJ- will fully con.lder
agoney comment. received within the
.peclOed Ibne fram., but wlli provide
no ""'JlO'I8O to the resource .geney,
except • provided below. The District
Enaineer will indicete In the
admlni.trative record ••socl.ted with
each notiOcatlon thet the resource
agencies' concerna were con.ldered. A.
",,!ulred by Section 305lbIl4KB) of the
Magnuson-Sleven. Fi.hery
eon......tlon and Manapm.nt Act. the
District Ensm- will pro"lde a
responae to National Marin. Flsherl..
Service within 30 day. of receipt or any
Esaenti.1 FI.h Habl..1co tion
recommend.tlona. Applicant ..
encouraged to provide the eo.,..
mU~tie copies of notlOcatlon. to
ex Ite agen notification.
oWetland~ineatlOO8: Wetland
dellneatlOO8 must be prepared in
accordance with the current method
""",Ired by the Corps. For NWP 29 see
paragraph lbK9J(1II1 for percell les. then
'I_ acre In .ize. The permltlee m.y ••1<
the Corps to delineete the .peclal
oquatic site. There m.y be some del.y
If the Corps does the delineation.
Furthermore, the 45-<1.y period will not
start until the _land delineation h..
been completed .nd .ubmltted to the
Corps, w1iere .pp~et •.
14 .r.pmpt'f: P:llon. E"ery
permittee W IS hK:e1. •
Nationwid. permit "erification from the
Corps will.ubmil ••Igned certification
regarding Ihe compl.ted work and .ny
required mitigalion. The certification
will be forw.rded by the Corps with the
aUlhorizelion letter. Th. certification
will Includ.: (a) A .Iat.m.nl that the
authorized work was done in
accordance with the Corps
.uthorlzetion, Including any general or
.peclftc condition.; lb) A st"ement Ih.t
.ny required mitlaatlon was compleled
In accord.nce witA the permit
conditions; .nd (cl The .Ignature or the
permittee certifying the completion of
the work .nd mlt~tlon.
15 .UM;tfMuIL'~,
e-iIl, e uae a more an one NWP
J'Cit"iIrnsle and complale project i.
prohibited. except when the acreage loss
or w.ters of the United 51....
.uthorlzed by the NWPa does not
exceed the acreage limit of the NWP
with the highest apeclfted acreage limit.
For example, If a ioacI crossllll over
tid.1 wa_11 constructed under NWP
14. with associated bank stabilization
.uthorlzed by NWP 13. the maximum
acreega 1018 of_lars of the United
St.... for the total project cannot exceed
'h acre.
'l!'l."orSupplY~. No activity.
Inc u ins structures an work In
na"igabl. waten of the United Stal.. or
discli.... ofdredpd or 011 material.
m.y OCCUr In the proxbnlty of a public
water suPI'IY Intake except wh... the
activity I. fOr repelr or the public w.ter
supply int.ke structures or adjacent
benk stabillzal\on.
¥,,];hellr.... !leclI. No activity.
inc u ins .tructures and work In
1IlI"lgabl. w.ten ofthe United St.t.. or
dlachatps of dredged or 1111 m..erI.l.
may occur In ..... ofconcentrated
sh.1I0.h populatlOO8, unless the activity
I. directly rel.ted to a shellOsh
harvestillfl actiYlty authorized by NWP
4.
.9t:j;ultt!dtMetsIe!. No acliYlty.
I ins structures .nd work In
na"lgable -en 01 the United States or
dlachatps 01dredged or 011 materiel.
may consist or unaullable material (e.g..
trash. debrl., car bodies. asph.lI. etc.1
and matarlal used for construction or
dischargad must be free from toxic
poIlu"nt. In toxic _nt. (_ Sec:tlon
307 01 the Clean W.ter Actl.
'r:sI~LThe project must bed8l~r~iiItruCtedto avoid and
minimize ad".... effect. to w.ters or
the United States to the maximum
extant precticable .t the project .lte (I.•.•
on .it.l. Mitlgalion will be """,ired
when necasaery to en.ure thet the
ed_effect. to the aqu.tlc
en"lronment are minimal. The District
Enaineer will consider the factors
dlscuased below when determining the
acceptabilily of .ppropriate and
precticable mitigation necesaery to
off.et adve... effect. on the oqu.tlc
environment that are more than
minimal.
lal Compen.atory mitlg.lion .t a
minimum 1:1 raUo will be required for
a11_I.nd Impacts requirlnsa PCN.
Consistent with N.tlon.1 poliey. the
Di.trlct Ensin_ will establi.h •
preferenca for restoralion 01 wetl.nd. to
meet the minimum compen..tory
millg.tlon ratio. with preserv.tlon uaed
on!y In exceptional circumstances.
Ibl To be prectlcable, the mltlg.tlon
must be ."ail.bl••nd capeble of belna
done con.ldarl~costs, exlsth,.
lachnology••nd logistics In Iigbt 01 the
overall project purposes. Examples of
mitigation lbat may be .pproprlata and
prectlcablelnclude. but ... not limited
to: reducins the .Ize 01 the project;
establishina and main"lnllII -'and or
upland .......ed buffers to protect open
waters sueD •••treama; and repleclns
'-01 aquatic resource functions end
values by creatlns, _torIlII, enhenclng,
or preaerYllII .imilar functions end
vafues. preferably In the_
watershild;
(cl The DlstrIcl EnaI- will """,Ire
restoration. creation. enhancement, or
r,reservatlon of other aquatic _rcesn order to otraet the authorlt.ed Impacts
to the extent -..ry to ensure th8t
the adverse affects on the aquatlc
environment ... mlnbnal. An Imporlant
element of any compenllltory mltlptlon
plan for projecta In or _ -.os or
other open _en I. the establi.hment
and maintenance. 10 the maximum
extent prectlcabl•• oI.......ed buffera
next to open _ten on the project lit•.
The "llllaleted buffer .hould cOnalst or
n"I"••pecles. Th. District EnsJneer
will d_11IlI the .pproprIst. width 01
the vegetated bulTer and In which C8I8I
It will be """,Ired. Normally. the
vegetated buffer will be 25 to 50 feel
wide on each .Ida or the strosm, but the
District EosIneer m.y require wider
veget.led buffers to addnu
documented w"er quality concems.lf
there ... open _en on the project .it.
and the District Enll_ requires
compenaetory mltlpl\on for _land
Impact. to ensure thot the net ad.....
affects on the oquotlc enYlronment ...
mlnlm.I, .ny .......ed buffer will
comprlae no more than 'h of the
remalnina compentatory mltlg"lon
acreage .fter the perm~,.filled
_lends beve bOen repIeced on • 0 ....
to-one acreage bul•. In .ddltlon,
compeo..tory miligatlon must addnu
.d..... effect. on wetland functions
and "alu.. and cannol be usad to 01Taet
the acreage of _land losses that would
occur in order to meet the acreage Iimlta
of some of the NWP. (e.,.. for NWP 39.
v_ acre or welIand. cannot be created to
changa a 'I. acre los. of_I.nd. to a
v_ acre los.; however, 'I. acre of created
wetl.nd. can be used to reduce the
Impacts of I '/1 acre 10•• of wetland.l.
Ifth. prospectl". permittee I. ",,!ulred
to .ubmlt a compen.alory mitigation
proposal with the PCN. the proposal
m.! be either conceptual or d.lailed.
lal To the exl.nt .pproprl.le.
permiltee••hould con.ider mltigltion
bonklns.nd other .pproprl.te form. of
compen..lory mitigation. If the DI.trlct
Ensineer determines thet compensatory
mltlg"ion Is nec....ry to olTaet los... of
w.len of the United Stat...nd en.ure
thet the net .d..... effects 01 the
authorlt.ed work on the aquatic
en"lronment ... minimal. consolidated
mitigation approaches, such ..
milig.tlon baD.... will be the preferred
method of proYldlna compensatory
mltlgal\on. unless the District EosIneer
determines that actlYlty..peclOc
compenaalory millgatlon I. more
.~ta.baaed on which I. best for
tli8 oqu..1c en"lronment. Theae types of
mitigation ... preferred becau. they
Involvaiargar blocIt. of protacted
aquallc enYlronment.... more likely to
meet the mltiptlon goal•••nd ... more
ea.ily cbeclted for compli.nce. If •
mitlg.tlon bank or other consolldsted
miligalion .pproach I. not available In
the walershed. the District Enalneer will
consider other appropriate forms of
compensatory mitigation to oITaet the
10180Iof_of the United States to
en.u.. th.. the nat ad_ effect. of the
.uthorIzed warl< on the aqu.tlc
en"ironment IIDl minimal.!et"'*'A..... Acti"ltles,
Inc u ina structures .nd work In
navigable _tars or the United Stiles or
diacba of dredpd or 011 matarl.l. In
spawnlna durins spawnins
_sons must be avoided to the
maximum extent prectlcable. Actl"lties
that result In the physical destruction
(•.g.• excev.ta. nil, or II1IOIher
downstream by substantl.1 turbidity) of
.n imparl.nt lpawning .....re not
authorlt.ed.
21.Me"'M',gfW.ter Rr:fi:°
the maxbnum extent practlca •
acli"lty mu.t be designed to m.lntaln
preconstructIon downstrosm Dow
condition. (...,.. location, capaclly. and
Dow retesl. Furthermore. the actl"lty
must nol permanently restrict or Imped.
the pa.saga or normal or expected high
Dowe lunI_ the prlm.ry purpose of the
011 I. to Impound watenl.nd the
structure or dlacbarg. of dredged or 011
m.terial must withstand expected high
Oowe. Th. acti"lty must. to the
maximum extent practlcabl., pro"ide
for ret.lning excesa Dow. from the .il.,
pro"ld. for mainlaining .urface Dow
rete. from the .it••imilar to
preconstruction conditions. and must
not increase water Dows from the
projecl .11., relocate water, or redirecl
water now beyond preconstruction
condition•. In addition. th••ctivity
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musl. 10 the m.,.lmum extent
practicable. reduce ad_ effec:ta luch
• s OoodlllJ or erosion down_m .nd
upstream of the project site. unless the
activity II put ot. lorpr syslem
designed 10 manop w.ler Oows.
22. Ad..... Elfacts F;re
ImPOundmenls. It lbe8CiYlty. IncludlllJ
IInJctures .iKI work In nevlpble _era
of the Unlled Stales or dlsch..... of
dredpd or fill materbll. creates an
Impoundmenl ofwaler. ad....... effec:ta
on the aqual1e tyItem caused by the
accelerated ......of_andlor the
Nllrictlon of its Dow ohall be
mlnlml_lo the moxbnume_
practicable.
23 Wat~ II.Ar.a.Actfri~ IlrUcI_ .nd
work In ",vlpbIe _ of the Unlled
Slales or dlscluqes of drecJ&ed or fill
material. Into bni8dlllJ ..... for
migratory waterfowl muet be .volded 10
the IIIIXlmum_I practicable.
241~'pfI~,.ltny
lemporary s must n \beIr
enllrely and the .lfacted ..... _ed
10 their pnoexIstl... eleY.llon.
25.~QjUg! Reegprs;pl!IIIIi Iesource waters Include.
NOM.:eteaJsneted marine sanctuules.
National EstuarIne ResMn:h~.
National Wild and Scenic R1....
a1llce1hab1tal for F......II' lIoted
th...1ened and enda"lDl'ad species.
coral ...r.. State natural herillJlD sites.
and outstandl... notional resoUreD
walers or o\ber walers omdally
deslp.lad by a stete as ....1...
particular environmental or _'OSlcal
IIBniBCIIIlCe and ldentlfiad by the
District Enai- after notice end
oppol1Unl\y for public COIftlMIIt. !be
District Enai- may.1so deslgllClle
addltlonsl a1Ucal resource _en .fter
notice end opportunity for comment.
1.1 Except .. noted below. dlscherpa
pf drecJ&ed or fill malerlallnlo wal... of
the Unlled SIal.. _ not authorized by
NWPI 7. 12. 14. 18. 11.21.29.31.35.
39, 40. 42. 43. end 44 for anyactl1,i1y
wllbln. or dlractly .lfactl.... a111ce1
-.reawaters. IncludIJlll-'.ndl
adjllcanl to aueh _ .... Dischuaes of
dtadpd or ml malerl.11 Inlo waten of
the United stem may be .uthorizedby
the eboYe NWPa In N.11ona1 Wild end
Scenic R1... If the activity complies
with General Condillon 7. Further. luch
discherpa m.y be llIIhorIzlId In
deslBJlaled a1Ug! hebllal for Federolly
listed lhrMtenad or end-.ed apocles
If the actlrity compllea wlil. General
Condition 11 .nd the U.S. FIsh end
Wildlife ServIce or the Notional Merlne
F1lhules SerYice h.1 concurred In a
determination of compliance wllh thll
condillon.
(hI For NWPa 3. 8. 10. 13. 15. 18. 19.
22.23.25.27.28,30.33,34.311.37. and
311. notification II required In
occordance with General Condition 13.
for .ny actlYity propoaed In the
deslgn.l.d crlUcal resource wllers
Includi",_I.ndl adjocenllO thooe
w.I.... !be District Enatn- may
.uthorIze activities under th... NWPI
only .ftar he determines thet the
Impacta to the a1tlcal resource walers
will be no mont then minimal.
28. Finl "1~fgo.yegr~inI.
For purpoaes I........ .1 on.
l00-yoor Roodpl.lna will be Identified
tJuoush the Federal~
Manopment ltpncy'11FEMA1 f100d
lnaurance RaI. Mop; or FEMlt-spprovad
local Roodplaln mopo.
la) Diacmu- Below HeadwoIera.
Dloche...ofdredpd or fill moterIeI
1010 waters of the United St_
reaulUna In pennonenl. olJove.tred. filii
within the l00-yoor Ooodplaln .1 or
below the polnl on. _ w..... the
....... annual Row hfive cubic feet
per.-ad (I.e.• below headwatersl_
not .uthorl_ by NWPs 29. 39. 40. 42.
43••nd 44. For NWPa t2 ond 14. tho
proapectIve perml_ muet notify lhe
biltilct EngI_1n occordanc:e with
Generol Condition 13 end the
notlficaUon must Include
documonloUon thot ony pennonent,
.bov........ Dillin _ ... ofthe Unlled
Sial.. within the l00-yeor Ooodpl.ln
below heodwaten comply with !'EMIt
or FEMlt-spproved toeal Roodpl.ln
conotrucllon nqulremenll.
(hI Diacho,.,... In Headrwlten (I.....
.hove the poInl on • _81 where the
.vonp onnuel Row Ia Ove cubic feet
\lD!"_dl.
111 flood Ftf,.,... DIsche,.,... ofdrecJ&ed or fill materbllinlo _ of
th. United SIales resulllJlllln
~I, alJove.trode filii within the
Rood &I. of tho l00-yoor ftoodpl.ln of
heed_ers ore not .uthorlzed bY NWPI
12. 14. 29. 39.40.42.43. end 44. unleal
the prospecIlve perml«.. notifies the
District Enat_ln occord.nee wllh
Canenl Condition 13. !be notlficallon
must Includ. documenlallon thot such
dloche... comply with FEMlt or
FEMlt-spproved local Roodplaln
conllructlon nqulromanll.
(21 fIood_y. Disch...ofdredSed
or nil _erl.llolo watara oflha United
stetea resulll",1n permonent••bove-
IJhIde filii within the Roodway of the
l00-yoor Ooodpl.ln of heed_......
nOl .uthorized by NWPI 29. 39. 40. 42.
43••nd 44. For NWPI 12 .nd 14. the
permllt..must notify the District
E",ineer In occord.nee with General
Condition 13 and the notillcotion mUll
Include documenlallon thel .ny
perm.nenl••bove pde filii proposed
In the Roodwoy comply with FEMIt or
FEMlt-spproved local Ooodpl.ln
conltructlon requlremanll.
D. Further Inrormatlon
1. District .",Inears h.ve authority 10
determine Ifon activity compli.. with
the _.nd conditlonl of.n NWP.
2, NWPa do not obvI.le the need 10
obI.ln other Feder.l. SI.le. or local
permill••pprov.ll. or .uthorl..tioDl
required by low.
3. NWPa do not IJhInl ony property
rlpll or excIualve prtYl......
4. NWPa do not .uthorlze eny Injury
to the property or rlpll of others.
5. NWP' do not .uthorlze Inlerference
with any exlsU", or proposed Fedenl
prolact.
E, Ppftpl!lont
Bptmgnq=t,,:BesI
Manopment iC8lI Pil ...
polides. pnctIces. proced_. or
_Implomonted 10 mlllllll. the
ad..... environmental effec:ta on
surfece waler qu.llly reaulll", &om
deYelopment. BMPI ore calegorlzed .1
IInIc\UI'II or non-ltruclural. A BMP
polI~~lfact the Iimlll on.
deYe .
Compen~ml!l~Ihm; For
purpoaes 0 Ion 1 404.
companaolory millgotlon I. the
restorollon. creotion. onhencem.nl, or In
exceptional c1rcumltances. preserv.llon
or wetlendl .ndlor other oqullic
..sources for tha purpose of
compensotlJlll for unavoldoble .dverse
Impacta which rem.ln .fter .11
approprl.te and proctlcsble .vold.nee
end mlnlmlzoUon hu been ochleved.
,CmI1JmJ; The est.blilhment of.
_hiiid"Oi'other aquaUc resource whe..
one did not formerIyexlsl.
f."f.:lI9!jEnt: Activities conducted In
ex sl "I _ .ndo or other oqu.Uc
..soureea which Increase on. or moro
oqullic functlona.
Eph..f!ftIltreom: An ephemer.1
_81~OWIns waleronly durl",.
end for • abort durstlon eller,
prodpll.tlon evenll In • typical yeor.
Ephomerel _81 bedl _Iocaled
.hove the Wiler I.ble year-round.
Groundwllerll not • lOUreD of w.ler for
the1_. Runoll from rolnr.1I II the
prlmory aouree of w.ler for1_Dow.!r:" !nJct: A unll of contilJUOUS I.nd
un one ownership which is oper.led
... farm or pert of. rum.
Fl~P.f.:Thel portion of lhe 1110-
,..rpai11 outsld.. of the RoodWlY
(often teferred 10 eo "Roodway mnse."
~The.... "'BulalM by
F,,;re;:;[Ii8je. or local requi..menlllo
provld. for the dlsch.'Se of the hese
flood 10 the cumulative increase in
water surface elevation is no more than
• des\BJIIted omOURt1-10 exceed one
root .1 lei by the NoUonsl Flood
Inluronce Propam) within the l00-yeor
Roodl,'·In.
In IMmlee' u!ilJlv: A lest 10
del.ntIIII8W al constllules • alJIlIle .nd
complet. project In the Corps nlIJUlatory
r,rosrom. A project II conaldered 10 h.vendopendenl ullllly If II would be
conIInJcted ebeonl the conatruclion of
other projectl In the project .....
PortIoDl of. mulU-phase prolact th.1
depend upon other pheoes of the project
do not have IndepoDdent utility. Pba....
of. project \hot would be_ad
even If the other pbooeo _ not buill can
be conalderod as llpont. allIlIIe.nd
complete projecta with Independent
utility.
'~:An Intermittent1tre87 Ji8W8t.durlnl certain
times of the yoor. when pound_er
I!roYIdes waler for _ Row. DurlJIlI
dry perIodl, Intormlttenl_ma may
not hove OowlJlll water. Runolf from
roinlellil • lupPIemonlal lOUreD of
w.ler for1_Row.
Ipg~~~Unlte~:Waten unit Shit.. liltude
the filled ""'" .nd other _ thet _
perm_ly ..........Iy .lfacted by
fioodlJlll. IXClIvotIon. or drolnlJlD...
result pf tho nlIJUlated actIYlty.
Pcmnanenl .d....... effec:ta Includo
perm.nenl .bove-ttrode. a11lfldo. or
below"lJhlde 1lI11 tLot cheJlll8 an oqu.lic
.... 10 dry I.nd, Incre... the bottOm
e1evotlon of. _erbody. or chanse the
use of. walerbody. !be--sa of Ion
of Wllers of the Unlled Slales 1. tho
threshold moasu.........1of the Impact 10
exlstlns _ ... for delermlnlna wl>ether
• project moy qualify for on NWP: It II
not • net threshold ibot Ia calculated
.lIer COftIlderiJlll compenaolory
mltlptlon th.t moy be used 10 olfoot
I...... ofoquolic functlona and valuel.
!be Ion of_81 bed Includes th.
IIneor feet of _ bod thel II filled or
IXClIvoted. W.len or tho United Stam
lemponrlly Riled. Rooded. excaveled.
or drolned. bul restored 10
p..-nllrUcllon conloura end elevollonl
.fter conllrUcllon. ere not Included In
the81_1pflon of walera ofth.
United 51.1...
~ddl_~:A non-tldol
wfJt 1:.wet (I.e•• • water or the
United Staml thot h not aubject 10 the
ebb and Row oflidoI w.l.... !be
definillon of a _I.nd can be found .1
33 CFR 328.3(b). Non-tld.I_I.ndl
contlguoullo Udol walara _Iocaled
I.ndword of the hlp tide line (i..... the
Iprlns hlp tld.linel.
Openlb_ter: An .... thel. durlJlll.
year WI normol patternl of
preclpll.tlon. h.. II.ndins or Rowins
wiler for sufficienl durotlon 10 esl.bUlh
.n ordinary hlp w.ler mon. AqUollc
VIJlDIation wltliln the ._of ...ndins or
Rowl", w.ler Is eilher lIOIHmerpnl•
sperae. or .boont. Veptatad ohallO__
conlldered 10 be open_. !be term
"open w.ler" Includes rivers. Itrooml,
laba. end pondl. For the purposel or
the NWPa. this term does not Include
ephemeral waters.
~nnial_m:A penmnlall_hu~wlJlllwaiery_und durl",.
typical yeor. !be w.ler table h localed
oliOve the -... bod for moat of tho
yoor. Groundw.ler II the prtlllar)' aouree
of water for IIreom Row. Runolf from
..Inlellil ••upplemontal aouree of
weier for _ Row.
dl!E':::i~P:~llnlo
wolara of the Unlled St.les. Inciudinll
wetJanda. thel resulte In • auhslonllaf
IlICI'HIIln pound elevollou .nd
permonenlly converll port or.1I ofthe
_erbody 10 dry I.nd. Structurol Blls
authorized by NWPI 3. 25. 311. etc. ere
not Included.
~!be protactlon ofcarporIont _lando or other
oqu.Uc resourcea In perpetully tJuoush
the Implemontallon of .pproprIate lejaJ
.nd phyticol mechenlsma. PreservaUon
moy Include protactlon of upland ....1
.djacont 10 _I.nds .1 _sory to
enlu" proIactlon .ndlor enhellCllllenl
of the overall aquollc ecoaystem.
RestOlUtIon: R.-tablialimenl of
_I.nd .nCllor other aquatic resource
characterillico ond functlon!l) at • alte
where they he.. ceooed 10 exist. or exist
In • lubst8nUaIly' d"lfl4ed iloilO.
!fm"D~1 com~: Rime endpOD camp ;;.........uatle lit..
under the 404(hKl) Culdollneo. Steep
IJhIdlent oaetIona of _ ....
_(mea chereclerlzed by rime end
pool complexes. Such _81 ooctlonl
ere'-'BJIlzobia by \bell b)'droulic
characterlsl1ea. !be ropld movemenl of
waler over • COlI.... subotrote In rim..
reaulllin • fIJUBh now•• turbulent
.urfece. end hlp dlllOlved oxypn
Ievo.. In the water. Pooh ere _per
..... usocl.led with rimes. Poollore
cheracterlzed by. Ilower_
veloclly•• Itrooml"ll Row•• Imooth
surface••nd. Rner lubstrote.
Slnft~cpm~et..D~:!be term
"110& i Comp~.piOj8CFII deftned
01 33 CFR 330.2111 .. the-. project
propoaed or occompilibed by one
ownerfdeYeloper or pertnerahlp or other
..socillion ofowneraIdoveIopen1-
dof'millon or Independent utllilyl. For
llneor proJecta. thiI"llnsIe ond complete
prolact•• (i...... Iinsle and complete
crossing) will .pply 10 _h crosalJlll or
...porole Wiler or the Unlled 51.1.. (i.....
• Iinsle w.lerbodyl.llhellocallon. An
.xceplion is for lin... projects crosslns
• Iinsl. walerbody _rollimes .1
oeper.le .nd dlltanllocatlons: _h
croal",11 considered. slnale .nd
complete prolact' However. Indlvldu.1
ch.nuell In • br.lded Itroom or river. or
Indlvldu.lerml of. 1IItgCI, il'l8lJUl.rly-
Ih.ped _llud or lalt•• etc.• _ nol
oeporst. w.lerbodl...
SIonn!'l!!n :'ffie"'i::lrnl:Slormw.ler
m.nopm.nl I mac anllm for
controlliJlll stormwaler runoll for tho
pwpoool ofredudna downotream
.....Ion. _erqu.llty d....doUon••nd
Roodlna end mltlgatiJlll the ad_
elfactl of cheJllIes In land use on the
oqUollc onvlronment.
S!l!!mt!pt!tmol!l!l!!me9!11!1ea:
Storm...JIWlII8IDent 4i.. are
tbooo focIlillea. Includlns but not
limited 10. ltormwaler retenUon ond
delenlion pondo .nd BMP.. which
..loin _ for. period ofUmo 10
mnlral runolf andfor Improve the
quality (I.....by redudJlll the
concentrotlon of nUlrlanll. aedlmenll.
hazardous luhstancea end other
pollutantal of Itormwaler runoff.
~:!be substrata of the
atIiiiiiiCIiiiil between the ordlnory
hlp water morb. !be lubllrale moy be
bedrock or lnorpnic partlc'" thel roJlll8
In II... from cloy 10 boulders. Wetlands
contllJUOUI to the _ bod, bul
oulIIde of the ordinary high water
morb. ere not conlldered put of the
_bed.
Streo ~!f'lizGtion.!be
m.liipu'fhiiio7lin......chonnello
IIICI'HII the rote pf w.ler Row throup
tho Itroom chonnel. Manlpulalion m.y
Include deepentns. wldeni",.
Ilrolghlenl.... umDrlns. or other
actIvlllea th8t chanse the _ crosl-
ooctIon or other aspectl of_m
chennel pomotry 10 lftC""'se the role of
wiler Row throup the _81 chann.l.
A channelized _ remelna • w.ler
of the United SI.les, despite the
modlRcationl to Increooe the rol. of
_erOow.
~-Iand:AIid.I_lend Is.
_ ..(I...... WIler ofthe United
Slalesl tholla Inundoted by tidol Wlten.
!be deIlnlUona or. -'end end IId.1
wll... can bo found .1 33 CFR 32\1.3(h1
end 33 CFR 3211.3(0. resJ*:lively. Tld.1
waters rill end leilin • predlct.ble .od
_roble rhythm or cycle due 10 the
IJhIYlI.Uonol pulls of lhe moon .nd sun.
Tidal waten end where the rise .nd f.1I
of the waler aurfoce can no lonpr bo
practicolly measured In • predict.ble
rhythm due 10 mosltina by other w.I....
wind. or other eRacta. Tld.1 wetl.nds
.re localed chann..lword of tha hlSh lide
line (i..... sprins high IIde Iinel.nd ere
Inund.led by Iid.1 w.lers two limes per
luner month. durins sprinS high lid.s,
l, .. __ L"H'~ L L,,_ ' L_b" l~_ l~.~_. L-. l.~"..~ l~~ L_,,,~~ l_ .."c" L l._.,. L_MOO L_~ L..., L. l ..,,_
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V:::;r:'ed buffW A vegetaled upland
or wet darea next to riven. strams.
lakes.... other open walers which
oeparales the open waler &om
developed areas. Includins asrlculturel
land. Vegetaled buffers provide a vulely
ofaquetic hebltal functiona end values
''''B.. aquallc habnal for /ish end other
aquatic orpnlsms. mod....11on or waler
temperature chenges. end delritus for
aquatic food wabe) and help Improve ...
maintain local watar quelity. A
vegeteted buffer ceo be established by
maintaining an exlatlng vegeteted areaor..=ns native_. ahrubs. and
h us plants on lend next to open
walers. Mowed lawns are not
considared V"B"lated buffers because
they provide lillIe ... no aquallc habitat
functions and values. The eslablishment
and mainlenance of veselaled buffers Is
a method of compensalory mltisallon
tbeI can be used in conjunction with the
reatoration. crealion. enhancemenl. or
preaarvation ofaquatic hebltats 10
ensure thai activities authorized by
NWPI mullin minimal advarse effects
to tha aquallc envlronmenl. (See
General Condilion 19.)
!l"""'P!!!d ebglIptrI. Vesatated
sh.iOWs are spacial aquatic siles under
tha 404(b)(t) Guidelines. They era areas
Ihal era permanenlly inundeled and
under normal circumstances have
rooted aquellc veselalion. such as
seagr81S8S in inarine and estuarine
syatems and a variely of vascular rooled
planls in freshwaler systems.
Wal,mody: A walerbody Is any area
thet in a normal year has waler Iiowins
or atandlns above sround 10 the extenl
thet evidence of on ordinary hiSh water
muk is established. Wellands
conllsuous 10 the walerbody era
considered put of the waterbody.
(Fa Doc. 00-5194 Flied :HHIO; 8;45 amI
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REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON PROPOSED REGIONAL CONDmONS
FOR NATIONWIDE PERMITS PROPOSED ON JULY 1, 1998
There are two types ofregional conditions: 401ICZM regional conditions and Corps regional
conditions. The 401/CZM regional conditions are developed by the State under Section 401 ofthe
CWA and the Section 307 of the Coastal Zone Management Act and become regional conditions to
NWPs. The 4011CZM regional conditions are added to the NWPs and announced by a District public
notice. The public does not have the opportunity to comment on 401lCZM regional conditions
through the Corps public notice process, but rather through the State process. Corps regional
conditions are proposed by the District Engineer for a 3o-day comment period and are reviewed and
approved by the Division Engineer. For more details on the regional conditioning process, please
refer to the July I, 1998, Federal Regjsternotice (63 FR 36048 - 36049).
In this public notice, the Louisville District is requesting comments on potential Corps regional
conditions that have been suggested by the public and listed in Enclosures 1 and 2. The Louisville
District is requesting comments as to which ofthese Corps regional conditions are necessary to
ensure that the proposed NWPs will authorize only those activities that have minimal adverse effects
on the aquatic environment, individually or cumulatively. The Division Engineer makes the final
detennination as to which Corps regional conditions are necessary to ensure that the NWPs will
authorize only those activities that result in minimal adverse environmental effects on the aquatic
environment. Additional Corps regional conditions that are not necessary to ensure that the NWPs
authorize only activities with minimal adverse effects will be considered by the Division Engineer,
but any Corps regional conditions adopted must: I) provide value added for the aquatic environment,
2) not be excessively burdensome on the regulated public, and 3) be able to be implemented by the
On July I, 1998, the Corps published its proposal to issue 6 new Nationwide Pennits (NWPs) and
modify 6 existing NWPs in Part nofthe Federal Register (63 FR 36040 - 36078). The Louisville
District issued a public notice in July, 1998, to solicit comments on the proposed new and modified
NWPs, as well as proposed Corps regional conditions, for a 30 day comment period. In that public
notice, the Louisville District requested comments and suggestions for additional Corps regional
conditions for the proposed new and modified NWPs to ensure that those NWPs authorize only those
activities with minimal adverse effects on the aquatic environment, individually or cumulatively. The
Louisville District also held a public meeting on August 20, 1998, to discuss the Corps regional
conditioning process for the proposed new and modified NWPs and receive suggestions for
additional Corps regional conditions.
The purpose ofNWP regional conditions is to ensure that the NWPs authorize only those activities
that result in minimal adverse effects on the aquatic environment, individually or cumulatively.
NWPs are developed at Corps Headquarters to authorize most activities that would result in minimal
adverse environmental effects on the aquatic environment. However, the Corps detennines whether
the minimal effects test is met from a watershed perspective, and whether regional conditions are
necessary to account for differences in aquatic resource functions and values across the country.
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Corps with resources available to the Corps.
When Corps regional conditions are approved by the Division Engineer, those regional conditions
will become effective when the new and modified NWPs become effective. Unless otherwise noted,
all proposed regional conditions listed in Enclosures I and 2 are applicable for activities in Indiana
and Kentucky, respectively. Comments on the proposed Corps regional conditions, as well as any
other suggested Corps regional conditions, should be submitted in writing to: Mr. James M.
Townsend at CELRL-OP-F, P.O. Box 59, Louisville, Kentucky 40201-0059. Comments are due by
November 6, 1998. Similar public notices proposing regional conditions in other regions or States are
being published concurrently by other Corps district offices.
The States are reviewing the NWPs to determine the need for 40IICZM regional conditions. The
Louisville District is working with the States to ensure that the Corps and 401/CZM regional
conditions will ensure that the NWPs authorize only those activities that have minimal adverse
effects on the aquatic environment, individually or cumulatively. Districts and States can coordinate
workload to maximize the effective use oftheir respective resources and avoid unnecessary
duplication ofworkload.
Provisional determinations, including environmental documents, have been prepared indicating that
these NWPs comply with the requirements for issuance under general permit authority. The Corps
will prepare final environmental decision documents when the NWPs are issued or modified. These
documents will be available when the final NWPs are issued, at the Louisville District office or on
the Internet at http://www.usace.army.millinetlfunctionslew/cecwolreg/. Furthermore, these NWP
decision documents will be supplemented by Division Engineers to address their decision concerning
regional conditions for the NWPs. These supplemental documents will be available at the Louisville
District office when the final NWPs become effective.
The July I, 1998, Federal Register notice for the proposed new and modified NWPs is available on
the Internet at http://www.usace.army.millinetlfunctions/ew/cecwo/reg/. As an alternate, World Wide
Web users can access the Federal Register through the Government Printing Office (GPO) at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aceslaacesOO2.html.
PROPOSED REGIONAL CONDmONS FOR NATIONWIDE PERMITS IN INDIANA
Note: (I) Information on Pre-Construction Notification in addition to below can be found at NWP
General Condition No. 13 (Federal Register, 63 FR 36075-36076).
(2) Mitigation includes activities that avoid, minimize, and compensate for impacts.
Nationwide A: Residential, Commercial and Institutional Activities.
(I) Section 10 waters and wetlands contiguous to Section 10 waters shall be excluded.
(2) Pre-Construction Notification (PeN) is required to the Corps for all stream impacts. Impacts refer
to filling/excavation below Ordinary High Water (OHW). The impact on ephemeral, intermittent, and
perennial streams is limited to no more than 500 linear feet ofstream.
(3) All PeN's must include a mitigation plan to offset losses to "waters ofthe United States".
(4) The following waters ofthe United States in Indiana are excluded:
a. Morse Reservoir and associated wetlands
b. Geist Reservoir and associated wetlands
c. Bogs
d. Calcareous fens
e. Vernal pools
r. Natural lakes and adjacent wetlands
g. Wetland portion ofdune and swale systems
h. Wet prairies (meadows)
i. A list ofother high value waters is currently being developed by Indiana Department of
Environmental Management, Indiana Department ofNatural Resources, the U. S. Environmental
Protection Agency, and the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service for consideration by the Corps of
Engineers. .
(5) In Lake, Porter, LaPorte and St. Joseph Counties, the size ofthe discharge shall not exceed 1/2
acre, and shall be cumulative over time.
Nationwide B: Master Planned Development Activities.
(I) Section 10 waters and wetlands contiguous to Section 10 waters shall be excluded.
(2) The impact on ephemeral, intermittent, and perennial streams is limited to no more than 1000
linear feet ofstream.
(3) Condition 4 ofNWP "A" applies to this NWP.
Nationwide C: Stormwater Management Facilities.
(I) The impact on ephemeral, and intermittent streams is limited to no more than 500 linear feet of
stream, and I acre oftotal impacts to "waters ofthe U.S."
(2) Condition 4 ofNWP "A" applies to this NWP.
(3) In Lake, Porter, LaPorte and St. Joseph Counties, the size ofthe discharge shall not exceed 1/2
acre, and shall be cumulative over time.
Nationwide D: Passive Recreational Facilities.
(I) The construction ofnew golfcourses or new ski areas is not authorized by this NWP.
(2) All PeN's must include a mitigation plan to offset losses to "waters ofthe United States."
(3) A PCN is required to the Corps for facilities impacting those "waters ofthe United States" listed
in Condition 4 ofNWP "A."
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(4) In Lake, Porter, LaPorte and St. Joseph Counties, the size ofthe discharge shall not exceed 1/2
acre, and shall be cumulative over time.
Nationwide E: Mining Activities.
(I) This NWP is limited to I acre for all "waters ofthe United States." The impact on ephemeral,
intermittent, and perennial streams is limited to no more than 500 linear feet ofstream.
(2) Condition 4 ofNWP "A" applies to this NWP.
(3) The Corps will conduct agency coordination on all PCN's in accordance with General Condition
13(e).
(4) All PeN's must include a mitigation plan to offset losses to "waters of the United States."
Nationwide F: Reshaping Existing Drainage Ditches.
A PCN is required for projects which affect greater than 500 linear feet or which are located in
waterways with a drainage area greater than 5 square miles in the Kankakee River, Lake Michigan,
St. Joseph River (mouth on Lake Michigan) and Maumee River watersheds.
Nationwide Permit No.3: Maintenance.
•• none proposed ••
Nationwide Permit No.7: Outfall Structures and Maintenance.
•• none proposed ••
Nationwide Permit No. 12: Utility Activities.
(I) The construction ofnew electric or pumping substations, and permanent access roads is not
authorized.
(2) A PCN is required to the Corps for activities impacting those "waters ofthe United States" listed
in Condition 4 ofNWP "A."
Nationwide Permit No. 14: Linear Transportation Crossings.
(I) This NWP for public projects is limited to the loss ofone (I) acre.
(2) A PCN is required to the Corps for crossings impacting those "waters of the United States" listed
in Condition 4 ofNWP "A."
N!ltionwide Permit No. 27: Stream and Wetland Restoration Activities.
(I) A PCN is required to the Corps for activities impacting those "waters of the United States" listed
in Condition 4 ofNWP "A" and all Section 10 waters.
lII.llti()n~id~~e!J!lit No. 40: Agricultural Activities.
(I) Perennial streams are excluded.
(2) A PCN is required to the Corps for activities impacting those "waters of the United States" listed
in Condition 4 ofNWP "A."
(3) Impacts shall not exceed (I) acre, and the impacts are cumulative over time.
(4) A mitigation plan is required for impacts over 1/4 acre.
PROPOSED REGIONAL CONDmONS FOR NATIONWIDE PERMITS IN KENTUCKY
Note: (I) Outstanding Resource Waters (ORW's) are streams designated by the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet. A list is enclosed.
(2) Information on Pre-Construction Notification in addition to below can be found at NWP General
Condition No. 13 (Federal Register, 63 FR 36075-36076).
(3) Mitigation includes activities that avoid, minimize, and compensate for impacts.
Nationwide A: Residential, Commercial and Institutional Activities.
(I) Section 10 waters and wetlands contiguous to Section 10 waters shall be excluded.
(2) Pre-Construction Notification (PeN) is required to the Corps for all stream impacts. Impacts refer
to fillingfexcavation below Ordinary High Water (OHW). The impact on ephemeral, intermittent, and
perennial streams is limited to no more than 500 linear feet ofstream.
(3) All PeN's must include a mitigation plan to offset losses to "waters of the United States".
(4) Discharges causing the loss ofgreater than one tenth (0.1) acre in the Pond Creek watershed of
Jefferson County, Kentucky, will require a PCN to the Corps.
Nationwide B: Master Planned Development Activities.
(I) Section 10 waters and wetlands contiguous to Section 10 waters shall be excluded.
(2) The impact on ephemeral, intermittent, and perennial streams is limited to no more than 1000
linear feet ofstream.
Nationwide C: Stormwater Management Facilities.
(I) The impact on ephemeral, and intermittent streams is limited to no more than 500 linear feet of
stream, and I acre oftotal impacts to "waters of the U.S."
(2) Discharges for greater than one tenth (0.1) acre in the Pond Creek Watershed in Jefferson County,
Kentucky will require a PCN to the Corps.
.....
I
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(3) All work in ORW's will require a PCN to the Corps.
Nationwide D: Passive Recreational Facilities.
(I) The construction ofnew golfcourses or new ski areas is not authorized by this NWP.
(2) All PeN's must include a mitigation plan to offset losses to "waters ofthe United States."
(3) All work in ORW's will require a PCN to the Corps.
Nationwide E: Mining Activities.
(I) This NWP is limited to I acre for all "waten ofthe United States." The impact on ephemeral,
intermittent, and perennial streams is limited to no more than SOO linear feet ofstream.
(2) This NWP is not applicable for sand and gravel mining or dredging activities.
(3) The Corps will conduct agency coordination on all PeN's in accordance with General Condition
l3(e).
(4) All PeN's must include a mitigation plan to offset losses to "waten ofthe United States."
Nationwide F: Reshaping Existing Drainage Ditc~.
-- none proposed--
Nationwide Permit No.3: Maintenance.
(I) AD work in ORW's will require a PCN to the Corps.
Nationwide Permit No.7: Outfall Structures and Maintenance.
(I) All work in ORW's will require a PCN to the Corps.
Nationwide Permit No. 12: Utility Activities.
(I) The construction ofnew electric or pumping substations, and permanent access roads is not
authorized.
(2) All work in ORW's will require a PCN to the Corps.
Nationwide Permit No. 14: Linear Transportation Crossings.
(I) This NWP for public projects is limited to the loss ofone (I) acre.
(2) All work in ORW's will require a PCN to the Corps.
Nationwide Permit No. 27: Stream and Wetland Restoration Activities.
(I) PCNs will be coordinated with the Kentucky Department ofFish & Wildlife Resources in
accordance with General Condition 13 for activities on public or private land with no agreement.
(2) All work in ORW's and in all Section 10 waten will require a PCN to the Corps.
Nationwide Permit No. 40: Agricultural Activities.
(I) Perennial streams are excluded.
(2) All work in ORW's will require a PCN to the Corps.
(3) Impacts shall not exceed (I) acre, and the impacts are cumulative over time.
(4) A mitigation plan is required for impacts over 1/4 acre.
L~,*,._ l,.~"_, L,.v__ L-... L.__~ L~~_, L ..._ L.-...., L. _ l.~. L.__ L._ L __ l_.=_=. L...,-_~ L_,....__, L __..,. l.-~... l_.._....
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K-l
Standing in Environmental Citizen Suits: Laidlaw's Clarification
of the Injury-in-Fact and Redressability Requirements
iDg is rapidly eroding."). But see ld. at 22 ("The Courl'~ decision to
review Ibis ruling [by die coun ofappeals in Laidlaw] may be a sig-
nal of the justices' wil1ingneu to halt, or even possibly revene. Ihe
10911 of ground."). .
8. 484 U.S. 49,18 ELR 20142 (1987).
9. 33 U.S.C. 11365(a), ELR STA.T. PWPCA AS05(a}.
10. See 484 U.S. at 55. 56, 18 ELR at 20143.
11. See id. at 64-65.18 ELR lit 20146. The Court W .....l insistent lh~ tbe
good-failh allesation of a present violation was what the Act re·
quired: ''The statuted~ nO( require: that a defendant 'be in viola-
tion' of the Act at the conunene:cment of suit: rather. the statute re-
quires that a defendant be 'aUeG~d to be in violation.... ld. &164, III
ELR at 20146. Justice Scalia. concurring along with Justices Stevens
andO'CoMor. rejected this interpretation. concluding instead that:
(T)bc issl1C to be resolved by tbe: Court ofAppealS on remand
ofthis suit is not whether the allegation ofa continuing viola-
tion on the day suit was brought was made in good faith uiler
reasonable inquiry. but whether the petitioner was in fact "in
violation" on the date suit WIlS brought.
ld. at 69. 18 ELR at 20147.
12. Id. at 59. 18 ELR at 20145.
13. Id. at 60-61. 18 ELR at 20145.
Before turning to a summary of standing law prior to
Laidlaw. the standing issue needs to be framed by an appre-
ciation of the environmental citizen suit context in which it
arises. In Gwaltney ofSmithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation" the Court considered the scope of the citizen
suit provision of the Clean Water Aet (CWA).' The Coun
concluded that Congress intended the provision to be for-
ward looking; that is, a citizen suit claim cannot be based on
a violation that bas completely ceased at the time that the
complaint is filed. In Gwaltney. both lower couns had held
that a citizen suit could be brought under the CWA based on
violations that were wholly past. III The Court rejected this
interpretation, holding that the Act requires a claimant to
make a good-faith allegation that the defendant is in violll-
lion of the Act at the time that the claim is filed.1I
The Coun decided, based on "the language and stnJcture"
of the citil.en suit provision, that the Aet foreclosed claims
based on wholly past violations.12 The Court concluded.
moreover. that allowing claims to be based on wholly past
violations would be inconsistent with the "supplementary
role" that Congress intended citizen suits would play in the
enforcementofthe Act, and "wouldchange the nature ofthe
citi7.ens' role from interstitial to potentially intrusive."n
The Gwaltney Court also addressed the relation between
mootness and standing in response to the defendant's eon-
tenlion that the Act had to be construed to require "ongoing
noncompliance" dwing the action to prevent evasion of the
The Court's Conception ofEnvironmental Citizen Suits
Professor ofLaw, University ofKentucky Collcgc ofLaw. I wisb to thank
my colleague, John Rogers, fot discussing the subject of this Article with
me and for providing very helpful conunents on a p~viOLlS draft. Anyer-
rOtS ate my own.
1. 120 S. Ct. 693, 30 ELR 20246 (2000),
2. Severa! members ofthe FourthCirtllit would disagree with the state-
ment that Laidlaw merely clarified standing law, See FricndM of the
Earth v. Gaston CopperRecycling Corp.• 204 F.3d )49. 164,30ELR
20369.20375 (4th Cit. 2000) (en blllC:) (Niemeyer. I.• contllning)
("the decision in Laidlaw repR:~nts a sea change in constitutional
standing princjple~"): id. at 165.30ELR at 20375 (Luuig. J., coru:ur-
ring) (a ",,;gnifica.nt change in environmental standing doctrine (is)
worked by" Laidlaw); id. (Hamilton.. J., concuning) (Laidklw "hal;
unnecessarily opened !he standing floodgate:s").
3. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
4. 523 U.S. 83, 28 ELR. 20434 (l998).
5. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 504 U.S. 555. 606, 22ELR 20913.
20927 (1992) (Blaclanun. J.• dislOCnting) ("I cannotjoin thc Court on
what amounts to a slash-and-burn eXpedition throLlgh the law of en-
vironmental lItllndina.").
6. Id.
7. See. e.g.. John D. Ec:heverrill &: Jon T. Zeidler, Barely Standing,
ENVTL. F.• July/Aug. 1999. at 20. 21 ("Bene:ath the cumulative
weight of a serres of recent Supreme Court decisions. citizen stand-
by Michael P. Healy
I n its first week of business during the new millenniwn, Factual and Legal Backgroundthe U.S. Supreme Court decided Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.,J and
provided important clarifications about the law of standing
in environmental citizen suits.2 Specifically. the Court re-
jected the narTOW view of environmenlal injury-in-fact ad-
vocated by ] usticc Scalia and instead adhered to the broader
view of injury-in-fact established in a nonenvironmental
context by the Coun's decision in Federal Elections Com-
mission v. Akins.' As importantly, the Court also addressed
the redressabitity requirement of Article m standing in
Laidlaw. Here too. the Court did not apply the narrow view
ofredressability that Justice Scaliahad defined for the Court
in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment.4 and in-
stead fOWld that the deterrence afforded by civil penalties
was sufficient redress for environmental injUl)'-in-facL
This Anicle will analyze the Court's quite generous view
ofcitizen suit standing in La;tllaw. Afterpresenting the legal
background to the Laidlaw decision in the rust pan of this
Article. I will tum to an unalysis of the Court's holdings in
Laidlaw. To be sure, the Court's decision was adumbrated
in important ways by the Court's broader conception of
st&lnding aniculated inAkins. Nevertheless, the decision wHJ
be welcomed by environmentalists who had been eon-
cemed, viewing the aff.arent "slash and bum" assault on en-
vironmental standing in Stul Co. and DefendersofWildlife
v. Lujan,' that the Court was ready to foreclose citizen suits
when the defendant was unable to demonstrate that the stat-
utory violations giving rise to the suit would recur causing·
measurable harm.' .
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"case or conttoversy",requirement of Article m,l~ an issue
also considered in Laidlaw.1S The Cowt rejected this con-
cern, slating that a live controversy is only mooted by the de-
fendant's compliance upon defendant's showing '~t it is
absolutely clear lhallhc allegedly wronpful behavior could
not reasonably be expected to recur",l
In sum, the CWA requires that a defendant be in violation
at the time the complaint is filed, Once that requirement is
met, the defendant must meet a very high standard to dem-
onstrate that, because lhe violations will not recur, the con-
troversy is no longer live.
The Court's Conception ofArticle 111 Standing
Having established the forwll1'd-Iooking nature of the envi-
ronmental citizen suit, we tum to a summary of how the
Court viewed Article m·standing in environmental cases
prior to Laidlaw. It is nOW well established thata ''triad ofin-
jury in fact, causation, and redressability comprises the core
of Article m's case-or-eontroversy requirement, and the
party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of es-
tablishing its existence...., This summary will consider two
of these requirements, injury-in-fact and redressability, be-
14. Jd. at 66, 18 ELR at 20141.
IS. Laidluw', analysis of mOOlnCSS i$ discussed irifra.
16. 484 U.S. at 66-67. 18 ELR. at 20147 (ciWioDS, internal quotations
lIIU1 fOOlllote omit~).
GWtUwy'1l inle1'pl'eI3tion ofthc scope of the citizen suitprovition
did not wra on the Court'll \;ew of lhe scope of Article m standing.
Justitr; Saalia, who concunc<l in Gwalrney in an opinion joined by
Ju.'ltices Stevens and O'Connor, addressed standing, however. Jus-
tice Scalia argued thBt, to eDSure that the pll1inliff bad Article m
standing, the CoW1lhould rcquir: Il plllintiff to demonstrate that the
defendant WolS "in ..;olation" IU me time the citi~c:n suit was filed,
rathtr m.n require only a good-faith allegationofa present violation.
S" 484 U.s. at 10-71,18 ELR at 20147 (Scalia, I., coneurring).1n
later citizeh suit standing ca.~es, Justices disagreeing with the ap-
proach of the CoW1 majority have made arguments analogoul! to the
lU'gUinellt presented in Justice Scalia's GWalfMy concurrente. In-
deed, JUStiUli~ia and Stevens, ()n opposite sides of the constitu-
ti~ issue in latcr CIll>C-", have arsued that the Court should interpret
citizen suit provi~ionsnarrowly to a\'oid havins to address the con-
stiUlIi~question ofArticlenI ~tnndiQJ.Compar, Steel Co. v. Cit-
izensforaSctterEnv'l, 523 U.S. 83,132-33, 28 ELR 20434,20444
(1998) (Stevens, J.• concwrlng) (Even jf Congress did not intend to
confer jurisdiction over citizen luiu for wholly put violatiOl\S, the
COW1'S "settled policy ofadopting acceptable conSttuetions ofstatu-
tory provision... in Older to avoid the unnecessary adjudication of
constillllional questions-bCTC, the unresolved stallding ques·
tion-strongly sUppor1.'l a construction ofthe stalllte that does ootau-
thome suilll for wboDy past violationll.") willa Pederal Eleetions
Corron'n v. Akins, 524 U.S,. J I. 32 (1998) (Scalia, J.. di~fttiQS) ("a
narrower reading oC 'pattY nggrievcd' [in the text of the fcderal
Eletti()n Campaign Act citizc:n-!luit proVision] is suppotted by the
doc:trine ofcODStitutional doubt, which counsels \is to in~rpretstat-
utes, if possible, in such f~hion as to avoid gt'llve constitutional
queslions.j (citation omiued). Cf Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan,
504 U.S. :iSS, S85, 22 ELR. 20913, 20922 (1992) (Stevens, J., con-
cuning) ("Although 1belicve \hilt n:llpOndents have standing, I nev-
ertheless concur in the judgment or reversal bccaWle 1am persuaded
that the Government is cornet in its S\,lbmi~sion that ,7(a)(2) does
nat llpply to activities in foreisn cOWltries."). .
The debate betlll,'een Justic.:s Scalia und SteveDS in these CllHCli has
the effect of tr&nsfonnins the old saw, when you don't have the facts
argue the law, into "when you can't win the constitutional debate IU'-
gue Illiltutory cOllSuuction," Justice Scalia inccrcstingl~brands this
approach by Justice 5teyens in Steel Co. as "ultra vires, •523 U.S. at
102,28 ELR at 20437, basc4 on his view that the Court is duty bound
to decide whether there is standing before it hall the jUdicial power to
interpret the scope or the statUCC'5 citizen suit provision. See ill. at .
10t-02,28 ELR at 20437.
17. Sleel Co., 523 U.S. at 103-04.28 ELR at 20438 (footnote and eita-
tion omitted).
cause the Court has focused on them in its more recent
standing cases, particularly its environmental cases.
The Injury-in-Fact Requirement
To define the injury-in-fact requirement in \he context ofen-
vironmental citizen suits, two different issue8 have been the
focus of Cowt analysis. First, the Coun has focused on the
type ofenviromncntal impact that may constitute an injury
for purposes of the Anicle m injulY-in-fact requirement.
Second, the Court has addressed the class of claimants that
may properly claim an injury-in-facllnfonning theCowt's
approach to both of these issues has been a long-standing
concern that a litigant should not be able to establish an in~
jury-in-fact based on a generalized grievance. The follow-
ing summary of the state of the law relating to both in-
jury-in-fact issues, as welt as the Court's concerns about
Jeneralized grievances, provides background for an under-
standing of the significance of Laidlaw.
o The Broad Ran eo Co nizable Environmental I" ·u.ries.
In Its Important early enVJronmen stan nJ case, terra
Club v. Morron,l' the Court viewed broadly the range of im-
pacts to the environment that would give rise to an in-
jury-in-fact for purposes of Article In:
The injury alleged by the Sierra Club will be incurred
entirely by reason of the change in the uses to which
Mineral King will be put, and the attendant change in thc
aesthetics and ecology of the area. Thus, in referring lO
the road to be built through Sequoia National Park, the
complaint alleged that the de...elopment "would deslroy
or otherwise adversely affect the scenery, natural and
historic objects and wildlife oftbc park and would im-
pair the enjoyment of the park for future generations."
We do notquestion that this type ofhann may amount to
an ''injmy in fact" sufficient to lay the basis tor standing
under § 10 of the APA. Aesthetic and environmental
well-heing, like economic well-being, are important in-
grcdieQlS ofme quality oflifc in oursociety, and the facl
that plU1icular enviromnental interests are shared by the
many rather than the few does not make them le.~s de-
serving onegal protection through thejudicial process. I')
Later in the opinion, the Court reiterated both compo-
nents ofits broad view ofcogni~ableinjuries: they "may re-
flect aesthetic, conservational, and recreational as well as
economic values," and they may be "widely shared.n:!ll
The Coun's broad recognition or the status of environ-
mental injuries as cognizable under Article mwas consis-
tently reiterated in cases decided afterSierra Club.21 Indeed,
the Court's broad acceptance ofenvironmental injury as in-
jury-in-fact can be seen in the Court'$ recent acceptance, in
its "slash and bum" standing decision in Defenders ofWi/d-
life,22 ofthe proposition that ''the desire to use or observe an
animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undenj-
18. 405 U.S. 727. 2 ELR 20192 (1972).
19. Id. at 734, 2 BLR at 20194.
20. Jd. at738,2ELR lit20195 (internal quolationsaod citation ominccl).
21. Suo £.I{., Lujan v. National Wildlife Ped'n, 497 U.S. 871. 886. 20
ELR.20962, (1990) (expressing ''nodoubt" that among interests "lilt·
utca protected were "'recreational use and aesthetic enjoYlhent",:
UDiuXt State_ v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669. 3 ELR 20536 (1973).
22. See Dcfendenl of Wildlife v. Lujlll\. S04 U.S. 55S, 22 ELR 20913
(1992).
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ably a cognizable interest for purpose ofstanding."u In sum,
the Court has consistently viewed a broad range ofenviron-
mental impacts as constituting injury-in-fact for purposes of
Article m.
The Coun interestingly had no occasion in these C8.ClCS to
identify the existence ofany clearlimits on the types ofenvi-
ronmental injuries that are cognizable under Article In.This
is because, as will soon be discussed.:l4 all but one of these
cases resulted in decisions that the plaintiffs lacked stand-
ing. not because the injuries they sought to protect were in-
adequate. but because the plaintiffs adduced insufficient
proof lbat they had an actual interest in the environmental
am~nity or resource being affected. The one exception.
United Slates v. Srudellls Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP).25 also did not result in the Court's ar-
ticulation of limits, because the standing issue was resolved
on the pleadings and the plaintiff had alleged that cogniza-
ble interests would be affected by the claimed illegality.
Moreover. the COlin was not concerned in these cases
about relating the injury claimed by the plaintiffs to the
statutory schemes chat gave rise to the claims ofillegality.u.
The Court may have seen no need for such an analysis both
because the types ofharms being claimed by the plaintiffs
appeared to be traditional sorts of injuries even in the ab-
sence of statutory protection, and because the Coon
viewed it as pl.ain that the statutes at issue were protecting
these sorts oftnterests.37 In the Court's recent decision in
Akins,u however. the Court gave specific attention to the
relatio~shipbetwccn a congressionally defined injury and
the Artlcle UI requirement of injury-jn-facL Plaintiffs in
that case brought a citizen suit, alleging that the Federal
Election Commission (FEC) violated the Federal Election
Campaign Aet of 1971 (FECA) when it declined to find
that a polilical action conunittee, the American Israel Po-
litical Affairs Committee (AIPAC), had violated FECA
and refused to order that groug. to comply with FECA' 5
public reporting requirements. 9
23. Jd••t 562·63,22 ELR at 20916 (c:itation omitted). The Coun has
held, moreover. th:\t when c5tablillhcd. environmental injurics .re
commonly irrcparable. Se,' Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of
Gambell, 480 U.S. 531,17 ELR 20574 (1987). The Court did not
rCllc:h the issue ofenvironmental injury-in-fact in Steel Co. v Cili.
uns for a Better £nv'to S23 U.S. 83. lOS, 28 ELR. 20434 20439(1998). '
24. Su the discussion irifra.
25. 4,12 U.S. 669,689,3 ELR 20536,20540 (1973); ("[W]e deal here
SJTnply wilh lhe J)leadings in whic:h the (plllintiffsl alleged a specific
and perceptible harm that distinguished thern from other citizens
who had not used the natw1l1 rellOW'CeS that were claimed to be af-
fected.") (footnolc omiUed).
26. See William A. Pletcher. 77le Strllc:hmt ofStanding, 98 Y4LE LI.
22.1.~ (.1988) ~"the Court did not engage in serious statutory anal·
YSIS In either SlttrrQ Club or SCRAP).
27. The Court's lack of concc:m in these environmental casc:s may be
~C?atrasted with its statutory analysil in Hardin v. Kc:ntucky Util-
Jtles Co., 390 U.S. 1(1968). There, the Court stated that injuries reo
lIult~n$ from c:o~perition would not ~ellerally "c:onfcr Itanding Oft
the InJu.red bUlImess to question the lClalily of any aspect of its
competltor's operation~.• Itl. at 6 (citations omiu~). 'The Court
conc:luded that prudential standing was present "when the particu-
lar ltatutOry provision invo)coo does renec:t a lcgislative purpose to
protect a c:omJ)(:titive intere.~t." Id. In that circumstance. ''the in-
jured competitor hal standing to require compliance with that pro-
vision." Id. (citation omitted).
28. 524 U.S. 11 (1998) (Breyer, 1.).
29. See id. at 14-16.
30 ELR 10457
The Court held that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a cog-
nizable Anicle ill injury. given the purpose ofthe statutory
scheme enacted by Congress:
The "injury in fact" that respondents have suffered con-
sists of their inability to oblain infonnation-Jists of
AlPAC donors ••. and campaign-related contributions
and cxpcndiNres-that. on respondents' view of the
~aw. the statute requires that AIPAC make public. Therc
IS DO reason to doubt. their claim that the information
wO~d help them (and others to whom they would com-
mUlUeate tt) to evaluate candidates for public office, es.
pecially candidates who received assistance Cram
AlPAC, and to evaluate the role that AIPAC's financial
assistance might play in a specific election. Respon-
dents' injury consequently seems concrete and particu-
lar. Indeed, this Court has previously held that a plaintiff
suffers an "injury in faer' when the plaintiff flliIs 10 ob-
tain information which must be publicIy dilicloscd pur-
suant [0 a staNte.30
~otwitbstanding the fact that the injury in Akins was ef-
fectively ~efinedbr the nature ofthe statute's requirements
of report1Dg and disclosure, the Coun held that Congress
had not exceeded its constitutional power as limited by Arti-
cle m, because the statutorily defmed injury met Article
~'s partic~ty requirement: ".The informational injury at
lSSu~here•.direcdy.related to votlng, the most basic ofpoliti·
cal nghts, 15 suffiCIently concrete and specific such that the
fact ~at .it is widely shared does not deprive Congress of
COnstItutiOnal power to authorize its vindication in the ted-
eral coutts,"]1
In short, the Court has accepted in environmental cases
~at a br~a.d ~ge ofenvir~nmentalimpacts constitute cog-
mzable tnJunes under Article m. Outside of the environ-
mental context, the Court has indicated a willingness to take
the lead from Congress in accepting as cognizable under Ar-
ticle minjuries that are defined by statute.):
o Proper Partiesfor Asserting a Claim ofInjury. Notwith·
standing the Court's acceptance of envlI'onmental injuries
as injuries-in-fact under Article m, some of the Court's
most prominent modem standing cases have held that plain-
tiffs claiming environmental injuries resulting from statu-
tory violations failed to meet the injury-in-ract requirement.
Indeed, what the Court gave in Sierra Club. when il cata-
logued the broad range of environmental injuries cogniza-
ble under Article m, it largely withdrew by circumscribing
~e parties.w~oc~uldassert those interests.33 The Court spe-
ctfi~l>: dlstmgulshed between the requirement of a cogni-
zable Injury and the requirement ofactual injury, stating that
"broadening the categories of injury that may be alleged in
support of standing is a different matter from abandoning
30. Id. at 21 (c:itation omitted).
31. Jd. at 24·25.
32. Cj. Fletcher, s"pru note 26. al 253 ("when lhe Court has decided ae-
~al c:~e~ involving !<llllutory rights. it has never required any show.
mg of Injury beyond that set out in the statute itself."). Because thc
<?oun in Akins~Id thllt the injury~scnedwas cogni:l:llble under Ar·
tic:1e m~eca~~ It was ~?ncrcle, It did not 80 3S far 3S to 3cc:ept ludge
Fletc:her s opinIOn thllt [w]hen Congrc:sl paRRCR a a;1II1ule conferring
a legal right on a pl.intiff to enforce a statutorily crelltcd dULY, the
Coun should not require Wt the plaintiff ,how 'injury in fact' o,'cr
and above the violation of the statutorily c:onferred rit;ht." Id.
33. See 405 U.S. at734-35, 2 ELR al20194 ("the 'injury in fll:t' tcM reo
quires more thanan injuI)' to Il Co,nizablc inlcrelilo It requires thallhc:
party seeking review be himscl amont; tbe injured.").
30 £0. 10458 £NVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER. 6-2000
the requirement that the pllIty seeking review must himself
have suffered an injury:'14 The Sien-a Club's complaint
failed with regard to this latter requirement:
The impact of the proposed ehanaes in the environ-
ment ofMincral King \\ill Dot fall indiscriminately upon
ever; citizen. The alleged injury will be felt directly only
by those who use Miner<l1 King and Sequoia National
Pllrk. and Cor whom Ihe aesthetic and recreational values.
ofthe area will be lessened by the highway and ski resort.
The Siena Club failed to allege that it or its members
would be alfecr.cd in anyoffheiractivities orpastimesby
the Disney development. Nowhere in the pleadings or
affidavits did the Club stale that its members use MinuaJ
King for any purpose, much less that they use it in aDy
way that would be significantly affected by the proposed
actions of the respondents.~'
The Coun believcd that this "requirement that a party
seeking review must allege facts showing that he is him-
self adversely affected ... does serve as at least a rough
attempt to put the decision as to whether review will be
sought in the hands of those who have a direct stake in
the outcome.")6
In two more recent decisiuns, the Court relied upon this
personal effect rcquirement to hold that environmental
claimants had failed to establish an injury-in-fact. In
Lujan \I. National Wildlife Federat;on.)1 the Coun held
that the plaintiff had failed to establish an injury-in-fact.
where its proof of injury was affidavits of members who
stated that they used and enjoyed federal lands "in the vi-
cinity or' lands to be affected by the challengcd govern-
ment action.3M
Similarly, the Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate an injury-in-fact in Lujan v. Defenders o/Wild-
life.39 Although the Court accepted that the underlying inju-
ries would, ifproved, COll5titute Articleminjuries,40 it con-
cluded that
To survive the Secretary's summal)' judgment motion,
respondents had to 5ubmil affidavits Or other evidence
showing. through specific facts, not only that Jisted spe-
cies were in fact being threatened by funded activities
abroad. but aJ50 that one or more of respondents' mem-
belli would thereby be "directly" affected apart from
!heir "special interest" in thee] subject.41
The Counconcluded that this direct effects testhad not been
met in the circumstances of the casc, because the affidavits
supponing the plaintiff's cJaim for standing stated only that
the affiants had plans to return "some day" to the foreign na-
tions where the animals of interest to those members lived
34. ld. Ilt 738. 2 ELR at 20195.
35. rd. lit 735, 2 ELR at 20194 (fooUlote omincd).
36. Id. at 740. 2 ELR at 20195.96.
37. 497 U.S. 811. 20 ELR 20962 (1990).
38. See id. at 886. 20 ELR at 20964. See also id. at 889, 20 ELR at
20966 (the standing requirement is not met "by averments which
state only lhat one of respondent's members UIIC5 Unllpecifled por-
tions of an immense tract of territory. on some ponions of which
mining activily has occurred or probably will occurby virtue of rbe
governmental action.").
39. 504 U.S. 555, 22 ELR 20913 (1992).
40. Set: Federal Elections CC\mm'n v. Akins. 524 U.S. 11 (998).
41. 504 U.S. at .563,22 ELR at 20916 (citation aDd internal quota.
tions omitted).
and any injury was accordingly not inunincnt42: "Such
·some day' intentions-without any description ofconcrete
plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some
day willbe-do notsupport a finding ofthe 'actual or inuni-
nent' injury that our cases reqUire"'·) The Court stated that
the pwpose ofa requirement ofimminence Uis to insure thaI
the alleged injury is not too specUlative for Article m pur-
poses••• :144The claimed injury was, in the Coun's view, too
speculative because "the plaintiff alleges only an injury at
some indefinite future time, and the acts necessary to make
the injury hap~n are at least partly within the plaintiff's
own control." In his concurring opinion, Justicc Kennedy
elarified why he had concluded that the plaintiffs' claimed
injuries were too speculative in this case:
While it may seem lrivial to require that Mss. Kelly
and Skilbred acquire airline tickets to the project sites or
8IUIOunce a date certain upon which !hey will relUrn. this
is not a case where it is reasonable to assume that the
affiants will be using the sites on a regular basis, nor do
the affiants claim to have visited the sites since the pro-
jects conunenced.46
The Defenders ofWildlife Courtalso addressed the plain-
tiffs' cJaim that they suffered injury-in-fact because they
were interested in the study and protection ofan ecosystem
that is part of an interconnected global ecosystem, so thlU
harms to species in a foreign locale by the challenged gov-
ernment action also hann the rest of the ecosystem in which
plaintiffs claim an interest. The Court rejected this claim of
an injury. because the plaintiffs had failed to meet the per-
ceptible effect requirement: ·'To say that the Act protects
ecosystems is not to say that thc Act creates (if it were pos-
sible) rights of action in persons who have not been in-
jured-in-fact, that is, persons who use ponions of an eco-
system not perceptibly affected by the unlawful action in
question."47 Oiven how remote the plaintiffs were from the
place where the animal species ofconcern to them were ar-
guably being harmed, the plaintiffs could show no such
perceptible effect:
It is clear that the person who observes Or works with n
particular animaJ threatened by a federal decision is fac-
ing perceptible barm, since the very 5ubject ofhis inter-
est \\i11 no longer exist. It is even plausible-though it
goes to the outermost limit ofplausibility-to think that
42. The COurt foeused its concern about the showing ofa direct injury
on whether the affiants would pcTllOtlally experience the reduced
numbcrll ofanimah. rorber than whether that reduction w()uld uctu-
ally occur:
We shallasllumefor the sake ofargument thatthese affida-
vits contain faclS showing thllt cettAin agency-funded projects
lhteatel'l listed species-though that is questionable. They
plainly contain no faclll, however. sbowing how damage to the
species will produce "'imminent"' injury to [the llfCillnL~].
Jd.
43. Jd. at 564. 22 ELR at 20916 (citation omiucd).
44. Id. at 564 n.2. 22 ELR at 20916 n.2.
45. Ill.
46. Id. at 579,22 ELR ilt 20920 (citations omitted). JUlilice Slevens re-
jected this concern. concluding \hat the affiants' interests and previ-
OUli mits to view rbe species at issue wen: sufficient 10 cliblblish im-
mineDce. See id. at 584 n.2, 22 ELR at 20921 n.2 (Stevens, J.• con-
curring) ("[R)espondents would not be: injured by the challenged
projects ifthey hid DOt visited lhe sites orstudied the threatened spe-
cies and habitat. But, ... respondents did villit the sites; moteover.
they have expressed an intent to do so again.").
47. la. at 566.22 ELR at 20917.
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a person who observes or wc>rlcs with animals ofa partic-
ular species in the very area of the world where Chat spe-
cies is threatened by a federal decision is facing such
hum, a;inee some animals that might have been the sub-
jcclofhis interestwill no longerexisl It goes beyond tbe
limit, however, and inlO pure speculation and fantasy, to
say that anyone who observes or works with an endan-
gered species, anywhere in the world, is appreciably
hanned by a single projecl affecting some portion ofthaI
!lpecics with which he ha.o; no JIlOl'especific connection.'"
In sum, although the Court has concluded that a broad
range of environmental impacts may give rise to an Article
minjury-in-fact, the Coun has sought 10 ensure that the par-
ticular plaintiffclaiming an injury from such an impact will
be imminently affected in a perceptible way.
o GelJeralit.ed Grievances. The purpose of the Coun's re-
quirement thatplaintiffs demonstrate that they will sufferan
actual injury-in-fact is to foreclose the judiciary from being
used by claimants "to do no more than vindicate their own
value preferences.,..e This bar against the judicial resolution
ofgeneralized grievances50 was applied in the fmt great en-
vironmental standing case, Sierra Club,S I to reject the Sierra
Club's cffort to establish standing doctrine that would per-
mit that organization to bring a public action.52
More recently, the baragainst the litigationofgeneralized
grievances has been debated by the Court when it has re-
solved standing issue!! in environmental and
nonenvironmental contexts. The opposing sides of the de-
bate about the scope oflhe general17..cdgrievances barhave a
sharp fundamental disagreement about the types of injuries
that give rise to injury-in-fltCl. Although the views ofJustice
Scalia, who wrote for the majority in Defenders ofWildlife
and advocates a broad scope to the generalized grievance
bar, appeared to be prevailing in the early 199Os, the views
of Justice Breyer, who wrote for the majority in Akins and
views the bar more narrowJy. have more recently driven the
Coun's approach to this issue.
In Defenders ofWildlife, the Court's consideration ofthe
generalized grievance bar arose in the context of the lower
court's view that "the injury-in-fact requjrement had been
satisfied by congressional conferral upon all persons of an
abstract, self-contained. nomnSb'umental 'right' to have the
Executive observe the procedures required by law."n Writ-
ing for the Court, Justice Scalia rejected this view, findin;
that a plaintiff could bring suit based on the government's
failure to conform to proceduteS mandated by statute only
when the failure to comply with the required procedures re-
sulted in direct and tangible injury.54 The CoUrt grounded
48. Id. at 566·67. 22 ELR III 20917 (citation and foomote omitted).
49. Sierra Club v. Monon. 405 U.S. 727, 740, 2 EI.R 20192, 20196
(1972).
50. The Court often contrasts the noncogni7.able Senetll1ized grievance
with particularized injuty. See Defendm tifWildlife. S04 U.S. alS60
n.l, 22 ELR Ilt 20915 ft. 1 ("By panicu!arized. we mean that the in-
jl1l')' must affect the plaintiff in III pen;anal and individual way.").
51. 405 U.S. at 727.2 ELR at 20192.
52. Jd. Ilt 736,2 ELR at 20194.
53. 504 U.S. al 573, 22 ELR at 20918.
54. Id. at 573·74, 22 ELR at 20919:
We have consistently held that II plaintiff raising only II
genenl11y available grievnnce about govemment-e:laiming
only hann to hill lindevery citizen'sintcmt in properapplica-
tion of the Constitution and laws. and seeking relief that no
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this requirement in separation-of-powers limits on the judi-
cialy that translate into limits on Congress' power to define
cognizable injury:
The question presented here is whether the public inter-
est in proper administration of the laws (specifically, in
agencies' observance of a particular, statutorily pre-
scribed procedure) can be convened into an individual
right by a statute that denominates it as such, and that
permits all citizens (or, for lhatmatter, a subelas.o; ofciti·
zens who suffer no distinctive concrerc harm) to sue. If
tbe concrete injury requirement has the separa·
tion-of-powers sipificance we have always said, the an-
swermustbe obvious: To pennit Congress to convert the
ulldifferentiated public interest in executive officers'
compliance with the law into an "individual right" vindi-
cable in the courts is to permit Congress lO b'8nst"er from
the President to the courts the Chief e"ecutive's most
important constitutional duty, to "take Cue that the
Laws be faithfully executed,.. Art. n, A3.55
Justice Scalia's broad view of the generalized grievance
bar sh~pedhis reading for the Coun majority of the Court's
previous decision in United States v. Richardson56 and what
he viewed as the broad prece<1cntial value of that case. In
Richardson, the Court decided that the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate standing in a suit claiming that the govern-
ment's failure to disclose expenditures of the Centrallntelli-
gence Agency violated the statement and account clause of
the U.S. Constimtion." In Defenders (if Wildlife, Justice
Scalia read Richard.ton as establishing thal standing was
lacking because "such a suit rested upon an impennissible
'generalized arievance: and was inconsistent with 'the
framework of Article DI' because 'the impact on [plaintiffJ
is plainly undifferentiated and common to lin mcmbers of
the public.'''"
Only six years later, however, Justice Scalia found him-
selfin the minority when the Courtagain addressed the gen-
eralized grievance bar to standing. In Akin.)·,59 Justice
Breyer, writing for the majority, acknowledged that "(l]he
FEC's strongest argument is its contention that this lawsuit
involves only a 'generalized grlevance.'''60 The Coun then
held that the generalized grievance bar did not apply to inju-
ries that, while widely shared, are "sufficiently concrete and
specific.,061 Justice Breyer, on behalfof the Akins majority.
more directly and tangibly bellefits him t1wI it does the pub.
lie lIllatge-does not statean Artic:leInCiIIle orcolIU'Oversy.
TheCourtnoted that its standingdecisions have adhered lO a requite-
ment that a plaintiff show petSOIW injwy: "lbe dissent is unable to
eile a siDBle case in which we ae;twllly found slanding solely on the
basis ofa 'procedural right' unconnected to the plaintiff's Own con-
crete hann."/d. It S73 n.8, 22 ELR at 20918-19 n.8.
SS. 504 U.s. at 567-77, 22 ELR at 20918.
S6. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
57. Art. I. 19. cl. 7 ("a regular Statement and Account ot"the Receipts
and Expenditures ofall pUblic Money shall be published (rom lime
to time").
S8. 504 U.S. at 579. 22 ELR at 20919 (quoting RicI/ardsotl, 418 U.S. at
176-77).
59. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
60. Jd. III 23.
61. The Court stated that:
(W)hcre a harm ill concrete. though widely shan:d, the Court
has found injury in fael Thus the fAct tbat a political rOlUm
may be mon:: readily aVailable where an injury ill widely
sbared (while counseling against, ,.1Y, interpreting 1l11l;llute
lIS conferring standing) doc" not, by itself. automatically dis-
K- 5
30ELRI046O ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 6-2000
rejected the applicabilitl of Richardson, which had been
citeCi by neither party.' The Court concluded that Con-
gress had established through FECA a concrete right to
particular information viewed by the claimants as impor-
tant to their exercise of the right to vote. It stated that in
Akins, unlike Richardson, "there is a statute which ... does
seek to protect individuals such as respondents from the
kind ofharm they say they have suffered, i.e., failing to re-
ceive,tarticular information about campaign-related activ-
ities. This left Justice Scalia able only to chide the Court
for abandoning Richardson'" and to decry the Court's ac-
ceptance of ~_ role for the judiciary defined by Congress
that conflicts descriptively and normatively with the gov-
ernmental structure.6$
In sum, the Court's approach to injury-in-fact in environ-
mental cases has accepted a broad range of impacts as con-
stitutionally sufficient, while it has sought to ensure that the
claimant is a directly affected party. The Court has recently
been engaged in a spirited and closely divided debate about
whether a claimant who has brought a citizen suit is assert-
ing a gcneralized grievance that is not a cognizable in-
jury-in-fact
qualify an inlcrest for Article mpurposes. Su~h an interetlt,
where sufficiently concrete, may ~unl as DI1 injwy in fac:l.
This ~on~l~ion Mems particularly obvious where (ro use a
hypothetiral example) large numbers of individuals IUffer
the same common·law injury (sa)', Il widespread mass ron),
or where lute numbers ofvoters svfferintcrferenc:e with vot-
ing rights ~nferred by law. We ~nclude that simiLlrly, the
intormational injury Ilt iuue here, directly related to voting,
the most basi~ ofpolitical rights, is sufficiently concrete and
specific such that the: fact thllt it il; widely shared does not de-
prive Congress ofconstitutional power ro authorize its vindi·
cation in the f&:deral ~uftS.
Id. at 24-25-(citations and inlemll1 quotation. omitted); uelI1so ill. at
23 ("The: kind of judicial language to which the FEe points, how-
ever. invariably appl:Ms in CIl!lCS where the batm at issue is not onl)'
widely I;hared, but is also otan absttxt and indefinite namre-for
example. harm to the 'common concern for obc:l1ience to law.·.. (ci-
tation omitted».
62. Srr id. at 21.
63. Id. 11122 (citation omittvd).
64. Tn hili dissent. Justice Scalia arguc:c1 that, "[fluirly read. and applying
a fair understanding of iL\ importantJlu~, Riclwvlson ill indis-
tinguishll.ble (rom the present case." S24 U.S. al 34 (Scalia. J.. dis-
senting).l sbould note thal it i" nice ro see, ifonly in this limited con-
text, Justice SClIlia taking a purposivist approac:h to intetptetation,
after ~jceling such an approach to the interpretation ofsWlltes: See.
e.g., Chisom v. Roemer. 501 U.S. 380, 417 (1991) (Sc:a1iIl,J. dissmt-
ing) (criticizing the: Court's pl.lr'pO$ivist interpretation of the Voting
Rigbts Ae:t).
65. See id. 111 36-37 (Scalia. J.. dis~nting):
If lOday's decision is ~olTCct, it is within the power of eon-
gress to authori:te lltIy interested person ro mWlage (lhrough
the C:OUrtlt) the Executivc's enforcement of any law that in-
cludes a requiremenl for the ftling and pUbli~ availl1bility ofa
piece ofpaper. Thill ill not the system we have bad, and il; not
the system we sbould dc:.'>irc.
See also id. lit 36 (Scalia. J., dissenting):
When !he Executive can be directed by the COllnS, at the in-
!ltllJle!: ofany voter. to J'Cmc:c1y a deprivation which affee:t6 the
entire elcc:ton.te in precisely the same wly-and particularly
when that deprivation (here, the unavailability of inlonna-
tion) is one inseverable part of a lareer enfor~ement
scheme-thc~hall OCCUlTed a shitt of political responsibility
to II branch designc:c1 not t.o proteCt the public &llarse but to
pro~t individual rights.
The Redressabilitx Requirement
Redressabillty is the other standing requirement that the
Court has considered recently in the context of environ-
mental citizen suits. In Steel Co.," the plaintifrs citizen
suit claimed that the defendanthad violated the £mergcncy
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986
(EPCRA)67 by failing to prepare required reports on its in-
ventory of hazardous substances and release of toxic sub-
stances.A After receiving the required notice of the plain-
tifrs planned citizen suit, the defendant issued the re-
quired reports prior to the filing of the eomplaint.6~ The
Court assumed that the plaintiff had demonstrated in-
jury-in.facl,?O but held that the plainlifflacked standing be-
cause none of the forms of relief it had sought would re-
dress the injury caused by the defendant's filing of its un-
lawfully late reports.71
The fonn ofreliefthat the Court analyzed most closely re-
garding rcdressability was the plaintiffs request for civil
penalties imposed for statutory violations.on Justice Scalia's
opinion for the majority relied upon. this time in the
66. 523 U.S. at 83. 28 ELR at 20434.
67. 42 U.S.C. tfllOOl·11050, ELR STAT. EPCRA tt301-330.
68. 523 U.S. at 87·88, 28 ELR at 20434.
69. rd. al88. 28 ELR. at 20434.
70. ld. at lOS, 28 BLR at 20438.
71. The ~urt concluded thai:
The complaint asks for (1) a declaratory judgm~nt tbat peti-
tioner violated EPCRA: (2) authorization to illSpec:t periodi-
cull)' petitioner's facility and~rdA (with COSI£ bome by pe-
titioner); (3) an otder requiring petitioner to provide respon-
dent c:opieJl of all ~mpJjallce reports S\Ibmitted to the EPA;
(4) an order requiring petitioner to pay civil penaltics of
S2S.000 perday fouach violation of §§ 11022 and 11023: (S)
an aWlIJ'dofall respondent's "costs, inc:onnection with the in·
vestigalion an<1 prosecution of this matter, including n:&linn-
able attorney and expert witness fees. as authorized by Sec-
tion 326(f) of [EPCRAr: and (6) any such CW'lher relief as
the courtdeems appropriate. NODe ofthe spc:c:ific item" ofre-
lief" sought, and non~ that we can envision as "appropriate"
under the geoeral request, would liel'\'e to reimburse respon-
dent for Joellell caused by the late r~porting, or t.o eliminale
any effects of that late reporting upon respondent.
Id. at 105-06.28 ELR at 20438 (citation and footnClCCI' omitted).
72. The brevity of the Coun's analysis of the lack of redrcss u';(lCilltcd
witb the other fonnll of relief sought by the plaintiff is an indication
or the Court's view of the insufficiency of the claim. The Court
found that the declaratory relief sought by the plaintiff would be
"worthless" bec:aUlll th~ was ''00 ~ntroYcn.,.over whether peti-
tioner failed to file repoftS. orover whether such 11 failure constitutes
a violation. .. ."ld.at 107,28 ELR lit 20438. The Coun viewed the
second and third items ofrelief sought by the plaintiff to be "injunc-
tivc in natun:." ld. lit 108, 28 ELR at 20439. The Court concluded
dtllt, "{i]t respondent had alleged llcolltinuing violation or th~ immi-
nence of a futurt viollltion. the injunctive J'Clief n:quc:.~tcll would
remedy thllt a1leaed hann. But tbc~ i~ no such allegation here-and
on the f~lIlo(the case. there seems no bIIl1ill (or it." Id. TIle Coun reo
jected in this context tbe Solicitor GelIeral's argument that future il-
legalilctivil)' should be presumed when illegal activity only ceases
in response to litigation. See id. at 109,28 ELR at 20439. The finol
specified fonn orrequested relief was the recover)' or the costs ornt·
igation. The Court rejected tlult fonn of reliefas redress, bc:eau$C "Il
plaintiff cannot achieve standing ro Utisute 1\ substantive issue by
briDging suit for the ~st of bringing suit," Jd. at 107. 28 ELR III
20438. The: plaintiffalso souCht other unspecified, "appropriate" reo
lief, but the Coun ~ncluded that no relief "tbat we can cnvision a.~
'appropriate' under the seneral request, would seNe to reimburse reo
lIpolldect for losses C&\Iied by the late reponing. or to eliminate any
effccts or that late reponing upon respondent'" Id. at 106,28 ELR
at 20438.
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redl'esSllbility context. the principle that the Constitution
does not pennil adjudication based on a generalized
grievance. Becausc the civil penalties available under
the statule would be paid to the federal government.
rather than to the plaintiff. the Court stated that. "[i]n re-
questing them•.•. respondent seeks not remediation of
its own injury-reimbursement for the costs it incurred
as a result of the late filing-but vindication of the rule
of law-the 'undifferentiated public interest' in faithful
execution of EPCRA:m
Although the Court then referred to 1ustice Stevens' con-
tention that the civil penalties provided by the statute are ad-
equate redress because of their detelTCnt effect. the Court's
analysis actually rejected only his claim that such penalties
are adequate redress because of the "psychic satisfaction"
they yield:
Justice Stevens thinks it is enough that respondent will
be gratified by seeing petitioner punished for its innac-
tioDli IlDd that the punistunent wiU deter the riskoffuture
harm. If that were so. our holdings in Unda R.S. v. Rich-
ardD•• and Simnn \I. Easl~rnKy. 'V~ifare Rights Organ;-
lcuion. are inexplicable. Obviously, sucb a principle
would make the redressabillty requirement vanish. By
the mere bringing of his suit, ~ry plaintiff demon-
strates his beliefthat afavorablejudptent willmalce him
happier. But although a suitor may derive great comfort
and joy from the fact that the United Stares Treasury is
not cheated, that a ...TOngdoer gets his just deserts [sic],
or that the nation's laws are faithfully enforced, that psy-
chic satisfaction is nOl an acceptable Article m remedy
because it does not r~.dre"'!i a cognizable Article ill in-
jury. ReHef that does not remedy the injury suffered can- .
not bootstrap aplaintiffinto federal court; that ill the "cry
essence of the redre..sabiUty requiremenL7~
As this passage expliUns. Justice Scalia's redressability
analysis for the majority wa$ dependent on the fact that the
civil penalties available under EPCRA were inadequate re-
dress for past violations because they had to be paid to the
federal government. rather than to the plaintiff. Justice
Scalia therefore acknowledged that the lack of
redressability would be cured if Congress had provided
that part of the penalties, even perhaps a peppercorn, be
paid to the plaintiff for the statutory violations proved in
the casC.75 This concession, which likely reflects the histor-
ical acceptance ofqui tam actions, has the effect of recog-
nizing broad congressional authority to defme constitu-
tionally adequate redress. Given this acceptance of con·
gressional power by lhe Steel Co. majority, Justice Scalia's
73. Id. at 107.28 ELR at 20438 (cillltions omitted).
74. Id. at 106-07,28 ELR Ilt 20438 (cilatiollS omitted).
75. See id. at 107.28 ELR III 20438 ("[T]hec:iviJ pcnahi~s authori:tedby
the litalU~ .•• mightbe viewed as asortofcompensation orredre.ss to
responclcnt if the)' were payable to respondent."). Justice Stevens
chided tbe majority for tfIiK view:
Yct it is unclear why the separation of POWCf/l question
should tum on whcth~r the plaintiffreceives monetary com-
pensation. In either instaor:c:. a private citizen is enforcing
the lllw. 1fIleparation of powers does not preclude standing
whc:n CongresH erea~s alegal right that authoriz:cs compen-
sation to the plaintiff. it is unclear why separation ofpowers
should dictllle aCOtluary result when Congreashas created a
legal right but hilS directed that payment be mllde 10 the fed-
eral Treasury.
ld. at 127.28 ELR at 20443 (Stevens. J.• concurring).
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concerns about the impact of broadened citizen suit stand-
ing appear to be nothing more than policy arguments rele-
vant to Congress' decisions about proper redress. rather
than necessary limitations on citizen litigation mandated
by our constitutional suucture.'6
In sum, the Court's analysis of the redressability require-
ment in the context ofenvironmental citil;en SUiL~ appeared
to limit standing because succeeding in having stanltory
civil penalties imposed on a violator ofenvironmentallawll
was found to be inadequate redress for the plaintiffs
claimed environmental injury.
Laidlaw and Its ImMel OD. Stalldiog in Environmental
Citizen Suits
Against this unsettled legal background. the Court has now
decided Laidlaw." Laidlaw operated a point source that had
received a national pollution discharge elimination system
(NPDES) pennit to discharge pollutants into waters of the
United States as required by the CWA.71 Laidlaw thereafter
"repearcdly" violated the emissions limitations established
by the pennit over an eight-year period." Several of these
violations occurred after the plaintiff bad filed the com-
plaintlO Laidlaw moved for summary jUdgment in district
court, contending that the plaintiff did not demonstrate a
cogniuble Article m injury-in-fact.I ' friends of the Earth
responded by submitting affidavits and depositions of its
members describing their use of and interest in the water-
way receiving Laidlaw's unlawfully high pollutant dis-
charges.IZ "After examining this evidence, the District
Coun denied Laidlaw's summary judgment motion, find-
ing-albeit 'by the very slimmest of margins'-that FOE
had standing to bring the suit.""
76. Cj. Uf. at 127.28ELR at 20443 ("[I]n this casc! (a"wnins for present
purposes that respondent coneclly reads the statute) not only has
Congre,s authorized stllftdirlS. but the Exeeutive Branch hlL~ IllllO en-
dorsed its interpretation ofArticle m. It is this Court's decision. not
anything that Conpss or the Executive has done. that c:nCt'Qau;;hes
on the domain ofotherbranches ofth~ Fc:dc:ral Government.") (cita-
tion and footnote omitted).
77. 120 S. Ct. at 693. 30 ELR at 20246.
78. See 33 U.S.C. §§1311(a). 1342(a). ELR STAT. FWPCA §§30l(a).
402(a).
79. See lAidlaw. 120 S. Cl at 701-02.30 ELR at 20247:
Once it received its permit, Laidlllw began 10 discharge
mOlls pollutants into the waterway: repcatedly.laidlllw·s
dischatps exceeded the limits setby the permit. In particular.
cbpitc ClLperimenting with several1lCChnologic:a1 fiUli. Laid-
law consistently failed to meet the permit's sningent 1.3 ppb
(plItts per billion) daily avenge limit an mercut)' discharges.
11lc: District Court \aiel' found d13t Laidlaw had violated the
merauy limits on 489 occlISions between 1987 and 1995.
(Citation omitted)
80. See id. at 702, 30 ELR at 20247:
The record jndicatc~ that after POE initiated the !lui&, but be-
fore the District Court rendered judgment, Laidlaw violated
the Jnel'ClIJY discharge limitation in its permit 13 rimes. Thc
DisUict Coun also found thlll Laidlaw h:ld conunitted 13
monitorin~ lind 10 reponing violations durinS this period.
Th~ last recorded mercury discharge violation occurred in
January 1995.10n8 after the complaint was filed but about
two years before judgment will: rendered.
(Citauona omitted.)
81. Id.
82.Id.
83. Id. (citation omined).
30ELA 10462 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 6-2000
In January 1997, the district court entered judgment
against Laidlaw. finding that the defendant had repeatedly
violated its pennit limitations, and ordered Laidlaw to pay a
civil penalty of S405.8oo.... In setting the penalty at that
level. the district court accounted for the statutory factots.
including the "total deteITent effect'tIS and its finding that
"there has been 'no demonstrated proofofharm to the envi-
ronment' from Laidlaw's mercury discharge violations.''''
In resolving LaidJaw's subsequent appeal, the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court ofAppeals relied on the Supreme Court decision
in Steel Co. and "reasoned dUlt the case bad become moot
because 'the onl)' remedy currently available to
lFOE]-dvil penalties payahle to the govemment-would
not redress any injury [FOE has] suffered.' The court there-
fore vacated the District Court's order and remanded with
instructions to dismiss the action.""
Given the defendant's contentions regarding standing
and the decision of the court of appeals, Laidlaw pre-
sented the Court with the opportunity to address both the
injury-in-fact and redtessability requirements of Article
U( standing.
Injury-in-Facr in Environmental Cases
As decided by the Court. Laidlaw had much to say about the
constitutional sufficiency of an injury premised on adverse
environmental impaClS. Laidlaw differed from the earlier
environmental sWlding cases, in which the Court found no
injury-in-fact, because members of the plaintiff organiza-
tion had identified a desire to use the local resource being
impacted by the illlegedly unlawful activity. For example,
the Court referred to statcments ofone sucb member in affi-
davits and a deposition that he resided near Laidlaw's facil-
ity and the affected waterway and that be refrained from us-
ing the waterway for recreation "because of his concerns
about Laidlaw's discbarges:'u In the Court's view, the evi-
dence of direct injury to the plaintiff in Laidlaw took the
case wholly out of the improper party category that the
84. ld. at. 703.30 ELR at 20247 (citing Friends of Ihc Earth v. La.idlaw
EnvtJ. Serv5. (TOC). Inc.• 956 F. Supp. 588,27 ELR 20976 (O.S.C.
1997»).
IS. rd.
86. rd. at 704. 30 ELR at 20247 (quoting 9S6 F. Supp. at 602, 27 El..R at
20982). The Court also quoted the dilltrict court's statement jn the
eonrext of determining the civil penalty that "'(tlbe NPDES pennit
violations at issue in thi& citil.en suit did not rc..~uIt in any health risk
or environmcnlal b:ltm.... rd. at 104. 30 ELR at 20248.
87. ld. lit 703.30 ELR at 20248 (citation omitted).
88. Id.at 704.30 ELR at 20248:
1l1he Disttiet Court found that FOE had demonstrated sum-
cient injury to establish IitilJlding. Forexample, FOE member
Kenneth Lee Curtis averred in affidaVits that he lived a
half-mile from Laidlaw'S facility; that he occasionatly drove
over the North Tyeer River, and that it looked and smeUod
polluted; and that he would like to flSh. camp, .wUn, and pic-
nic in and Ilear the river between 3 and 15 miles downstream
from the facility. lIS be did when he waU r.eenaaer, butwould
not do so because he was concerned that the water wu pol-
lUled by La.idlaw·s dillcbarge... Curtis reaffinncel these state-
ments in exten,i\'e deposition testimony. For example, he
lestitied \.hat he would like to fish in the river At a specific spot
he used as a boy, but that be would not do so now because of
his concerns about LWJlaw's discharges.
(Citations omitted.)
Court had framed in National Wildlife Federation and De-
fenders oj Wildlife."
The critical injury-in-fac:t issue resolved in Laidlaw in-
steadconcerned the natureof the enviromnental injurics that
are cognizable under Article m. On this issue. as we dis-
cussed earlier. the Coun had consistently stated that degra-
dation of the environment claimed as injurious to a plaintiff
constituted a cognizablc Article m injury-in-fact.90 Indeed,
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Laidlaw majority. relied on
the watershed decision in Sierra Club to support the conclu-
sion that there was an injury-in-fact: "Wehave held tbat en-
viromnental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when
they aver ahat they use the affected area and are persons 'for
whomlhe aesthetic and recreational values of the areu will
be lessened' by the challenged activity,"'·
The problem for the Laidlaw majority, though, was iden-
tifying how such values of the receiving waterway were
"lessened" given the district court's finding that Laidlaw's
illegal discharges had neither actually hanned nor increased
the risk of harm to the environmcnt.IIZ This finding is some-
what surprising, but no doubt attributable to the limited evi-
dence presented by Friends of the Barth in response to the
motion for summary judgment on standing. The plaintiff
was apparently unable to demonstrate that the permit viobi-
tions had caused violations of the applicable water quality
standards.93 More surprising. though, was the plaintiff's ap-
parent failure to claim injury based on the nature of thc toxic
effects of the pollutant (mercury) or the incrca.~d risk of
89. ~e id. at 705-06. 30 ELR at 20249, where the Court sr.-ncd that:
[TJbe affidavits lIJId testimony p~lJCnted by FOE in this case
assert that Laidlaw's diacharges. and thc affiant members'
n::uonable concems about the effects ofthose dischaTgr:.~. di-
rectly affeeted thoseaftlants I recn::atiolUl1, aesthetic, and ew-
nonW: interests. TbelOe SUbmissions present di~posilively
more than the mere "genenl averments" and "conclusory Ill-
legauon," found inadequate in NGtiorull Wildlife Fedrmfio".
Nor can the affiantll' coftditional statcments-that they
would use the nearby North Tyger River for n:c:rcation if
Laidlaw were not discbargiDg pollutants into it-be eqU3ted
with the speallative "'some day' intentions" lO visit endan-
cered species halfway around the world that we held imuffi-
cieRt to show injury in fllCt in Deftlll:ten of Wildlife.
(Citations omitted.) In this reptd, the mcmberll of Friends of the
Eutb were like the plaiDtiffli in Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American
Cecacean Soc.,478 U.S. 221 (1986), IUIdRobertsoll v. Methow Val-
ley Citizens Council. 490 U.S. 332 (1989). Even Justice Scalia had
notnised any concerns about standing in d\OSe cases bcc;lIu>lC of the
plaintiffs' obvioull interest in the affected resource. See Defenders of
Wildlife v. Lujan. 504 U.S. 555. 573 n.8, 22 ELR 20913.20918-19
0.8 (1992).lbat theLAidJaw Collrtdistinguisbed Defenders n/Wild-
life on this ground makes the earlier decision more "plausible." See
Cass R. Sunstein. What'. Standing After Lujan? Of Cirirc" Suits.
"lnjllneJ, " and Artkle 111,9) Mlot. L. REV. 163.203 (1992) ("iC
theoutcome in [Defrnders o/lVildlife) turnS on the fact that plainliffIi
made: an jnadcqlUtle showing tbat the)' would indeed return to tIll: rel-
eVllJlt sites, the Court'. decision is bardly impIl1Uliible.").
90. See di~ussion 61lpra.
91. Id. at 70s. 30 ELR At 20249 (quoting Sienv Club. 405 U.S. at 735. 2
ELR at 20194).
92. See supra note 86 and accompanying !eXt
93. Su 33 U.S.C. U313, ELR STAT. FWPCA 1303" C/ Friends of the
Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 157,30
ELR 20369, 20372 (4th Cit. ;ZOOO) (en bmlc) (in t"inding in-
jury-in-fact. the court ~liell on the fact that pennitlimitations vio-
lated by the defendant were set at a level needed to ensure willer
qUality standard compliance).
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their OCCuTTcnce givcn the unlawfully increased amounts of
the pollutant in the waterway."
The Coun found an injury-in-fact in Laidlaw by cmploy-
ing the analytic method it had utilized in Akins and by rely-
ing on its own Jong-standing conception of environmental
injury. As we will see, both parts of the Court's analysis
were necessary to its conclusion that Friends of the Earth
had identified a cognizable injury-in-fact. First, thc Court
proceeded as it had inAkins to follow the lead ofCongress in
identifying a copizable injury-in-faet" and held that
The relevant showing for pmposes of Article m
standing ..• is 1101 injlU')' to the environment but itUury to
the plaintiff.To insistupon the fonner rather than the IIlt-
ler as part ofthe standing inquiry ... is to raise the sland-
ing hurdle higher than the necessary showing for success
on the merits in an action allegin& noncompliance with
an NPOES pcnnil.96
The nature of the Coun's analysis-both matter-of-fact and
brief-shows the effect that Akins has had in relating statu-
tory violation to injury-in-fact: injury-in-fact was prescnt
because the effect that Congress sought to prevent by its
statutory requirement-increased pollutant levels in a wa-
terway resulting from the defendant's permit viola-
tions-was felt to be injurious to those who wished to use
the affected local resource.
Akins, of course, did not hold that an Article m in-
jury-in-fact was present simply because the plaintiffs
claimed lhal they werc hanned by the statutory violation.
The Court required that the injury be sufficicntly concrete to
be cognizable under Articlc Ill. This leads to the secondpan
of the Laidlaw Conn's analysis in support of its finding of
Article ill injury-in-fact. Here, the Court relied on the con-
ception ofenvironmental injury to which it has consistendy
adhered and which resulted in the decision that the injury at
issue in Laidklw was concrete. At bottom, Laidlaw demon-
strates very nicely that the Court's conception of environ-
mental injury reflects a property-rule, rather than liabil-
ity-rule, paradigm.\l7 As Judge Calabresi and Mr. Melamed
94. The dil\lrict court foune! that "'[t]he NPDES permit violations at is-
sue in this titiz:cn liuitdid not result in any heMlm risk ......' 120S. Ct.
at 704, 30 ELR at 20247 (quoting 956 F. Supp. al 602, 27 ELR at
2(982). For IJl cxampl~of a c:ase in which the ~laintiffs ~sented
suc:h evidence ofincreased risl. . nfharm due to mcrea.'ieCl pollutant
levels, 5Ce Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at IS7, 30 EtR at 20372.
The LDidlaw Court's c~1usionof an injUly-in.faet would have
been less notewonhy ifthe plaintiffs had adducede"idencc about the
increased ri"k createdby increased levels ofmertury in the receiving
wate~ and tlle Coun hid found an injury bued on that heightened
riU. See Sunstein, nlpra note 89, at 203-04 (arguing thl&t in-
jUlY-in-fact mAy be identifiC'.o ba!lCd on conduct creating en"iton-
mc:ntlll risks); see also Glumn Copper, 204 F.3d at 160, 30 BLR at
20373 ("Threats or iutre.ued risk ... constitutes eo~izable barm.
Threatened enviromnental injuty is by natu~ probab11istic."). For a
discu£sion of·'the 'multiple warhead' nlllUte of the Clean Willet
Act's apPl"OllCh~ to [lirnittngl to;lticpoJlUlion.'· see OliverA. HoucJc.
The Regulation ofToxic Pullulanu Under the Cklm Water Act, 21
ELR 10528, 10528 (Sept. 1991).
95. See SllprQ note 64 and accompanying text.
96. lAidlaw, 120 S. Ct. al704, 30 ELR It 20248.
97. See I/enera/ly Guido Calabresi &. A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules. LiiJbilil)' Rilles. and lnalierwbility: One View of the Cathe-
dlTll, 85 H.uv. L. REV. 1089 (1972). For Ildiscussion ofan environ-
mental contexl in which legislaturc.~ have d.iffercd in theirlldherence
to a property-rule approach rather than liability-rule approach in de-
fining II regulatory ~gjme, 6&~eMichael P. Healy, £nIland's Con-
laminatedumdAetuf1995: PerspectiwsonAmerica·sApproach 10
HazardoUS SubSUUlce Cleanups and EvolVing Principles ofIntlma-
lionaJ lJzw, 13 J. NA1·. Rt:50URCEU< ENVrL. L. 289, 298-99 at n.48
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describe these two lypes of rulcs in their famous article,
when an cntitlement is protected by aproperty rule, its value
is dctermined by the person who holds the entitlement.; that
person will not sell the entitlement unless she receives what
shc believes the entitlement is wonh.9A The authors contrast
this regime with a regime that protects an entitlement by a li-
ability rule; under such a regime, the valuc of the entitle-
mcnt is "objectively detennined" rather than delennincd by
the owncr's SUbjective valuation."
Laidlaw is exceptionally instructive in this regard. because
the case impHcated the issue of injury both at the constitu-
tional threshold of standing and at the later stage or the as-
sigmnent of liability. On the threshold standing issue, the
Court focused on the artieulated belicfor the members of the
plaintiff organization themselves that the local enviromnent
that they planned to use and enjoy ~alionallywas being
banned as a result of the defendant discharging unlawfully
high amounts ofpollutants into the resource. For the Coun,
the important fact is the objective illegal inc..Tea5C in the level
of pollutants in the watelWay: The members' fceling of
aggl'icvement in response to that illegally high~l1ulion level
is then acceptedas "reasonablc" by the Court. I Although the
Courtclaimed that it was demanding objectivity,l°' its lU1aly-
sis reflects an unstated vision ofenvironmental injury thal ac-
cepts the subjectivity of an individual's response to prohib-
ited enviromnental impacts. 1bis is the Court's own under-
standing of injury; it does not arise out of the Court's under-
standing ofthc interests thatConpss intended to protect.10:
(1997-1998) (arguing that England's statutory schcme for cleaning
up hazanlous substances reflects a liability rule, while the American
federal statutoI)' scheme reflects a property rule).
98. See Calabresi &. Melamed, 811plTl note 97, It 1092; ue uuu ill. at
1106-08.
99. 14. 8t1092. See alsn id. at 1106-08 (de£cribing eminent domllin u.~ a
valuation memod mat len" on a liability rule).
100. See ~idlQw, 120 S. Ct. It 706, 30 ELR lit 20249, where the Coun
stated that:
[I]t i& Wldisputed that Laidlaw's unlawful conduet-disch.vg-
ing poUutanlll in eu:ess of permit Iimils-was occurring at the
time the complaintwas filc:d. UnderLyons, IIlen, the (lilly ··'ub-
jcetive:" U;suehere is "(t)he reIIlIOnableness of(the] fc:ur" thIlt led
the affiants to mpond to thnt conceded1y ongoing conduct by
reCrainins from IISC of the North Tyga- River lind SUlTOUnding
o:eas. Unlike the dissent, we see notIUng "improbable" about
the proposition thata c:ompany's <:oIlQn\lOUll and pervasive iDe-
ga! dischaJBes ofpollutants into ariverwouldcause nearby II:si-
dents toewtail lheirrmeationaluse oflhatWIIlerWay and would
subjectmem to othercconomicand aesthetic hmns.nle pr0po-
sition i1 entirely reasonable, the District Coun found it was uue
in this case, and that i~ cllOugh for injlU)' in fact.
(Citation omitted.)
101. See id.
102. TIle Court's own propeny-rule paradigm for understandingenviron·
mental injury may be contrasted with an argument about environ·
mental injury that judge Fletcher presented in his wen-known aJ'tic1e
on Atanding. See Fletcher, 611pro note 26. 1lIere, Judge P1etchcr ar-
gued that the Coun properly demllnded little proof of tbe aClUal
threatened injury in United States v. Students Challenging Regula.
tory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 3 ELR 20536
(1973), becau~ the statutory scheme that plo.intifts relied upon for
protection wa~ the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 42
U.S.C. §§4321-437Od,Eta STAT. NSPA §§2-209. See P1etchcr, SUo
pro note 26, at 259-60. Judge FlelCher arglled that Congress had en·
IICted that statute to compel agencies to develop illfonnati(lll ahaul
the expected environmental impaCl< of their actions lind the Coon
should accordingly limit the requiJed showing of injury-in-f.ct
given that Iltatl1tOl')' purpose, because me agency h llUPf'O"ed to de-
velop that very eVIdence of injury during its environmental revi~w.
/d. JudGe Fletcher recognized that the Coun did not engage in this
analysis. Jd. Ilt 259.
K-9
30ELR 10464 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER. 6-2000
Justice Scalia's criticism in Laidlaw that the plaintiffs'
grievance is widely shared and thus generalized because the
plaintiffs failed to adduce evidence ofobjective harm to the
environmentlOJ-proof, for example, that the excess merM
cury discharged by Laidlaw resulted in the hospitalization
ofchildren or caused dead or injured I1Sh-was beside the
point for the majority: The majority believed that environ-
mental injury for Article m purposes follows from prop-
ertyMrule subjectivity, rather than Iustice Scalia's liabil-
ityMrule objectivity. For the Supreme Court and the district
court in Laidlaw, that concern about objective indicia of
harm, of which there was none, was defined by Con;ress to
be a factor in c;alculating the amount of the penalty (i.e., the
liabiIi~)I04; it was not determinative of the standing ques-
tion.1 The Court's analysis of injuryMin-faet in Laidlaw is
consistent with the approach that Justice Scalia (ironically)
had presented for the Coun in Defenders of Wildlife. I06
There, in response to Iustice Blackmun,s complaint that
the Court's narrow limit on the parties that could demon-
strate injury-in-facl would necessitate a very specific de-
scription of actual injury in a loss of consortium case be-
fore standing could be found, lin Justice Scalia had distin-
guished the requisite proof of injury for standing, which
looks to the existence vel non of injury, from the proof of
injury for liability, which depends on the precise extent of
jnjury and is considered in the damages aspect of the
case.11II Because Friends of the Earth proved in Laidlaw
that its members were personally affected by the increased
103. See ill. at 714,30 ELR at 20252 (Scalia, J., dislleDling):
At the very least, in the present case. one would expect to sec
evidence supponing the affidavits' bald assenions n:garding
decreasing recteIltional USilge and declinin~ bome values, IS
well as e'..idellec for the improbable proposition that
Laidlaw's violations. even though hannless to the mviron-
ment, are somehow responsible for these effects.
(Citation oinitted.)
104. See lAidlaw, 120 S. Ct.1ll70!, 30 ELR 11120247 ("In deleniDg the
amount ofany civil penalty, the dislriet eowt must ta" into lICCOUnt
'the seriou5llClls of the violation or violations••..to, (quotil:l& 33
U.S.C. §1365(d»); Friends of the Eanh v. Laidlaw Envtl. SeNS.
(TOC), Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588, 602-03, 27 ELR 20976. 20982
(D.S.C. 1997) (evaluating the extent of"demonsttated advenc affixt
[sic) onthe envUomnent'· in determining the amount ofthe civilpen-
alty). rev·don otMrgrounds. 149F.3d 303, 28 ELR 21444(4thCir.
1998),rnJ'amlothergTOlArW.12OS.Ct.693,30ELR20246(2000).
lOS. Congress' dcci!>ion to employ a liability rule for determinin, the
penalty for lIiolations is consistent with the view of Calabral and
Melamed Chat sucha rule "facilitates acombinaliOllofefficiencyand
distributive n:sults wbich wouldbe difficult to achieve under a prop-
erty rule." Calabresi &. Melamed. supra note 97, at 1110.
106. S~DefeN1mofWjld1ife,504U.S.at564n.2.22ELRat20916n.2.
107. Ste /d. at 593, 22 ELR al20924 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (l14der
the Coun's approach to iAjury-in-fact, "a Federal Ton Claims Act
plaintiffalleging loss ofconsonhnn should make sure to fumiah diiA
Court with a 'de£cription ofCOftaete plans' for ber nightly schedule
of attempted activities.").
108. Set id. at S64 n.2, 22 ELR It 20916 n.2:
Our insistenc:e upon 'hcse established requirements of
,tIlftdinS does not meOUl that we would. as lhc dissent f;Qn-
tend!;. "demllnd ... det1il~descriptioos" of damages. 5veh
as a "nighdy liChedule ot 8ltm1lpted activities" from plain-
tiffs alleging 1055 of eon~ortium.Thllt case and the others
posited by the dissent all involve QctllQl harm; the existenee
of standing is clear, though the precise extent of hann re-
mains to be determined at trial. Where there b no actual
harm. however, its imminence (though not its pn:cise ex-
tent) must be estabUshed.
(Citation omitted.)
pollution levels because of their intended use of the im-
pacted resource, the Court concluded that injury-in-fact
was present under the CWA-proof of its precise extent
was relevant only to the penalty.
This approach of the Laidlaw majority in accepting the
injury to plaintiffs as cognizable under Article III because it
is subjectively concrete thus conforms to previous environ-
mental standing decisions ofthe Court. For the Court, j ust as
a claimant is injured-in-fact when a forest she uses will have
fewer trees because ofthe action beinS challenged as unlaw-
ful, a claimant is injured when a waterway shc uses ha...
higher pollution levels becausc of NPDES permit viola-
tions.1n the fonner context, the Court has never required the
plaintiff to show either the specific trees that would be re-
moved by the govenunent action or that removal of those
specific trees would objectively impair the area's aesthetics
by, for example, offending a reasonable observer of nature
or reducing the market value of the property. In the pennit
violation context. of course, a claimant meeting the proper
party requirements ofNational Wildlife Federation and De-
fenders' ofWildlife is by definition able to demonstrate that
the resource of interest has illegally hiSh pollutant levels;
the Laidlaw Court's decision conformed to its earlier hold-
ings thatpro()foffurtherharm was not necessary to show in-
jury-in-facLt09
In shon. the Court's injury-in-fact analysis in Laidlaw is
important for two reasons. First, the Court again decided to
follow Congress'lead by accepting as an injury-in-fact un-
der Article m an effect that is more clearly injurious be-
cause it is " legal violation. As in Akins, the Coun did not
hold that Congress hadpower to define injuries that arc cog-
nizable under Miele UI.J10 On the other hand, Laidlaw also
did not undermine the CWA regulatory scheme by holding
that. notwithstanding the broadly prolective purposes of the
CWA, III a citizen suit claimant is able lO bring an action
109. The decree to which the Laidlaw re5ult is bounded in Ihis n:spcct de-
pends on the environmental medium affected by the unla\\1'u1 pollu-
tion, Other waterways may be less bounded thin the waterwlY at is-
sue: in lAidlGw. Foreumple. the COW't's decision that the plaintiff
demOllSlrated iDjwy-iA-fact in Friends ofthe E:ulh v. Olston Copper
Recycling Corp. was based on its view that excessive pollutant lev-
els re.ulting!Tom the derendant's permit violations aftetted a Mdis_
chArge zone" extending 16.5 miles from a lab into which the defen-
dant'seftluent flOwed. See 204 f.3<1149, 158, 30 ELR 20369,20373
(4th Cir. 2000). Because the p1aintirr~ property wa~ well within chill
area, 'he court concluded chill the pillintiff suffered injury-in-f·acl.
See /d. When ail is the affected medium, the effc:ets an: far les.~
bounded. See infra note 126.
110. The LDidUzw COllrt thus did not make the argull'lent Chat the coun
seemed to make in Gaston Copper. Tbcn:, when the Founh Circuil
explained its eonelusion thllt the plaintiff demonstrated in-juty-U1-fact, the court suggested a willingRC5S to find an Article m
injutY-in-faet liimply on the basis of a swulOry violation. SL'e 204
F.3d at 163, 30 ELR at 20375:
To deny 5tanding to Shealy here ,",ould further thwart con-
gressional intentbyn:en:ating the old SySlem orwater qualily
standards whose failure led to the enactment of the Clean
Water Act in the fIrSt place. An imponant reason for Con-
gress' shift to end-of-pipe stllftdards was to eUminate the
need to addn:ss complex question" of environmental abase-
ment llIld scientifie ttacc:ability in enforcement proceedings.
(Citation omitted.)
111. OIle purpose of the CWA is to move toward the zero discharge of
pollutants into waters of the: United State~. See 33 U.S.C.
§1251(a)(l), ELR STAT. fWPCA §lOl(a)(l) ("lIJt is the nationll
golal thllt the dillChllClC of pollUWlts into the navisable walen; be
eliminated by 1985.").
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only upon proof that the pennit violations are causing water
quality standard violations, orsome otherobjective harm.
Second, because the Court decided to accept the statutory
injury in Laidlaw as cognizable under Artiele mand be-
cause the district court made the fact-finding that the statu-
tory violation caused no measurable environmental degra-
dation, the Court had to identify more clearly the limits of
Article m injury in this environmental eontexL The Coon
accepted as sufficiently concrete an injury that arises be-
cause ofa subjective response to inegally high pollution lev-
els. The Court's acceptance improves our understanding of
the contours of Article m injury-in-fact, because the case
demonstrates that aggrievement as a result of a statutory vi·
olation is sufficient when it lessens environmental value to
users of the affected resource, even ifit is lessened only as II
subjective mattcr.112
This conception of injury-in-fact is arguably both nar-
rower and broader than the injury detennined to be cogniza-
ble inAkins. It is narrower because in Laidlaw the aggrieved
plaintiffhad tobe a proper party by showing that the subjec-
tive injury resulting {Tom illegalJy high Jevels of pollution
actually affected a particular resource used by the plaintiff.
Only those using this resource would have standing to assert
the subjective injury. In contrast, the class of those who
might claim an injury due to nondisclosure of infonnation
underAkinsdoes not seem similarly constrained: any person
can claim an interest in infonnation the disclosure ofwhich
is required by the statute and Akins accordingly appears
broader than Laidlaw. 1I3 Laidlaw, though, is arguably
broader than Akins along a different axis. Laidlaw does not
require any proofof objective. that is measurable, environ-
mental degradation. Laidlaw would thus appear to pennit
any person with a proper interest in a resource affected by
pollution levels that are illegally high as a result of defen-
dant's statutory violations to show injury-in-fact as long as
the person feels injured by that higher level of pollution.
lhis aspect of Laidlaw may be seen as broader than AIcins,
because the injury-in-fact in Akins was grounded on a depri-
vation ofactual infonnation claimed to be important to vot-
ing. Thus. Akins defines a largely unbounded class of per-
sons who would he able to claim injury, while Laidlaw de-
fines actual injury in a way that appears unbounded once a
proper piUty demonstrates a statutory violation.
Redressability in Cirizen Suit Cases
Unlike the injury-in-fact context, where the recent Akins
precedent was available to help the plaintifrs claim for
standing, recent precedent in the redressability context was
112. In 5om~ Cl&SCli, proofof0statutory violation may necessitate proofof
actual hann to the environment. Forexample. 0 plaintiffmay bring a
citizen suit based on a claim that the defendant's discbatse ofpollut.
Qn1S bas caused a violation of state water quulity ~tlIIldards. whim
compliance with water quality standards is a condition of the defen-
donl·s NPDES permit. For a discussion of the &lalutory
pennili~ibilily of such citizen suits, see Michael P. Healy. Srill Din1
After 1'wellry-Fiv~ Y~ar,,: Warrr Quality Standard Enforcement
and tile Availabilityo!Cilkrfl Suir.r. 24 ECOLOCY 1..Q.393 (1997).
In that circumstance. proof of the ..latutory violation would be
sufficient for Anicle 111 injury without.ny need (0 rely on subjec.
tive: pe:rceptions.
113. 1bedegree to Which the Laidlaw result i~ bounded in this respect de-
pends 011 the environmental medium affected by the unlawful pollu-
tion. The air mc:dium ill, for example, far leu bounded than a river.
Set infI'Q note 126.
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far Jess favorable. The Court in Steel Co. had only recently
relied on a lack of redressability to hold that there was no
standing when the plaintiffwas complaining about past vio-
lations of an environmental reporting Statute.ll• In particu-
lar. the Coon had concluded that payment ofcivil penalties
to Ihe federal fisc would not redress the plaintiff's injury by
giving them psychic satisfaction.' IS
Perhaps because the plaintiff in Sreel Co. had not claimed'
that there was a likelihood of future statutory violations
given the company's prior failures to submit the required re-
ports, the Steel Co. Court never specifically rejected the ar-
gument that civil penalties were sufficient redress due to the
deterrence of future violations.II' The factual context of the
claim in Laidlaw differed significantly from Steel Co. in this
regard. Because of the convergence ofthe Court's statutory
decision in Gwaltney that a CWA citizen suit is forward
looking with the mOOb1ess doctrine, which provides that "a
defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a
case bears the fonnidable burden ofshowing that it is abso-
lutely clear the allegedly wron~uJ behavior could not rea-
sonablybe expected to recur,"u the Laidlaw plaintiffs had a
live claim based on the violations at th(, umc thc claim was
flIed unless the defendant met its "formidabJe burden" of
showing thatpennit violations would not recur in the future.
It was-in this contextofthe reasonable threat that future inju-
ries would result from pennit violations that. the Laidlaw
Court considered whether civil penalties offered sufficient
redress for the plaintiffs.II.
In this context, the Court thought it straightforward
that penalties provide reasonable deterrence against fu-
ture violations and accordingly redress injuries that result
from violations:
It can scarcely be doubled tha~ for a plaintiff who is
injured or faces the threat offuture injUI)' due (0 illegal
114. Steel Co. ill diseuatiW mpra at notes 6,5.75 and accompanying text.
I IS. see sup", note 74 and accompanyins text
116. Justice SCalia disagreed with this reading of Strel Co.• amI he con-
tended. when clislICnting in lAidlaw, that Suel Co. had decided the
redress queatiOD. See 504 U.S. at 71S, 30 ELR at 20253 ("Only Illlit
Term. we held that such penalties do nol redre!i~W1)' injury 0 citizen
plaintiff has suffered from past violations.").
I 17. 120 S. Ct. at 709,30 ELR at 20250 (cilation omi~). The CoW1 ex-
plained in thill regard that"therearecircumstanees in Which tbe pros-
pect that a defendant wID engage in (or ~sume) harmful conduct
may be too speculative to support lltandin~. butnot too speculative to
overcome mootness." Id. This greater willingness to pennit resolu-
tion of a pending case than to lIlOCepl a ease lU the Ol.llset reflects in
part the value or judicial efficiency:
Standing doctrine functions to ensure, among other
tbings. that the scarce resources ofthe fedenl.l courtli are de-
voted to those disputes in which the parties have a concrete
stake. In contnP,5t, by the time mootness is an issue. the case
has been brought and litigated. oflen (as here) for years. To
abandon the case at an advanced IIt1lse mil)' prove more
wosleful than frugal.
Id. at 710, 30 BLR at 20250.
118. This contelllual difference was the ground on which the LAidlaw
Court distinguished Steel Co. See Laidww. 120 S. Ct at708. 30 ELR
at 20249-50:
In ahort, Srrel Co. held that private plaintiffs. unlike the Fcd·
eral Government. may not sue to assess penalties for ~1Jol1y
pastViolations. but our decision in that caae did not reOlCh the
issue of SWldinS to seek penalties for violatirmllihat are on-
soint ollhe timeofthe complaintand that could continue intn
the future if undeterred.
(Footnote omit~.)
30 ELR 10466 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 6-2000
conductongoing at the time ofsuit, a sanction !hateffec-
tively abates that cOnduct and prevents its 1"eCurTeDCe
provides aform ofredress. Civil penalties can fit that de-
scription. To the extent that they encourage defendants
to discontinue current violations and deter them from
commiaing future ones, they afford redress to citizen
plaintiffs who are injured or threatened wi!h injUl)' as a
consequence ofongoing unlawful conduc1.119
In addition to relying on the inherent plausibility of the
deterrent effect ofpenalties, the Coun supported its conclu-
sionofdeterrenteffect by Jeference to pJevious decisions of
the Court.''ll Perhaps more impottantly in the context ofits
conclusion that Article mstanding was present, lhe Court
twice relied on Congress' own detennination that the civil
pcna.lties available under the CWA would deter future viola-
tions.UI The Laidlaw decision thereby built upon the
Court's approach in Akins and the analysis ofinjury-in-faet
in Laidlaw itself. which followed Congress' lead in identi-
fying an injury cognizable under Article III. by relying on a
congressional detennination of deterrence to find constim-
tionally adequate redress. l22 The Laidlaw Court thus effec-
tively held that, by both providing that civil penalties are
available in the forward-looking CWA citizen suit and find-
ing that civil penalties deter future violations, Congress has
provided at least the pep~rcom of redress that the Coon
found lacking inSteel Co. 123 Pinally. the Coon supported its
119. ld. at 706-07, 30 ELR at 20249.
120. See id. at 706. 30 ELR at 20249 ("We. have recognized on numerollS
ocQSiOlls that 'all Livil penll1ti~s hav~ some detetrent effect:")(cita-
1i000s omitted).
12t. Sa id. at 707. 30 ELR at 20049:
Congress has found that civil penaltie5 in Clean WatJ:r Act
~s do more than promote immediatc: compliance by limit-
iIIg the defendanfs «onomic incentive. 10 delay itll Allain-
rnent of permit limits: they also deter future violations. This
eongrl:ssiolULl dl:te:nninatioa WlU'tllnu judicial attention
and respect.
tilt is rcawnabll: for Congress to conclude that an actual
award ofcivil penalties docs in fac:t briDi with it a aigaificant
quantum of deterrence over and above wbat is achie.vcd by
theme~pnnpc:ct ofsuch penalties. A would-be pollutermay
or may not be dissuaded by the existence of a remedy on the
books, bUl 01 defeadant once hit in its pocketbook will sUJ'CJy
Ihink twice before polluting again.
ltl. (footnote: omiued).
12:z. For Justice Scalia in dissent, this extension of the ti/dns rationale
meant tMt the Coun·s impro~'rallowanceofiTljury-in-faetbasedon
• gcncn.lizcd grievance in Akin$W8~ now extended to an unconstitu-
rional recognitionofgener:l1ized redress. Id. at716,30£LR at20253
(5c:a1ia. J~ dissentinc): .
Just as a "ceneralized grif:vanc:e·' that affects the entire citi-
z:cmy cannot ~ati~fy the injury-in-fact requirement even
Ibougb it aggrieves the pl.intiff .Iong ",;th everyone else, so
allio a generalized remedy that deters aU future unlawful ac-
tivity against all persons cannot satisfy the remediation re-
quiremenl. even though it deters (among other things) repeti-
tion of this pllJ1ieuJar unlawful activity against these particu-
lar plaintiff'~.
(Citation omittc:d.)
123. See slIpra note 75 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia Will ad-
amant in bis "'lew that Congre!ts ha'l nO lIulhority under the con-
stitvtional "tructun: to make 01 civil penalty serve tbc purpose of
the peppercorn:
In seeltinl to overturn tblt tradition by givinS llII individual
plaintiff !he power to invc.ke a public remedy, Congress has
done prcciliely what W~ have said it C<lMot do: convert an
intuitive view that penalties would provide redress by rely-
ing on the fact that the district court had factored the deter-
rent effectofthe penalty on Laidlaw when it fixed lhe proper
amount of Laidlaw's civil penalty.l:U
For the Court. therefore, this was lite "ordinary case" in
which penalties would be reasonably expected to yield de-
terrence of future violations that would give rise to in-
jury-in-fact to the plaintiff.12$
Conclusion
An told when read in the light of recent standing cases,
Laidlaw is very much a clarification ofhow that law applies
in the context of likely fututc violations of statutory stan-
dards intended to protect against pollution of the environ-
ment. The case does not establish ncw doctrine, but rathcr
extends the Akins rationale to define a cognilable in-
jury-in-fact to the context ofenviromnental injury. The ca~
also coDiums the Court's propeny-IUle paroldi1.7JI\ for identi-
fying environmental injury, so that measurable degradation
in environmental or health quality is not necessary to dem-
onstrate injury-in-fact. Laidlaw's effect therefore is to focus
claimants in environmental citizen suits on demonstrating
that they are proper parties by showing a Teal inLCrcst in the
resource or environmental amenity being arfcCLCd by the
"undifferenti~ publiC interest" into an "individual right"'
vindicable in the courts. The \lOrt of sca~l'Sbot redress ap-
proved today makes nonsense ofounllltc:mentin Schl~nnger
... R~s~l'\IulJ Comm. to Srop rhe War that the requirement of
injury in foct "inaures the framing of reUef no broader than
rcquiJ'Cd by the precise. fllClS." A claim ofparticularized fu-
ture injury has today been madl: the vehicle (or pur~uing
generalized penalties for past violations. and a thre~hold
.howing of injury in foct has become a lever that will move
thc world.
t20 S. Ct. at 71&-17,30 EU at 20153 (citations omitted); see also
id. at 717, 30 ELR at 20253 ("[I)l is my view that a plaintiff'"s desire
to benefit from the detencnt cff~ of Il public penally for pasl con-
duct can never sufrlCl to establish a case or controversy of the son
known to our law.j.
124. Id. It 707, 30 ELR at 20249:
Here, th<: c:ivi) penalties sought by FOE ClItried with them a
deterrent effect that made it liGly, as opposed to merely
llpeculative, that th~ penalties would redJess poe's injuries
by abating current violatiollll and preventin2 future ones-as
the Disaict Court reasonably found wh~n it a~sed II ~n­
alty of $405.800.
(Cilation omitted.)
125. S~, id.
We. recognize that thcJ'C may be II point Al which the deterrenl
effect of a claim for civil penalties become. ~o in~ubslllntial
or so remote that it cannot suppon citizen standiTlg. The fact
that this vanishing point is not easy to ascertain does 1I0t de·
tract from the deterrent power of MUch pelUlltil:l; in the ordi-
nary case.
Justice Scalia ridiculed the idea that the CIL'IC cuuld be ~'iewed as an
ordinary one for purposes of tbe value ofdeterrence for the plaintiff.
Id. at 7J8. 30 ELR at 20254 (Scalia, J., dissenting):
(Ilfthis case is, as the Court SU&;Ce&ts. within the central core
of' "deterrence" stlnding, it i!l imponible 10 imacine what
the "outer limits" could possibly be. Thc Court's expn:!i~l:d
reluctance. to define those "outer limits·' serves only lo.dis·
guise the fact that it hll. promulgated 01 revolutionary new
doctrine ofstanding that ""ill pennit lbe entire body of pub.
lic civil penalties to be banded ovcr to cnfoJ'Ccment by pri-
vate: inlerestfl.
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statutory violation. m FinalJy as to the Article III
redrcssability requirement. lAidlaw wholly marginalizes
126. The limits of the Court's willingness to find iII)mY-in-fact in suc;h
suit~ may be more likely to be identified in auzat suits under the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §i7401-7671q, ELR ST4T. CAA
§§l01-618, where the affected resource is far less c:abined than a wa-
terway and the pennit violaticlns have 8t$uable effects in arcaJ that
lite far disrant from where the source IS located. Reglll'ding the
uncabined Dature of air qualil)' impac:ts. see P. Wn.UAMSON " P,S.
Lrss. Under.rranding tM EtJrth $y$fDll. In Poucy MAImIG IN AN
EM OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 23 (R.E.. Munn,
J.W.M.la Riviere &. N. van Loomcn Camplgne eels.. 1996);
In cvcl')' breath we take there life around tOI' atorna of oxy-
gen; it ill therefore a statistical near-conaint)' that It IClISt one
ofthese oxygen atom has been previously breathed by Con-
fucius-and UlOlher by Albert Einstein, or anyone else who
lived more than a few decades ago (to allow for worldwidc
mWni within the almosphere).
Cf. Bonk over Older Coul Plants Widens CIS Starts File Theil' Own
CleanAirActSuits, 1999UnL ENV'T REP. (McOraw-HilJ),Dce. 3,
1999, at I (describing actions brought by nottheutem .tates claim-
ing violations by midwcstcrll power plants ofnew source permit reo
30 ELR 10467
Steel Co. by eoncludins that the civil penalties that Con-
gresS provides in citizen suits offer sufficient redres~ by de-
terring future violations (that must be threatened in any
event to avoid mooOlC5s).lZ7
quirements based on ozone impacts in the northeastern stilles). The
SCRAP Coun slIgg"ted that cheremay be prismatic Iim~tson stand-
ittgwhen an lICtion with In allegedly unlawful cnvironmental impact
hal an exceptionally widespread impact, at IC&Ht when the impact is
"less direct and perceptible:' See United Stutes v. Studc:nlS Chal-
lenging Regulatol)' ASeDcy Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669.3
ELR 20536 (1973). Cf. ArlamJas v. Oldahoma. 503 U.S. 91, 112
(1992) (upholdins EPA interpretation ofCWAregulations requiting
a showing that a source's discharae caused a "detectable change in
water quality" 39 miles downstream ~fore more Iilringent willer
quality-baled limitations would be requlred.
127. lbe lAidlaw Coun thereby limited the cffect ofSteel Co. to the nar-
row circumstances ofa citizec suit based on I wholly past viollllion.
M utatutorymaUcr, the Courthl1d,ofc:ourse, previousl,y foreclosed
.ucb action. under the CWA. ~e Gwaltney or Smithflcld. Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 6+65,18 ELR 20142, 20145
(1987).
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Environmental groups brought action
pursuant to citizen suit provision of Clean
Water Act (CWA) against holder of Na-
tional Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit, alleging, inter
alia, \iolation of mercury diicharge limits,
and seeking declaratory and injunctive re-
lief, civil penalties, costs, and attorney
fees. The United States District Court for
the District of South Carolina, Joseph F.
Anderson, Jr., J., 956 F.Supp. 588, found
numerous permit violations, bnposed pen-
alty of $405,800, and denied request for
declaratory and injunctive relief. Appeal
was taken. The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, 149 F.3d 303, vacated and
remanded ",ith instructions to dismiss.
Certiorari was granted. The Supreme
Court, Justice Ginsburg, held that: (1)
groups had standing to bring citizen suit
seeking both injunctive relief and civil pen-
alties; (2) action was not rendered moot by
permit holder's compliance with permit
limits or its shut down of facility, absent
showing that violations could not reason-
ably be expected to recur; and (3) Supreme
Court would not address groups' request
for attorneys' fees.
Judgment of Court of Appeals re-
versed and remanded.
Justice Stevens med concurring opin-
ion.
Justice Kennedy med concurring opin-
ion.
Justice Scalia med dissenting opinion
in which Justice Thomas joined.
1. Health and Environment e=>25.15(4.l)
Purpose of notice to the alleged viola-
tor, under Clean Water Act's citizen suit
provision, is to give violator an opportunity
to bring itself into complete compliance
\\ith the Act and thus render unnecessary
a citizen suit. Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, § 505(a), (b)(l)(A), (g), as
amended, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1365(a),
(b)(I)(A), (g).
2. Health and Environment e=>25.15(U)
Citizens lack statutory standing under
Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision to
sue for violations that have ceased by the
time the complaint Is med. Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, § 505(a), as amend-
ed, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a).
3. Federal Civil Procedure 4=tlO3.2, 103.3
To satisfy Article Ill's standing re-
quirements, a plaintiff must show: (1) It
has sufl'ered an injury in fact that is con-
crete and particularized and is actual or
bnminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant; and (3)
it is likely, as opposed to merely apecula-
tive, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision. U.B.C.A. Const. Art. 3,
§ 2,cLl.
4. Associations e=>20(l)
An association has standing to bring
suit on behalf of its memben when its
memben would otherwise have standing to
sue in their own right, the Interests at
stake are germane to the organization's
purpose, and neither the clabn asserted
nor the relief requested requires the par-
tkIpation of Individual memben In the law-
suit. U.B,C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1•
5. Health and Environment e=>25.15(U)
Environmental groups alleged suffi-
cient Injury in fact to establish standing to
seek injunctive relief In action against
holder of National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit for
alleged violation·of mercury discharge JIm-
Its, punuant to citizen suit provision of
Clean Water Act (CWA), e\'en if there was
no resulting injury to the environment, as
group memben alleged that, although they
would like to use affected river for recre-
ational purposes, they would not do so due
to permit holder's alleged discharges.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.; Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, § 505(a, g),
as amended, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a, g).
6. Health and Environment e=>25.15(3.3)
Environmental plaintiff's adequately
allege injury In fact, for standing purposes,
when they aver that they use the affected
area and are penons for whom the aesth-
etic and recreational values of the area will
be lessened by the challenged activity.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.
7. Health and Environment e=>25.15(4.5)
Environmental groups had standing
to seek civil penalties In action against
holder of National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System·(NPDES) permit for
allegedly ongoing violation of mercury dis-
charge limits, pursuant to citizen suit pro-
vision of Clean Water Act (CWA), even
~
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though such penalties are paid to govern-
ment, not private plaintiff's, since penalties
would encourage pennit holder to discon-
tinue current violations and deter it from
committing future ones. U.S.C.A. Const.
Art. 3, § 2, cL 1.; Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, § 505(a, g), as amended, 33
U.S.C.A. § 1365(a, g).
8. Federal Civil Procedure e=tl03.2
A plaintiO' must demonstrate standing
separately Cor each Corm oC relief BOught.
9. Federal Courts e=t13.25
Neither National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) pennit hold-
er's substantial compliance with its pennit
nor its subsequent shutdown oC hazardous
waste incinerator Cacility from which it
discharged pollutants rendered moot envi-
ronmental groups' citizen suit, under Clean
Water Act, seeking clviI penalty Cor ,iola-
tion oC pennit's mercury discharge limits,
absent clear showing that violations could
not reasonably be expected to recur, not-
withstanding groups' failure to appeal dis-
bict court's denial oC injunctive relief.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
§ 505(a, g), as amended, 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1365(a, g).
10. Federal Courts e=t12.1
A defendant's voluntary cessation oC a
challenged practice does not deprive aCed-
eral court oC its power to determine the
legality oC the practice under the mootness
doctrine; if it did. the courts would be
compelled to leave the defendant Cree to
return to his old ways.
11. Federal Courts e=t12.1
A ease might become moot based on a
deCendant's voluntary conduct if subse-
quent events made it absolutely clear that
the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur, but the
heavy burden oC persuading the court that
thti challenged conduct cannot reasonably
be expected to start up again lies with the
party asserting mootness.
12. Federal Civil Procedure ¢::>103.2
In a lawsuit brought to Corre compli-
ance, it is the plaintiff's burden to establish
standing by demonstrating that, if ,un-
checked by the litigation, the deCendant's
allegedly wrongful behavior wi11likely 0c-
cur or continue, and that the threatened
injury is certainly impending.
13. Federal Civil Procedure e=tl03.2
Federal Courts e=t12.1
There are circumstances in which the
prospect that a deCendant wl11 engage in or
resume harmful conduct may be too specu-
lative to support standing, but not too
s~tive to overcome mootness.
14. Federal Courts e=t13
When a mentally disabled patient files
a lawsuit challenging her confinement in a
segregated institution, her posteomplaint
transfer to a community-based program
wl11 not moot the action, despite the fact
that she would have lacked initial standing
had she filed the complaint after the trans-
Cer.
15. Federal Civil Procedure e=tl03.2
If a plaintiO'larks standing at the time
the action commences, the fact that the
dispute is capable oC repetition yet evading
review wl11 not entitle the complainant to a
Cederal judicla1 Corum.
16. Federal Courts e=t12.1
Disbict Courts cannot retain jurisdic-
tion over case8 iii which 'one or bOth'oC the
parties plainly lacks a continuing inti!rest,
as when the parties have settled or a plain-
tiff pursuing a nonsurviving claim has died,
notwithstanding the sunk costs to the judi-
clalsystem.
17. Health and Environment e=t25.15(12)
Under Clean Water Act's citizen suit
provision, the disbict court has discretion
to determine which Corm oC relief is best
suited, in the particular ease, to abate cur-
rent violations and deter future ones.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
§ 505(a), as amended, 33 U.S.CA
§ 1365(a).
18. Injunction e=tl
A Cederal judge sitting as chancellor is
not mechanically obligated to grant an in-
junction Cor every violation or law.
19. Health and Environment e=t25.7(24)
Denial oC injunctive reUeC in action
brought under Clean Water Act's citizen
suit provision does not necessarily mean
that the district court has concluded there
is no prospect or future violations Cor clviI
penaltles'to deter. Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, § 505(a, g), as amended,
33 U.s.C.A. § 1365(8, g).
20. Federal Civil Procedure e=t2582
Federal courts should aim to ensure
the framing oC relieC no broader than re-
quired by the precise Cacta.
21. Health ,and Environment
e=t25.15(2.1)
A district court in a Clean Water Act
citizen suit properly may conclude that an
injunction would be an excessively intru-
sive remedy, because it could entail con-
tinuing superintendence oC the pennit
holder's activities by a Cederal court, which
is a proreas burdensome to court and per-
mit holder alike. Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, f 505(a), as amended, 33
U.S.C.A. f 1365(a).
22. Federal Courts e=t460.1
Supreme Court would not address
plaintlft's entitlement to attorneys' Cees un-
der catalyst theory, on appeal from dis-
missal Cor mootness oC citizen suit under
Clean Water Act, but would have disbiet
court addreas request Cor Cees in the first
instance, where district court had stayed
time Cor petition Cor attorneys' Cees untn
time Cor appeal had expired or, if either
party appealed, untn appeal was resolved.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
f 505(d), as amended, 33 U.s.C.A.
§ 1365(d).
• The syUabus constitutes no part of Ihe opinion
of Ihe Court but has been prepared by Ihe
Reporter of Decisions for Ihe convenience of
8"Ualnu •
Defendant-respondent Laidlaw Envi-
ronmental Services (TOC), Inc., bought a
Cacllity in Roebuck, South Carolina, that
included a wastewater treatment plant.
Shortly thereafter, the South Carolina De-
partment oC Health and Environmental
Control (DHEC), acting under the Clean
Water Act (Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(I),
granted Laidlaw a National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System (NPDES) per-
mit. The permit authorlzed Laidlaw to
discharge treated water into the North
Tyger River, but limited, among other
things, the discharge oC pollutants into the
waterway. Laidlaw began to discharge
various pollutants Into the waterway;
these discharges, particularly oC mercury,
an extremely toxic pollutant, repeatedly
eiceeded the limits set by the pennit.
On Aprlll0, 1992, plaintifT-petitioners
Friends or the Earth and Citizens Local
Environmental ActIon Network, Inc. (re-
Cerred to collectively here, along with later
joined plaintifT-petitioner Sierra Club, as
"FOE"), notified Laidlaw oC their intention
to file a citizen suit against it under the
Act, 33 U.s.C. § 1365(a), after the expira-
tion oC the requisite 6O-day notice period.
DHEC aeceded to Laidlaw's request to file
a lawsult against the eornpany. On the
last day before FOE's 6O-day notice peri-
od expired, DHEC and Laidlaw reached a
settlement requiring Laidlaw to pay $100,-
000 in clviI penalties and to make "every
effort" to comply with its permit obli-
gations.
On June 12, 1992, FOE filed this citi-
zen suit against Laidlaw, alleging n!'ncom-
pliance with the NPDES permit and seek-
ing declaratory and Injunctive relief and an
award oC civil penalties. Laidlaw moved
Cor summary judgment on the ground that
FOE lacked Article III standing to bring
the lawsuit. After examining aCfida,its
and deposition testimony from members oC
the plaintiff organizations, the District
Ihe reader. See UJlit~d Slales v. D~lro;t Tim-
ber &- Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321. 337, 26 S.Ct.
282, SO LEd. 499.
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Court denied the motion, finding that the
plaintiffs had standing. The District
Court also denied Laidlaw's motion to di&-
miss on the ground that the citizen suit
was barred under' § 1365(b)(l)(B) by
DHEC's prior action against the company.
After FOE initiated this suit, but before
the District Court rendered judgment on
January 22, 1997, Laidlaw violated the
mercury discharge limitation in ita permit
13 times and committed 13 monitoring and
10 reporting violations. In Issuing ita
judgment, the District Court found that
Laidlaw had gained a total economic bene-
fit of $1,092,581 as a result of its extended
period of noncompliance with the permit's
mercury discharge limit; nevertheless, the
court concluded that a civil penalty of
$405,800 was appropriate. In particular,
the District Court found that the judg-
ment's "total deterrent effect" would be
adequate to forestall future violations, giv-
en that Laidlaw would have to reimburse
the plaintiffs for a significant amount of
legal fees and had itself incurred signifi-
cant legal expenses. The court declined to
order injunctive relief because Laidlaw, af-
ter the lawsuit began. had achieved sub-
stantial compliance with the terms of its
permit.
FOE appealed as to the amount of the
District Court's civil penalty judgment, but
did not appeal the denial of declaratory or
injunctive relief. The Fourth Circuit va-
cated the District Court's order and re-
manded with Instructions to dismiss the
action. Assuming, arguendo. that FOE
initially had standing, the appellate court
held that the case had become moot once
Laidlaw complied with the terms of its
permit and the plaintiffs failed to appeal
the denial of equitable relief. Citing Steel
Co. 11. Citizem frn Better Environment,
523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d
210, the court reasoned that the only rem-
edy currently available to FOE, civil penal-
ties payable to the Government, would not
redress any injury FOE had suffered.
The court added that FOE's failure to
obtain relief on the merits precluded re-
covery of attomeys' fees or costs because
such an award is available only to a "pre-
vailing or substantially prevailing party" .
under § 1365(d). According to Latdlaw,
the entire Roebuck facility has since been
permanently closed, dismantled, and put
up for sale, and all discharges from the
facility have permanently ceased. .
Held: The Fourth Circuit erred in
concluding that a citizen suitor's claim for
ci\it penalties must be dismissed as moot
when the defendant, after commencement
of the litigation, has come into compliance
with its NPDES permit. pp. 703-712..
(a) The Constitution's case-or-conb'o-
veray limitation on federal judicial authori-
ty, Art. III, § 2, underpfnB both standing
and mootness doctrine, but the two inqui-
ries differ in crucial respects. Because the
Fourth Circuit was persuaded that the
case had become moot, it simply assumed
that FOE had initial standing. See Arizo-
nans frn Offl.Cial English 11. Arizona, 520
U.S. 43, 66-67, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d
170. But because this Court concludes
that the Court of Appeals erred as to
mootness, this Court has an obligation to
assure itself that FOE had Article III
standing at the outset of the litigation.
pp. 703-704.
(b) FOE had Article III standing to
bring this action. ThIs Court has held
that to satisfy Article Ill's standing re-
quirements, a plaintiff must sho\v "injury
in fact," causation, and redres§bility. Lu-
jaIl 11. Deferulers of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
56()..061, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351.
An association has standing to bring suit
on behalf of its members when its mem-
bers would have standing to sue in their
own right, the interests at stake are ger-
mane to the organization's purpose, and
neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires individual members'
participation in the lawsuit. Hunt v.
lVashillgWn State .4.pple Advertising
C07nm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 24~j,
63 L.Ed.2d 383. The rele\'ant shcming for
Article III standing is not injury to the
environment but injury to the plaintiff. To
insist on the former rather than the latter
is to raise the standing hurdle higher than
the necessary showing for success on the
merits in a citizen's NPDES permit en-
forcement suit. Here, injury' in fact was
adequately documented by the affidavits
and testimony of FOE members asserting
that Laidlaw's pollutant discharges, and
the afl"umts' reasonable concerns about the
effects of those discharges, directly affect-
ed those aftiants' recreational, aesthetic,
and economic interests. See, e.g., Sierra
Club 11. Morton, 405 U.s. 727, 735, 92 S.Ct.
1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636. These submissions
present dispositively more than the mere
"general averments" and "conclusory alle-
gations" found inadequate in Lvjan 11. Na-
tional Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871,
888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695, or
the "'some day' intentions" to visit endan-
gered species halfway around the world
held insufficient in Defenderr of Wildlife,
504 U.S., at 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130. pp. 704-
706. '.
(c) Laldlaw argues that FOE lacked
standing to seek civil penalties payable to
the Government, becaus8 such penalties
offer no redress to citizen plaintiffs. For a
plaintiff Who Is injured or threatened with
injury due to megal conduct ongoing at the
time of suit, a sanction that effectively
abates that conduct and prevents Its recur.
rence provides a form of redress. Chit
penalties can fit that description. Insofar
as they encourage deCendants to discontin-
ue current violations and deter future
ones, they afford redress to citizen plain-
tI1'fs Injured or threatened with injury as a
result of ongoing unlawful conduct. The
Court need not explore the outer limits of
the principle that civil penalties provide
sufficient deterrence to support redressa-
bDity, because the civil penalties sought
here carried a deterrent effect that made
it likely, as opposed to merely speculative,
that the penalties "''auld redress FOE's
injuries--es the District Court reasonably
found when it assessed a penalty of $405,-
BOO. Steel Co. is not to the contrary.
That~ held that private plaintiffs may
not sue to assess penalties for wholly past
violations, 523 U.S., at 106-107, 118 S.Ct.
1003, but did not address standing to seek
penalties for violations ongoing at the time
of the complaint that could continue into
the future If undeterred, see id., at lOS,
118 S.Ct.l003. pp.706-708.
(d) FOE's chit penalties claim did not
automatically become moot once the com.
pany came into substantial compliance
with Its permit. A defendant's voluntary
cessation of a challenged practice ordinari-
ly does not deprive a federal court of its
power to determine the legality of the
practice. City of Muqv.ite 11. Aladdin',
Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289, 102 S.Ct.
1070, 71 L.Ed.2d 152. If it did, courts
would be compelled to lesve the defendant
free to return to its old ways. Thus, the
standard for determining whether a case
has been mooted by the deCendant's volun-
tary coziduct is stringent: A case might
become moot if subsequent events make it
absolutely clear that the allegedly \\TOng-
ful behavior could not reasonably be ex-
pected to recur. United States 11. Concen-
trated Phosphate Export Assll., 393 U.S.
199, 203, 89 S.Ct. Ml, 21 L.Ed.2d 344.
The heavy burden of persuading the court
that the challenged conduct cannot reason-
ably be expected to recur lies with the
party asserting mootness. Ibid. The
Court of Appeals incorrectly conflated this
Court's case law on initial standing, .see,
e.g., Steel Co., ",ith its case la\\' on moot-
ness, see, e.g.. City of Mesquite. Such
confusion is understandable, given this
Court's repeated description of mootness
as "the doctrine of standing set in a time
frame: The requisite personal interest
that must exist at the commencement of
the litigation (standing) must continue
throughout its existence (mootness)."
E.g.. Arizonana, 520 U.S., at 68, n. 22, 117
S.Ct. 1055. Careful reflection, however,
reveals that this description of mootness is
not comprehensive. For example. a defen-
dant claiming that its voluntary compliance
moots a case bears a formidable burden.
By contrast, it is the plaintifrs burden, in a
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In 1972, Congress enacted the Clean
Water Act (Act), also known as the Feder-
al Water Pollution Control Act, 86 Stat.
Bruce J. Terris, Washington, DC, for
petitioners.
Jeffrey P. Minear, Washington, DC, for
United States as amicus euriae, by special
leave of the Court.
Donald A. Cockrill, Greenville, 00, for
respondent.
KENNEDY, SOUTER, and BREYER, self, Incurred significant legal expenses."
JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., and Id., at 610-611.
KENNEDY, J., med ~ncurring ~piniOn8. The Court of Appeals vacated the Dis-
SCALIA, J., med a dissenting opinion, In - trict Court's order 149 F.3d 303 (C.A.4
which THOMAS, J., joined. 1998). The case~e moot, the appel-
late court declared, once the defendant
fully complied with the terms of its permit
and the plaintiff faDed to appeal the denial
of equitable relief. "(C)Ivil penalties pay-
able to the government," the Court of Ap-
peals stated, "would not redress any Ir\iury
Plaintiff's have 1lUfrered." Id., at 307. Nor
were attorneys' fees In order, the Court of
Appeals noted, because absent relief on
the merits, plaintiff's could not qualify as
prevailing parties. I d., at 307, n. 5-
We reverse the judginent of the Court
of Appeals. The appellate court erred in
concluding that a citJzen suitor's claim for
civil penalties must be dismissed as moot
when the defendant, albeit after com-
mencement of the litigation, has come Into
compliance. In directing dismissal of the
suit on grounds of mootness, the Court of
Appeals incorrectly conflated our case law
on initial standing to bring suit, see, e.g.,
Steel Co.v. Citizens fur a Better Environ-
tnent, 623 U.s. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140
L.Ed.2d 210 (1998), with our case law on
post-eommencement mootness, see, e.g.,
City ofMesquite tI. Aladdin's ClUltle, Inc.,
455 U.s. 283, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 71 L.Ed.2d
152 (1982). A defendant's volunt8ry cessa-
tion of allegedly unlawful Conduct ordinari-
ly does not suffice to moot a case. The
Court of Appeals also m1sperceived the
remedial potential of civil penalties. Such
penalties may serve, as an alternative to
an injunction, to deter future violations
and thereby ,edress the Ir\iuries that
prompted a citizen suitor to commence
litigation.
For U.s. Supreme Court briefs, see:
1999 WL 311764 (Pet.BrIef)
1999 WL 513836 (Resp.BrIef) -
1999 WL 623917 (Rep1y.Brief)
Justice GINSBURG delivered the
opinion of the Court.
This case presents an important ques-
tion concerning the operation of the citi-
Zen-suit provisions of the Clean Water Act.
Congress authorized the federal district
courts to entertain Clean Water Act suita
initiated by "a pel'l!On or persons haling an
interest which is or may be adversely af-
fected." 33 U.s.C. §§ 1365(a), (g). To
impel future compliance with the Act, a
district court may prescribe injunctive re-
lief in such a suit; additionally or alterna-
tively, the court may impose civil penalties
payable to the -United States TreasurY.
§ 1365(a). In the Clean Water Act citizen
suit now before us, the District Court de-
termined that injunctive relief was inap-
propriate beeause the defendant, after the
institution of the litigation, achieved sub-
stantial compliance with the terms of its
discharge permit. 956 F.supp. 588, 611
<D.S.C.I997). The court did, however, as-
sess a civil penalty of $405,800. Id., at
610. The "total deterrent effect" of the
penalty would be adequate to forestall fu-
ture violations, the court reasoned, taking
into account that the defendant "will be
required to reimburse plaintiff's for a sig-
nificant amount of legal fees and has, It-
Ronlel'O-Bareelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313, 102
S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91. Denial of in·
junctl\'e relief does not necessarily mean
that the district court has concluded there
is no prospect of future \iolatlons to deter.
Indeed, It meant no such thing in this case;
the District CoUlt denied Ir\iunctl\'e relief,
but expressly based Its award of civil pen-
alties on the need for deterrence. A dis-
trict court properly may conclude that an
injunction would be too Intrusive, because
It could entail continuing and burdensome
superintendence of the pennlt holder's ac-
tivities by a federal court. See City of
Melquitt, 455 U.S., at 289, 102 S.Ct. 1070.
Both Laidlaw's permit compliance and the
facility closure might moot this case, but
only If one or the other event made it
absolutely clear that violations could not
reasonably be expected to recur. Concen-
trated Phoaphate Ezpcnt Assn., 393 U.S.,
at 203, 89 S.Ct. 361. These are disputed
factual matters that have not been aired in
the lower courts; they remain open for
consideration on remand. pp.708-711.
(e) This Court does not resolve FOE's
argument that it is entitled to attorne~"S'
fees on the theory that a plaintiff can be a
"prevailing party" under § 1365(d) If It
was the "catalyst" that triggered a favor-
able outcome. Although the Circuits have
divided as to the continuing validity of the
catal~"St theory follO\\ing Fan-ar v. Hobby,
606 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566. 121 L.Ed.2d
494, It would be premature for this Court
to address the question here. The District
Court sta)1!d the time for a petition for
attorneys' fees unW the time for appeal
had expired or until any appeal was re-
solved. Thus, when the Fourth Circuit
addressed the availability of counsel fees,
no order was before it either den)ing or
awarding fees. It is for the District Court,
not this Court, to address in the ru'St
Instance any request for reimbursement of
costs, including fees. pp.711-712.
149 F.3d 303, reversed and remanded.
GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion
of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.
J., and STEVENS, O'CONNOR,
lawsuit brought to force compliance, to
establish standing by demonstrating that,
if unchecked by tJle litigation, the defen.
dant's allegedly wrongful behavior "ill
likely occur or continue and that the
threatened injury is certainly impending.
Whitmore v. Arkan.!as, 495 U.s. 149, 158,
110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135. The
plain lesson is that tJlere are circumstances
in which the prospect that a defendant wl1l
engage in (or. resume) harmful conduct
may be too speculative to support stand-
ing, but not too speculative to overcome
mootness. Further, if mootness were sim-
ply "standing set in a time frame," the
exception to mootness for acts that are
"capable of repetition, yet evading review"
could not exist. See, t.g., Olmstead v. L.
C., 527 U.s. -, -'-, n. 6, 119 S.Ct.
2176, 21M, n. 6;144 L.Ed.2d 540. Standing
admits of no similar exception; If a plain-
tiff lacks standing at the time the action
commences, the fact that the dispute is
capable of repetition yet evading revie\v
will not entitle the complainant to a federal
judicial forum. See, e.g., Steel Co., 523
U.S., at 109, 118 S.Ct. 1003. Standing
doctrine ensures, among other things, that
the resources of the federal courts are
devoted to disputes in which the parties
have a concrete stake. Yet by the time
mootness is an issue, abandonment of the
case may prove more wasteful than frugal.
Courts have no license to retain jurisdic-
tion over cases in which one or both of the
parties plainly lacks a continuing interest,
see, e.g., Arizonans, 620 U.s.. at 67, 117
S.Ct. 1055, but the foregoing examples
highlight an important difference between
the two doctrines, see generally Honig v.
Doe, 4M U.s. 305, 329-332, 108 S.Ct. 592,
98 L.Ed.2d 686 (REHNQillST, C. J., con-
curring).
Laidlaw's argument that FOE doomed
Its own civil penalty claim to mootness by
failing to appeal the denial of Irliunctlve
relief misconceives the statutory scheme.
Under § 1365(a), the district court has dls-
cretion to determine which fonn of relief is
best suited to abate current \iolatlons and
deter future ones. See Weinbe1y,rer v.
~
I
.-
00
1_,. t ..,~ L..-. L.= L-. 1,_ L- L~.~". L_~, 1_=-_ L_ l."c",,,. l~o lp._..... L._ ..". L. L_. L" .... L.
-, -, t -, -, -.., -, ~-, -.., --, -, -, -, -, --, --, -, --I --,
FRIENDS OF EARTH v. LAIDLAW ENVIRONMENTAL SERVS.
Cite u 120 S.CL 693 (20001
701 702 120 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
~
....
\0
816, as amended, 33 U.s.C. § 1251 et seq.
Section 402 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342,
provides for the issuance, by the Adrninis-
traoor of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) or by authorized States, of
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
S)"Stem (NPDES) permits. NPDES per-
mits impose limitations on the discharge of
pollutants, and establish related monioor-
ing and reporting requirements, in order
00 improve the cleanliness and safety of
the Nation's waters. Noncompliance with
a permit constitutes a violation of the Act.
§ 1342(h).
[1, 2] Under § 605(a) of the Act, a suit
00 enforce any limitation in an NPDES
permit may be brought by any "citizen,"
defined as "a person or persons having an
iriterest which is or may be adversely af-
fected." 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a), (g). Sixty
da)"S before initiating a citizen suit; howev-
er, the would-be plaintiff must give notice
of the alleged violation 00 the EPA, the
State in "'hich the alleged 'iolation oc-
curred, and the alleged ..iolaoor.
§ 1365(bXl)(A). "[T]he purpose of notice
to the alleged violaoor is 00 give it an
opportunity 00 bring itself inoo complete
compliance "ith the Act and thus ... ren-
der unnecessary a citizen suit." Gwaltney
of SnzUhjield, Ltd.. tI. CMsapeoke Bay
Foundation. Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60, lOs
S.Ct. 376, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987). Accord-
ingly, we ha...e held that citizens lack statu-
oory ~tanding under § 605(a) 00 sue for
\'iolations that have ceased by the time the
complaint is med. Id., at 56-63, 108 S.Ct.
376. The Act also bars a citizen from
suing if the EPA or the State has already
commenced, and is "diligently prosecut-
ing," an enforcement action. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b)(1)(B).
The Act authorizes district courts in citi-
zen-suit proceedings to enter injunctions
and 00 assess civil penalties, which are
payable to the United States Treasury.
§ 1365(a). In determining the amount of
any civil penalty, the district court must
take inoo account "the seriousness of the
violation or violations, the economic benefit
(if any) resulting from the ..iolation, any
hisoory of such ..iolations, any good-faith
efforts 00 comply with the applicable re-
quirements, the economic impact of the
penalty on the ..iolaoor, and such other
matters as justice may requil-e." § 1319(d).
In addition, the court "may award costs of
litigation (including reasonable attomey
and expert 'litness fees) 00 any prevailing
or substantially prevailing party, whenever
the court determines such award is appro-
priate." § 1365(d).
B
In 1986, defendant-respondent Laidla'v
En'ironmental Services (TOC), Inc.,
bought a hazardous .....aste incineraoor facil-
ity in Roebuck, South Carolina, that in-
cluded a wastewater treatment plant.
(The company has since changed its name
00 Safety-IOeen (Roebuck), Inc., but for
simplicity we "'ill refer 00 it as "Laidla'l'"
throughout.) Shortly after Laidlaw ac-
quired the facility, the South Carolina De-
partment of Health and Emironmental
Control (DHEC), acting under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(a)(1), granted Laidlaw an NPDES
permit authorizing the company to dis-
charge treated water inoo the North Tyger
Ri...er. The permit, which became effec-
tive on January 1, 1987, placed limits on
Laidlaw's discharge of se..-eral pollutants
into the river, including-of particular rel-
evance 00 this cas~mercury, an eJI.'treme-
ly ooxic ponutant. The permit also regu-
lated the flow, temperature, ooxicity, and
pH of the emuent from the facility, and
imposed moniooring and reporting obli-
gations.
Once it received its permit, Laidlaw be-
gan to discharge "'arious pollutants inoo
tlle waterway; repeatedly, Laidlaw's dis-
charges exceedl'd the limits set by the
permit. In particular, despite experiment--
ing "ith se"eral technological fIXes, Laid-
law consistently failed 00 meet the permit',;
stringent 1.3 ppb (parts per billion) daily
average limit on mercury discharge,;. The
District Cow1. later found that Laidlaw
had violated the mercury limits on 489
occasions between 1987 and 1995. 956
F.Supp., at 61~1.
On April 10, 1992, plainiifr-petitioners
Friends of the Earth (FOE) and Citizens
Local Environmental Action Network, Inc.
(CLEAN) (referred 00 conectively in this
opinion, oogether with later joined plain-
tifT-petitioner Sien'll Club, as "FOE") rook
the preliminary step neceasary 00 the insti-
tution of litigation. They sent a letter to
Laidlaw notifying the company of their
intention 00 me a citizen suit against it
under § 505(a) of the Act after the expira-
tion of the requisite 6O-day notice period,
i.e., on or after June 10, 1992. Laidlaw's
lawyer then contacted DHEC 00 ask
whether DHEC would consider filing a
lawsuit against Laidlaw. The Disbict
Court later found that Laidlaw's reason for
requesting that DHEC me a lawauit·
against it was 00 bar FOE's proposed citi-
zen suit through the operation of 33 U.S.C~
§ 1365(b)(lXB). 890 F.Supp. 470, 478
(D.S.C.1995). DHEC agreed 00 me a law-
suit against LaidlaW; the company's Jaw-
~-er then drafted the complaint for DHEC
and paid the ming fee. On June 9, 1992,
the last day before FOE's 6O-day notice
period expired, DHEC and Laidlaw
reached a settlement requiring Laidlaw 00
pay $100,000 in dvil penalties and to m~e
" 'every effort'" to comply with its permit
obligations. 890 F.Supp., at 479-481.
On June 12, 1992, FOE ffied this citizen
suit against Laidlaw under § 505(a) of the
Act, alleging noncompliance with the
NPDES permit and seeking declaraoory
and injunctive relief and an' award of civil
penalties. Laidlaw moved for summary
judgment on the ground that FOE had
faned 00 present e..-idence demonstrating
injury in fact, and therefore lacked Article
III standing 00 bring the lawsuit. Record,
I. The District Court noted that "Laidlaw
drafted the state-court complaint and settle-
ment agreement, filed the lawsuit against it·
self. and paid the fi1Ing fee." 890 F.Supp., at
489. Further, "the settlement agreement be·
tween DHEC and Laidlaw was entered into
with unusual haste, without giving the Piain·
Doc. No. 43. In opposition 00 this motion,
FOE submitted affidavits and deposition
testimony from members of the plaintiff
organizations. Record, Doc. No. 71 (Ems.
41-51). The record before the District
Court also included affidavits from the or·
ganizations' members submitted by FOE
in support of an earUer motion for prelimi-
nary injunctive relief. Record, Doc. No.
21 (Ems. 6-10). Alter exainining this e..i·
dence, the District Court denied Laidlaw's
summary judgment motion, finding-albeit
"by the very slimmest of margins"-that
FOE had standing 00 bring the sult. App.
in No. 97-1246(C.A.4), pp. 207-208 ('fr. of
Hearing 39-40 (June 30, 1993».
Laidlaw also moved 00 dismiss the action
on the ground that tlte citizen suit was
barred under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) by
DHEC's prior action against the compan~·.
The United States, appearing as amicm
curiae, joined FOE in opposing the mo-
tion. After an e:<tensive analysis of the
Laidlaw-DHEC settlement and the cir-
cumstances under which it was reached,
the District Court held that DHEC's ac-
tion against Laidlaw had not been "dill·
genUy prosecuted"; consequently. I}.
court allowed FOE's citizen suit tu
ceed. 890 F.Supp., at 499.t The record
indicates that after FOE initiated the suit,
but before the District Court rendered
judgment, Laidlaw violated the mercury
discharge limitation in its permit 13 times.
956 F.supp., at 621. The District Court
also found that Laidlaw had committed 13
moniooring and 10 reporting violations dur-
ing this period. Id., at 601. The last
recorded mercury discharge violation oc-
curred in January 1995, long after the
complaint was med but about two years
before judgment was rendered. Id., at
621.
tiffs the opportunity to inten'ene." ibid. The
court found "most persuasive" the Cact that
"in imposing the civil penalty of $100,000
against Laidlaw, DHEC Cailed to recover, or
even to calculate. the economic benefit that
Laidlaw received by not complying with its
permit." id.. at 491.
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On January 22, 1997, the District Court
issued its judgment. 956 F.Supp. 588
(D.S.C.l997). It found that Laidlaw had
gained a total economic benefit of $1,092,-
581 as a result of its extended period of
noncompliance with the mercury discharge
limit in its pennit. Id., at 603. The court
concluded, however, that a civil penalty of
$405,800 was adequate in light of the guid-
ing factors listed in 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).
956 F .supp., at 610. In particular, the
District Court stated that the lesser penal-
ty was appropriate taking into account the
judgment's "total deterrent effect." In
reaching this determination, the court
"considered that Laldlaw will be required
to reimburse p1llintiffs for a significant
amount of legal fees." Id., at 610-611.
The court declined to grant FOE's request
for injunctive relief, stating that an injunc-
tion was inappropriate because "Laidlaw
has been in substantial compliance with all
parameters in its NPDES pennit since at
least August 1992." Id., at 611.
FOE appealed the District Court's civil
penalty judgment, arguing that the penalty
was inadequate, but did not appeal the
denial of declaratory. or injunctive relief.
Laidlaw cross-appealed, arguing, among
other things, that FOE lacked standing to
bring the suit and that DHEC's action
qualified as a diligent prosecution preclud-
ing FOE's litigation. The United States
continued. to participate as amicua curiae
in support of FOE.
On July 16, 1998, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit issued its judgment.
149 F.ad 303. The Court of Appeals as-
sumed without deciding that FOE initialIy
had standing to bring the action, id., at
306, n. 3, but went on to hold that the case
had become moot. The appellate court
stated, first, that the elements of Article
III standing-injury, causstion, and re-
dressabllity-must persist at every stage
of review, or else the action becomes moot.
Id., at 306. Citing our decision in Steel
Co., the Court of Appeals reasoned that
the case had become moot because "the
only remedy currently available to
[FOE]-ei\il penalties payable to the gov-
ernment-would not redress any injury
[FOE has] suft'ered." Id., at 306-307.
The court therefore vacated the District
Court's order and remanded \\ith instruc-
tions to dismiss the action. In a footnote,
the Court of Appeals added that FOE's
"failure to obtain relief on the merits of
[its] claims precludes any recovery of at-
torneys' fees or other litigation costs be-
cause such an award is available only to a
'prevalling or substantially prevailing par-
ty.' .. Id., at 307, n. 5 (quoting 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(d». .
According to Laidlaw, after the Court of
Appeals issued its decision but before this
Court grsnted certiorari, the entire incin-
erator facility in Roebuck was permanently
closed, dismantled, and put up for sale,
and all discharges from the facility perma-
nently ceased. Respondent's Suggestion
of Mootness 3. .
We granted certiorari, 525 U.S. 1176,
119 S.Ct. llll, 143 L.Ed.2d 107 (1999), to
resolve the inconsistency between the
Fourth Circuit's decision in this case and
the decisions of several other Courts of
Appeals, which have held that a defen-
dant's compliance with its pennit after the
commencement of litigation does not moot
claims (or civil penalties under the Act.
See, e.g., Atlantic State, Legal Founda-
tion, Inc. 1/. Strok Die Casting Co., 116
F.ad 814, 820 (CA7), eert. denied,' 522
U.s. 981, 118 S.Ct. 442, 139 L.Ed.2d 379
(1997); Natural ReIOUTCe' Defenae Coun-
cil, Inc. 1/. Temco Rfg. and MT.1g., Inc., 2
F.ad 493, 5()3..0()4 (C.A3 1993); Atlantic
State. Legal Foundation, Inc. 1/. Pan
American Tann.ing Corp., 993 F.2d 1017,
1020-1021 (C.A2 1993); Atlantic State,
Legal. Foundation, Inc. v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1135-1136 (CAll
1990).
II
A
The Constitution's case-or-contro\Oersy
limitation on federal judicial authority, Art.
III, § 2, underpins both our standing and
our mootness jurisprudence, but the two
inquiries dIffer in respects erltical to the
proper resolution of this ease, 80 we ad-
dress them separately. Because the Court
of Appeals \\'88 persuaded that the case
had become moot and 80 held, it simply
assumed without deciding that FOE had
initial standing. See Arizonam for Offi-
cial Englilk 1/. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66-
67, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997)
(court may assume without deciding that
standing exists in order to analyze moot-
ness). But because we hold that the Court
of Appeals erred in declaring the case
moot, we have an obligation to assure our-
selves that FOE had Article III standing
at the outset of the litigation. We there-
fore address the question of standing be-
fore turning to mootness.
. -[3, 4] In LuJan 1/. Defenden of Wild-
life, 504 U.s. 555, 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130,
119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), we held that, to
satisfy Article III's standing requirements,
a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an
"injury in fact" that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely,
as opposed to merely speculative, that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision. An association has standing to
bring suit on behalf of its members when
its members would otherwise have stand-
ing to sue in their own right, the interests
at stake are germane to the organization's
purpose, and neither the claim asserted
nor the relief requested requires the par-
ticipation of individual members in the law-
suit. Hunt 1/. Waakington State Apple
Advertiring Comm~ 432 U.s. 333, 343, 97
s.Ct. 2434, 53 LEd.2d 383 (1977).
[5] Laidlaw contends first that FOE
lacked standing from the outset even to
seek injunctive relief, because the plaintiff
organizations failed to show that any of
their members had sustained or faced the
threat of any "injury in fact" from Laid-
law's activities. In support of this conten-
tion Laidlaw points to the District Court's
finding, made in the course of setting the
penalty amount, that there had been "no
demonstrated proof of harm to the en\i-
ronment" from Laidlaw's mercury dis·
charge violations. 956 F.Supp., at 602;
see also ibid. ("[T]he NPDES pennit vio-
lations at issue in this citizen suit did not
result in any health risk or environmental
harm.").
The relevant showing for purposes of
Article III standing, however, is not injury
to the environment but injury to the plain-
tiff. To insist upon the former rather than
the latter as part of the standing inquiry
(as the dissent in essence does, poBt, at
713-714) is to raise the standing hurdle
higher than the necessary showing for sue·
cess on the merits in an action alleging
noncompliance with an NPDES pennit.
FjlCUSing properly on injury to the plain-
tifJ', the DiStrict Court found that FOE had
demonstrated sufficient injury to estsblish
standing. App. in No. 97-1246(CA4), pp.
207-208 (Tr. of Hearing 39-40 (June 30,
1993». For example, FOE member K.!!n-
neth Lee Curtis averred in affidavits that
he lived a half-mile from Laidlaw's facility;
that he occasionally drove over the North
Tyger Rr.-er, and that it looked and
smelled polluted; and that he would like to
fish, camp, swim, and picnic in and near
the river between 3 and 15 miles down-
stream from the facility, as he did when he
was a teenager, but would not do so be-
cause he was concerned that the water was
polluted by Laidlaw's discharges. Record,
Doc. No. 71 (Exhs. 41, 42). Curtis reaf-
firmed these statements in extensive depo-
sition testimony. For example, he testi-
fied that he would like to fish in the river
at a specific spot he used as a boy, but that
he would not do so now because of his
concerns about Laidlaw's discharges.
Ibid. (Exh. 43, at 52-53; Exh. 44, at 33).
Other members presented evidence to
similar effect. CLEAN member Angela
Patterson attested that she lived two miles
from the facility; that before Laidlaw opo
l,.~_.., L.-~..,., l .._.~.. L~__ l.~_ l.~_" l_~ L __. 1_." L_.~. L~_. L,,_.~ .. l ..~,.,. l.".... L._ t . L..-.. l __ L.
-, --, -, -, -., -, -,
"
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erated the facility, she picnicked, walked,
birdwatehed, and waded in and along the
North 1)'ger River because of the natural
beauty of the area; that she no longer
engaged in these activities in or near the
river because she was concemed about
hannful effects Cram discharged pollu-
tants; and that she and her husband
would like to purchase a home near the
river but did not intend to do so, in part
because of Laidlaw's discharges. Record,
Doc. No. 21 (Exh. 10). CLEAN member
Judy Proitt averred that she lived one-
quarter rnDe Cram Laidlaw's faeility and
would like to fish, hike, and picnic along
the North Tyger River, but has refrained
Cram those activities because of the dis-
charges. Ibid. (Exh. 7). FOE member
Linda Moore attested that she lived 20
rnDes Cram Roebuck, and would use the
North Tyger River south of Roebuck and
the land surrounding it for recreational
purposes were she not concerned that the
water contained hannful pollutants. Ree-
ord, Doe. No. 71 (Exhs. 45, 46). In her
deposition, Moore testified at length that
she would hike, picnic, camp, swim, boat,
and drive near or in the river were it not
for her concerns about illegal discharges.
Ibid. (Exh. 48, at 29, 36-37, 62-63, 72).
CLEAN member Gail Lee attested that
her home, which is near Laidlaw's faeility,
had a lower value than sirnDar homes lo-
cated further Cram the facility, and that
she believed the pollutant discharges ac-
counted for some of the discrepancy. Rec-
ord, Doe. No. 21 (Exh. 9). SieITll Club
member Norman Sharp averred that he
had canoed approximately 40 rnDes down-
stream of the Laidlaw faeility and would
like to canoe in the North Tyger River
closer to Laidlaw's discharge point, but did
not do so beeause he was concemed that
the water contained hannful pollutants.
Ibid. (E~. 8).
[6] These swom statements, as the
District Court determined, adequately doc-
umented injury in taet. We have held that
en'ironmental plaintiffs adequately allege
injury in fact when they aver that they use
the affected area and are persons "for
whom the aesthetic and recreational values
of the area will be le&sened" by the chal-
lenged activity. Sierra, Clllb v. Morton,
405 U.s. 727, 735, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31
L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). See also Defeuders of
Wildlife, ~ U.S., at 562-563, 112 S.Ct.
2130 ("Of course, the desire to use or
observe an animal species, even for purely
esthetic purposes, is undenisbly a cogniza-
ble interest for pWlJOses of standing.").
Our decision in Lujan v. National Wild-
life Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 110 S.Ct.
3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990), is not to the '
contrary. In that ease an endronmental
o~tion assailed the Bureau of Land
Management's "land "ithdrawal l'e\iew
program," a program covering millions of
acres, alleging that the program illegally
opened up public lands to mining activities.
The defendants moved for summary judg-
ment, challenging the plaintiff organiza-
tion's stlinding to initiate the action under
the Admlnistrati"e Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. I 702. We held that the plaintiff
could not survive the summary judgment
motion merely by offering "a"erments
which state only that one of [the organiza-
tion's] members uses unspecified portions
of an immense tract of territory, on some
portions of which mining activity has oc-
curred or probably will oeeur by virtue of
the governmental action." 497 U.S., at
889,110 S.Ct. 3177.
In contrast, the affidavits and testimony
presented by FOE in this ease assert that
Laidlaw's discharges, and the affiant
members' reasonable concerns about the
effects of those discharges, direetly affect-
ed those affiants' recreational, aesthetic,
and economic interests. These submis-
sions present dispositively more than the
mere "general averments" and "conclusory
allegations" found Inadequate In National
Wildlife Federation. Id., at 888, 110 S.Ct.
3177. Nor can the affiants' conditional
statements-that they would use the near-
by North Tyger River for recreation if
Laidlaw were not discharging pollutants
Into it-be equated with the speculative
" 'some day' intentions" to visit endan-
gered species halfway around the world
that we held insufficient to show injury In
fact in Defenders of Wildlife. 504 u.s., at
564, 112 S.Ct. 2130.
Los Angeles II. Lyon" 461 U.S. 95, 103
S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), relied
on by the diasent, poat, at 714, does not
weigh against standing in this case. In
Lyona, we held that a plaintiff lacked
standing to seek an Injunetion against the
enforcement of a poUce chokehold policy
because he could not credibly allege that
he faeed a reaUstIc threat from the poUey.
461 U.s., at 107, Do 7, 103 S.Ct. 1660. In
the footnote from Lyom cited by the dis-
sent, we noted that "[t]he reasonableness
of Lyons' fear Is dependent upon the likeli-
hood of a recurrence of the allegedly un-
lawful conduct," and that his "subjective
apprehensions" that such a recurrence
would even take plocs were not enough to
support standing. Id., at 108, Do 8, 103
S.Ct. 1660. Here, in contrast, it is undis-
puted that Laidlaw's unlawful conduct-
discbarglng pollutants in excess of permit
limits-was oeeurrlng at the time the com-
plaint was IDed. Under Lyona, then, the
only "subjective" issue here Is "[t]he rea-
sonableness of [the] fear" that led the am-
ants to respond to that concededly ongoing
conduct by refraining from use of the
North Tyger River and surrounding areas.
Unlike the dissent, post, at 714, we see
nothing "improbable" about the proposi-
tion that a company's continuous and per-
vasive illegal diseharges of pollutants Into
a river would cause nearby residents to
curtail their recreational use of that water-
way and would subject them to other ec0-
nomic and aesthetic harms. The proposi-
tion is entirely reasonable, the DIstrict
Court found it was true In this ease, and
that Is enough for Injury in fset.
[7] Laidlaw argues next that even if
FOE had standing to seek Injunctive relief,
it laeked standing to seek clviI penalties.
Here the asserted defect is not injury but
redressability. Civil penalties offer no re-
dress to private plaintiffs, Laidlaw argues,
because they are pald to the govemment,
and therefore a citizen plaintiff can never
have standing to seek them.
[8] Laidlaw is right to insist that a
plainWf must demonstrate standing sepa-
rately for each fonn of relief sought. See,
e.g., Lyona, 461 U.S., at 109, 103 S.Ct. 1660
(notwithstanding the faet that plainWf had
standing to pursue damages, he lacked
standing to pursue injunctive relief); see
also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358, Do 6,
116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996)
("[Sltandlng Is not dispensed in gross.").
But it Is wrong to maintain that citizen
plaintiffs facing ongoing violations never
have standing to seek clviI penalties.
We have reeognized on numerous occa-
sions that "all clviI penalties bave some
deterrent eff'eet." Hudson v. United
StateI, 622 U.s. 93, 102, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139
L.Ed.2d 450 (1997); see also, e.g., Depart-
ment ofRevinue ofMont. v. Kurth Ranch,
511 U.s. 767, 778, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128
L.Ed.2d 767 (1994). More speclfieally,
Congress has found that civil penalties in
Clean Water Ad eases do more than pr0-
mote hnmediate compliance by limiting the
defendant's economic incentive to delay its
attainment of permit limits; they also de-
ter future violations. This congressional
determination warrants judieial attention
and respect. "The legislative history of
the Ad reveals that Congress wanted the
district court to consider the need tar ret-
n'bution and deterrence, in addition to res-
titution, when it imposed civil penalties.
... [The district court may] seek to deter
future violations by basing the penalty on
its economic impaet." 7'ull v. United
StateI, 481 U.S. 412, 422-423, 107 S.Ct.
1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987).
It can seareely be doubted that, for a
plaintiff who is Injured or faees the threat
of future iJUury due to illegal conduct on-
going at the time of suit, a sanction that
eff'ectively abates that conduct and pre-
vents its recurrence pI'O'ides a form of
redress. Civil penalties can fit that de-
scription. To the extent that they encour-
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age defendants to discontinue current vio-
lations and deter them from committing
future ones, they afford redress to citizen
plaintiffs who are injured or tJ,reatened
\\ith injury as a consequence of ongoing
unlawful conduct.
The dissent argues that it is the avail·
ability rather than the imposition of civil
penalties that deters any particular pollu-
ter from continuing to pollute. Post, at
718-719. This argument misses the mark
in two ways. First, it overlooks the inter-
dependence of the availability and the im-
position; a threat has no deterrent value
unless it is credible that it will hi! carried
out. Second, it is reasonable for Congress
to conclude that an actual award of civil
penalties does in fact bring with it a signif-
icant quantum of deterrence over and
abOve what Is achieved by the mere pros-
pect of such penalties. A would-be pollu-
ter may or may not be dissuaded by the
existence of a remedy on the books, but a
defendant once hit in its pocketbook will
surely think twice before polluting again"
We recognize that there may be a point
at which the deterrent effect of a claim for
civil penalties becomes so insubstantial or
so remote that it cannot support citizen
standing. The fact that this vanishing
point is not easy to ascertain does not
detract from the deterrent power of such
penalties in the ordinary case. Justice
Frankfurter's observations for the Court,
made in a different context nearly 60 years
ago, hold true here as well:
"How to effectuate policy-the adap-
tation of means to iegitimately sought
ends-Is one of the most intractable of
legislative problems. Whether pro-
2. The dissent suggests that there was little
detelTent work for civil penalties to do In this
case because the lawsuit brought against
Laidlaw by DHEC had already pushed the
level of detelTeoce to "near the top of the
graph." Post. at 718. This suggestion Ig-
nores the District Court's specific fineling that
the penalty agreed to by Laidlaw and DHEC
was far too low to remove Laldlaw's econom·
Ie benefit from noncompliance, and thus was
inadequate to deter future violations. 890
scribed conduct is to be deterred by qui
tam action or triple damages or injunc-
tion, or by criminal prosecution, or
merely by defense to actions in contract,
or by some, or all, of these remedies in
combination, Is a matter within the legis-
lature's range of choice. Judgment on
the deterrent effect of the nrious weap-
ons in the armory of the law can lay
little claim to scientific basis." Tigner v.
TUM, 310 U.S. 141, 148, 60 S.Ct. 879, 84
L.Ed. 1124 (1940).s
In this case we need not explore the outer
limIts of the principle that civil penalties
provide sufficient deterrence to support
redressabUity. Here, the civil penalties
sought by FOE canied with them a deter-
rent effect that made it likely, as opposed
to merely speculative, that the penalties
would redress FOE's injuries by abating
current violations and preventing future
one&-8ll the District Court reasonably
found when it asseased a penalty of $405,-
BOO. 956 F.supp., at 610-611.
Laidlaw contends that the reasoning of
our decision in Steel Co. directa the conclu-
sion that citizen plaintifl's have no standing
to seek civil penalties under the Act. We
disagree. Steel Co. established that citizen
suitors lack standing to seek civil penalties
for violations that have abated by the time
of suit. 523 U.s., at 106-107, 118 S.Ct.
1003. We specifically noted in that case
that there was no allegation in the com-
plaint of any continuing or imminent \iola-
tion, and that no basis for such an allega-
tion appeared to exist. It!., at 108, 118
S,Ct. 1003; see also Gwaltney, 484 U.S., at
59, 108 S.Ct. 376 ("the harm sought to be
addressed by the citizen suit lies in the
F.Supp. 470. 491-494. 497-498 (D.S.C.1995).
And It begins to look especially farfetched
when one recalls that LaIdlaw Itself prompted
the DHEC lawsuit, paid the filing fee, and
drafted the complaint. See supra. at 702. n.
1.
s. In Tigner the Court rejected an equal protec-
tion challenge to a statutory provision ex-
empting agricultural producen from the
reach of the Texas antitrust laws.
present or the future, not in the past"). In
short, Steel Co. held that private plaintiffs,
unlike the Federal Government, may not
sue to assess penalties for wholly past
violations, but our decision in that case did
not reach the issue of standing to seek
penalties for violations that are ongoing at
the time of the complaint and- that could
continue into the future If undeterred.4
B
Satisfied that FOE had standing under
Article III to bring this action, we turn to
the question of mootness.
[9-11] The only conceivable basis for a
finding of mootness in this case Is Laid-
law's voluntary conduct-either' ita
achievement by August 1992 of substantial
compliance with Ita NPDES permit or ita
more recent shutdown of the Roebuck fa-
cility. It Is well settled that "a defendant's
voluntary cessation of a cha1Ienged prac-
tice does not deprive a federal court of ita
power to determine the legality of the
practice." City of Muquite, 455 u.s., at
289, 102 S.Ct. 1070. "[I]f it did, the courts
would be compelled to leave '[t]he defen-
4. In insisting that the redressab1llty require.
ment Is not met, the dissent relies heavily on
Liru14 R.S. v. Richard D•• 410 U.S. 614. 93
S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973). That rell·
ance Is sorely misplaced. In Liru14 R. 5•• the
mother of an out-of·wedlock child rued suit to
force a district anomq- to bring a criminal
prosecution against the absentee father for
fallure to pay chlld support. 14.. at 616. 93
S.Ct. 1146. In finding that the mother lacked
standing to seek this extraordinary remedy.
the Court drew attention to "the special status
of criminal prosecutions In our system," itL.
at 619, 93 S.Ct. 1146, and carefully limited Its
holding to the "unique context of a challenge
to [the non-enforcement of] a criminal stat·
ute," id.• at 617. 93 S.CL 1146. Furthermore.
as to redressab1llty. the relief IOIIllht In Li,ul4
R. 5._ prosecution which, If successful,
would automatically land the delinquent fa·
ther In jall for a fixed term. itL. at 618, 93
S.Ct. 1146. with predictably negative effects
on his eamlng power-would scarcely reme·
dy the plaintiffs lack of child support pay-
ments. In this regard. the Court contrasted
"the civil contempt model whereby the defen·
dant 'keeps the keys to the jall In his own
dant •.. free to return to his old ways.'''
Id., at 289, n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 1070 (citing
United Sf4tes v. lv.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S.
629, 632, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303
(1953». In accordance \\ith this plinciple,
the standard we have announced for deter-
mining whether a C8!e has been mooted bj'
the defendant's voluntary conduct is strin-
gent: "A case might become moot If subse-
quent eventa made it absolutely clear that
the allegedly 'lTOngful behalior could not
reasonably be expected to recur." United
Statu fl. ConceJltrated Phosphate Ezport
A,m., 393 U.S. 199, 203, ~ S.Ct. 361, 21
L.Ed.2d 344 (1968). The "hesvy burden of
persua[ding)" the court that the challenged
conduct cannot reasonably be expected to
start up again lies 'lith the party asserting
mootness. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals justified ita moot-
ness disposition by reference to Steel Co.,
which held that citizen plaintiffs lack
standing to seek civil penalties for wholly
past violations. In relying on Steel Co.,
the Court of Appeals confused mootness
\\ithstanding. The confusion is under-
standable, given this Court's repested
statements that the doctrine of mootness
pocket' and may be released whenever he
complies' with his legal obligations." Ibid.
The dissent'. contention. post at 716. that
"precisely the same situation exists here" as
In Liru14 R. S. Is, to say the least. extravagant.
Putting aside Its mistaken reliance on Li"da
R. 5.• the dissent'. broader charge that citizen
suits for civil penalties under the Act cany
"grave Implications for democratic gover·
nance." post. at 715-716. seems to us over·
drawn. CertaInly the federal Executi\'e
Branch does not share the dissent's \"lew that
such suits dissipate Its authority to enforce
the law. In fact, the Department of Justice
has endorsed this citizen suit from the outset.
submitting amicus briefs In support of FOE in
the District Court. the Court of Appeals, and
this Court. See supra, at 702, 703. As we
have already noted, supra, at 701, the Federal
Government retains the power to foreclose a
citizen suit by undertaking Its own action. 33
U.S.C. § 1365(bXl)(B). And if the Executi\'e
Branch opposes a particular citizen suit, the
statute allows the Administrator of the EPA to
"intenrene as a matter of right" and bring the
Government's views to the attention of the
court. § 136S(cX2).
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can be described as "the doctrine of stand-
ing set in a time frame: The requisite
personal interest that must exist at the
commencement of the litigation (standing)
must continue throughout its existence
(mootness)." Arizonan. fur Official En-
gli.h, 520 U.s., at 68, n. 22, 117 S.Ct. 1055
(quoting United State. Parole Comm'n v.
Gemghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397, 100 S.Ct.
1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980), in turn quot-
ing Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudica-
tion: The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J.
1363, 1384 (1973» (internal quotation
marks omitted).
[12, 13] Careful reflection on the long-
recognized exceptiona to mootness, howev-
er, l'e\"eals that the description of moot-
ness as "standing set in a time frame" is
not comprehensive. As just noted, a de-
fendant claiming that its voluntary compli-
ance moots a case bears the formidable
burden of showing that it is absolutely
clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could
not reasonably be e:<pected to recur. Con-
centrated Phosphate E:rport Asm, 393
U.s., at 203, 89 8.Ct. 361. By contrast, in
a lawsuit brought to force compliance, it is
the plaintiff's burden to establish standing
by demonstrating that, if unchecked by the
litigation, the defendant's allegedly wrong-
ful behavior will likely occur or continue,
and that the "threatened injury [is) cer-
tainly impending." Whitmore 11. Arkan-
sas, 495 U.s. 149, 158, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109
L.EcL2d 135 (1990) (citationa and internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, in
Lyon&. as already noted, we held that a
plaintiff lacked initial standing to seek an
injunction against the enforcement of a
police chokehold policy because he could
not credibly allege that he faced a realistic
threat arising from the policy. 461 U.s.,
at 105-110, 103 S.Ct. 1660. Elsewhere in
the opinion, however, we noted that a city-
wide moratorium on police chokeholds--an
action that surely diminished the already
slim likelihood that any particular individu-
al would be choked by police-would not
have mooted an otherwise valid claim for
injunctive relief, because the moratorium
by its terms was not pennanent. ld., at
101, 103 S.Ct. 1660. The plain lesson of
these cases is that there are circumstances
in which the prospect that a defendant will
engage in (or resume) harmful conduct
may be too speculative to support stand-
ing, but not too speculative to overcome
mootness.
[14,15] Furthermore, if mootness were
simply "standing set in a time frame," the
exception to mootness that arises when the
defendant's allegedly unlawful activity is
"capable of repetition, yet evading review"
could not exist. When, for example, a
mentally disabled patient mes a lawsuit
challenging her confinement in a segregat-
ed institution, her postcomplaint transfer
to a community-based program will not
moot the action, Olmstead v. L. C., 527
U.s. -,-, n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 2176, 2184,
n. 6, 144 L.Ed.2d 540 (1999), n. 6), despite
the fact that she would have lacked initial
standing had she med the complaint after
the transfer. Standing admits of no simi-
lar exception; if a plaintiff lacks standing
at the time the action commences, the fact
that the dispute is capable of repetition Yet
evading review will not entitle the com-
plainant to a federal judicial forum. See
Steel Co., 523 U.s., at 109, 118 S.Ct. 1003
(" 'the mootness exception for disputes ca-
pable of repetition yet evading review ...
will not revive a dispute which became
moot before the action commenced' ")
(quoting Rem~, t1. Geary, 501 U.s. 312,
320, 111 S.Ct. 2331, 116 L.Ed.2d 288
(1991». .
We acknowledged the distinction be-
tween mootness and standing most recent-
ly in Steel Co.:
"The United States '" argues that
the injunctive relief does constitute
remediation because 'there ls a pre-
sumption of [future] injury when the
defendant has voluntarily ceased its ille-
gal acti\;ty in response to litigation,'
even if that occurs before a complaint ls
med. . .. This ma1<es a sword out of a
shield. The 'presumption' the Govern-
ment refers to has been applied to re-
fute the assertion of mootness by a de-
fendant who, when sued in a complaint
that alleges present or threatened inju-
ry, ceases the complained-of activity.•.•
It is an Immense. and unacceptable
stretch to call the presumption into ser-
vice as a substitute for the allegation of
present or threatened injury upon which
initial standing must be based." 623
U.S., at 109, 118 S.Ct. 1003.
[16] Standing doctrine functions to en-
sure, among other things, that the scarce
resources of the federal courts are devoted
to those disputes in which the parties have
a concrete stake. In contrast, by the time
mootness is an issue, the case has been
brought and Utigated, often (as hel'll) for
years. To abandon the case at an ad-
vanced stage may prove more wasteful
than frugal. This argument from sunk
costs s does not license courts to retain
jurisdiction over cases in which one or
both of the parties plainly lacks a continu-
ing interest, as when the parties have set-
tled or a plaintiff pursuing a nonsurvlving
claim has died. See, t.g., DeFuniB v. Od£-
goord, 416 U.S. 312, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 40
L.Ed.2d 164 (1974) (per curiam) (non-
class-action challenge to constitutionality
of law school admissiona process. mooted
when plaintiff, admitted pursuant to pre-
liminary injunction, neared graduation and
defendant law school conceded that, as a
matter or ordinary school policy, plaintiff
would be allowed to finish his final term);
Arizonan.!, 620 U.s., at 67, 117 S.Ct. 1055
(non-class-action challenge to state consti-
tutionalamendment declaring English the
official language of the State became moot
when plaintiff, a state emplo)'ee who
sought to use her bilingual skills, left state
employment). But the argument surely
highlights an important difference between
.the two doctrines. See generally Hrmig v.
Doe, 484 U.s. 305, 329-332, 108 S.Ct. 692,
5. Of course we mean sunk costs to the judicial
S)"Stem. not to the litigants. Lewis v. Conti·
nental Ball" Corp.. 494 U.S. 472. 110 S.Ct.
1249. 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990) (cited by the
dissent. post. at 72 I) dealt \\ith the latter.
98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988) (REHNQUIST, C.
J., concuning).
[17-21] In its brief, Laidlaw appears to
argue that, regardless of the effect of
Laidlaw's compliance, FOE doomed its
own ci\i} penalty claim to mootness by
failing to appeal the District Cowt's denial
of injunctive relief. Brief for Respondent
14-17. This argument misconcen'es the
statutory scheme. Under § 1365(a), the
district court has discretion to determine
which form of relief is best suited, in lohe
particular case, to abate current \iolations
and deter future ones. "[A] federal judge
sitting as chancellor is not mechanically
obligated to grant an injunction for every
violation of law." Weinbe7per v. Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.s. 305,313, 102 S.Ct. 1798,
72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982). Denial of injuncti\1!
relief does not necessarily mean that the
district court has concluded there is no
proSpect of future violations for civil penal-
ties to deter. Indeed, it meant no such
thing in this case. The District Cowt
denied injunctive relief, but expressly
based its award of civil penalties on the
need for deterrence. See 956 F.Supp., at
610-611. As the dissent notes, post, at
717-718, federal courts (!hould aim to en-
sure "'the framing of reUef no broader
than required by the precise facts.' "
Schlesinger t1. ResenMta. Comtn. to Stop
Ut, War, 418 U.s. 208, 222, 94 S.Ct. 2925,
41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974). In accordance with
this aim, a district court in a Clean Water
Art citizen suit properly may conclude that
an Injunction would be ali excessively in-
trusive remedy, because it could entail con-
tinuing superintendence of· the permit
holder's activities by a federal court-a
process burdensome to court and permit
holder alike. See City of Mesquite, 455
U.S., at 289, 102 8.Ct. 1070 (although the
defendant's voluntary cessation of the chal-
lenged practice does not moot the case,
DOting that courts should use caution to avoid
carrying fonvard a moot case solely to \indi·
cale a plaintiff's interest in recovering attor·
ne)'S' fees.
Furthermore, petitioners' claim for civil
penalties would not be moot e\"en if it were
absolutely clear that respondent's viola-
tions could not reasonsbly be expected to
recur because respondent achim'ed sub-
stantial compliance with its permit re-
quirements after petitioners filed their
complaint but before the District Court
entered judgment. As the Courts of Ap-
peals (other than the court helmv) have
uniformly concluded, a polluter's voluntary
post-complaint cessation of an alleged vio-
lation will not moot a citizen-suit claim for
civil penalties even if it Is sufficient to
moot a related claim for hUunctive or de-
claratory relief.· This conclusion Is con-
sistent with the structure of the Clean
Water Act, which attaches liability for civil
penalties at the time a permit \iolation
occurs. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) ("Any person
who violates [certain provisions of the Act
or certain permit conditions and limita-
tions] shaII be subject to a civil penaity
..."). It is also consistent with the char-
acter of ci\iI Penalties, which, for purposes
ot mootness analysis, should be equated
\\ith punith-e damages rather than with
injunctive or declaratory relief. See TuU
11. United States; 481 U.s. 412, 422-423,
107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987). No
one contends that a defendant's post-com-
plaint conduct could moot a claim for puni-
tive damages; civil penalties should be
treated the same way.
The eases cited by the Court in its dis-
cussion of the mootness Issue all involved
requests for injunctive or declaratory re-
lier. In only one, Los Angeles 11. Lyons,
461 U.s. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660,75 L.Ed.2d 675
(1983), did the plaintiff seek damages, and
'ion. Inc. v. Tyson Foods. Inc.• 897 F.2d 1128,
1134-1137 (CA.ll 1990); Chuapeake Bay
Foundation. Inc. v. Gwaltney ", Smithfield.
Ltd.. 890 F.2d 690. 696-697 (C.A.4 1989). Cf.
Powrll v. AlcConnac1c. 395 U.S. 486, 496. n. 8.
89 S.CL 1944. 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969) ("Where
SC\'era! fonns of rellef are requested and one
of these requests subsequently becomes moot.
the Court has ,till considered the remaining
requests').
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ed only that "this court has considered
that Laidlaw wm be required to reimburse
plaintiffs for a significant amount of legal
fees," and referred to "potential fee
awards." 956 F .supp., at 610-611. Thus,
when the Court of Appeals addressed the
availability of counsel fees in this case, no
order was before it either denying or
awarding fees. It Is for the District Court,
not this Court, to address in the first
instance any request for reimbursement of
costs, including fees.
•••
For the reasons stated, the judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit Is mersed, and the case Is
remanded for further proceedings consis-
tent \\ith this opinion.
It is 10 ordered.
Justice STEVENS, concurring.
Although the Court has identified a suf-
ficient reason for rejecting the Court of
Appeals' mootness determination, it is im-
portant also to note that the ease would
not be moot even if it were absolutely clear
that respondent had gone out of business
and posed no threat of future permit \iola-
tions. The Disbict Court entered a valid
judgment requiring respondent to pay a
civil penalty of $405,800 to the United
States. No post-judgment conduct of re-
spondent could retroactively invalidate
that judgmenl A record of voluntary
post-judgment compliance that would justi-
fy a decision that injunctive relier Is unnec-
essary, or even a decision that any claim
for injunctive relief is now IIlClCIl. would not
warrant vacation of the valid money judg-
ment.
•. comfon Lake Assn. v. Druel Contracting,
Inc., 138 F.3d 351. 356 (CA8 1998); Atlantic
Statu Legal Foundation. Inc. v. Stroh Die
CtJSting Co., 116 F.3d 814. 820(CA.7). celt.
denied. 522 U.S. 981, 118 S.Ct. 442, 139
L.Ed.2d 379 (1997); Natural lUsOUIUS De·
fense Council v. Taaco Refining and Mlctg.•
Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 502-503 (CA.3 1993); At-
lantic Statu' Legal FOImdation. Inc. v. Pan
Am. Tanning Corp., 993 F.2d 1017. 1020-1021
(CA.2 1993); Atlantic Statu ugal Founda-
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It would be premature, however, for us
to address the continuing validity of the
catalyst theory in the context of this case.
The Disbict Court, in an order separate
from the one In which it imposed civil
penalties against Laidlaw, stayed the time
for a petition for attorneys' fees until the
time for appeal had expired or, If either
party appealed, until the appeal was re-
solved. See 149 F .3d, at 305 (descnbing
order staying time for attorne)os' fees peti-
tion). In the opinion accompan~ing its
order on penalties, the District Court stat-
S.CL 386. 130 L.Ed.2d 233 (1994) (mootness
attributable to a volunlal)' act of a nonprevail.
ing party ordinariiy does not justify vacatur of
a judgment under review); see also Walling v.
James V. Reuter. Inc.. 321 U.S. 671. 64 S.Ct.
826.88 L.Ed. 1001 (1944).
6. We note that it is far from dear that vacatur
of the Dlstrlct Court's judgment would be the
appropriate response to a finding of mootness
on appeal brought about by the voiuntary
conduct of the party that lost in the District
Court. See U.S. Bancf)rp Afongage Co. v.
Bonner Mall Partnership. 513 U.S. 18. 115
C
[22] FOE argues that it Is entitled to
attorneys' fees on the theory that a plain.-
tiff can be a "pl'e\"aiUng party" for pur-
poses of 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) if it was the
"catalyst" that triggered a favorable out-
come. In the decision under l'e\iew, the
Court of Appeals noted that its Circuit
precedent construed our decision in FaT-
rar 11. Hobby, 506 U.s. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566,
121 LEd.2d 494 (1992), to· require rejec-
tion of that theory. 149 F.ad, at 307, n. 5
(citing 8-1 & 8-1 \I. State Bd. ofEd. ofN.
c.. 21 F.3d 49, 51 (CA4 1994) (en banc».
cr. Foreman 11. Dalla8 County, 193 F.3d
314, 320 (CA5 1999) (stating, in dicta, that
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"[s]uch abandonment Is an important fac- "[a]fter Fa'lTar ... th~ continuing vali~ty
tor bearing on the question whether a of the catalyst theory IS in serious doubt ').
court should exercise its~ to enjoin Fa'lTar aclmm...ledged that a cM} rights
~e "defendant from renewmg the prac- plaintiff awarded nominal damages may be
tice ). a "prevailing party" under 42 U.S.C.
LaidIawalso asserts, in a supplemental § 1988. 506 U.S., at 112, 113 S.Ct. 566.
suggestion of mootness, that the closure of The case involved no catal~1ic effect.
its Roebuck facility, which took place~ Recognizing that the issue \\115 not pre-
the Court of Appeals issued its decision, sented for this Court's decision in Fa'lTar,
mooted the case. The facility closure, like several Courts of Appeals have expressly
Laidlaw's earlier achievement of substan- concluded that Famlr did not repudiate
tial compliance with its permit require- the catalyst theory. See Marbley v. Bane,
ments, might moot the case,bu~ once 57 F.3d 224, 234 (C.A.2 1995); Baumgart-
more reiterate-only if one or the other of ner 11. Harrisburg Hausing Authority, 21
these events made it absolutely clear that F.3d 541, 546-550 (CA3 1994); Zinn 11.
Laidlaw's permit violations could not rea- Shalala. 35 F.3d 273, 276 (CA7 1994);
sonably be expected to recur. Concen.tmt- Little Rock School DiBt. 11. Pltwl:i County
ed Phosphate Ezport Asm., 393 U.S., at Special SelL Dist., /I 1, 17 F.3d 260, 263, n.
203, 89 S.Ct. 361. The effect of both Laid- 2 (C.A.8 1994); Kilgour 11. Pasadena. 53
law's compliance and the facility closure on F.3d 1007, 1010 (CA9 1995); Beard 11.
the prospect of future violations is a dIs- Teska., 31 F.3d 942, 951-952 (CA10 1994);
puted factual matter. FOE points out, for Morril 11•. West Palm Beach, 194 F.3d
example-and Laidlaw does not appear to 1203, 1207:(CAll 1999). Other Courts of
contest-that Laidlaw retains its NPDES Appeals have likewise continued to apply
permit. These issues have not been aired the catalyst theory notwithstanding FaT-
in the lower courts; they remain open for rar.Pam 11. United States Dept. of
consideration on remand.' Hcnuing and Urban Development, 988
F.2d 236, 238 (CAl 1993); Citizens
Against Tcu: Waste v. Westerville City
Schoot 985 F.2d 255, 257 (CA6 1993).
~
tv
~
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in that case the opinion makes it clear that
the inability to obtain injunctive relief
would have no impact on the damages
claim. 1d., at lOS, n. 6, 109, 103 8.Ct. 1660.
There is no precedent, either in our juris-
prudence, or in any other of which I am
aware, that provides any support for the
suggestion that post-eomplaint factual de-
velopments that might moot a claim for
injunctive or declaratory relief could either
moot a claim for monetary relief or retro-
actively invalidate a valid money judgment.
Justice KENNEDY, concurring.
Difficult and fundamental questions are
raised when we ask whether exactions of
public fines by private litigants, and the
delegation of Executive power which might
be inferable from the authorization, are
permissible in view of the responsibilities
committed to the Executive by Article II
of the Constitution of the United States.
The questions presented in the petition for
certiorari did not identify these issues "ith
particularity; and neither the Court of Ap-
peals in deciding the ease nor the parties
in their briefing before this Court devoted
specific attention to the subject. In my
view these matters are best reserved for a
later case. With this observation, I join
the opinion of the Court.
Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice
THOMAS joins, diasenting.
The Court begins its analysis by finding
injury in fact on the basis of vague affida-
vits that are undermined by the District
Court's express finding that Laidlaw's dis-
charges caused no demonstrable narm to
the em.-ironment. It then proceeds to
marry private wrong v.ith public remedy
in a union that Tiolates traditional princi-
ples of federal standing-thereby permit-
ting law enforcement to be placed in the
hands of private individuals. Finally, the
Court suggests that to avoid mootness one
needs even less of a stake in the outcome
than the Court's watered-down require-
ments for initial standing. I dissent from
all of this.
I
Plaintiff's, as the parties invoking federal
jurisdiction, have the burden of proof and
persuasion as to the existence of stariding.
Lujan 11. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351
(1992) (hereinafter Lujan)j FlV/PBS, 1M
v. Dalhu, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596,
107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990). The plaintiffs in
this ease fell far short of carrying their
burden of demonstrating injury in fact.
The Court cltes affiants' testimony assert-
ing that their enjoyment of the North Tyg-
er River has been diminished due to "con-
cern" that the water was polluted, and that
they "believed" that Laidlaw's mercury ex-
ceedances had reduced the value of their
homes. Ante, at 704-70s. These aver-
ments alone cannot carry the plaintiffs'
burden of demonstrating that they ha\'e
suffered a "concrete and particularized"
injury, Lujan. 504 U.S., at 560, 112 S.Ct.
2130. General allegations of injury may
suffice at the pleading stage, but at sum-
mary judgment plaintiffs must set forth
"specific fads" to support their claims.
1d., at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. And where, as
here, the case has proceeded to judgment,
those specific facts must be "'supported
adequately by the evidence adduced at tri-
al,'" ibid. (quoting Glad8tone, Realtors v.
ViUage ofBeUu'OOd. 441 U.s. 91, 115, n. 31,
99 S.Ct. 1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979». In
this case, the affidavits themselves are
woefully short on "specific facts," and the
vague allegations of injury they do make
are undermined by the evidence adduced
at trial
Typically, an environmental plaintiff'
claiming injury due to discharges in viola·
tion of the Clean Water Act argues that
the discharges harm the environment, and
that the harm to the emironment injures
him. This route to injury is barred in the
present case, however, since the District
Court concluded after considering all the
evidence that there had been "no demon-
strated proof of harm to the en\ironment,"
956 F.Supp. 588, 602 (D.S.C.I997), that the
"permit violations at issue in this citizen
suit did not result in any health risk or
environmental harm," ibid., that "[a]ll
available data ... fall to show that Laid-
law's aaual discharges have resulted in
harm to the North 'l)-ger River," id., at
602-603, and that "the oversll quality of
the river exceeds levels necessary to sup-
port ... recreation in and on the water,"
id., at 600.
The Court finds these conclusions un-
problematic for standing, because "{t]he
relevant showing for purposes of Article
III standing ... is not injury to the envi-
ronment but injury to the plaintiff'." Ante,
at 704-705. This statement is correct, as
far as it goes. We have certiunIy held that
a demonstration of harm to the environ-
ment is not enough to satisfy the injury-in-
fact requirement unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate how he personally was
harmed. E.g., Lujan. BUpnz. at 563, 112
S.Ct. 2130. In the normal course, howev.
er, a lack of demonstrable harm to the
environment will translate, as it plainly
does here, into a lack of demonstrable
harm to citizen plaintiff's. While it is per-
haps possible that • plaintiff' could be
harmed even though the environment was
not, such a plaintiff' would have the burden
of articulating and demonstrating the na-
ture of that injury. Ongoing "concerns"
about the environment are not enough, for
"[i]t is the reality of the threat of repeated
injury that is relevant to the standing in-
quiry, not the plaintift"s subjective appre-
hensions," Loa Angeles 11. Lycms, 461 U.S.
95, 107, n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d
675 (1983). At the very least, in the pres-
ent ease. one would expect to see evidence
supporting the affidavits' bald assertions
regarding decreasing recreational nasge
and declining home values, as well as evi-
dence for the improbable proposition that
Laidlaw's violations, even though harmless
to the environment, are somehow responsi-
ble for these effects. Cf. Glad8tone, BU-
pro. at 115, 99 S.Ct. 1601 (noting that
standing could be established by "convinc-
ing evidence" that a decline in real estate
values was attributable to the defendant's
conduct). Plaintiffs here have made no
attempt at such a shO\ving, but rel~' entire-
ly upon unsupported and unexplained affi.
davit allegations of "concern."
Indeed, e\'ery one of the .mants de-
posed by Laidlaw east into doubt the (iii
any event inadequate) proposition that
subjective "concerns" actually affected
their conduct. Linda Moore, for example, .
said in her affida\it that she would use the
affected "'8terways for recreation if it
were not for her concern about pollution.
Record, Doe. No. 71 (Exhs. 45, 46). Yet
she testified in her deposition that she had
been to the river only t\\ice, once in 1980
(when she visited someone who Ii\'ed by
the m-er) and once after this suit was filed.
Record, Doe. No. 62 (Moore Deposition
23-24). Similarl~', Kenneth Lee Curtis,
who claimed he was injured by being de-
prived of recreational .ctivi~· at the river,
admitted that he had not been to the river
since he ",as "a kid," (Curtis Deposition,
pt. 2, p. 38), and when asked whether the
reason he stopped visiting the river was
because of pollution, lIIIS\\"el'ed "no," id., at
39. As to Curtis's claim that the river
"looke[d] and smell[ed] polluted," this con·
dition, if present, was surely not caused by
Laidlaw's discharges, which according to
the District Court "did not result in any
health risk or environmental harm." 956
F.Supp., at 602. The other aff'tants cited
by the Court were not deposed, but their
affidavits state either that they would use
the river if it were not polluted or hannful
(as the court subsequently found it is not),
Record, Doe. No. 21 (Exhs' 7, 8, and 9), or
said that the river looks polluted (which is
also incompab1lle \\ith the court's rmd-
ings), ibid. (Exit. 10). These affiants
have established nothing but "subjective
apprehensions."
The Court is correct that the District
Court explicitly found standing-albeit "by
the very slimmest of margins," and as "an
awfully close call." App. in No. 97-1246
(C.A.4), p. 207-208 (Tr. of Hearing 39-40
(June 30, 1993». That cautious fmding,
FRIENDS OF EARTH v. LAIDLAW El\'VIRONME~"TAL SERVS.
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however, was made in 1993, long before
the court's 1997 conclusion that Laidlaw's
discharges did not harm the environment.
As we have pre\iously recognized, an ini-
tial conclusion that plaintiff's have standing
is subject to reexamination, partieularly if
later l!\idence proves inconsistent \\ith
that conclusion. Gladstone, 441 U.S., at
115, and n. 31, 99 S,Ct. 1601; Wyoming v.
Oklahoma. 502 U.S. 437, 446, 112 S.Ct.
789, 117 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). Laidlaw chal-
lenged the existence of injury in fact on
appeal to the Fourth Cireuit, but that
court did not reach the question. Thus no
lower court has reviewed the injury-in-faet
Issue in light of the extensive studies that
led the Distriet Court to conclude that the
environment was not harmed by Laidlaw's
discharges.
Inexplicably, the Court is untroubled by
this, but proceeds to find injury in faet in
the most eaBual fashion, as though it is
merely confinning a' careful anal)'Bis made
below. Although we have previously re-
fused to find standing based on the "con-
clusory allegations of an affidavit" Lujan
v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S.
871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695
(1990), the Court Is content to rlo just that
today. By accepting plaintiff's' vague, con-
tradietGry, and unsubstantiated allegations
of "concem" about the environment as ad-
equate to prove injury in fact, and accept-
ing them even in the face of a finding that
the environment was not demonstrably
harmed, the Court makes the injury-in-fad
requirement a sham. If there are permit
violations, and a member of a plaintiff'
environmental organization lives near the
offending plant, it would be diffic:ult not to
satisfy today's lenient standard.'
.11
The Court's treatment of the redressa-
bility requirementr-which would have
been unneeessary if it resolved the injury-
in-fad question con-eclly-is equally cava-
lier. As diseussed above, petitioners al-
lege ongoing injury consisting of diminish-
ed enjoyment of the affected waterways
and decreased property values. They al-
lege that these injuries al'e caused by
Laidlaw's continuing pennit "iolations.
But the remedy petitioners seek is neither
recompense for their injuries nol' an in-
junction against future violations. In-
stead, the remedy is a statutorily specified
"penalty" for past violations, pa)'able en-
tirely to the United States Treasury.
Only last Tenn, we held that such penal-
ties do not redress any injury a citizen
plaintiff' has suffered from past violations.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment, 523 U.S. 83, 106-107, 118 S.Ct. 1003,
140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). The Court none-
theleas finds the redressability require-
ment satisfied here, distinguishing Steel
Co. on the ground that in this ease the
petitioners allege ongoing violations; pay-
ment of the penalties, it sa)1l, will remedy
petitioners' injury by deterring future vio-
lations by Laidlaw. Ante, at 706-707. It
holds that.a penalty payable to the public
"remedies" a threatened private harm, and
suffices to sustain a private suit.
That holding has no precedent in our
jurisprudence, and takes this Court be-
yond the "eases and controversies" that
Article III of the Constitution has entrust-
ed to its resolution. Even if it were appro-
priate, moreover, to allO\v Artiele Ill's
remediation requirement to be satisfied by
the Indirect private consequences of a pub-
lic penalty, those consequences are entire-
ly too speculatjve in the present ease. The
new standing law that the Court makes-
like all expansions of standing beyond the
traditional constitutional limits-has grave
implications for democratic p'emance. I
shall diseuss these three points In turn.
A
In Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.s.
614, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973),
the plaintiff', mother of an illegitimate
ehild, sought, on behalf of herself, her
cht1d, and all others simllarly situated, an
injunction against diseriminatory applica-
tion of Art. 602 of the Texas Penal Code.
Although that provision made it a misde-
meanor for "any parent" to refuse to sup-
port his or her minor children under 18
years of age, it was enforeed only against
married parents. That refusal, the plain-
tiff contended, deprived her and her child
of the equal proteetlon of the law by deny-
ing them the deterrent effect of the statute
upon the father's failure to fulfill his sup-
port obligation. The Court held that there
was no Artiele III standing. There was no
" 'direct' relationship," it said, "between
the alleged injury and the claim sought to
be adjudicated," since "[t]he prospeet that
proseeution will, at least in the future,
result in payment of support ean, at best,
be tenned only speculative." Id., at 618,
93 S.Ct. 1146. "[Our eases] demonstrate
that, in American jurisprudence at least, a
private citizen laeks a judicially cognizable
Interest in the proseeution or nonproseeu-
tion of another." Id., at 619, 93 S.Ct. 1146.
Although the Court In Linda R.s. recit.-
ed the "logieal nexus" analysis of FlaBt v.
Cohen, 392 U.s. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20
L.Ed.2d 947 (1968), whicl1 has since faDen
. Into desuetude, "it Is clear that standing
."'as denied ... because of the unlikelihood
that the relief requested would redress
appellant's claimed injury." Duke Power
Co. 11. Carolina Environmental Study
Group. Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79, n. 24, 98 S.Ct.
2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). There was
no "logieal nexus" between nonenforce-
ment of the statute and Linda R. 8.'s
failure to reeeive support payments be-
eBWIe "[t]he prospect that pniseeution will
• •• result In payment of support" was
"speculative," Linda R. S., supra, at 618,
93 8.Ct. 1146-that Is to say, It was uncer-
tain whether the relief would prevent the
injury.\ Of course precisely the same situ-
ation exlsta here. The principle that "in
American jurisprudence ... a private citi-
I. the decision In Linda R.S. did not tum, as
today's opinion imaginatively suggests, on the
father's short-term Inability to pay support If
Imprisoned, Ante, at 704, n. 4. the Court's
only comment upon the Imprisonment was
that, unlike Imprisonment for civil contempt,
It would not condition the father'. release
zen laeks a judicially cognizable interest in
the proseeution or nonproseeution of an-
other" applies no less to prosecution for
civil penalties payable to the State than to
prosecution for criminal penalties owing to
the State.
The Court's opinion reads as though the
only purpose and effect of the redressabili-
ty requirement Is to assure that the plain-
tiff' receive .ome of the benefit of the relief
that a court orders. That is not so. If it
were, a federal tort plaintiff' fearing repeti-
tion of the injury could ask for tort dam-
ages to be paid, not only to himself but to
other vietims as well, on the theory that
those damages would have at least some
deterrent effect beneficial to him. Such a
suit Is preposterous because the "remedia-
tion" that Is the traditional busineas of
Anglo-American courts Is relief speeifieally
tanored to the plaintifrs injury, and not
any sort ot relief that has some incidental
benefit to the plaintiff. Just as a "general-
Ized grievance" that affeets the entire citi-
zenry cannot satisfy the injury-in-faet re-
quirement even though it aggrieves the
plaintiff' along with everyone else, see Lu-
jan, 504 U.s., at 573-574, 112 S.Ct. 2130,
so also a generalized remedy that deters
all future wilawful activity against all per-
sons cannot satisfy the remediation re-
quirement, even though it deters (among
other things) repetition of this partieular
unlawful acthity against these partieular
plaintiffs.
Thus, relief against prospective harm Is
traditionally afforded by way of an injunc-
tion, the scope of which Is limited by the
scope of the threatened injury. Lewi& v.
Ca..ey, 518 U.s. 843, 357-360, 116 S.Ct.
2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996); Lyons, 461
U.s., at 105-107, and n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1660.
In seeking to overturn that tradition by
upon paymenL the Cout1 then continued:
."I1te prospect that prosecution will. at least
In the future."-i.e., upon completion of the
Imprisonment-"result In payment of support
can, at best, be termed only speculali\"e."
Linda R. 5•• 410 U.S.• at 618, 93 S.CL 1146.
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ghing an individual plaintiff the power to
invoke a public remedy, Congress has done
precisely what we have said it cannot do:
convert an "undifferentiated public inter-
est" into an "indhidual right" vindicable in
the courts. Lujan. aupTU, at 577, 112
S.Ct. 2130; Steel Co., 523 U.S., at 106, 118
S.Ct. 1003. The sort of scattershot J'e-
dress approved today makes nonsense of
our statement in Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222,
94 S.Ct. 2925 (1974), that the requirement
of injury in fact "insures the framing of
relief no broader than required by the
precise facts." A daim of particularized
future injury has today been made the
vehicle for pursuing generslized penalties
for past violations, and a threshold show-
ing of injury in fact has become a lever
that will move the world.
B
As I have just di.'lCIIssed, it is my view
that a plaintiffs desire to benefit from the
detelTent effect of a public penalty for past
conduct can never suffice to establish a
case or controversy of the sort known to
our law. Such detelTent effect is, so to
speak, "speculative as a matter of law."
Even if that were not so, however, the
deterrent effect in the present case would
surely be speculative as a matter of fact.
The Court recognizes, of course, that to
satisfy Article III, it must be "likely," as
opposed to "merely speculative," that a
favorable decision will redress plaintiffs'
injw:r, Lujan. aupTU, at 561, 112 S.Ct.
2130. See ante, at 704. Further, the Court
recognizes that not all deterrent effects of
aU civil penalties will meet this standard-
though it declines to "explore the outer
limits" of adequate detelTence, ante, at
707-708. It concludes, however, that in
the present case "the civil penalties sought
by FOE carried with them a detelTent
effect" that satisfied the "likely [rather
than] speculative" standard. Ibid. There
is little in the Court's opinion to explain
why it believes this is so.
The Court cites the District Court's con-
clusion that the penalties imposed, along
with anticipated fee awards, provided "ad-
equate detelTence." Ante, at 702, 707-
708; 956 F.Supp., at 611. There is abso-
lutely no reason to believe, however, that
this meant "detelTence adequate to pre-
vent an injury to these plaintiffs that
would othenllise occur." The statute does
not even mention detelTence in general
(much less detelTence of future harm to
the particular plaintiff) as one of the ele-
ments that the court should consider in
fixing the amount of the penalty. (That
element can come in, if at all, under the
last, residual category of "such other mat-
ters as justice may require." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(d).) The statute does require the
court to consider "the seriousness of the
violation or \iolations, the economic benefit
(if any) resulting from the violation, any
history of such violations, any good-faith
efforts to comply ,vith the applicable re-
quirements, [and] the economic impact of
the penalty on the ~iolator...." Ibid; see
956 F.Supp., at 601. The District Court
meticulously discussed, in subsections (a)
through (e) of the portion of its opinion
entitled "Civil Penalty," each one of those
specified factors, and then-under subsec-
tion (1) entitled "Other Matters As Justice
May Require," it discussed "I. Laidlaw's
Failure to Avail Itself of the Reopener
Clause," "2. Recent Compliance History,"
and "3. The Ever-Changing Mercury Lim-
it." There is no mention whatever-in this
portion of the opinion or anywhere else-
of the degree of detelTence necessary to
prevent future harm to these particular
plaintiffs. Indeed, neither the District
Court's final opinion (which contains the
"adequate detelTence" statement) nor its
earlier opinion dealing \\ith the prelimi-
nary question whether South Carolina's
previous lawsuit against Laidlaw constitut-
ed "diligent prosecution" that would bar
citizen suit, see 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(I)(B),
displayed any awareness that detelTence
of future injury to the plaintiffs "..as nec-
essary to support standing.
The District Court's earlier opinion did,
however, quote with approval the passage
from a District Court case which began:
"'Civil penalties seek to deter pollution
by discouraging future violations. To
serve this function, the amount of the civil
penalty must be high enough to insure
that polluters cannot simply absorb the
penalty as a cost of doing business.'"
App. 122, quoting PIRG v. PotoeU Duf-
fryn Terminal&, I~>. 720 F.Supp. 1158,
1166 (D.N.J. 1989). When the Disbict
Court concluded the "Civil Penalty" sec-
tion of its opinion with the statement that
"[tlaken together, this court beUeves the
above penalty, potential fee awards, and
Laidlaw's own direct and indirect litiga-
tion expenses provide adequate deter-
rence under the circumstances of this
case," 956 F.supp., at 611, it was obvious-
ly harking back to this general statement
of what the statutorily prescn'bed factors
(and the "as justice may require" factors,
which in this case did not include particu-
larized or even generalized deterrence)
were designed to achieve. It meant no
more than that the court believed the cMl
penalty it had prescn'bed met the statuto-
ry standards.
The Court points out that we have previ-
ously said "'all civil penalties have some
detelTent effect,'" ante, at 706 (quoting
Hudson 10'. United StateB, 522 U.S. 93,102,
118 S.Ct.· 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997».
That Is unquestionably true: As a general
matter, polluters as a class are detelTed
from violating discharge limits by the
availability of civil penslties. However,
none of the cases the Court cites focused
on the detelTent effect of a single imposi-
tion of penalties on a particular lawbreak-
er. Even less did theY focus on the ques-
tion whether that particularized detelTent
effect (if any) was enough to redress the
injury of a citizen plaintiff in the sense
required by Article III. They all invoh'ed
penalties pursued by the government, not
by citizens. See Hudson, supra;at 96, 118
S.Ct. 488; Department of RevenUIJ of
Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 773,
114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994);
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 414,
107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d :i6s (1987).
If the Court had undertaken the neces-
sai-y inquiry into whether significant de-
terrence of the plaintiffs' feared injury
was "likely," it would have had to reason
something like this: Strictly speaking, no
polluter fa deterred by a penalty for past
pollution; he is deteJTed by the fear of a
penalty for jut·ure pollution. That fear
will be virtually nonexistent if the prospec-
tive polluter knows that all emissions vio-
latora are given a free pass; it will be
substantial under an emissiona program
such as the federal scheme here, which· is
regularly and notoriously enforced; it will
be even higher when a prospective pollu-
ter subject to such a regularly enforced
program has, as here, been the object of
public charges of pollution and a suit for
injunction; and it wil1 surely be near the
top of the graph when, as here, the pro-
spectl\'e polluter has already been subject-
ed to state penalties for the past pollution.
The detelTence on which the plaintiffs
must rely for standing in the present case
is the marginal increase in Laidlaw's fear
of future penalties that will be achieved by
adding federal penalties for Laidlaw's past
conduct.
I cannot say for certain that this mar-
ginal int:rease is zero; but I can say for
certain that it is entirely speculative
whether it will make the difference be-
tween these plaintiffs' suffering injury in
the future and these plaintiffs' going un-
harmed. In fact, the assertion that it will
"likely" do so is entirely farfetched. The
speculativeness of that result is much
greater than the speculativeness we found
excessive in Simon v. Eastern Ky. IVelfare
Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 43, 96
S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976), where
we held that den)ing § 501(c)(3) charita-
ble-deduction tax status to hospitals that
refused to treat indigents was not suffi-
ciently likely to assure future treatment of
the indigent plaintiffs to support Ftanding.
And it is much greater than the specula-
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tiveness we found excessive in Lindo. R.S.
v. Richaf'd D., discussed supra, at 702-703,
where we said U1at "the prospect that
prosecution [for nonsupport] will .... re-
sult in payment of support can, at best, be
tenned only speculative," 410 U.S., at 618,
93 S.Ct. 1146.
In sum, if this case is, as the Court
suggests, within the cenb'al core of "deter·
rence" standing, it is impossible to imagine
what the "outer limits" could possibly be.
The Court's e>:pressed reluctance to define
those "outer limits" serves only to disguise
the fact that it has promulgated a revolu·
tionary new doctrine of standing that will
pennit the entire body of public civll penal·
tics "to be handed over to enforcement by
private interests.
C
Article II of the Constitution commits it
to the President to "take Care U1at the
Laws be faithfully exeCuted," Art. II, § 3,
and provides specific methods by which all
persons exercising significant executive
power are to be appointed, Art. II, § 2. As
Justice KENNEDY'S concurrence c0rrect-
ly observes, the question of the confonnity
of this legislation with Article II has not
been argued-and I, like the Court, do not
address it. But Article III, no less than
Article II, has consequences for the struc-
ture of our government, see Schlesinger,
418 U.S., at 222, 94 S.Ct. 2925, and it is
worth noting the changes in U1at structure
which today's decision allows.
By pennitting citizens to pursue clvll
penalties payable to the Federal Treasury,
2. The Court points out that the government Is
allowed to Intervene in a citizen suit, see IInte.
at 707-709, n. 4; 33 U.S.C. § 1365(cX2), but
this power to "bring the Government's views
to the attention of the court," IInte, at 708-
709, n. 4, Is meager substitute for the power
to decide whether prosecution wUI occur. In·
deed. according the Chief Executive of the
United States the ability to inten-ene does no
more Ihan place him on a par with John O.
PubUc, who can Intervene-whether the gov·
ernment likes it or not-when the United
States files suiL § 1365(b)(lXB).
the Act does not pl'O\ide a mechanIsm for
individual relief in any traditional sense,
but turns over to private citizens the func-
tion of enforclng the law. A Clean Waw'
Act plaintift' pursuing clvll penalties actS as
a self-appointed mini·EPA. Where, as is
often the ease, the plaintift' is a national
associstion, it has significant discretion in
choosing enforcement targets. Once the
association is aware or a reported violation,
it need not look long for an Injured memo
ber, at least under the theory of Injury the
Court applies today. See supra, at 700-
702. And once the target is chosen, the
suit goes forward without meaningful pub-
lic control! The avaDability of civil penal.
ties vasUy disproportionate to the individu·
al Injury gives citizen plaintift's massive
bargaining power-whlch is often used to
achieve setUements requiring the defen·
dant to support environmental projects or
the plalntift's' choosing. See Greve, The
Private Enforcement or Environmental
Law, 65 Tulane L.Rev. 339, 355-359 (1990).
Thus is a public fine diverted to a private
interest.
To be sure, the EPA may foreclose the
citizen suit by itself bringing suit. 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B). This allows public
authorities to avoid private enforcement
only by accepting private direction as to
when enforcement should be undertaken-
which is no less constitutionally bizarre.
Elected omcla1s are entirely deprived of
their discretion to decide that a given vio-
lation should not be the object of suit at
all, or U1at the enforcement decision should
be postponed' See § 1365(b)(1)(A,) (pr0-
viding U1at citizen plalntift' need only wait
3. 1be Court observes that "the federal Execu·
tlve Branch does nOl share the dlssent's view
that such suits dissipate Its authority to en·
force the law." since It has "endorsed this
citlzen suit from the outset:' Ante, at 707. n.
4. Of course. In doubtful cases a long and
uninterrupted history of presidential acquies-
cence and approval can shed light upon the
constitutional undentandlng. What we have
here-ac:qulescence and approval by a single
Adminlslration~oes not deserve passing
mention.
60 days after giving notice or the violation
to the government berore proceeding with
action). This is the predictable and inevit-
able consequence of the Court's allowing
the use or public remedies for private
wrongs.
III
Finany, I ofTer a rew comments regard·
ing the Court's discussion of whether
FOE's claims became moot by reason or
Laidlaw's substantial compliance with the
pennit limits. I do not disagree with the
conelusion U1at the Court reaches. As-
suming that the plaint1ffs had standing to
pursue clvll penalties in the first instance
(which they did not), their claim might well
not have been mooted by LaIdlaw'1 volun·
4. In addition to the compliance and plant.
c:losure Issues, there also remaiDs open on
remand the question whether the c:urrent suit
was foreclosed because the earlier suit by the
State was "diligently prosecuted." See 33
U.S.C. § 1365(bXIXB). Nothing In the
Court's opinion c1Isposes of the Issue. The
opinion notes the District Court's 8ndIng that
1.aIdlaw Itself played a significant role In fa·
cilitatlnl the State's action. Ante, at 702. n.
I, 707, n. 2. But there Is no incompatibility
whatever between a defendant's facilitation of
suit and the State's diligent prosecution-u
prosec:utloas of felons who. confess their
crimes and tum themselves In regularly dem-
onstrate. LaIdlaw was entirely within Its
rights to prefer alate suit to this private en·
forcement action; and If It had such a prefer-
ence It would have been prudenl-l\Ven that
a State must act within 60 clays of recelving
notice of a citizen suit. _ § 1365(bXl)(A),
and given the number of cues State agencies
hand1e-lor LaIdlaw to maIre sure Its case did
nOl fall tbroush the cracb. South Carolina's
Interest In the action was not a £eigned last
minute contrivance. It had worked with
LaIdlaw In resolving the problem for many
)'ean, and had previously undertaken an ad·
mlnlstrative enforcement action resulting In a
consent order. 890 F.Supp. 470, 476 (D.S.C.
1995). South Carolina has filed an _iCJU
brief arsu1nl that allowing citizen suits to
proceed despite ongoing state enforcement ef.
forts "wUI provide citlzens and federal judges
the opportunity to reUtigate and sec:ond-guess
the enforcement and permitting actions of
South Carolina and other States." Brief for
South Carolina as Amicus Curiae 6.
5. Unlike Justice STEVENS' concurrence, the
opinion for the Court appean to recognize
tary compliance with the permit, and leav·
ing this fact-Intensive quel!tion open for
consideration on remand, as the Court
does, ante, at 711, seems sensible.· In
reaching this disposition, hOWC\'er, the
Court engages in a troubling discussion of
the purported distinctions between the
doctrines or standing and mootness. I am
trankly puzzled as to why this di.'ICIl88ion
appears at all. Laldlaw's clalmed compli·
ance is squarely within the bounds of our
"voluntary eessaUon" doctrine, which is the
basis for the remand. Ante, at 711.'
There is no reason to engage in an inter-
esting academie excursus upon the dift'er·
enees between mootness and standing In
order to invoke this obviously applicable
rule.'
that a claim for civil penalties Is moot when It
Is c:lear that no future Injury to the plaintiff at
the hands of the defendant can occur. The
concurrence suuests that civil penalties. like
traditional damages remedies, cannot be
mooted by absence of threatened Injury. 1be
anaJosy Is InapL TradItional money damages
are payable to compensate for the ..harm of
past condue:t, which subsists whether future
harm Is threatened or not; civil penalties are
privately assessable (according to the Court)
to deter threatened future harm to the plain·
tiff. Where there Is no threat to the plaintiff.
he has no claim to deterrence. 1be proposl·
tlon that ImposslbUity of future violation does
nOl moot the case holds true, of coone, for
civil·penalty suits by the government. which
do not rest upon the theory that lOme partlcu.
lar future harm Is being prevented.
6. The Coun attempts to frame Its exposition
as a c:otTective to the Fourth Circuit. which It
c:1aIms "confused mootness with standing."
Anre. at 709. The Fourth Circult's conclusion
of nonjusticiabl1lty rested upon the belief (en-
tirely correct, In my view) that the only reme-
dy being pursued on appeal, cMI penalties.
would nOl redress FOE's claimed Injury. 149
F.3d 303, 306 (1998). WhUe this might be
characterized as a conclusion that FOE had
no standing to punue ci\il penalties from the
outset. It can also be characterized. as It was
by the Fourth Circuit. as a conclusion that,
when FOE decUned to appeal denial of the
declaratory judgment and injunction, and ap-
pealed only the Inadequacy of the civil penal.
ties (which It had no standing to punue) the
CIISe tIS II whole became moot• . Given the
Court's erroneous conclusion that civil penal-
l,~ l_~.._ l_ ~ L..- L_ L- L..- l.-.- l~."._ L......-. L_ L_,,"" L- L~ .. l_",.._ L..... L_... L,_.__
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Because the discussion is not essential-
indeed, not even relevant-to the Court's
decision, it is or limited significance.
Nonetheless, I am troubled by the Court's
too-hasty retreat from our characterization
of mootness as "the doctrine or standing
set in a time rrame." Arizona718 for Offi-
cial EfrgliBh v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68, n.
22,117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997).
We have repeatedly recognized that what
is required ror litigation to continue is
essentially identical to what is required ror
litigation to begin: There must be a justi-
ciable case or conb'o\'ersy as required by
'Article III. "Simply stated, a case is moot
when the issues presented are no longer
'live' or the parties lack a legally cogniza-
ble interest in the outcome." Powell v.
McComuuk, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct.
1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). A Court may
not proceed to hear an action if, subse-
quent to its initiation, the dispute loses "its
character as a present, live controversy or
the kind that must exist if [the Court is] to
avoid ad\isory opinions on abstract propo-
sitions or law." Hall 11. Beals, 396 U.s. 45,
48, 90 S.Ct. 200, 24 L.Ed.2d 214 (1969) (per
curiam). See also Preiser v. Newkirk, 422
U.S. 395, 401, 95 S.Ct. 2330, 45 L.Ed.2d
272 (1975); Steffel 11. Thompson. 415 U.S.
452, 459, n. 10, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d
505 (1974). Because the requirement or a
continuing case or controversy derives
from the Constitution, Liner 11. lafco, Inc.,
375 U.s. 301, 306, n. 3, 84 S.Ct. 391, 11
L.Ed.2d 347 (1964), it may not be ignored
when inconvenient, United State, v. Alas-
ka S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116, 40 S.Ct. 448,
64 L.Ed 808 (1920) (moot question cannot
be decided, "(h]owever convenient it might
be"), or, as the Court suggests, to save
"sunk costs," compare ante, at 707, "ith
Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.s.
472, 480, 110 S.Ct. 1249, lOS L.Ed.2d 400
(1990) ("[R]easonable caution is needed to
be sure that mooted litigation is not
pressed rorward ... solely in order to
obtain reimbursement or sunk costs").
ties can redress private injury, it of course
rejec:ts both formulations-but neither of
them necessitates the Court's academic dis-
It is true that mootness has some added
\'ITinkles that standing lacks. One is the
"voluntary cessation" doctrine to which the
Court refers. But it is inaccurate ~'re­
gard this as a reduction or the basic re-
quirement ror standing that obtained at
the beginning or the suit. A genuine con-
troversy must exist at both stages. And
just as the initial suit could be brought (by
\'I'll)' or suit ror declaratory judgment) be-
rore the derendant actually violated the
plaintitrs alleged rights, so also the initial
suit can be continued even though the
derendant has stopped violating the plain-
titrs alleged rights. The "voluntary cessa-
tion" 'doctrine is nothing more than an
evidentiary presumption that the contro-
versy reneeted by the violation or alleged
rights continues to exist. Steel Co., 523
U.S., at 109, 118 S.Ct. 1003. Similarly, the
ract th8t we do not (md eases moot when
the challenged conduct is "capable or repe-
tition, yet evading review" does not dem-
onstrate that the requirements for moot-
ness and for standing differ. "Where the
conduct has ceased ror the time being but
there is a demonstrated probability that it
will recur, a real-liCe controversy between
parties with a personal stake in the out-
come continues to exist." Honig 11. Doe,
~ U.S. 305, 341, lOS S.Ct. 592, 98
L.Ed2d 686 (1988) (SCALIA, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis omitted).
Part or the confusion in the Court's dls-
cussion is engendered by the fact that it
compares standing, on the one hand, with
mootness based on troluntary ceBBation, on
the other hand. Ante, at 709. The re-
quired showing that it is "absolutely clear"
that the conduct "could not reasonably be
expected to recur" is not the threshold
showing required for mootness, but the
heightened showing required in a particu-
lar category or eases where we have sensi-
bly concluded that there is reason to be
skeptical that cessation of violation means
course comparing the mootness and standing
doctrines.
cessation of. live controversy. For claims immense power or suing to enforce the
of mootness based on changes in circum- public laws in private hands. I respectful-
stances other than voluntary cessation, the ly dissent.
showing we have required is less taxing,
and the inquiry is indeed properly charac-
terized as one of "'standing set in a time
frame.'" See Arizona1ll, aupm, at 67, 68,
n. 22, 117 S.Ct. 1055 (case mooted where
plaintift"s change in jobs deprived case or
"still vital claim for prospective relief");
Spencer 11. Kemna, 523 U.S. I, 7, 118 S.Ct.
978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (case mooted by
petitioner's completion of his sentence,
aince "throughout the litigation, the plain-
tift' must have suffered, or be threatened
with, an actual injury traceable to the de-
fendant and likely to be redressed by a
favorable judicial decision") (internal quo-
tation marks omitted); Lewia,aupm, at
478-480,116 S.Ct. 2174 (case against state
mooted by change in federal law that elim·
inated parties' "personal stake" in the out-
come).
In sum, whfie the Court may be cor-
rect that the parallel between standing
and mootness is hnperf'eet due to realistic
evidentiary presumptions that are by
their nature applicable only in the moot-
ness .context, this does not change the
underlying principle that" '[t]he requisite
personal interest that must exist at the
commencement of the litigation ..• must
continue throughout lis existence.... ' "
Arizona1ll, aupm, at 68, n; 22, 117 S.Ct.
1055 (quoting United Statea Parole
Comm'n 11. Geraghty, 445 U.s. 388, 397,
100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980».
•••
By uncritically accepting vague claims of
injury, the Court has turned the Article
III requirement of injury in fact into a
"mere pleading requirement," Lujan, 504
U.s., at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130; and by ap-
proving the novel theory that public penal-
ties can redress anticipated private
wrongs, it has come close to "mak[ing] the
redressability requirement vanish," Steel
Co., aupm, at 107, 118 S.Ct. 1003. The
undesirable and unconstitutional conse-
quence of today's decision is to place the
K-30
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Nonprofit environmental organiza-
tions brought citizens suit against operator
of smelting facility under Clean Water Act,
alleging violations of operator's National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit and seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief. Following bench trial,
the United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina, Matthew J.
Perry, Jr., Senior District Judge, 9
F.Supp.2d 589, dismissed suit for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, and plaintiffs
appealed. The Court of Appeals, 179 F.3d
107, affirmed. On rehearing en 'bane, the
Court of Appeals, Wflkinson, Chief Judge,
held that: (1) owner of lake four miles
downstream from facility suffered injury in
fact as result of facilfty's violations of
NPDES permit; (2) owner's injuries-as
result of pollution of lake were fairly trace-
able to facility's violations of NPDES per-
mit; and (3) owner's injuries were redreas-
able by citizen suit under Clean Water Act.
Reveraed and remanded.
Niemeyer, Circuit Judge, wrote opin-
ion concuning in judgement.
Luttig, Circuit Judge, wrote opinion
concuning in judgment, in which Niemey-
er, Circuit Judge, joined.
Hamilton; Senior Circuit Judge, \\TOte
opinion concuning in judgment.
1. ASsociations ~20(1)
Association may have standing to sue
in federal court either based on injury to
organization in its own right or as repre-
sentative of its· members who have been
harmed. U.S.CA Const. Art. 3, 1 2, c1. 1.
2. Associations e»20(1)
Organization bas representational
standing when (1) at leasi one of its mem-
bers would have standing to sue in his own
right; (2) organization seeks to protect
interests germane to organization's pur-
pose; and (3) neither claim asserted nor
relief sought requires participation of indi-
vidual members in lawsuit. U.S.CA
Const. Art. 3,.1 2, cl. 1.
3. Federal' Civil Procedure e»103.2
Plaintiff must suffer invasion of legal-
ly protected interest that is concrete and
partictiIarized before he can bring action.
U.S.CA Const. Art. 3,1 2, cl.1.
4. Health and Environment e=>25.15(4.1)
Owner of I8ke four miles downstream
from smelting facility suffered injury in
fact for standing purposes as result of
facility's violations of its National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permit, despite lack of evidence of chemi-
cal content, increase in salinity or negati,·e
change in ecosystem of waterway; owner
and his family used lake for swimming and
fisbing, facility had violated permit more
than 500 times, chemicals released were
harmful to health and environment, and
chemicals released by facility had been
found in lake. Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 505,
33 U.S.CA 1 1365. .
5. Health and Environment e=>25.15(U)
Violation of discharge restrictions es-
tablished by state pursuant to National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit program in order to pro-
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teet designated uses of receiving water-
ways necessarily means that these uses
may be harmed, for purposes of detennin-
Ing i!\lury In fact In standing inquiry as
result of violation. Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control .Act Amendments of 1972,
§ 301(a), 33 U.S.CA § 1311(a)•.
6. Health and Environment e=>25.15(U)
Lake owner's i!\luries as result of pol-
lution of lake were fairly traceable to
smelting facility's violations of its National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit, for purposes of deter-
mining owner's standing to bring action
under Clean Water.Act; evidence Indicated
past presence of metals In lake of the type
discharged by facility, facility was dis-
charging pollutants at levels that caused
environmental degradation, and discharge
travelled downstream beyond lake. Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control.Act Amend-
ments of 1972, § 505,33 U.S.CA § 1365.
7. Health and Environment e=>25.i5(U)
Where plaintiff bringing action under
Clean Water.Act has pointed to polluting
source as Seed of his i!\lury, and owner of
polluting source has supplied no alterna-
tive culprit, fairly traceable requirement
for standing can be said to be fairly met.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, § 505, 33 U.S.CA
§ 1365.
S. Health and Environment e=>25.15(U)
Injuries of lake owner arising from
smelting facility's repeated violations of
Nation8l Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit were redre8Sable
for st8nding purposes by citizen suit under
Clean Water .Act seeking i!\lunctive relief
for continuing and threatened future viola-
tions of permit; facility had over 350 dis-
charge violations and 650 monitoring' and
reporting violations In last year for which
record contained evidence. Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, § 505,33 U.S.CA § 1365.
ARGUED: Bruce J. Terris, Terris,
Pravlik & Millian, L.L.P., Washington,
D.C., for Appellants. Rufus Justin Smith,
United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.. for Amicus Cupae.
Harold Weinberg Jacobs, Nexsen, Pruet,
Jacobs & Pollard, L.L.P., Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
Kathleen L. MUllan, Terris, Pravlik & Mil-
lian, L.L.P., Washington, D.C.; Robert
Guild, Columbia, South Carolina, for Ap-
pellants. Lois J. Sehift'er, Assistsnt Attor-
ney General, Greer S. Goldman, David
Shilton, United Ststes Department of Jus-
tice, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae.
Before: WILKINSON, Chief Judge, .
and WIDENER, MURNAGHAN,
WILKINS, NIEMEYER, LUTTIG,
WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, MOTZ,
TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges,
and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Reversed and remanded by published
opinion: Chief Judge WILKINSON \\TOte
the opinion, In which Judges WIDENER,
.MURNAGHAN, WILKINS, WILLIAMS,
MICHAEL, MOTZ, TRAXLER, and
KING joined. Judge NIEMEYER "TOte
an opinion concurring In the judgement.
Judge LUTTIG \\TOte an opinion
concurring In the judgment, In which
Judge NIEMEYER joined.' Senior Judge
HAMILTON \\TOte an opinion concurring
In the judgment.
OPINION
. WILKINSON, Chief Judge:
Friends of the Earth (FOE) and Citi-
zens Local Environmental Action Network
(CLEAN) brought a citizen suit against
Gaston Copper Recyellng Corporation un-
der' the Clean Water Ad 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
Plaintiffs allege that Gaston Copper has
been illegally discharging a variety of pol-
lutants Into a South Carolina waterway.
W'JIson Shealy, a CLEAN member who
owns a lake only four miles downstream
from Gaston Copper's facilit;)·, testified
that the illegal discharges caused him and
his family to reduce their use of his lake.
CLEAN also submitted various federal,
state, and private studies as evidence that
the pollutants relesaed by Gaston Copper
adversely aft'ec:ted or threatened Shealy's
lake,; The district court dismissed the
ease, holding that plaintiffs lacked stand-
Ing because they had not demonstrated
sufficient i!\lury In fact.. Dismissing the
action, however, encroaches on congres-
sional authority by ereetlng barriers to
standing so high as to frustrate citizen
enforcement of the Clean Water Ad We
hold that Shealy, and hence CLEAN, have
standing to aue,; We thus reverse the
judgment and remand for a determination
of whether Gaston Copper has discharged
pollutants In exeesa of ita permit limits.
Y.
A
Congress enacted the Federal 'Water
Pollution Control .Act Amendments of
1972, better known as the Clean Water
Act, "to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological Integrity of the
Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
This legislation constituted "a maJor
change In the enforcement mechanism of
the Federal water pollution control pro-
gram." American Petroleum IfI8t. fl.
Tmin, 526 F.2d 1343, 1344 (10th Cir.I975)
(Internal quotation marks omitted). Prior
to 1972, the focus of federal efforts to
abate water pollution was measurement of
the quality of receiving waters. See, e.g.,
Water Quality .Act of 1965, Pub.I.. No. 89-
234, 79 Stat. 903. But the great difficulty
In establiahlng reliable. precise limitstions
on pollution baaed solely on water quality
targets led to substantial enforcement
problema, SA EPA t1. CtJlifomiB U f'f1L
StaU Water ResourcU Control Bd., 426
U.S. 200, 202-03, 96 S.Ot. 2022, 48 L.Ed.2d
578 (1976). In fact, the use ofwater quali-
ty standards as a control mechanism was
found to be "inadequste In every vital re-
spect." S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 7 (1971),
reprinted in 1972 U.s.C.CAN. 3668, 3674.
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The Clean Water Act therefore shifted
the focus of federal enforcement efforts
from water quality standards to direct lim-
itations on the discharge of pollutants-
i.e.. "eftluent limitations." See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311; Natural ResouTCU Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. t1. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th
Cir.I990). Whereas the previous scheme
required proof of actual i!\lury to a body of
water to establish a violation, Congress
now instituted a regime of strict liability
for illegal pollution dischargea. See, e.g.,
.United Statu t1. WincheBter Mun. Utili.,
944 F.2d 301, 304 (6th Cir.I99l). Govern-
ment regulators were therefore freed from
the "need (to] seareh for a precise link
between pollution and water quality" In
enforcing pollution controls. S. Rep. No.
92-414, at 8, reprinted in 1972
U.s.C.CAN. at 3675. Rather, they could
simply detennine whether a company was
emptying more pollutants Into the water
than the Act allowed In order to detec:t a
violation of the itatute.
The centerpiece of the Clean Water Act
is section 301(a). This section provides:
"Except as In compliance "'ith this section
and [other sections of the Act], the dis-
charge ofany pollutant by any person shall
be unlawful." 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). And
In section 402 of the Act, Congress estab-
lished the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES), which au-
thorizes the issuance of permits for the
discharge of limited amounts of eftluent.
Id. § 1342. The avaDability of such per-
mits simply recognizes "that pollution con-
tinues because of technological limit&, not
because of any inherent rights to use the
nstion'a waterways for the purpose of dis-
posing ofwastes." Natural Re.ouTCe. De-
ferule Council, Inc. fl. CoBtle. 568 F.2d
1369, 1375 (D.C.Cir.I977) (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted). Permit holders must
comply not only with limitations on the
amount of pollutants they may discharge,
but also with a variety of monitoring, test-
Ing, and reporting requirements. See, e.g.,
33 U.s.C. § 1318.
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B~ ~e Ennro~~~.~~oo
Agency (EPA) and individual states (with
EPA approval) may issue NPDES per-
mits. See id. § 1342(a), (b). Accordingly,
the State of South C~1iDa has established
an NPDES pennit program administered
by the Deparbnent of Health and Ennron-
men~ Control (DHEC). See S.C.Code
Ann. §§ 48-1-10 et seq. (Law. Coop. 1976
& West Supp.I998).
Critiea1 to ~e enforcement of ~e Clean
Water Act is the citizen suit provision
found in seet.ion 505. 33 U.s.C. § 1365.
Section 505(a) states ~t "anY ·citizen may
commence a civil action, on his own behalf
against any· person ..• who is iIIlegeQ to
be in violation of an eftluent standard or
limitation under this chapter." Id.
§ 1365(a). An "eftlu~t standard or limi-
tation" is defined to include any term or
condition of an approved permit. See id.
§ 1365(1). Citizens are ~us au~orized to
bring suit against any .NPDES pennit
holder who has allegedly violated ita per-
mit. A sueeessCul suit may result in ~e
award of iIUunetfve relief and ~e imposi-
tion of civil penalties payable to ~e United
States Treasury. See id. § 1365(a).
Seetfon sos(g).sets forth ~e statutory
standing requirement for ~e citizen suit
provision ·of ~e Clean Water Act. Id.
§ 1365(g). Specifieally, it defines "citizen"
as "a person or persons having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected."
Id. Congress has indicated that this provi-
sion confers standing to enforce ~e Clean
Water Act to ~e run extent allowed by ~e
Constitution. See Middleaez County Sew-
eTTJgeAutIr.. 11. National Sea Clammen
All'''' 453 U.s. 1, 16, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69
L.Ed.2d 435 (1981) (citing S. Conf.· Rep.
No. 92-1236, at 146 (1972), reprinted in
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, 3823, which notes
~t ~e term "citizen" in ~e Clean Water
Act reflects ~e Supreme Court's decision
in Sierra Club 11. MOTton, 405 U.S. 727, 92
S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972».
B.
Defendant Gaston Copper owns and op-
erates a non-ferrous metals smelting facili-
ty in Lexington County, Sou~ Carolina.
At this plant., Gaston Copper treats con-
taminated storm water and releases it into
Lake Watson, an impoundment on Gaston
Copper's property. Lake Watson's over-
flow is ~en discharged into ~e ennron-
ment by way of Boggy Branch, a tributary
of Bull Swamp Creek. Bull Swamp Creek
in turn flows into ~e North Fork of ~e
Edisto River, which lies 16.5 mDes down-
stream from ~e discharge point.
When Gaston Copper purchased ~e op-
eration in 1990, ~e facility was covered by
an NPDES pennit issued bY DHEC to the
plant's pmious .owner. DHEC reissued
~e ]l!!rmit to Gaston Copper with an effee-
tive date of March I, 1991. This permit
alloweeI ·Gaston Copper to discharge Waste-
water containing limited quantities of pol.
lutants, including cadmium, copper, iron,
lead, mercury, nickel, PCBs, and zine,
from Lake Watson into Boggy Branch.
The permit imposed pH limits as well.
The· terms and conditions of ~e permit
included the monitoring and reporting of
emuent discharges. Gaston Copper was
also required to abide by a schedule of
compliance for meeting its emuent limita-
tions.
Plaintiffs FOE and CLEAN are t",o
non-profit ennronmen~ organizations
dedicated to proteeting and improving the
quality of natural resources. One of.
FOE's stated objectives is "to combat and
eliminate water pollution." CLEAN exists
"to clean up South Carolina's ennron-
nient" and to "educat[e] South Carolinians
about ennronm~~ issues affecting ~em
as citizens and ways to address ~ose is-
sues."
W'alson Shealy is a member of CLEAN
who lives with his famDy four mDes down-
stream from Gaston Copper's facility.
Shealy has resided on this property since
1964. His .land contains a 67-acre lake
that was created by damming Bull Swamp
Creek. Shealy and his famDy fish, swim,
and boat in the lake. Specifieally, Shealy
clsima that he fishes In the lake approxi-
mately every other week and swims in it
about twice per year. He oeeasionally eats
~e fish that he catches in the lake. Fur-
ther, Shealy's grandehildren, who live with
him In ~e summer, swim and fish In ~e
lake nearly every summer day.
Shealy claima that the pollution or
~t of pollutJon from Gaston Copper's
upstream facility has adversely affected
his and his famDy's use and el\Joyment of
~e lake. He limits the amount of time
that his family swims In ~e lake because
of his concern that ~e water is polluted.
He also limits the quantity of fiSh that
~ey eat out of fear that Gaston Copper's
chemieals have lodged in the fish. Shealy
states ~t if it were not for this concern
about pollution, he would fiSh In his lake
more often, eat ~e fish he catches more
often, and allow his famDy to swim in the
lake more often. He also alleges that the
aetual or ~tened pollution diminishes
the value of his property. Shealy has
heard people refer to his lake as "the
polluted pond."
Guy Jones is a member of both FOE
and CLEAN. He is the owner and presi-
dent of a canoe company that runs trips on
~e Edisto River. Jones claima that his
concern ~at Gaston Copper is polluting
~e Edisto River affects his enjoyment of
canoeing and swimming. He also claima
~at his concem about ~e water quality
undermines his confid~ce in his compa-
ny's ability to market its trips to the gen-
eral public:.
. William McCullough, Jr.. is a member of
FOE who scuba dives In ~e Edisto River.
Heclaima ~t he is concerned that the
watera Into which he dives may be contam-
inated. McCullough is particularly trou-
bled by ~e po8Slole presence of heavy
metals. He states that he would be less
likely to dive into water that he knows to
contain pollutants.
On September 14, 1992, FOE and
CLEAN ffie<l a citizen suit in ~e United
States District Court for ~e District of
Sou~ Carolina pursuant to seet.ion 505 of
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the Clean Water Act. They alleged that
Gaston Copper had repeatedly violated the
terms and conditions of its NPDES permit
at its Gaston facility. Specifically, plain-
tiffs claimed ~t Gaston Copper had ex-
ceeded its pennit's discharge limitations
on numerous occasions, faned to observe
its permit's monitoring and reporting re-
quirements, and faned to meet its schedule
of compliance. Plaintiffs BOught declarato-
ry and Injunetfve relief to prevent further
pennit violations, as well as ~e imposition
of civil penaltJes and costs.
Nearly six years after suit was ffied and
after a slx-day bench trial, ~e district
court deelined to rule on the merits of ~e
ease. The court Instesd dismissed plain-
tiffs' complaint for lack of standing, hold·
Ing ~t none of plaintiffs' members had
shown iIUury in faet. See Friends of the
Earth. Inc. 11. Gaston Copper Recycling
CCYrp., 9 F.Supp.2d 589 (D.S.C.I998). A
divided panel of this court affirmed the
district court's judgment. See Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recy-
cling Carp.. 179 F.3d 107 (4th Cir.I999).
We granted rehearing en banc and now.
reverse.
A.
Article III of the Constitution restriet8
~e federal courts to the adjudication of
"cases" and ..controversies...· The thresh-
old requirement of standing is "perhaps
~e most important" condition of justicia-
bility. Allen·1/, Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750,
104 S.Ct. 3315,· 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984).
The standing inquiry ensures that a plain-
tiff has a sufficient personal stake in a
dispute to render judicial resolution appro-
priate. See id. at 750-51, 104 S.Ct. 3315.
The standing requirement also "tends to
assure ~at the legal questions presented
to the court will be resolved, not in the
rarefied atmosphere of a debating society,
but in a concrete factual context conducive
to a realistic appreciation of the conse-
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III.
The disbict court held that FOE and
CLEAN 1seked standing under Article III
because they failed to establish that any of
their members sufrered an Injury fairly
traceable to Gaston Copper's alleged per-
mit violations. The court pointed to the
supposed absence of certain types of evi-
dence: "No evidence was presented con-
cerning the chemical content of the water-
ways affected by the defendant's facility.
No evidence of any Increase In the salinity
of the waterways, or any other negative
change In the ecosystem of the waterway
was presented." Ga8ton Copper ReCfl-
cling, 9 F.Supp.2d at 600. The disbict
court therefore concluded that "[nlo evi-
dence was presented that any plaintiff
member bas been adversely afl'ected by
the defendant's conduct." Id.
We disagree. CLEAN bas surpassed
the threshold that Article III and the
Clean Water Act set for establishing a
ease or controversy. Wilson Shealy is a
classic example of an individual who has
suffered an environmental injury in fact
fairly traceable to a defendant's conduct
and likely to be redressed by the relief
sought. The trisl court erred therefore In
B.
In addition to meeting the "frreduoole"
constitutional minimum,.Lujan 11. Defend-
ers of Wildlife, 504 u.s. at 560,112 S.Ct.
2130,' an Individual must alsO lltisfy any
statutory requIrements for standing before
bringing suit. As noted earner, the citizen
suit provision of the Clean Water Act con-
fers standing on any "person or persons
having an Interest which is or may be
adversely afl'eeted." 33 U.s.C. I 1365(g).
The ·language chosen by Congress confers
standing on a "bioad category of potential
plaintift's" who "can claim some sort of
Injury," be It aetua1 or threatened, econom-
ic or noneconomic. National Sea Clam-
men, 453 U.s. at 16-17, 101 S.Ct. 2615.
The Supreme Court recognized In Na-
tional Sea. Clammera that this grant of
standing reaches the outer Umits of Article
III. Id. at 16, 101 S.Ct. 2615 ("It is clear
from the Senate Conference Repoit that
this phrase was Intended by Congress to
allow suits by all persons Possessing stand-
Ing under this Court'. decision In Sisrra
Club 11. Morton."). ,Thus, if a Clean Water
Act plaintiff meets the constitutional re-
quirements for standing, then he ipaofacto
satiafies the statutory threshold as welL
C.
[1,2] Finally, an association mat have
standing to sue In federal court either
based on an Injury to the organization In
its own right or as the representative of its
members who have been harmed. See
Warlk 11. Seldin, 422 U.s. 490, 511, 95
S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). An
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH V. GASTON COPPER RECYCLING
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the line of cauastion between the illegal organization has representational standing
conduct andiJUury too attenuated? Isthe when (1) at least one of its membelil would
prospect of obtaining relief from the Injury have standing to sue in his own right; (2)
II a resutt of a ,favorable ruling too speeu- the organization seeks to protect interests
lative?" Id. If the plaintiff can show that germane to the organization's purpose;
his claim to relief'is free from excessive and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the
abstraction, undue attenuatiOn, and unbrl- relief sought requires the participation of
dIed speculation, the Constitution places individual members In the lawsuit. See
no further barriers between the plaintiff Hunt 11. Washington State Apple Adver.
and an adjudication of his rights. Comm'n, 432 U.s. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434,
53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977).
FOE and CLEAN assert representa-
tional standing on behalf of their members
who.have been banned or threatened by
Gaston Copper'. discharge. The parties In
this ease contest only whether the first
prong of representational standing-i.e.,
whether any member of FOE or CLEAN
has Individual standing-has been satis-
fied.
context in which the suit is brought. In
some instances, environmental iJUury can
be demarcated as a traditional trespass on
property· or tortious Injury to a person.
In other cases, however, the damage is to
an individual's aesthetic or recreational'in-
terests. The Supreme Court has made it
clear that such interests may be vindicated
in the federal courts. See, e.g., Frienda of
the Earth,' Inc. 11. Laidlaw Envtl. SmJB.
(TOG), Inc., - U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 693,
705, - L.Ed.2d - (2000) (effect on
"recreational, aesthetic, and economic in-
terests" is cognizable iJUury for purposes
of standing); Lujan 11. Defenders of Wild-
life, 504 U.s. at 562-«J, 112 S.Ct. 2130
(purely aesthe~c Interest is cognizable for
purposes of standing); . Sierra Club v.
Marton, 405 U.S. at 734, 92 S.Ct. 1361
("Aesthetic and environmental wen-being,
like economic wen-being, are important in-
gredients of the quality of life In our soci-
ety . . • deserving of legal protection
through the judicial process."); A88ocia-
tion of Data Procuring SmJ. OrgB. 11.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25
L.Ed.2d 184 (1970) (interest supporting
standing "may reflect aesthetic, conserva·
tional, and recreational as wen as economic
values" (internal quotation marks omit-
ted». But bi!eause these and other non-
economic Interests may be v.idely shared,
the Supreme Court bas cautioned that en-
vironmental plainwrs must themselves be
"among the iJUured." Sierra Club 11. }.1M-
ton, 405 U.s. at 735, 92 S.Ct. 1361. If it
were otherwise, the Article III case or
controversy requirement would be reduced
to a meaningless formality..
Courts must therefore examine the alle-
gations in such cases "to ascertain whether
the partieular plainwr is entitled to an
adjudication of the particular claims as·
serted." Allen, 468 U.S. at 752, 104 S.Ct.
3315. Such scrutiny is necessary to filter
the truly aftlic:ted from the abstractly dis-
tressed. Courts discharge this duty by
asking such questions as: "Is the iJUury
too abstract, or otherwise not appropriate.
to be considered judicially cognizable? Is
quences of judicial action." VaUeIl Fcrrge
Chriatian CoUege 11. Americana United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.s. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d
700 (1982).
To meet the constitutional minimum for
standing, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal
iJUury fairly traceable to the defendant's
allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be
redressed by the requested relief." Allen,
468 U.s. at 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315. This
formula includes three elements: (1) iJUu-
ry in fact; (2) traceability; and (3) re-
dressability. See Lujan 11. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.s.' 555, ,~1, 112 S:Ct.
2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The iJUury
in fact prong requires that a plainwr suf-
fer an invasion of a legally protected inter-
est which is concrete and particularized, as
well as actual or imminent. See id. at 560;
112 S.Ct. 2130. The traceability prong
means it must be likely that the iJUury was
caused by the conduct complained of and
not by the independent action of some
third party not before the court. See id.
Finally, the redreasability prong entails
that it must be likely, and not merely
speculative, that a favorable decision will
remedy the iJUury. See id. at 561, 112
S.Ct.2130.
Whlle each of the three prongs of stand-
ing should be analyzed' distinctly, their
proof often overlaps. Moreover, these re-
quirements share a common purpose-
namely, to ensure that the judiciary, and
not another branch of government, is the
appropriate forUm in which to addreas a
plaintiff's complaint. See Allen, 468 U.S.
at 752, 104 S.Ct. 3315.
In most kinds of litigation, there is scant
need for courts to pause over the standing
inquiry. One un readily recognize that
the victim of an automobile accident or a
party to a ,breached contract bears the
kind of claim that he may press in court.
In other sorta of cases, however, the nexus
betWeen the legal clcaim and the individual
asserting the claim may not be so self-
evident. Standing inquiry in environmen-
tal cases, for example, must reflect the
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creating evidentiary baI:riers to standing
tlplt the Constitution does not require and
Congress has not embraeecL In fact, "the
legislative branch has Invited precisely the
type of suit brought by CLEAN. The
judicial branch is not at hberty to impede
its resolution on the merits. '
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leads to rust formation, which In turn de-
grades the aesthetic quality of the lake.
See J.A. at 186. And disruption of the
acceptable pH level of a 'waterway may
Increase the toxicity of certain chemicals to
fish. See J.A. at 482-83.
[6] Plaintiffs submitted further evi-
dence that Gaston Coppers permit excee-
dances Could and did cause enVironmental
degradation. To begin with, many of Ga-
stOn Copper's discltarge limits were es-
tablished by DHEC In order to attain a
partiCular water quality. BeCause these
discliarge restrictionS are set at the level
necessary to protect the designated uses
of the receivln"g watenvays, their violation
neeessarily means that these uses may be
harmed. See, e.g., Public' Interest Group
of New Jeisey, InC. 11. Rice, 774 F.supp.
317, 328 (D.N.J.1991). This fact was ·con-
firmed by a" DHEC employee called to
the stand by Gaston Copper at trial:
[Q:] And it's also assumed, is it not,
that If you do not meet those [nter-
quality-based discharge] limits, you may
be interfering with the designated uses
of those \\'aten\"8YS? '.
[A:] " That'scorrect. .
[Q:] And therefore If a designated use
is swimming and you don't meet those
limits,· you may very well be interfering
with the safety of BWimmlng In that wa-
terway?
[A:] Th8t's correct.
In addition, Gaston Copper faned forty-one
whole eft1uent toxicity tests In the forty-
nine months between _March 1991. and
March 1995. These tests consisted of
placing small organisms In eft1uent sam-
ples and counting the number that sicken.
And at least eight of these toxicity failures
",ere based on samples taken on days
when the company allegedly ..iolated its
emuent limits: E\'en the company's own
studies showed elevated quantities of cad-
mium, copper, lead, and mercury In sedi-
ment taken from the facility's recehing
waters and unnatural concentrations of
metals In the tissue of fish. Gaston Cop-
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constitutionally recognired as cognizable
bases for Injury in fac;t. &e, e.g., Laidlaw,
120 S.Ct. at 705; SiemJ Club 11. Momm,
405 U.S. at 734, 92 8.Ct. 1361.
Shealy is thus anyt.hlng but a roving
environmental ombudaman ReekIng to
right environmental wrongs wherever he
might find them: He isa real person who
owns a real home and lake In close proxim-
ity to Gaston Copper., These facts un-
questionably differentiate Shealy from the
general public. The company's discharge
violations affect the concrete, particulai'-
!zed legal rights or ,this .specific' citizen.
He brings this sui~ to vindicate his private
Interests In his and his famny's 'well-be-
Ing-not some ethereal public Interest.
We in tuJ1l are.~ted with an issue
"tftditionallY,thought to be capable of res-
olutiont.hrough the judicial process." Al-
len, 468 u:.s.at 752,104 S.ct. 3315 (inter-
nalquotation markso!Jlitted). "
Further, CLEAN has presented ample
evidence that Shealy's fears are reasonable
and not based on,mere conjecture. The
record is replete with evidence that Gaston
Copper is fouling its receiving waters.
PlaIntiffs ~bmltted discharge monitoring
reports spanning more than four years of
Gaston" Copper's operations. They allege
that these reports show over 500 violations
of the company's discharge limits, includ-
Ing unlawful releases of cadmium, copper,
iron, lead, and zinc, as well as pH viola-
tions. . ; :
Plalntift's also offered evidence In the
form of EPA studies and expert testimony
or t.IJ." liJverse health and environmental
effeetsof these chemicals.· For example,
copper is particularly toxic to aquatiC"or-
ganisms and can prevent spawnlngin fish.
See Joint Appendix at 183, 439. Human
beings are sensitive to lead poisoning,
which can result In hTeversible brain dam-
age to children and. other neurological im-
pairment. See J.A. at 185,448. Cadmium
is also toxic and may cause a variety of
health problems In humans, including can-
eer:See J.A. at 186, 412-16. Iron is
chronically toxic to aquatic organisms and
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SiemJ Club -11. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73
F.3d 546, 557 (6~ Qir.I996) (Internal quo-
tation zparks omitted); .,ee alto Comerva·
tion Council of North Caroli714 11. Cottan-
ro, 605 F.2d 498, 601 (4th Cir.1974) ("The
claimed Inj~ need not be great or sub-
stantial; an identifiable trifle, If actual and
genuine, gives rise to standing." (Internal
A. quotation markS omitted»•.
[3] We proceed then to examine eaeh" [4] Shealy has plainly demonstrated In·
of the three elements of the standing In- jury In fact. He has produced evidence of
quiry. The Injury In fact requirement pre- actual or threatened injury to a waterway
cludes those with merely generalized In which he has a legally protected Inter-
grievances from brlnglng suit to vindicate est." Shealy is a property owner whose
an Interest common to the entire public. lake. lies In the path of Gaston Copper's
See Lujan 11. Deferulers of.Wildlife, 604 toxic chemical discharge. He and his fam-
U.S. at 676, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Aplalntiff By swim' and fish in this lake. Shealy
must instead suft'er. an Invasion of a legally testified that he and his family sWim less
protected "Interest that. is "concrete and in and ei~ less fiSh" from the lake because
particularized" before he can bring an ac- of his fears of pollution from GaBtOnCop-
tion. It!. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. He must per's permit exeeedances: Shealy further
somehow differentiate himself from the claims thai tlie pollution or threat of pollu-
mass or people who may find the conduct tion has dlmiilished the value of his prop-
of which he complains to be objectionable erty. Indeed, otherS have referred to his
only In an abstract sense. In other wol'!1s, lake !IS "the polluted pond." ,
the alleged Injury "must affect the plaintiff "In fact, Shealy· has alleged precisely
In a persO!1al and Individual ny." It!. at those;types of Injuries thai CongreSs In-
,,660 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Without this re- tended to ,prevent by enacting the Clean
quirement, the federal judicial process Water Act. One of the well-recognized
would be transformed Into "no more than a aims of the Act is to· ensure that the
vehicle for the, vindication of the value nation's" waterways are "fishable and
Interests of concerned bystanders." Val- swinimable." See, e.g., Shanty Town As-
ley Forge, 454 U.S. at ~73, 102 S.Ct. 762 ,oes. Ltd. Parl:n.ership 11. EPA. 843 F.2d
(Internal quotation marks omitted). 782, 784 (4th Cii-.I988). Congress pro-
The Injury In fact requirement also claimed this goal to provide "for the pro-
blocks suit by those whose allegations' of tection and propagation of fish, shellfish,
Injury are" based on mere conjecture rath- and wildlife·and provide[] for recreation In
er than an actual (l~ lhreatened Invasion of and on the water." 33 U.S.C. § "1251(a)(2).
their legally proteciAld Ulterests. See Lu- And it is well established that the "Injury
jan 11.. Deferulers of Wildlife, 604 u.s. at required by Article III may exist solely by
660, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Federal jurisdiction virtue of statUtes Creating legal rights, the
cannot lie If the alleged Injury is merely Invasion of which creates standing."
"an Ingenious academic exercise In the Warth, 422 U.S. at 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197
conceivable." United State, 11. ·Sttulent8 (Internal quotation marks omitted). More-
Challenging Regu.14tory Agency PT'()U- over, DHEC developed Gaston Copper's
dure, (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 688, 93 S.Ct. permit limits pursuant to a statutory com-
2405" 37L.Ed.2d 254 (1973). But this mand to protect public health, fish, and
sWidard is one of kind and not of degree. wildlife and to allow recreational activities
Indeed, the claimed Injury "need not be on the water.· See 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a).
large, an identifiable trifle will suffice." These health and recreational Interests are
~
w
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per's pennit'violations thus bear a direct same chemieals' that the plant released in
relationship to the waterways health. .... its wastewater during the tenures of both
Moreover, Gaston Copper's discharge af- Gaston Copper and its predecessor. AI-
fects or can afrect the waters for a signifi- though these teSts were conducted·before
cant .distance downstream. The partil!;! Gaston Copper took control of the fadlity
have stipulated that the overflow from in 1990, Gaston Copper opersted the
Lake Watson pours into Boggy Branch, a smelting facility using a simllar waste\\..•
b1'butary of Bull Swamp Creek, which ter treatment system to that of its prede-
empties into the Edisto River. Yet plain- cessor.. The evidence of past pollution is
tiffs offer far more than the stipulated therefore direet1y relevant to the question
description of the downstream flow of the of whether Gaston Copper subsequently
water. Durlng the comment period for affected or could affect Shealy's lake.
GastoD' Copper's pemlit, DREC oftieia1ly Shealy's testimony that pollution of the
responded in writiilg to one downstream type. discharged by this system has
property owner's question ai follows:· reached his lake in the past shows that his .
[Q:] I own Property where Bull Swamp fears are based on more than mere speeu-
goes into the Edisto River, and I'd like lation.
to know, would the nmoff go that farT In Sum, the evidence paints a stark pie-
[A:] Yes, the nmoff will go to Boggy ture: Gaston Copper has been aeeusedof
Branch to Bull Swamp to the Edisto violating its diseharge pennit. Its dis·
River. The ~nf1uence of Bull Swamp charge affects or has the potential to affect
and [the] Edisto River fa 16.5 mlles. the waterway for 16.5 mlles downstream.
Common sense dic:tstes that the purpose of Wllson Shealy sits a mere four mlles from
the question was to determine just how far the mouth of the discharge pipe. The
downstream Gaston Copper's diseharge state has found the kinds of chemicals
would affect 'property owners. And the discharged by Gaston Copper in Shealy's
clear implication of DREC's response fa lake In the past. And federal and private
that Gaston Copper's discharges can 1m- studies demonstrate the harmful environ-
pad; the receiving waterway for a good mental and health Impacts of the .toxic
distance downstrearn-we11 past Sheaty's chemieals released by Gaston Copper.
property and on down to the Edisto River Wben this evidence fa viewed in light of
itself. Shealy'i lake is fed by Bull Swamp the legal threshold for standing, it fa clear
Creek only four miles downstream from that the dlab:ict court erroneously dis-
the polluting facility. DHEC has indieated missed plaintiff's' suit. Shealy's claim fa
that the runoff' will reach at least as far as not a "generalized grievance" that rele-
the Edisto, which lies 12.5 miles beyond gates him to the ststus of a "concerned
Shealy's property. Shealy's lake and bystander" with a mere abstract interest
home therefore lie more than four tlmes in the environment. GoBton Copper ReC1/-
closer to Gaston Copper than the acknowl- cling, 9 F.supp.2d at 600. While Shealy is
edged outer perimeter of the diseharge unquestionably "concerned," he is no mere
zone. "bystander." See Cedar Point Oil Co., '13
AB if this were not enough, Shealy has F.3d at 556.
afso presented uncontroverted testimony. It fa instructive to contrast Shealy's Inju-
that the types of chemieals released into ry with the Injuries alleged by the plain·
the water by Gaston Copper had been tiffs in Lujan 11. Defen.ders ofWildlife, 504
previously found in his lake. DHEC em- U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351.
ployees visited Shealy's property in the In that case, the Defenders of Wildlife
198Os, analyzed the water quality of his sought to challenge a government regula-
lake, and rePorted the presence of copper, tion that rendered the Endangered Spe-
zinC; nickel, iron, and PCBs. These are the cies Act inapplicable to American actions
FRIENDS OF mE EARmv. GASTON COPPER RECYCLING
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in foreign nations. See id. at 557-558, 112
S.Ct. 2130. Two members of the group
alleged that they had traveled to foreign
countries and observed the habitats of cer-
tain endangered species.. See id. at 563,
112 S.Ct. 2130. They afso profeased an
intent to return to those countries at some
indefinite future time In the hope of seeing
the animals themselves. See id. at 563-64,
112 8.Ct. 2130. The members feared,
however, that American involvement in de-
velopment projects abroad would damage
the species' habitats, thereby risking ex-
tinction and causing the members harm.
See id. at 663, 112 S.Ct. 2130.
The Supreme Court dismissed the' ease
for Iaclt of standing because plaintifl's
members' allegations Were'inaufticlent to
establish inJury in fact.. See id. at~,
112 S.Ct.2130•. The members faDed to
show how damage to the species would
produce imminent Injury to themselves.
See id. at 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130. They could
not demonstrate any inJury "apart from
their apecla1 interest in. the subject." I d.
at 663, 112 S.Ct. 2130 ('mternal quotation
marks omitted). Their "some day" inten-
tions to return to the areas they had visit-
ed ",..ere simply not enough. See id. at 564,
112 S.Ct. 2130.. The Court also rejected a
variety or. theories connecting distant
plaintiff'a to areas of bnpad; on endangered
species as "ingenious academic exerclse[s]
in the conceivable." Id. at 566, 112 S.Ct.
2130 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The most. expansive of these theories
would have recognized inJury in fact to
"anyone who observes or works with an
endangered species, anywhere in the
world" resulting from "a slngIe project
affecting some portion of that species with
which he has no more specific connection."
Id. at 667, 112 S.Ct. 2130.
Shealy, by contrast, need not resort to
such hypothetical harms to demonstrate
his inJury in fact.. He fa not asserting a
mere academic or philosophical interest in
the protection of the South Carolina water-
ways affected by Gaston Copper's pollu-
tion. Nor· does he clalm that he merely
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"some day" intends to et\ioy the'Use of his
lake. Rather, he is a property owner in
the path of a toxic discharge whose injury
is ongoing. He is thus precisely the t)'pe
of plaintlfI that the Supreme Court emi-
si~dinL~~uD~~n~~~if~
namely, one who fa acting to protect a
"threatened concrete interest of his" own.
504 U.S. at 5'13 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 2130.
The 'distrlct court, hO\\"e\'er, required
that plainWl's present further midence
concerning one or more of the follO\\ing:
(l) "the chemical content of the "..tel'\\-"8)'S
affected by the defendant's facility"; (2)
"any fJicrease in the salinlt)· of the "..ter-
",..ys"; and (3) "other negath'e change in
the ecoBYBtem of the waterway." . Gaston
Copper Recycling, 9 F.supp.2d at 600.
But the Supreme Court does not require
such proof. In Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. at 704-
05, .the Court found that several citizen
affidavits attesting to reduced lise of a
waterway out of reasonable fear and con-
ce111 of pollution' "adequately documented
Injury in fact." Each of the citizens al-
leged that he or she would make greater
recreational use of some part of the affect-
ed waterway were it not for their concern
about the hannful effects of the defen-
dant's discharges. See id. The Court re-
quired no evidence of actual harm to the
waterway, noting: "We have held that en-
vironmental plaintiffs adequately allege in-
jury in fact when they a\'er that they use
the affected area and are persons 'for
whom the aesthetic and recreational values
of the area will be lessened' by the ehal-
lenged activity." Id. at 705 (quoting Sier.
ra Club u Morlo11, 405 U.s. at '135, 92
S.Ct. 1361).
Nor has any clreuit required additional
scientific proof where there was a direct
nexus between the c1almant and the area
of environmental Impairment. In Cedar
Point Oil Co., for example, the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that citizens' concern about water
quality in Galveston Bay sufficed as Injury
in fact where "[t]wo of the afftants live
near Galveston Bay and all of them use the
bay for recreational activities." 73 F.ad at
L_..c 1 _ 1..-,. ~. L~.. L.~.. l .._,= 1_,_..... L_.~," I . L._.~ L,,_ L,_._,. l,.,~_. l_.,... L ...~ 1_= ·L..." L ...
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656. It "its enough that "the affiants ex-
pressed fear -that the discharge •• , will
impair their enjoyment of these activities
because these adivities are dependent
upon good water quality." Id.
Likewise, in Friends of the Earth tI.
Con8olidoUd RaU Corp., the Second Cir-
cuit found that two citizen affidavits "quite
adequately satisfy the standing threshold."
768 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir.I985). In the first
affidavit, a citizen stated that "he pasSes
the Hudson [River] regularly and tind[s]
the pollution in the river offensive to [his]
aesthetic values." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). In the second, a father
"avetted that his children swim In the
river, his son occasionally fishes In the
river and his family baa and will continue
to picnic along the river." Id. And In
United State. tI. Metropolitan St. Louis
Sewer Diat., the Eighth Circuit approved
the standing of a citizens' group whose
members alleged that they "visit, cross,
and frequently observe" the Mississippi
River and "from time to time ... use these
waters for recreational purposes." 883
F.2d 54, 56 (8th Cir.I989). In none of
these eases-where Incidentally the claims
of standing were weaker than the one be-
fore us-did the court require further spe-
cific allegations .or evidence of the actua1
level of pollution in the waterway. -
Courts have also left no doubt that
threatened injury to Shealy Is by itself
injury In fact.· The Supreme Court has
consistently recognized that threatened
rather than actua1 injury can satisfy Arti-
cle III standing requirements. See, e.g.,
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472, 102 S.CL
752; Gladstone Realtcm tI. Village ofBeU-
wood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 99 S.CL 1601, 60
L.Ed.2d 66 (1979). "[O]ne does not have
to await the consummation of threatened
injury to obtain preventive relief. If the
injury Is certainly impending that Is
enough." Babbitt tI: United Farm Work-
en Nat'l UnUm. 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99
S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Threats or increased risk thus consti-
tutes cognizable harm. Threatened envi-
ronmental injury Is by nature probabilistic.
And yet other circuits have had no trouble
understanding the injurious nature of risk
itself. For example, in Village of Elk
Grow Village tI. Evans, the Seventh Cir-
cuit found standing because "[t]he Village
is in the path of a potential flood" and
"even a small probability of injury Is suffi-
cient to create a ease or controversy." 997
F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir.I993). Similarly,
the Dlsbiet of Columbia Circuit in Moun-
tain State, Legal Found. tI. Glickman held
that an increased risk' of wildfire from
certain logging practices constitutes injury
in fact. 92 F.3d 1228, 123oh15 (D.C.Cir.
1996)•. And the Fifth Circuit in Cedar
Point Oil Co. did not require evidence of
actua1 harm to the waterway, noting:
"That this bUury is couched in terms of
future impairment rather than past im-
pairment Is of no moment." 73 F.3d at
556. :
In this ease, Gaston Copper's alleged
permit violations threaten the waters with-
in the acknowledged range of its dls-
charge, including the lake on Shealy's
property. By producing evidence that Ga-
ston Copper Is polluting Shealy's nearby
water source, CLEAN has shown an in-
creased risk to its member's downstream
uses. This- threatened injury is sufficient
to provide injury in fact. Shealy need not
wait until his lake becomes barren and
sterile or assumes an unpleasant color and
smell before he can invoke the protections
of the Clean Water Act. Such a novel
demand would eliminate the claims of
those who are direetly threatened but not
yet engulfed by an unlawful discharge.
Article III does not bar such concrete
disputes from court. See Lujan tI. Defend-
en of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112
S.Ct.2130.
Gaston Copper contends that Shealy has
not supplied adequate proof of environ-
mental degradation to show injury in fact.
"The relevant showing for purposes of Ar-
ticle III standing, however, is not injury to
the environment but injury to the plaintiff'.
To insist upon the former J:8ther than the
latter as part of the standing inquiry ••• Is
to raise the standing hurdle higher _than
the necessary showing for success on the
merits in an action alleging noncompliance
with an NPDES permit." Laidlaw, 120
S.CL at 704. Shealy's reasonable fear and
concern about the effeCts of Gaston _Cop-
per's discharge, supported by objective ev~
idenee, directly affect his recreational and
economic interests. .This imp8etconsti-
tutes injury in-fact. -See id. at 705-06. It
requires no abstraction or conjecture to
understand the hanD t1ult coDrronts Shea-
ly: We~erefore ll8ve DO doubt that Shea-
ly can be coUnted "among the injured" for
standing purposes. Lujan tI. DeferuUn of
Wildlife, 504 U.s. at 563, 112 S.Ct. 2130
(internal qUotation marks omitted). The
distnet coUrt's error lies in asking too
much-namely, in constructing barriers to
an iiljured citizen's vindication of indispUt-
ably private intereSts' in the use of his
property and in the hei.lthof his family.
Article III does not command such a judi-
cial evisceration of the Clean Water Act's
protections. And separation of powers
principles will not countenance ill .
B.:
.-
CLEAN also satisfies the second prong
of the standing inquiry. The "fairly trace-
able" requirement ensures that there Is a
genuine nexus between a plaintlfrs injury
and a defendant's alleged illegal conduct.
See Lujan tI. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.s. at 560, 112 S.CL 2130. But traceabili-
ty "'does not mean that plaintiff's must
show to a scientific certainty that defen-
dant's eft1uent :.. caused the precise
harm suffered by the plaintiffs.'" Natu-
ral Re.ourcu Defense Council, .Inc. tI.
Watkins, 954F.2d 974, 980 n. 7 (4th Cir.
I. It Is clear lhal CLEAN member Shealy has
demonstrated Injury In fact. The c1alms to
Injury of FOE members Jones and McCul·
lough, however. present closer questions.
The district court has not had an opportunity
to consider their claims In light of the Su-
preme Court's standing analysis In Laidlaw.
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1992) (quoting Public Intere.t Group of
New leney, Inc. tI. PoweU DuJJryn Termi-
naU, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 72 (3d Cir.I990».
If scientific certainty were the standard,
then plaintiff's would be required to supply
costly, sbiet proof of causation to meet a
threshold jUrisdictional requirement--even
where, as here, the asserted cause of ac-
tion does not Itself require such proof.
Thus, the "fairly traceable" standard is
"'not equivalent to a requirement of tqrt
causation.'" Id. (quoting Powell Dulfryn
Terminala, 913 F.2d at 72). Other circuits
have refused to interpret It as such. See
Cedar Point OU Co., 73 ~.3d at 557~;
Natural Re,ourcu Defense Council, Inc.
1/. Temco Ref. &: MI;tg., Inc., 2 F.3d 493,
505 (3d Cir.I993); PoweU DufJrvn Termi·
naU, 91.3 F.2d at 72-73.
Rather than pinpointing the origins of
partieuIar molecules,- a plaintiff' "must
merely show _that a defendant discharges a
pollutant that causes or contributes to the
kinds of bUuries alleged" in the specific
geographic area of concern. Watkins, 954
F:.2d at 980 (internal quotation marks
omitted). In this way a plaintiff' demon-
strates that a particular defendant's dis-
charge has affected or has the potential to
affect his interests. See id. at 98G-81.
[6] CLEAN has satisfied this stan-
dard. Much of the evidence already cited
for Shealy's injury In fact also proves
traceability to Gaston Copper. Shealy tes-
tified to the past presence of metals in his
lake of the type discharged by Gaston
Copper. Plaintiff's have also submitted
toxicity tests that show Gaston Copper is
discharging pollutants at levels that cause
environmental degradation. In addition,
plaintiff's submitted evidence that the com-
pany's dis~ will travel - 16.5 Dilles
dO\\'JlStream-well beyond the four-Dille
point that is Shealy's lake. Shealy's testi-
120 S.Ct. at 704-06. We therefore remand
Jones' and McCuilough's asseltions of sland·
ing to the district court for evaluation In light
of Laidlaw. We leave to the discretion of the
district court whether to reopen the record
for further testimony on the question of FOE's
standing.
204 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES, FRIENDS OF THE EARm v. GASTON COPPER RECYCLING
Clleu204 f.3clt49 (4,hCIr. 2000)
~
w
00
162
mony, buttressed by objective evidence
from DHEC, thus establishes that his inju-
ries are Cairly traceable to Gaston Copper.
[7] Moreover,. there Is no suggeStion
that any entity other than Gaston Copper
Is responsible Cor the injury in Cact that
Shealy has established. The "f'airly trace-
able" reqwrement Is in large p8it designed
to ensure that the injury complained oC Is
"not the result oCthe Independent action'oC
some third party not. beCore the eowt."
Lujan fl. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 u.s. at
560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Where a pJ8lntiff has
pointed to a pOlluilng source as the seed oC
his injury, and the owner oC the polluting
source has supplied no alternative culprit,
the "f'airly traceable" requirement can be
said to be Calrly met.· ThIs Is the ease
here. As we have held, Shealy has shown
injury in Cact. ThIs injury must, oC course,
be attn'butable to someone'or something.
Shealy points' to a definite polluting
r sOUl'C&-namely, Gaston Copper-and sup-
ports this contention with objective evi-
dence. Gaston Copper points to no other
polluting source in response. Its effortS to
contest the traceability oC Shealy's injury
to its Cacility therefore Can.
We decline to transCorm the "f'alrly
traceable" requirement into the kind oC
scientific inquiry that neither the Supreme
Court nor Congress intended. The ab-
.Bence oC laboratory analysis oC the chemi-
cal content, salinity, or ecosystem oC Shea-
ly's lake Is oC no moment Cor one simple
reason: The law does not require such
evidence. While Article III sets the mini-
mum requilements Cor standing, Congress
Is entitled to impose more exacting stand-
Ing requirements Cor the vindication oC Ced-
eral statutory rights if it wishes. Here the
legislature chose to go to the run extent oC
Article III in conferring standing on any
person with "an interest which Is or may
be adversely affected." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(g); National Sea, Clammerr, 453
U.S. at 16, 101 S.Ct. 2615. To have stand-
ing hinge on anything more in a Clean
Water Act ease would necessitate the liti-
gation oC complicated IsSues oC scientific
Cact that are entirely collateral to the ques-
tion Congress wished resolved-namely,
whether a defendant has exceeded its per-
mit limits.
In applying the "f'alrly traceable" re-
quirement, iome distinction, oC course,
must be made between plaintiffs who lie
within' the discharge zone oC a polluter and
those who are so Car downstream that
their injuries cannot Calrly be traced to
that defendant. Compare Frienda of the
EarlJl. [fie. 11. Cnmm Cent. Petroleum
Corp., 95 F.3d 358, 361...Q (5th Cir.l996)
(finding an eighteen-mile distance "too
large to infer causation"), tuitI& Frienda of
the EarlJl. [fie. 11. Chetmm Chem. Co., 900
F.supp. 67, '15 <E.D.Tex.1995) (finding a
two-~Cour-mile distance sufficient to show
causation). But to tum aWay a citizen who
sits squarely In the discharge zone oC a
polluting Caeility seems more calculated "to
negate the strict liability standard oC the
[Clean Water] Act" than to articulate any
meaningful distinction. PoweU Duffr1Jn
Tmninala, 913 F.2d at 73 n. 10. CLEAN
has charged that (1) Gaston Copper ex·
ceeds its discharge permit limits Cor chem-
icals that cause the types oC injuries Shes·
ly alleges and that (2) Shealy's lake lies
within the range oC that discharge. No
court has required additional prooC oC cau-
sation in such a ease.
C.
[8] Finally, CLEAN has standing be-
cause a favorable decision by the disbict
court wiD redress Shealy's injuries. The
redressabIlity requirement ensures that a
plaintiff "personally would benefit in a
tangible way from the court's interven-
tion." WarlJl. 422 U.s. at 508, 95 S.Ct.
2197. A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief
shows redressability by "alleg[ing] a con-
tinuing violation or the imminence oC a
future violation" oC the statute at issue.
Steel Co. 11. Citizens for a Better Envy' 523
U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1019, 140 L.Ed.2d
210 (1998); lee alao Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. at
707~ (noting that Steel Co. held that
private plaintiffs may not sue to asseSB
penalties Cor wholly past violations).
Here CLEAN seeks injunctive and oth-
er relief Cor Gaston Copper's continuing
and threatened future violations oC its per-
mit. Not only did CLEAN allege continu-
Ing violationa In its complaint, but over 350
oC the alleged discharge violationa and over
650 oC the alleged monitoring and report-
ing violationa occurred after the complaint
was filed. In Cact, some oC the alleged
violationa occurred in 1997, the last period
Cor which the record contains evidence.
CLEAN has sought relieC Cor continuing
and threatened future violations at every
stage oC this litigation, Including this ap-
peal.. We hold therefore that CLEAN
presents clahns oC redresasble injury.!
.IV~
ThIs ease illustrates at heart the bnpor-
tance oC judicial restraint. Courts are not
at liberty' to write their own rules oC evi-
dence Cor eiwironmental standing by cred-
iting only direct evidence oC bnpalrment.
Such elevated evidentiary hurdles are In
no way mandated by Article III. Nor are
they permitted by the Federal Rules oC
Evidence or the text oC the Clean Water
Act. It Is In Cact difficult to see how one
can move from the section 505(g) standard
or "an interest which Is or may be adverse-
ly affected" to a standard oC direct scienti-fic prooC oC an observable negative bnpact
on a waterway.
Litigants routinely rely on ciri:iunstan-
tial evidence to prove any number oC con-
tested Issues. And if a prosecutor may
rely wholly on circmnatantial evidence to
prove that a criminal defendant is guDty
beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no
apparent reason-and certainly not a rea-
i. Because Shealy'used a waterway adW1$e1y
affected or capable of being adversely affected
by Gaston Copper'. conduct. Gaston Copper'.
monitoring and· reportilll violations also
cause him Injury In fact. CLEAN alleges that
these violations continue and il=quests Injunc.
tive and other relief to stop ·them. CLEAN
thus has standing to pursue Its monitoring
and reporting claims under a straightforward
163
son apparent from the Constitution, the
Federal Rules, or the Clean Water Act
itseiC-to regard this type oC prooC as per
Ie deficient Cor establishing standing in a
Clean Water Act ease. Citizens may thus
rely on circumstantial evidence such as
proximity to polluting sources, predictions
oC discharge inf1uence, and past pollution
to prove both injury In Cact and traceabili-
ty. ThIs is what Wilson Shealy did. To
require more would bnpose on Clean Wa-
ter Act suits a set oC singularly difficult
evidentiary standards.
To deny standing' to Shealy here would
further thwart congressional intent by re-
creating the old system oC water quality
standarda whose Canure led to the enact-
ment oC the Clean Water Act in the first
place. See, e.g., Water Quality Act oCl965,
Pub.L. No. 89-234, 79 stat. 903. An bn-
portant reason Cor CongreSB' shift to end·
oC.pipe standards was to eliminate the
need to address complex questions oC envi-
ronmental abasement and scientific tracea-
bility In enforcement proceedings. To
have standing now turn on direct evidence
oC such things as the chemical'composition
and salinity oC receiving waters would
throw Cederal legislative efTorts to control
water pollution Into a time warp by judi-
cially relnststing the previous statutory re-
gime in the Corm oC escalated standing
requirements. Courts would become en-
meshed in abstruse scientific discussions
as standing questions assumed a compli-
cated liCe oC their own. ThIs danger Is
iliustrated by this very ease, where the In-
depth discussion oC control ststions, macro-
Invertebrate sampling, and milligrams per
kilogram has taken us Car afield from the
straightforward Clean Water Act issue oC
application of this circuit'. precedent In Sier-
I'd Club v. Simkins Indll$., Inc., 847 F.2d
1109. 1112-13 (4th CIr.1988) (defendant'.
failure to monitor and report emuent dis-
charges as required by permit causes Injury In
fact to plaintiff'. Interests In protecting emi-
ronmental Integrity of and curtailing ongoing
unlawful disc:harges Into waterway).
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whether Gaston Copper has violated its
pennit limitations.
"[T]he law of Article III stimding is built
on a single basic idea-the idea of separa-
tion of powers." Allen, 468 U.S. at 752,
104 S.Ct. 3315. Courts must a"oid infring-
ing this principle either by reaching be-
yond jurisdictional limitations to decide ab-
stract questions or by reCusing to decide
concrete cases that Congress wants adjudi-
cated. This case presents a concrete con-
troversy in which courts are left. with no
other choice but to effectuate Congress'
clearly expressed language and intent. To
bar the courthouse door to Shealy's claims
of private injury woUld undennine the citi-
zen suit provision of the Clean Water Act.
We therefore reverse the judgment of the
district court and remand this case for a
detennination of whether Gaston Copper
has c1iscbarged pollutants in exceaa of its
permit limits.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, concurring
in the judgment and in the concurring
opinion of Judge Luttig:
. For the reasons that follow, I concur in
the judgment and join Judge Luttig's con-
curring opinion,
The concept of constitutional standing
lies at the heart of the judicial power
confeITed on courts by Article III of the
Constitution, As the articulation of that
standing requirement is relaxed, the scope
of Article III power expands, moving it to
a position where it could be exercised to
resolve contests over legislation simply be-
cause citizens disagree with its interpreta-
tion. With a continuation of this trend,
courts would ultimately become a super-
legislative body, arbitrating the conflicts of
the views of its citizenry generally,
Before the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in FriendB of th~ Earth, 1m;. v. Laid-
law EnvtL SenJ8., 1m;., - U.s. -, 120
S.Ct. 693, - L.Ed.2d - (2000), I would
have aftinned the district court in this case
because the plaintiffs, who expressed only
a subjective belief of injUl'l', have not
shown that they "personally [have] suf-
fered some actual or threatened injury as
a result of the putstively illegal conduct of
the defendant and that the injury fairly
can be traced to the challenged action."
Valley FOT1]e Christian CoUege v. Ameri·
cam United far Separation ofChurch and
State, 1m;., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct.
752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). These
o minimal requirements of Article III as-
sured that legal issues would not be re-
solved "in the rarified atmosphere of a
debating society," Ido The Supreme Court
recognized in Valley FOT1]e that federal
courtS are not "publicly funded forums for
the"ventilation of public grievances or the
refinement of jurisprudential understand-
ing." [do at 473, 102 S.Ct. 752; Bee also
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 559-60, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 0 119 L.Ed.2d
351 (1992) (standing is "an essential and
unchanging part of the case-or-controversy
requirement of Article III" and the sepa-
ration of powers).
As my concurrence in Judge Luttig's
opinion indicates, I believe that the deci·
sion in Laidlaw represents a sea change in
constitutional standing principles, and in
view of that decision I agree that we are
now required to reverse.
LUTTIG, Circuit Judge, \\ith whom
Judge Niemeyer joins, concurring in the
judgment:
I concur in the judgment of the court,
but not in its opinion. Through no fault of
this court, the Supreme Court's recent de-
cision in FriendB of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,
- U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 693, - L.Ed.2d
- (2000), has rendered much of the
discussion in today's opinion not merely
unnecessary, but af'fumatively confusing.
Rather than persist in the fiction (as we do
in the court's opinion) that Laidlaw was
part of the fabric of standing jurispru-
dence at the time of argument in this case,
or worse (as we also do) that that decision
was merely an unexceptional reaffirmation
of the Court's previous precedents, I would
simply reverse the district court's judg-
ment on the specific reasoning of the Su-
preme Court in Laidlaw and say little else.
The unfortunate implication left. by the
court's fanure to address the significant
change in emironmental standing doctrine
worked by the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Laidlaw (and by the court's
comfortable, but mistaken, assumption
that the Supreme Court's decisions prior
to Laidlato themselves dictated the conclu-
sion we reach today), is that the district
court seriously erred in Its application of
the standing doCtrine extant at ~e time
that it ruled-which it did not.
HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment:
The Supreme Court's decision in
Friends of the 0 Earth, 1m;. v. Laidlaw
EnvtL SenJ8. (TOG), Inc., - U.S. -,
120 S.Ct. 693, - L.Ed.2d - (2000), has
unnecessarily opened the standing flood-
gates, rendering our standing inquiry "a
sham," id. 120 S.Ct. at 715 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). However, being bound by
Laidlaw EnvtL SenJ8., I concur in the
court's judgment reversing the district
court's judgment and remanding the case
for a detenninatioii" as to whether Gaston
Copper has discharged pollutants in excess
of its pennit limits.
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HYPOTHETICAL ONE
Including Six Scenarios
"FUN AND FACTS"
BACKGROUND: Starshine in Cosmic County, Kentucky, a largely rural county, has
been chosen as the site of the Fun n' Fast Snowboard Company's newest manufacturing plant.
Fun n' Fast has several factories in other states and has been cited with several environmental
violations. Fun n' Fast uses a special coating on their snowboards to reduce friction. The
coating process involves the use ofEXS, a multi-purpose chemical that can be a risk to human
health and the environment if released into soil or water. Fun n' Fast is a subsidiary of
MegaSports, Inc. A large number of Cosmic County citizens have formed, and incorporated,
the Citizens United to Protect Sparkling (CUPS) because the location of the future Fun n' Fast
is bordered by Sparkling River. Sparkling River runs through the county, including
downtown Starshine, and is a popular river for fishing and canoeing. Fun n' Fast has applied
for a KPDES permit.
John Apple is a member of a small three person law firm, Apple, Bean & Curd in his
hometown Starshine.
SCENARIO A. In 1997, John, while an associate in a big law firm in Louisville,
represented MegaSports in the negotiations to purchase property in High Hopes, Kentucky, a
town located several counties away from Starshine. John has not represented MegaSports in
any other matters. Bats n' Balls, another MegaSports subsidiary, recently finished
construction of a baseball manufacturing factory at the High Hope property and has been
issued a KPDES permit to discharge into the Upper Fork of Sparkling River. Bats n' Balls
also uses EXS in the process of binding the core of the baseballs they manufacture. Several
High Hopes citizens have requested a formal hearing before the state environmental
protection agency to contest the KPDES permit.
v' On Monday May 9, 2000, John gets a call from the President of CUPS. CUPS
wants John to be their spokesperson at next week's public hearing on Fun n'
Fast's draft KPDES permit. The public hearing is conducted by the state's
environmental protection agency. On the same day, Bats n' Balls' plant
manager calls John's partner, Jim Bean, and asked Mr. Bean ifhe can
represent Bats n' Balls at the administrative adjudicatory hearing scheduled for
late August.
What should Joh" and Jim do?
v' Meanwhile, at the state agency's hearing office, Administrative Law Judge
Brownfill is assigned to hear the case on the Bats n' Balls KPDES permit.
Administrative Law Judge Brownfill is a former private practitioner and had
represented MegaSports in tax matters for several years. He remembers that
Bats n' Ball is a subsidiary of MegaSports.
Should ALJBrownfill preside over the case?
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SCENARIO B: John's wife is in-house counsel for a local manufacturing
company, Better Widgets. In last night's dinner conversation John and his wife are talking
about his upcoming meeting with representatives of CUPS. John's wife tells him that Better
Widgets uses EXS in their manufacturing processes and the environmental manager at the
plant says it's really safe. John has already read several studies about the potential
environmental and health effects ofEXS and thinks there's pretty good evidence to challenge
a KPDES permitting a discharge into Sparkling River.
Can John represent CUPS?
SENARIO C: Assume the background facts. Administrative law Judge
Brownfill attends John Apple's wedding in Starshine, Kentucky. John and Brownfill were
law school buddies. At the reception, a local citizen activist strikes up a conversation with the
ALJ about the growth of industry in Cosmic County and the threat to the environment from
the new snowboard company. Brownfill comments that progress has a price and Cosmic
County can probably use the tax dollars from its corporate citizens. A few months later,
Brownfill is assigned to a case involving CUPS petition to contest a KPDES permit issued to
Fun n' Fast Snowboard Company.
Should ALJBrownfillpreside over the case?
Brownfill decides its OK for him to preside over the cas~ so he reviews the file. He
learns that his old law school buddy, John Apple, is representing the citizens group.
Should ALJBrownfillpreside over the case?
Brownfill decides its OK for him to preside over the case. Shortly before the final pre-
hearing conference, Brownfill receives a thank-you note for the silver napkin rings Brownfill
had given the newlyweds. John added in his note: P.S. I look forward to the hearing and the
chance to bring out the awful truth about EXS.
What should Brownfill do?
SENARIO D: Assume the background facts except now Fun n' Fast has been
in operation for several years in Cosmic County. They are John's "best" client. Last year, the
Fun n' Fast laboratory discovered a cheaper and safer chemical to use in the manufacturing of
its snowboards. The company properly disposed of its remaining drums of EXS at a
permitted facility. One day at lunch, the plant manager tells John that he and the plant
maintenance supervisor recently found three remaining drum of EXS in the basement of Fast
n' Fun. Not wanting to deal with the "red tape" of disposing of these few drums, the plant
manager had told the maintenance supervisor to 'just get rid of them." The maintenance
superviser dumped one drum into a sinkhole close to a small stream that runs by the plan and
into the Sparkling River. He poured the other drums out on the ground behind the plant's
warehouse, close to the property line. The plant manager told John that he didn't think one
drum would cause any harm to public health or the environment. John remembers reading
company documents about studies documenting fish kills from exposure to certain levels of
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EXS. He has also read studies confirming the human health risks associated with eating EXS
contaminated fish. The plant manager tells John he knows John won't tell anyone because of
the attorney-client privilege.
What, ifallythillg, should Johll do?
Meanwhile, the plant maintenance supervisor is a personal friend of John's partner Joe
Curd. Joe receives a late night call from the supervisor. The supervisor tells Joe the story of
the illegal dumping. The plant manager now feels badly about dumping the EXS because his
young son likes to fish in the Sparkling River. He wants to "come clean" and asks Joe for
some "friendly advice."
What should Joe do?
SENARIO E: Assume background facts. Joe Curd, the newest partner at
Apple, Bean & Curd was, for numerous years, in-house counsel for the state's environmental
protection agency. Several years ago, Bats n' Balls, a MegaSports Subsidiary, was cited for a
release ofEXS into the environment from its Bright Spot, Kentucky Plant. Joe negotiated an
Agreed Order with Bats n' Balls. Joe left state government employment one year ago. Bats
n' Balls has opened a plant in High Hope, Kentucky and has been issued a KPDES permit.
The High Hope Chapter of CUPS calls Joe and ask him to represent them in a formal
administrative hearing to contest the KPDES permit issued to Bats n' Balls.
What should Joe do?
Assume the background facts. The High Hope plant has been in operation several
years, the above-described release was from the High Hope plant, and negotiation by Joe
required Bats n' Balls to obtain all state permits required for its High Hope facility. At the
time Joe negotiated the Agreed Order, the High Hope plant did not have any point sources.
However, the company recently constructed a holding pond for storm water runoff from the
facility. The pond has a discharge pipe. The High Hope Chapter of CUPS calls Joe and ask
him to represent them in a formal administrative hearing to contest the KPDES permit issued
to Bats n' Balls.
Call Joe represellt the High Hope Chapter ofCUPS?
SENARIO F: Assume background facts; but, Fun n' Fast has been in business
for numerous years. Assume Snowboarding quickly became "passe" and Fun n' Fast is
closing its doors. John's wife, in-house counsel for Better Widgets tells John her client is
interested in the Fast n' Fun property. John remembers an incident a few years ago
concerning the plant maintenance supervisor and drums ofEXS being dumped on the Fun n'
Fast. As far as John knows, no one, including any state or federal agency, is aware of the
illegal dumping.
What should Johll do?
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HYPOTHETICAL TWO
"COVERING THE DRUMS"
Mary Mutual graduated from law school in 1994 and opened her law office in
Lexington, where she has concentrated in small business matters, domestic relations,
bankruptcy and estate planning. Last month, a client called Mary to discuss an
"environmental problem." Mary had previously represented this client in a divorce. The
client had purchased a small farm close to Lexington and had discovered an area where
several drums had been dumped. He didn't know what were in the drums and was afraid
to call the "state" because he didn't want to get stuck with "some sort of expensive
environmental problem." He asked Mary if he could just cover the drums up and just
forget about it. Mary told the client she would call him back in a one week. Mary has a
good friend that has handled some environmental cases and she thinks she can call her to
find out what the client should do. Three weeks later, Mary ~ti11 hasn't had a chance to
talk to her friend about this matter. She is so embarrassed that she hasn't returned the
call, she thinks she'll have her paralegal call the client and tell him something.
./ What should Mary do?
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HYPOTHETICAL THREE
"BLUE SKIES ENVIRONMENTAL"
Law Firm handles most of Smalltown Bank's real estate closings. Recently,
Smalltown Bank loaned another one of Law Firm's clients the money to purchase
property in the new industrial park. Law Firm didn't act as the closing attorney on this
deal. The bank contracted with Blue Skies Environmental Consulting to conduct a Phase
I study of the property. No problems were found. When client began construction of his
new manufacturing plant, an old tank was discovered during some excavation work.
Client has some preliminary testing conducted and there is soil contamination. Client
knows a little about the state's tank clean up fund, and isn't sure the removal and clean up
of this tank will be covered. Client comes to your office, a new associate in Law Firm,
and wants you to sue Blue Skies Environmental. You aren't familiar with all of Law
Firm's clients. .
./ What should Lawfirm do?
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